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This research investigates community-led interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The 
objective is to examine the parallels and differences in the response and outcomes of the 
2014 Ebola epidemic. Many challenges made aid less effective such as misinformation, 
rumors, stigma, and logistical difficulties that lowered the demand for aid resources. These 
market inefficiencies were the demand-side barriers that were prolonging the disease spread. 
 
A qualitative methodology was employed to answer the research question. Sixty-seven semi-
structured interviews were conducted from January to July 2017; 33 of these interviews were 
in Sierra Leone and 34 interviews in Liberia. Informants included health workers, chiefs, 
chiefs’ advisors, a secret society leader, NGO representatives, a government worker, and 
volunteers during the outbreak. Thematic analysis and the data were supported by NVIVO. 
The key themes are: ‘Government’s Response and Community Reaction,’ ‘Local Institutional 
Intervention,’ and ‘Governing the Outbreak.’ Informants were chosen through purposeful 
sampling methods in three provinces in each country. 
 
The findings demonstrate that traditional leaders in Sierra Leone immediately responded 
through rulemaking and enforcement after the first Ebola case was officially announced. 
Specifically, rulemaking helped to create behavior changes to increase demand for aid 
resources, such as mandatory referrals to the health centers. These laws and door-to-door 
contact tracing were scaled up to a national emergency strategy, relying on traditional leaders 
to monitor and enforce them. In Liberia, community and traditional leaders organized in many 
areas to correct some of these demand-side barriers too. In both cases, the response from 
community-level leaders happened before the international community scaled up aid 
resources in August 2014, with some donors and humanitarians arriving as late as December 
2014. 
 
However, Liberia’s local strategies were not scaled up and coordinated nationally, as it was 
in Sierra Leone. Thus, the interventions implemented were not universal. According to 
figures by the World Health Organization, Sierra Leone had 25% more Ebola cases than 
Liberia but had 18% fewer Ebola deaths. This is interpreted as contact tracing and 
institutional changes having more impact in Sierra Leone to refer Ebola patients into early 
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THE SPECIFIC CASE OF THE 2014 Ebola epidemic in Liberia and Sierra Leone is 
investigated for parallels and differences in local governance and response. In the 
context of these sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, Traditional Local Institutions (TLIs) 
are the norms and customs that are governed by traditional leaders termed paramount 
chiefs, chiefs, clan leaders, councils, monarchs, youth leaders, and secret society 
leaders. The paramount chiefdom is a legally recognized order of government and 
public administration. The chiefs are supposed to be elected and serve as local 
authorities; however, the relationship, governance, and legitimacy vary in different SSA 
countries. State institutions are, instead, rules and customs governed by the state and 
its government. 
The chapter is structured as follows; section I discusses the motivations for 
carrying out this research. Then section II is on the scope of the thesis regarding 
traditional leaders and their role governing the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa. 
Under this section, key terms used throughout the thesis are explained, in addition to 
the investigation, research question, and the narrative. The narrative helps to 
summarize the thesis and key elements of this narrative that will appear in the 
respective chapters. Section III discusses key concepts that came up during the research 
of this phenomenon. It begins with a timeline of key events during the 2014 Ebola 
epidemic, informed by the literature and interviews from informants. Then it presents 
the theoretical framework it uses to explain the phenomenon. The final section is the 
chapterization of the entire thesis. 
I. Statement of Purpose
My intention to cover this topic is motivated by my interest in understanding why 
the West African countries’ health infrastructures were weak after several years of post-
conflict development. In addition, how the epidemic transformed the discussion around 
aid and health interventions. According to Kirton (2014), disease knows no boundaries 
and an underdeveloped healthcare system in one country can escalate to a regional or 
global crisis; a lesson learned from various world pandemics.1 
1 There is a difference in terminology between a pandemic, epidemic, outbreak, and endemic. An outbreak is an 
occurrence of a disease, usually in larger numbers than expected, but an outbreak can happen in a small area, such as one 
neighborhood. A pandemic is a disease outbreak that covers very large geographical areas such as an entire continent, or 
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Since the turn of the millennium, there has been a growing interest in health as a 
foreign policy and as a development policy to promote economic growth. According to 
Kassalow (2001), since the height of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, health problems in low-
income countries are no longer seen as soft factors and need to be prioritized in terms of 
global and regional security, development, and trade interests. The vast literature 
questioning aid and its effectiveness, from radical approaches like Kothari (2005), to 
macroeconomic studies such as Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004), cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid. 
I researched the concepts of good governance policies that purport to make 
institutions stronger for development, and for improving the governance of healthcare 
systems. The findings from the field showed that state institutions were performing 
poorly but surprisingly, TLIs not only provided knowledge, accountability, and supported 
community engagement, but also influenced policy. Therefore, these findings can 
redefine the current debate on good governance (Gray, 2016; World Bank, 2002; World 
Bank, 2017). It also fits in the discussion of institutional change and institutional quality, 
in terms of rural-based institutions (Baldwin, 2015; Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015; Bulte, 
Richards, and Voors, 2018; Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012; Pande and Udry, 2005) 
and how traditional leaders can impact development and governance (Baker, 2007; 
Baldwin, 2015; Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012; Dia, 1996; Sesay, 2019; Tokpa and 
Yengbeh Jr., 2012; UNDEF, 2014; Unsworth, 2010; Van den Boogaard, Prichard, and Jibao 
2019). And at the empirical level, the role of traditional and community leaders who 
organized during the West African Ebola outbreak (McMahon et al., 2017; Parker and 
Allen, 2018; Parker et al., 2019; Perry and Sayndee, 2017; Richards, 2016; Van der Windt 




This section explains the scope of the thesis. First, it gives a brief analysis of what 
TLIs are and why they are important in today’s world. Part A briefly conceptualizes key 
terms that will be used throughout this document. There are debates regarding the terms 
                                                          
in the case of HIV/AIDS, worldwide. For the case study of the 2014 Ebola disease eruption, the literature uses “outbreak” 
and “epidemic” interchangeably and so does the thesis. See Morens, Folkers, and Fauci (2009), Pandem-Sim, (2017), and 
World Health Organization (2010) for more reading on these terminologies. 
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used, however, these debates are out of scope for the thesis. However, the controversy of 
these terms should be acknowledged and explained why the terms are chosen. Part B 
briefly describes the investigation of key concepts that bind the theoretical framework. 
Part C introduces the research question and part D gives the narrative. 
The chiefdom institution in SSA extends well before the European colonial period 
and has shown resiliency, despite changes in power structures during and after colonialism 
(Davidson, 1998; Tokpa and Yengbeh Jr., 2012). In Sierra Leone, British colonizers reshaped 
hierarchical structures in the society, consolidating the powers of the chiefs (Acemoglu, 
Reed, and Robinson, 2014). As for Liberia, it gained independence in 1847 as Africa’s oldest 
republic and second free Black republic, after Haiti (BBC News, 2019; Office of the 
Historian, 2016). However, tribal leaders were not incorporated into the administrative 
affairs of the central government in the capital of Monrovia. Indigenous ethnic groups 
were left with magistrates until the mid-twentieth century (Tokpa and Yengbeh Jr., 2012). 
Today, TLIs are still effective and the leaders are part of the elite political class in 
many parts of SSA. Liberia and Sierra Leone are decentralizing executive and legislative 
affairs since the conflict period, but chiefdoms and clans are formally recognized as local 
jurisdictions. The authority of traditional leaders includes the ability to pass laws and 
impose penalties, without parliamentary or senate approval (Chieftaincy Act, 2009; The 
Local Government of 2018, 2018). It is important to clarify that these institutional 
structures vary, with some having a top-down legal and administrative structure while 
others may be acephalous (D’Azevedo, 1989; Mulbah, 2018). Thus, during the 2014 Ebola 
epidemic, several chiefdoms implemented similar bylaws in Sierra Leone. These were 
considered useful and implemented into a nationwide strategy, promoted by the central 
government in Freetown. In this sense, the phenomenon under study is an interesting 
example of rulemaking, high institutional quality, and good governance. 
The thesis analyzes the phenomenon of rulemaking and TLIs during the epidemic. It 
uses a market approach to understand supply and demand factors in governing a disease 
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This section discusses some terms that are used throughout the thesis and why 
these terms were chosen for clarity and consistency. 
i. Traditional Local Institutions 
 
The literature has various terminologies to refer to local authorities and institutions 
that may be confusing for the reader. Therefore, the thesis uses traditional local institutions 
(TLIs) for consistency and clarity. 
Unsworth (2010)’s research in South Asia identifies these institutions as, Informal 
Local Governance Institutions with traditional leaders or chiefs, whose existence can be 
traced back to the indirect rule of European colonial administrations. However, many 
countries have chiefs that existed long before the colonial period (Davidson, 1998). 
Informal (‘traditional’) local governance institutions [ILGIs] are persistent, influential and very diverse. The extent to which 
they exercise effective and acceptable public authority reflects both their origins, and the contemporary institutional context 
in which they operate. Efforts to improve local governance need to take account of this diversity. Some informal local 
governance institutions can work synergistically with formal institutions; in other cases, they may undermine or weaken 
them. Looking at the origins of ILGIs might provide a useful guide for better targeting of development programmes. 
(Unsworth, 2010, p. 71) 
 
The term, ‘informal’ institutions, has been broadly used in the literature to mean 
‘norms and behaviors’ and specifically in development and political studies to refer to 
corruption or patrimonialism (Bratton, 2007; Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston, 2009; 
Khan, 2010). However, this terminology used in Unsworth (2010) and Pande and Udry 
(2005) are local institutions where the norms and customs are governed by traditional 
leaders, termed paramount chiefs, chiefs, or village councils. Khan and Mehmood (2016)’s 
analysis on the role of elders during the conflict period in Swat, Pakistan, also refer to them 
as informal institutions and reveal their ability to play a positive role in resolving conflict. In 
addition to their ability to raise militant groups, as radicalized Imams encouraged local 
youths to join the Taliban.2 Likewise, Bratton (2007) include traditional leaders as informal 
institutions since they govern through patron-client networks, however, clientelism 
operates through state institutions too. 
Therefore, non-state institutions are more than the corrupt or clientelist practices 
that scholars focus and sometimes term as, ‘weakening institutions or poor governance.’ 
‘Informality’ is the practices or norms beyond the state’s reach, but the status and authority 
of these leaders are officially recognized in the constitutions of many African nations. So, 
                                                          
2 The definition varies, as Khan and Mehmood (2016) include religious leaders, like Imams and mosques, in the definition 
of informal governance institutions, but they were not included in Unsworth (2010)’s research. 
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historically they may have been seen as informal and having poor governance (Acemoglu, 
Reed, and Robinson, 2014; Hanlon, 2005; Jackson, 2005; Richards, 2005), but are very much 
part of the political and legal structure of the domestic societies, (Fanthorpe, 2001; 
Fanthorpe, 2006) and have took part in various local development projects too (Baldwin, 
2015; Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012; Unsworth, 2010). 
Others use the term, ‘traditional’ to refer to these institutions (Iyanya, 2018; Ubink, 
2008). Iyanya (2018) says that, although he uses the term ‘traditional’ in his case study of 
the Igede ethnic group in central Nigeria, this term implies a locally created custom that had 
evolved. However, that may not be the case in some places because British colonial rule 
changed the chieftaincy administration in many countries (e.g. Sierra Leone) by inserting 
ruling families that reflected the imperial monarchy institution of Europe; whereas 
precolonial chieftaincy was based on a gerontocracy, such as a council of elders (Iyanya, 
2018). The term ‘traditional’ also implies a static institution. However, chapter two further 
discusses how traditional leaders have been incorporated into modern development and 
governance efforts. 
A third option is the term ‘indigenous’ (Dia, 1996; Watson, 2003). This is defined in 
the context of power, meaning it is applied to those, “who have been marginalized in the 
past from dominant forms of governance and knowledge,” (Watson, 2003, p. 290). 
However, this would only apply in some contexts, such as the case of Liberia where 
indigenous ethnic groups were marginalized by the Americos.3 Thus, this would not be 
suitable as a general term for this thesis, since traditional leaders are part of the political 
elite. The term ‘traditional’ is preferred, although it does not mean these institutions are 
static or archaic. 
The term, TLIs, also broadly encompasses secret society leaders,4 which have not 
always been included in prior works examining the governance of traditional authorities in 
3 The history of Liberia will be discussed in chapter one, section 1.3. However, the Americos are descendants of repatriated 
slaves and historically, this minority dominated the political and economic landscape of the country, largely marginalizing 
other ethnic groups. 
4 Secret Societies are organizations that govern religious and cultural customs and there are multiple societies (Little, 1947; 
Little 1949). Marriott (1899) says most of these societies in West Africa are “tribal” except for the Poro which can be found 
in many countries in this region. However, Day (2012) and Moran (1989; 2012) say the secret societies also have political 
and social roles in contemporary West Africa. The Sande or Bundu society (also spelled Bondo) gives status to older women 
and women from dominant lineages, even over junior males (Day, 2012; Moran, 2012). However, the patriarchal system is 
still reflected in the overall society (Moran, 2012). Sande is a term used by the Mende ethnic group in West Africa for the 
female secret society (Day, 2012). Some of these works only examine the societies, but not vis à vis the chieftaincy and 
governance. 
xv | P a g e
Africa, except for a few studies such as Jackson (2006; 2011), Moran (1989; 2012), and 
Richards (2016). Given that secret societies also have a role to play in local politics and 
governance, not least because in some areas the chief is also the head of the society, thus, it 
makes sense to include them. For example, during the 2014 Ebola epidemic, secret society 
leaders were consulted by the chiefs in implementing and enforcing emergency 
management regulations (Richards, 2016). 
ii. Rulemaking
‘Rulemaking’ is the term that is used for this research as it distinguishes it from 
other strategies of community engagement or collective action. In institutional theory, 
institutions are the norms and laws of society (North, 1990). So, the leaders of the 
institution engage in rulemaking for legal and social purposes. The reason for using this is 
because rulemaking from the paramount chiefs was an internally devised strategy, 
created before humanitarian aid resources began to scale up in August 2014 to address 
the disease outbreak. In the second chapter, in section 2.6, the literature debates various 
community engagement strategies for a disease outbreak response. However, these tend 
to be externally led by external partners. In addition to why rulemaking is preferred, it is 
because the paramount chiefs are the political elite and ‘collective action’ is sometimes 
used to describe how a marginalized group organizes for change (Scott, 1992). These 
actors are not marginalized in their communities and the findings show that traditional 
and community leaders participated in other engagement efforts, other than making and 
enforcing laws. 
iii. Good Governance
‘Good Governance’ is a term broadly used in the development studies literature to 
refer to the World Bank’s policies and macroeconomic reforms for recipient countries of 
aid (Nyei, 2014; Tirman, 2005; World Bank, 2002). “Good governance includes the 
creation, protection, and enforcement of property rights, without which the scope for 
market transactions is limited…” (World Bank, 2002, p. 99). This concept was developed 
from Douglass North’s theory of institutions and institutional quality (Gray, 2016; World 
Bank, 2002). Throughout the thesis, unless it is specified otherwise, ‘good governance’ and 
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‘institutional quality’ are used interchangeably, as they are referring to the scope of liberal 
economic reforms with the intended output of economic growth. 
iv. Community Engagement
The thesis uses the term ‘Community Engagement’ to capture all community-level 
intervention strategies depicted in the literature. However, the declaration of the 1978 
Almá Atá Conference on primary healthcare defines community engagement much more 
holistically than as a bottom-up perspective (World Health Organization, 1978a). 
Therefore, different terminology, such as community/health sensitization, social 
mobilization, community outreach, community participation, etc…denotes different levels 
and degrees of community engagement, including some strategies that are top-down. 
Also, the methods of development and engagement can exclude the perspectives of 
marginalized people.5 
There is an initiative led by a group of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
including the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement that created universal minimum 
standards that should be practiced in all humanitarian responses: the Sphere Standards 
(Sphere Association, 2018). Under guidelines for disease outbreaks, there are Infection 
Prevention Control (IPC) practices and it says that it may not be possible to implement all 
these practices, but instead, to let community engagement guide how to implement safer 
IPC during a disease outbreak (Sphere Association, 2018). Community engagement is 
defined as working with the patients and community to improve access and acceptability 
of care, and to implement feedback mechanisms (Sphere Association, 2018). However, the 
handbook does not specifically define a ‘community’ or how humanitarian workers can 
ensure they are engaging with the right stakeholders to achieve this. So, implementing 
community engagement is not universal as different organizations may use different 
strategies and channels to reach the community with varying degrees of success. 
Additionally, these strategies do not always include local knowledge in formulating a 
response. 
5 Assessments for strategies and mobilization may not always consider the voices of local people. These paradigms are 
created by development or humanitarian professionals. So, some terms may also reflect levels of power between 
professionals and the poor. See Chambers (1997) on techniques of participatory rural appraisal. Also, to understand 
concepts of public participation, constructs of power, and how this broadly impacts policy, see Arnstein (1969). 
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Consequently, the literature review in chapter two, section 2.6, shows various and 
sometimes conflicting ideas of ‘community engagement.’ However, it is not the scope of 
the thesis to define these terminologies or to argue which strategy worked best. It is only 
acknowledging that donors and humanitarian organizations have their strategies, and 
these are not governed or enforced by any single international agency. Although the 
Sphere standards are used broadly and well known, including within the World Health 
Organization (WHO) to develop intervention strategies during a humanitarian response 
(World Health Organization, 2013), practices still vary. This may be conflicting at times if 
one source shares the same label with another source, but each implements their 
respective strategies differently. 
v. Public Health Emergency
Under the WHO’s 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR), the WHO has the 
authority to coordinate an international response to an extraordinary event that poses a 
threat to global health security (World Health Organization, 2018c). These regulations have 
only been enacted a handful of times since coming into effect in 2007. However, the WHO 
and other partners do respond in a coordinated fashion to disease outbreaks without 
declaring it a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). Thus, mentioning 
the PHEIC helps us to understand that the 2014 Ebola epidemic is a public health 
emergency. Specifically, this is to differentiate it from other public health crises, such as the 
chronic crisis with the HIV/AIDS pandemic or growing concerns to target non-communicable 
diseases. As Kamradt-Scott (2011, p.1) defines it, 
A sense of immediacy can be appropriately inferred from this qualification—immediacy further corroborated by the inclusion 
of the term “emergency” within PHEIC—supporting the commonly held view that the IHRs are designed to deal with acute 
(as opposed to chronic) public health conditions that are readily transmissible and disruptive to international trade. 
This quote conceptualizes how ‘public health emergency,’ is used in this thesis: as an 
outbreak of an infectious disease that poses a threat to the security and stability of the state 
and requires an international response. This is slightly different from the WHO’s definition, 
which includes bioterrorism (World Health Organization, 2018b). However, the literature 
review is not limited to events where a PHEIC was declared. Before the 2005 IHRs came into 
effect, if a nation had a public health emergency, it invited the WHO, technical expertise, 
and coordinated aid resources (Kamradt-Scott, 2015). 
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B. The Investigation 
 
Whilst investigating the research question, I used broad concepts of community 
engagement, aid, and health governance. There is a plethora of literature and research 
available across the disciplines of economics, public health, development studies, political 
economy, and international relations. 
These tend to focus on long-term effects on the healthcare system, such as social 
equity, health status, health promotion (Abbott, Sapsford, and Binagwaho, 2017; Ayo, 
2012; EQUINET, 2007; Evans, Elovainio, and Humphreys, 2010). In addition, some 
literature gives a macro perspective of how donors, such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) finance the development of healthcare systems in low-
income countries (Johnston, Deane, and Rizzo, 2015; Navarro, 2007; Rosser and Bremner, 
2015). However, since this is an examination of a disease outbreak, the scope was 
narrowed to the literature on disaster-relief and humanitarian aid that is supplied during 
such occasions. The political economy and international relations literature tend to focus 
on the areas of conflict and security or natural disaster response (Duffield, 2013; Jaspars, 
2018; Roderick, 2006; Tirman, 2005). However, it seems that when it comes to public 
health crises, the amount and scope of the academic literature is vastly on the chronic 
HIV/AIDS pandemic and the recent 2014 Ebola epidemic. The reason for this examination 
of public health crises, and not all complex humanitarian emergencies, is because stigma 
and fear often lead to demand-side barriers, where some people may refuse health care. 
Additionally, community engagement and response strategies are different in a 
disease outbreak than in other disasters (Arola, 2008). During the West African Ebola 
epidemic, and to a lesser extent with HIV/AIDS, there was stigma (NPR, 2014; Pisani, 
2011). In the 2014 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak, health workers were stigmatized 
for spreading the disease and many people were afraid to receive care (Dixon, 2014; 
Fofana, 2014b; Pellecchia et al., 2015). One does not encounter such stigma or response 
from survivors or families affected by an earthquake or flooding. So, the training, research, 
or lessons learned from the generic disaster literature would not have the same 
dimensions in terms of getting communities to cooperate or participate. 
 
C. Research Question 
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The thesis seeks to understand the parallels and differences in how the Ebola 
outbreak was managed in the case study countries. The aims and objectives are steps to 
examine how governance is perceived in the literature and the significance of community-
led engagement during a disease outbreak. By examining these different components of aid, 
governance, and community engagement in health, I seek to contribute to this debate on 
how local actors managed the outbreak in their respective countries and how their 
governance contributed to the overall response. 
In the context of fragile states, aid is channeled through NGOs or the private sector 
to deliver services or public goods. This is because they are seen as having good governance 
when states are weak, as explained in Dietrich (2013). However, there is a gap in the current 
discourse on how TLIs have good governance for social outcomes, and how the response to 
the Ebola epidemic overall was shaped by institutions responding at different levels 
(national and local) that either helped or hindered governance of the crisis. This was divided 
into two aims and four objectives to answer the overall research question. 
The specific aims and objectives of the thesis are listed below: 
● Investigate the role of TLIs and community-level leaders during the 2014 Ebola
epidemic in Liberia and Sierra Leone
A) Examine how the responses of state and community-level
institutions differed.
B) Identify challenges that hampered the management of Ebola
identification and prevention at the local level.
● Examine the links between community engagement and aid performance in public
health emergencies.
A) Examine what the narratives of health workers and community
stakeholders tell us about the overall response and how the disease
outbreak was managed.
B) Examine what the literature says about the community’s impact on aid
resources.
D. Narrative
The scope of the literature reviewed fits with the concepts mentioned above of 
institutions, public health emergencies, and good governance. The first dimension 
examines the overarching framework on institutions, which includes the debate on good 
governance and institutional quality and why people cooperate. The second dimension 
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examines strategies of aid resources and community engagement. This dimension 
examines supply and demand factors in the specific context of a public health emergency. 
Finally, the third dimension examines how demand-side barriers impacted the 2014 EVD 
outbreak in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and how local institutions responded. 
The research question was informed by gaps in the literature, which do not fully 
explain the role of TLIs in emergency management, and when community engagement 
strategies are top-down. Especially when large numbers of external partners, donors, and 
humanitarian organizations are involved in the response. In the context of Sierra Leone’s 
emergency response, TLIs helped to overcome demand-side barriers, such as lack of trust, 
misinformation, and lack of coordinated leadership. In this case, high institutional quality 
(good governance), defined as correcting information failures and reducing social costs 
during the crisis, made the response more effective. While Liberia faced similar 
governance challenges, including the lack of trained and supported health workers; we do 
not find any evidence of coordinated leadership that was scaled up nationally. Instead, 
local communities organized independently to reduce or prevent cases of EVD. 
The authority and involvement of paramount chiefs and other community leaders 
helped to bring cooperation, restore trust, and encourage sick persons to visit the health 
facilities for testing and treatment. The organizations of the paramount chiefs and the 
secret societies are respected and have more influence in rural areas, where often the 
central government lacks presence and trust. The WHO says a lesson learned from the 
response in Liberia was, “Intensification of technical interventions, like increased 
laboratory capacity, more treatment beds, and a larger number of contact tracing and 
burial teams, will not bend the curve in the absence of community engagement and 
ownership,” (World Health Organization, 2015c). This is referring to the supply-side of the 
intervention, which is how international donors and NGOs tend to engage. This means 
bringing resources, such as drugs, mobile treatment centers, or ambulances, and technical 
assistance, such as epidemiologists or trainers. However, without community 
engagement, intervening with only these resources is unlikely to change the pace of the 
disease spread. 
Soon after the WHO declared the 2014 EVD outbreak a PHEIC in August 2014, and 
officially intervened; it assessed the situation in Sierra Leone. It found that the epicenter in 
the eastern region had begun to resolve itself, and thus, would be mainly concentrating 
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their efforts in the western and northern regions (World Health Organization, 2014a). The 
epicenter in Liberia, Lofa County, had resolved its EVD cases in November 2014 (World 
Health Organization, 2015C). 
The findings indicate that, during the 2014 Ebola epidemic, TLIs in Sierra Leone 
passed bylaws6 to curb the disease spread. Local communities see these institutions as 
trustworthy, legitimate, information brokers, and accountable to constituents, however 
not all traditional leaders govern in this manner (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson, 2014; 
Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen, 2013; Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen, 2014; Hanlon, 2005; 
Jackson, 2005; Jackson, 2006; Mamdani, 1996; Peters and Richards, 1998; Richards, 
2005). Those traditional leaders who are not accountable may be overthrown or lose 
their constituency (Baldwin, 2015; Fanthorpe, 2006; Hagan et al., 2015; Logan, 2013). 
These qualities of TLIs are what led to a turning point in some areas, before the WHO 
officially intervened. These qualities also make them effective mediators of aid 
performance in Sierra Leone. In Liberia, community engagement occurred but it was 
sporadic and sometimes unsupported by donor resources and state institutions. 
III. Researching the Ebola Epidemic
The 2014 Ebola epidemic was a humanitarian crisis that reignited a debate 
regarding the limitations of development, aid intervention, global health governance, and 
the domestic states’ infrastructure and response (Abramowitz, 2014; Benton and Dionne, 
2015; Boseley, 2014; Cenciarelli et al., 2015; Chandler et al., 2015; Drain, 2015; DuBois et 
al., 2015; Farmer and Mukherjee, 2014; Gostin and Friedman, 2015; Grover et al., 2016; 
Gulland, 2014; Gupta, 2015; Gupta, 2017; Kamradt-Scott, 2016; Nunes, 2016; Obilade, 
2015; Pailey, 2017; Quinn, 2016; Robinson and Pfeiffer, 2015; Stubbs et al.,2017a; 
Transparency International, 2015). Through literary sources and primary data (key 
informants), a brief timeline was constructed to depict how events unfolded in the 
beginning stages of the EVD outbreak. This thesis divides the timeline into two periods: 
phase one from December 2013 to September 2014 and phase two is from October 2014 
until the disease outbreak was declared over in June 2016. This is different from how the 
6 The word bylaw is spelled differently in different countries or different sources, sometimes byelaw or by-law is used. The 
thesis uses the spelling ‘bylaw’ consistently unless it is directly quoting a source. 
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WHO classifies the phases during this outbreak.7 The reason for this is because it 
captures the timeline from the informants’ view of notable events, especially during the 
first several months before the international community mobilized aid resources. The 
thesis holds that creating this timeline decolonizes the historical narrative of the 
outbreak by centering a timeframe from the perspective of local actors (the ones who ‘do 
not write history’). This is inspired by Chakrabarty (2000)’s work on global history. 
Chapter one, section 1.6, introduces the challenges faced during the intervention, 
however, this focuses on the supply-side of the market. Chapter two, section 2.7, 
discusses community engagement strategies and local responses in West Africa, hence, it 
focuses on the demand-side barriers. It is divided this way, as chapter one provides 
historical context and the literary debate in chapter two is where the thesis makes it 
theoretical and evidence-based contributions to knowledge. 
A. Timeline
Figure 1 Former epicenter of Kailahun and Kenema districts and Lofa County had decreased EVD cases. September 28 to 
October 18, 2014 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014)
7 The WHO divided the phases in the EVD outbreak according to the epidemiology of the disease spread (World Health 
Organization, 2015f). They classify phase one as from August to December 2014, after declaring a PHEIC. This leaves out all 
epidemiology information for the first nine months of the outbreak (December 2013 to August 2014), including local 
efforts to contain the disease spread. This also means that epidemiology data before August 2014 are less reliable and 
accurate. 
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The first Ebola infection was confirmed in a young boy in the Guéckédou prefecture 
in the forested region of southern Guinea. It is believed that he encountered a fruit bat, a 
suspected reservoir of EVD,8 in December 2013 and subsequently passed away (Marí Saéz et 
al., 2015). There were rumors of mysterious deaths in this remote part of the country 
(Tounkara, 2014), however, the Guinean ministry of health announced that the illness, 
which had killed thirty-four people, was EVD on March 22nd (Africaguinee.com, 2014). 
Meanwhile, Conakry, the capital of Guinea, had experienced three consecutive waves of 
EVD from February to August 2014 (Faye et al., 2015). It was the first major urban center 
affected in this outbreak. On March 30, 2014, the Government of Liberia confirmed its first 
EVD case in the Northern rural county of Lofa, which borders Guinea near where the young 
boy died. On April 2nd, a case is confirmed in Monrovia on the Western coast (Davies and 
Rushton, 2016). Around that time in April, there are reports that officials were in Sierra 
Leone investigating some mysterious deaths, however, the first case of EVD is confirmed on 
May 25th (DePinto, 2016). 
In Sierra Leone, the index case (first patient) was a nurse working in Koindu, which 
is not far from the Guinean and Liberian borders. A paramount chief, who was also a 
trained nurse, heard about the case at a clinic in his chiefdom, and immediately traveled to 
the rural village of Daru (Richards, 2016). An exact date is not given, but Richards (2016) 
and primary data suggest that all the paramount chiefs in the rural eastern Kailahun 
District, passed a set of bylaws in June 2014. The nurse passed away from EVD, soon after 
arriving in Sierra Leone. In June 2014, new cases appear in other parts of the country, 
including in the west, where the capital Freetown is located. 
In Liberia, Lofa County had two waves of EVD, the first in March 2014, which 
declined after a few weeks, but it reignited again in late May 2014 (Fast et al., 2015). Fast 
et al. (2015) say that EVD was imported in, but it is not clear if they meant from another 
country or perhaps, from somewhere else within Liberia. In August 2014, President Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf declares a state of emergency (BBC News, 2014b). According to informants 
8In infectious disease ecology and epidemiology, a natural or disease reservoir is any plant, animal, or human that can host 
a disease without having symptoms but can spread this disease to others. It is unknown which animal or plant is a reservoir 
for EVD; scientists have looked since the 1970s and narrowed the search to a few species of fruit bats. See Groseth, 
Feldmann, and Strong (2007), Marí Saéz et al. (2015), Pourrut et al. (2005), Preston (2012), Taylor, Leach, and Bruenn 
(2010). 
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from the field, some local communities began organizing as a response to the 
Government’s announcement and perceptions on how it was responding. 
In the rural eastern Kenema District of Sierra Leone, the paramount chiefs are 
persuaded to adopt bylaws, according to the informants. It is said this happened in July 
2014. However, from that time until August, President Ernest Bai Koroma hears about the 
bylaws in the two rural districts and the subsequently decreasing EVD cases. He asks all the 
paramount chiefs in the country to implement bylaws and integrates these into a state of 
emergency declaration on July 30, 2014 (Barbash, 2014; Government of Sierra Leone, 
2014). 
The WHO declares the Ebola epidemic in West Africa to be a PHEIC on August 8, 
2014 (World Health Organization, 2014c). This authorizes it to mobilize aid resources 
without an official invitation from the domestic governments. However, by September 
2014, EVD case incidences stabilize in the Kailahun and Kenema districts. Thus, according 
to the WHO, these districts are no longer epicenters of the disease outbreak (World Health 
Organization, 2014a). Different neighborhoods in Liberia conduct community engagement 
efforts, such as setting up checkpoints and door-to-door health education, according to the 
informants. According to Kouadio et al. (2015), EVD cases also begin to decline in Lofa 
County, a former epicenter, and this county had the highest rate of EVD survivors. 
i. The Delay in Aid
There were health-related aid resources in West Africa before the Ebola epidemic; 
NGOs accounted for most of the health services delivered in both countries. However, 
according to informants, some resources were leaving due to pre-arranged agreements or 
some continued to provide services during the outbreak. In addition, informants say that 
the Chinese government had sent aid resources during phase one, specifically, 
ambulances. Uganda had also sent experienced volunteers to train health workers on 
safely caring for EVD patients. However, the scale up of mainly Western derived aid 
resources, such as the WHO, United States, and the United Kingdom did not occur earlier 
than September 2014. 
In an interview, the former WHO Director-General explained that the organization’s 
main role is to provide technical assistance and it is not a first responder; hence why it did 
not respond sooner than August 2014 (Fink, 2014). However, Kamradt-Scott (2016)’s 
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research found that there were long-standing structural issues, such as 2005 IHRs; this 
gave the WHO authority to coordinate an international response, however, it is under 
strict guidelines that require a majority vote from the member states to determine if an 
event meets the definition of a public health emergency. Another structural issue that 
hampered the agency’s response was a 51% budget cut voted by the members in 2013. 
This resulted in large layoffs in the emergency response team, from 90 to 36 persons 
(Kamradt-Scott, 2016). However, that same year, the World Health Assembly voted for the 
WHO to have greater responsibilities in humanitarian responses, including mental health 
services during a crisis (World Health Organization, 2013). The WHO responded that a 
PHEIC is sometimes confused with an operational response, which it is not. The agency 
claims it mounted an operational response when it was first notified of EVD in West Africa 
(Ippolito, Di Caro, and Capobianchi, 2015). 
Thus, there was a global response to mobilize aid and send resources to West 
Africa. However, by the Spring of 2015, some resources began to scale down or withdraw 
because of declining case rates, such as troops sent by the United States Agency for 
International Development (Bullard, 2018; Giahyue, 2015). 
B. Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework has three dimensions in its scope, as it addresses a gap 
in knowledge at each dimension. This is discussed in the literature review in chapter two. 
Since TLIs, mainly operate in the rural and remote context, they are not often examined 
for institutional quality or impact on external factors such as aid, the economy, or 
emergencies. The thesis extends the concept of institutional quality to examine TLIs for 
social outcomes and not just economic growth. 
The first dimension is represented in figure 2 below, the top image represents the 
original theoretical framework with the concepts of rulemaking, protection of property 
rights, monitoring and enforcement, social capital, and low transaction costs. These are 
considered concepts of high institutional quality for economic growth (Dreher, 
Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston, 2009; North, 1990; Rodrik, 2004; World Bank, 2002). The 
bottom image is the framework extended with two new concepts the thesis is exploring in 
the orange hexagons, the ability to correct information failures and social costs. These two 
xxvi | P a g e
market failures have been used before in social economics and health interventions 
(Becker and Becker, 1997; Jha and Chaloupka, 2000), but not in an institutional analysis. 
The second dimension examines community engagement strategies during a public 
health emergency. A public health emergency is defined as an acute infectious disease 
outbreak as explained above in section II, part A. Each NGO or donor has its specific 
strategy to supply aid and engage with the local communities. For example, the global 
health cluster (WHO, United Nations Children’s Fund, and Food and Agriculture 
Organization) has a strategy that it endorses to provide health education and community 
sensitization during a disease outbreak (World Health Organization, 2012a). Additionally, 
there are the Sphere standards as mentioned above. However, institutional quality and 
TLIs are not thoroughly discussed at this level. The literature suggests that community 
stakeholders were passive recipients of health promotion or cooperated to fulfill the 
agendas of external partners. 
In figure 3 below, the top image depicts key concepts from the disease outbreak 
literature discussed in chapter two, section 2.6 (Allaranga et al., 2010; Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2007; Cohen, 2018; Enserink, 2005; Georges et al., 1999; Ilunga 
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Kalenga et al., 2019; Lamunu et al., 2004; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2018a; Médecins Sans 
Frontières, 2018b; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2019; Moran, 2018; Msyamboza et al., 2014; 
Muñoz, 2017; Nkengasong and Onyebujoh, 2018; Okware et al., 2002; Onyango et al., 
2007; Roddy et al., 2007; U.K. Department for International Development, 2011; World 
Health Organization, 2007; World Health Organization, 2009) These concepts in the blue 
boxes include bringing clinical resources, such as medicine, gloves and masks, ambulances. 
The human resources concept is depicted by training health workers on how to manage 
and treat suspected patients and training volunteers to do health education in the 
communities. Government support is usually the ministry or department of health that is 
collaborating with the agency for logistical support. A community engagement strategy is 
sometimes mentioned in the literature or cultural barriers are discussed. At this level, the 
literature portrays the lead agency as correcting supply and demand-side barriers after 
implementing its strategy of supplying technical resources and expertise, this includes the 
expertise of overcoming community perceptions. 
The bottom image shows an orange hexagon of institutional quality, which is a gap 
in the literature that the thesis intends to address. Using the extended framework, where 
institutional quality includes the concepts of correcting information failures and reducing 
social costs. 
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The third dimension is the 2014 Ebola epidemic, where the literature on community 
engagement strategies and aid expand to discuss the challenges of the traditional 
strategies and the importance of engaging with local communities. The bylaws passed by 
paramount chiefs in Sierra Leone are discussed, but not in relation to institutional quality, 
and how multiple levels of institutions collaborated or hindered governance efforts of this 
outbreak. Community engagement in Liberia is also discussed, but not analyzed from this 
perspective. 
In the top image, the boxes of ‘human resources’ and ‘clinical resources’ are the 
same concepts as before. ‘Community engagement’ is also the same as defined above, 
however, the literature varies on what this means, including Perry and Sayndee (2017)’s 
book entitled ‘Social mobilization in Liberia’ but it discusses how communities self-
organized, rather than agency-led strategies. We see another box called ‘demand-side 
barriers.’ This concept focuses on specific challenges that are brought up repeatedly in the 
literature, such as getting people to stop burying the deceased, as this may spread EVD and 
to encourage them to visit a health center in the early stages of an illness to test for EVD. 
‘Bylaws’ is as a concept to this dimension as the effectiveness of this intervention led by 
TLIs are debated (Boland and McKay, 2018; Enria, 2017; Parker and Allen, 2018; Parker et 
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al., 2019; Richards, 2016; Van der Windt and Voors, 2020; Wilkinson et al., 2017). The 
bylaws were introduced to correct some of the demand-side barriers as mentioned. 
The bottom image shows two conceptual gaps in knowledge that the thesis will 
address in the orange hexagons. The first is institutional quality, using the extended 
definition as described above. This is the theoretical contribution of knowledge to the 
thesis. The second orange hexagon ‘polycentric governance’ is the evidence-based 
contribution, as these were observations formed through the informants’ narratives of 
how the outbreak was governed via multiple institutions. 
In a public health emergency, behavior changes are needed to reduce the risk and 
the disease spread. These changes are to encourage (increase demand) community 
members to visit the hospitals or use safe hygienic practices. In this role, TLIs and 
community leaders have a part to play. Donors and humanitarians are often on the supply-
side of the aid market, where they may bring medical equipment, build makeshift medical 
units, do training and capacity building, but often are not equipped to address any 
demand-related factors that limit uptake of such resource deployment, like rumors and 
misinformation that were documented during the 2014 Ebola epidemic (Ohlheiser, 2014; 
Phillip, 2014; Thiam et al., 2015). This does not mean they are unaware of the demand-side 
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barriers or do not try to address them but are limited in how to do this effectively. These 
information failures (rumors and misinformation) led to a social cost. In this case, the social 
costs are Ebola deaths, which depleted families and communities. These high social costs, 
in turn, were affecting local and national economies and production. 
Primary data from the case study suggest that through rulemaking, monitoring, and 
enforcement, TLIs demonstrated high institutional quality by lowering social costs and 
fixing information failures in the market. By correcting these market inefficiencies, they 
helped to increase demand for health-related aid resources. TLIs in Sierra Leone passed 
bylaws to incentivize consumers to report sick persons to a health center and decrease 
‘risky’ behaviors,9 such as prohibit funerals, blood rituals of the secret societies, personal 
contact, and movement. These were enforced by substantial fines. Community 
engagement efforts in Liberia also fixed information failures and some social costs, but 
informants say that aid resources also helped to reduce social costs by having health 
workers return to caregiving. Additionally, the same local strategies in Sierra Leone were 
scaled up as national emergency policies, where it was not coordinated everywhere in 
Liberia. These findings were based on the informants’ interviews; thus, while there was not 
a strong narrative regarding the impact of aid by Sierra Leonean informants, it does not 
mean that aid did not benefit health workers. 
The primary data are triangulated with the WHO’s Ebola situation report. 
According to this report, Sierra Leone reported 14,124 total cases with 3,956 deaths and 
Liberia reported 10,675 cases and 4,809 deaths due to EVD during the entire outbreak 
period (World Health Organization, 2016a). Therefore, the EVD death rates in Sierra 
Leone was 28%, while in Liberia it was 45% of EVD cases, according to these figures 
provided. Sierra Leone identified more EVD cases than Liberia, at almost 4,000 more 
cases, but recorded nearly a thousand less deaths than Liberia (World Health 
Organization, 2016a). Thus, rulemaking and a bottom-up approach to nationalizing the 
local bylaws made a difference in Sierra Leone, where the epidemic was rural dominated 
and traditional leaders had a larger role in governing. 
IV. Chapterization
This section provides a summary of the chapters in this thesis. 
9 Quotes are used around the term ‘risky’ because these are not high-risk behaviors in normal times. 
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A. Chapter One
The first chapter is the contextual background of Sierra Leone and Liberia before 
the 2014 EVD outbreak. This includes their historical development broadly and healthcare 
systems specifically. Both countries were ‘founded’ for repatriated slaves from Britain, the 
Caribbean, North and South Americas, as well as free persons (including escaped slaves) 
(Frankfurter et al., 2018; Harris, 2012). However, political and economic construction 
differed with Liberia firmly consolidating Monrovia as a highly centralized seat of power 
that largely excluded the diverse indigenous ethnic groups in the interior (Harris, 2012). In 
Sierra Leone, the Krios, a term for the descendants of repatriated slaves, did largely stay in 
Freetown and the western area. However, the country operated as a British colonial 
protectorate where the paramount chieftaincy was manipulated to serve the colonial 
agenda, this included forced labor and taxes (Harris, 2012). 
After the war, there was a large influx of Western-derived aid and developmental 
resources to rebuild state institutions and improve governance to ideally prevent another 
civil conflict. However, some scholars, such as Harris (2012), Mulbah (2018), Mustapha 
(2016), Pailey (2017), and Sawyer (2005a) argue that some of these reforms may not bring 
democracy and legitimacy to national governments. Official governance indicators from 
the World Bank (2017) show that both countries are operating under weak governance, 
however, this only reflects state institutions and not traditional ones. In terms of liberal 
economic and democratic performance, neither country is operating to the standards set 
by Western-derived experts. 
This chapter demonstrates that good governance reforms were meant to create 
institutional change to state-run institutions and improve their institutional quality for 
economic growth. However, these policies have had mix success. These development 
reforms do not always include traditional institutions, and thus, leave out this perspective 
of local development. Second, the health-related governance data show that the 
countries were improving on a few indicators, but this did not translate into a widespread 
improvement in the health infrastructure. Leaving both countries vulnerable to a disease 
epidemic. 
B. Chapter Two
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This chapter begins by examining the original framework of New Institutional 
Economics led by key thinkers North, Acemoglu, and Oström. What began as a theory to 
analyze economic history was then used in development policy, as this theory focuses on 
what changes make an economy grow, decline, or stagnate. Institutional quality is 
normally conceived as institutions that can protect private rights, enforce contracts, and 
keep transaction costs low (North, 2003). This would encourage people to cooperate and 
not defect (corruption or cheating). However, what is missing is how institutions can 
govern for social outcomes and use this to determine institutional quality. 
Another branch of new institutional economics is the concept of polycentric 
governance, where institutions at the local, national, and regional levels collectively 
govern for public goods. This builds on Oström (1990; 2010)’s work where actors come 
together in collective action to prevent overexploitation of limited agricultural resources. 
This could be useful in helping us explain how multiple institutions governed the EVD 
outbreak. 
The chapter engages in the debate on traditional institutions from various studies. 
Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014), Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen (2013; 2014) Hanlon 
(2005), Jackson (2005; 2006), Mamdani (1996), Peters and Richards (1998), and Richards 
(2005) argue that traditional leaders tend to be despotic or corrupt. And, Adjei, Busia, and 
Bob-Milliar (2017), Fanthorpe (1998; 2001; 2006), Logan (2013), and Ubink (2008) say that 
these leaders still have popular legitimacy and rural-based constituents see a place for 
them governing in the modern state. The thesis holds that the literature supporting 
traditional chiefs tends to use cultural and religious identity as the main factors. However, 
these cannot be generalized as not all chiefs hold religious authority and culture is not the 
only aspect that defines and legitimizes them. The thesis fits into a third debate that does 
not argue for chiefdoms to stay or be abolished, but rather looks at how their governance 
impact social or economic outcomes, and if needed, how these may be reformed 
(Baldwin, 2015; Bulte, Richards, and Voors, 2018; Dia, 1996; Khan and Mehmood, 2016; 
Pande and Udry, 2005; Sesay, 2019; Unsworth, 2010). 
The next two dimensions of literature are on public health emergencies and the 
2014 EVD outbreak. These are critically reviewed in a power-laden context, using Scott 
(1992)’s concept of public and hidden transcripts. The public transcript is the dominant 
narrative that is accepted as mainstream and not often challenged. The hidden transcript 
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gives a narrative that rivals the dominant one and is not often accepted as mainstream. 
The dominant narrative is that donors and humanitarians typically respond in a disease 
outbreak to bring supplies and affect change in behaviors (demand-side barriers). This 
depicts community engagement and mobilization strategies as top-down and led by an 
external actor, such as an NGO. The narratives of how local groups self-organized are 
hidden transcripts. 
The final dimension on the 2014 Ebola epidemic shows some public and hidden 
transcripts. Specifically, there are critiques of how traditional interventions were not 
penetrating the community to change ‘risky’ behaviors or engage with people. The 
standard biomedical information was not disseminated in a culturally and contextually 
appropriate way. A hidden transcript reveals that community and traditional leaders 
organized during this outbreak to correct demand-side barriers, and there is a debate on 
whether the eradication of EVD can be attributed to local efforts and not aid intervention. 
C. Chapter Three
The third chapter discusses the qualitative methods used and how data were 
collected in the field. A qualitative methodology seeks to explore a phenomenon closely 
and in-depth. This comparative case study design was chosen as both countries exhibit 
close parallels in their histories and development trajectories, but the differences in some 
governance indicators made for an interesting comparison. As demonstrated in chapter 
one, Liberia was considered a model for post-conflict development after the war, 
however, both countries had difficulties identifying and containing EVD in the beginning 
stages of the epidemic. 
The process of undertaking fieldwork is also discussed in detail: sampling, 
mapping, interviewing, field supervision, gatekeepers, and protocols on leaving the field 
so that future research is not hindered. Copies of the questionnaires used to collect data 
are in Appendix A. These strategies were used with the intent of seeking knowledgeable 
informants from diverse backgrounds. Ethics approval was obtained through the 
University of Westminster in 2016 and an amendment in 2017, consent forms and 
information sheets are in Appendix B. 
Thematic analysis is used to structure the work into three broad themes of 
‘Government’s Response and Community Reaction,’ ‘Local Institutional Intervention’ and 
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‘Governance of the Outbreak.’ These themes were derived from coding through Nvivo 
version 11 software. The primary data (informants’ interviews) are triangulated with 
secondary data from the WHO. Triangulation is used in the manner described by Denzin 
and Lincoln (2005) for qualitative research, to demonstrate a reality through multiple 
angles. 
Rigor and robustness of the research are discussed in section 3.7; specifically, what 
is meant by robustness in qualitative research, as opposed to reliability and validity in 
quantitative research. This section explores the key thoughts on producing high quality 
research and uses the criteria by Morse et al. (2002) to define the rigor and robustness of 
the findings. Namely, methodological coherence, sampling and saturation, data analysis, 
and theory development. An evaluative criterion of member checking was used after the 
research was completed. Gatekeepers gave feedback on whether the findings matched 
their lived experiences during the outbreak, these documents are in Appendix C. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with the limitations of the research project. 
D. Chapter Four
This is the findings chapters. It contains the demographics statistics of the 
informants, then gives a baseline assessment of each countries’ healthcare system before 
the EVD outbreak. Then, the data are arranged thematically. The first theme, 
‘Government’s Response and Community Reaction,’ discusses several information failures 
and social costs. Informants remember the beginning of the outbreak lacking clear 
information and protocols on diagnosing or handling potential EVD patients. They were 
simply told not to touch, but this is a paradox for caregivers, not to mention community 
members began to lose trust. Some health workers reported leaving the health centers or 
their facilities closing, another social cost. 
The second theme, ‘Local Institutional Intervention,’ discusses how community 
and traditional leaders began organizing because of the belief of government 
incompetency. Some reported that when aid resources arrived in phase two, many health 
workers returned to the health centers to take care of patients and felt positive about 
donor interventions. However, some community stakeholders were less enthusiastic, 
reporting that NGOs and donors did not work with them nor supplied resources for 
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distribution. Some health workers also said that government and aid resources came too 
late. 
The third theme, ‘Governance of the Outbreak,’ is a holistic view of how multiple 
institutions helped or hindered the response. There is a narrative of polycentric 
governance to address specific challenges (Oström, 1990; Oström, 2010), as no one 
institution was able to address supply and demand barriers. In Liberia, the governance of 
aid institutions supplying resources benefited health workers, and community organizing 
helped fix demand-side barriers. However, community organizing did not consistently 
happen everywhere with the same set of protocols. Some neighborhoods had checkpoints 
for isolation while others only did health education. 
In Sierra Leone, TLIs governed to correct demand-side barriers by reducing 
misinformation and social costs. The supply-side of the intervention, such as equipment 
and medicine was challenging as local institutions do not control for this. Some reported 
that aid resources, such as contact tracing and health sensitization penetrated the 
communities because there was more cooperation. However, since this began in phase 
one of the outbreak, this could be referring to aid resources already present in the 
country or resources brought in by non-Western donors like China or Uganda. 
E. Chapter Five
The final chapter is a discussion of the literature and findings to achieve the aims 
and objectives of the thesis. The first section is a synopsis of the informants’ narrative of 
self-organizing. This builds on Hewlett and Hewlett (2008)’s observations of rural 
communities enacting emergency management regulations during an EVD outbreak. This 
achieves the first objective: determining how state and community responses differed. 
Then a critical discussion on how locally derived responses in health have received scant 
or negative attention. 
The following section is a market approach of the 2014 EVD outbreak and details 
the various information failures and social costs that slowed containment of the disease. 
These market failures affected the demand for health services, including those provided 
by NGOs. Thus, this section fulfills the second research objective of identifying the 
challenges in EVD management and prevention and explains the theoretical contribution 
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to knowledge. The first and second sections achieves the first aim regarding the role of 
TLIs during the EVD outbreak. 
The third section, 5.4 discusses the third theme of the overall governance of the 
response with multitier institutions. This builds on Oström (1990; 1998)’s and Sawyer 
(2004)’s concept of polycentric governance. Traditional and community-level institutions 
governed the demand-side of the market and aid and state institutions governed the 
supply-side barriers. This is the evidence-based contribution to knowledge, and it achieves 
the third objective regarding the informants’ narratives of how the outbreak was 
governed. 
The final section discusses the literature debate on community engagement during 
the 2014 EVD outbreak and its implication on aid and future disease outbreaks. It 
introduces the policy contribution to knowledge on how future epidemics can be 
governed through bilateral knowledge exchange. The controversy surrounding the bylaws 
and how the public transcripts (Scott, 1992) have perceived these efforts are critically 
discussed. It examines the secondary data from the WHO and interprets why EVD death 
rates were lower in Sierra Leone, due to a bottom-up nationalized community 
engagement effort to reduce social costs (EVD deaths). This section achieves the 
remaining objective (the literary discussion on the community’s impact on aid) and both 
sections 5.4 and 5.5 answer the second research aim regarding community engagement 
and aid performance during a public health emergency. 
The entire thesis consists of five chapters, excluding the introduction and 
conclusion. The appendices and bibliography are listed at the end of the thesis.





















CHAPTER ONE:  
The Countries’ Context 
 
 
The research is sensitive to the conditions surrounding the phenomenon of interest. This 
deepens our understanding of internal and external factors. 
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1.1 Introduction 
The central question addressed in this chapter is: why were the health systems of 
Liberia and Sierra Leone so weak when the Ebola outbreak started, despite years of aid and 
post-conflict development? The countries were modernizing their overall infrastructure and 
delivery of services, including healthcare while battling widespread poverty. Sierra Leone’s 
incidence of poverty as of 2010 was 60% (International Monetary Fund, 2011b) and Liberia 
stood at 64% during this same period (International Monetary Fund, 2011a). Reconstruction 
is largely financed by loans and grants that come with policy conditionalities (Guttal, 2005). 
Individual nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or private entities are not equipped to 
address system-wide problems or even other medical conditions outside the scope of the 
donors’ priorities. For example, both countries have private foreign firms providing health 
services for their workers. However, during the 2014 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) epidemic, 
some companies continued operations and even made donations to humanitarian 
organizations (Knight, 2016; Rooney, 2014), but many companies suspended operations and 
left the country, taking their health resources with them (DW, 2014). Strategic planning and 
reliance on external resources may help fragile states provide ‘interim’ or ‘basic’ health 
services while governments build an infrastructure for a long-term solution (Keith and 
Cadge, 2010). However, these may not be dependable during a crisis or help implement 
system-wide changes. This is the context of post-conflict development and health in the 
case study countries, particularly their healthcare systems before the disease outbreak. 
The discussion in this chapter is situated in the broader context of aid and health 
interventions, giving an understanding of the supply-side of the aid market. The first section 
briefly discusses aid and its terminology and evolution. This includes how aid became 
liberalized through ‘good governance’ policies of small government and privatization of 
resources. Then, it goes on to demonstrate how global health policies have been impacted 
by this. Section 1.3 discusses Liberia’s history and development, and then Sierra Leone is 
discussed in the same fashion in the next section. Section 1.5 reflects on both countries and 
compares a few governance indicators. The final section, 1.6, is a brief introduction of the 
2014 EVD outbreak in West Africa and challenges on the supply-side of the intervention. 
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1.2 Understanding Aid 
Before examining the details of Liberia’s and Sierra Leone’s history, development, 
and healthcare system, it may be useful to first understand the supply-side of the aid 
market. This section explains what aid is, its purposes, how donors and humanitarian 
organizations choose to channel aid resources, and how they evaluate interventions or how 
the aid was governed by recipient countries. The thesis examines aid resources that are 
dispensed during a public health emergency. However, given the fragile nature of the case 
study countries’ infrastructure, several types of aid resources were mobilized during the 
response. Learning these parameters will help to understand the demand-side challenges in 
the second and fourth chapters. 
A substantive part of the literature has examined ‘development aid.’ Development 
aid aims to improve the socioeconomic conditions of recipient countries (Moyo, 2010). It 
accounts for most aid resources as the World Bank’s International Development Association 
is one of the largest assistance programs (World Bank, 2018). 
Aid has a long history that has evolved since World War II (Glennie and Sumner, 
2016; Jaspars, 2018). For example, for decades, aid focused on capital expenditures such as 
building hospitals, schools, or donating vehicles, but not discretionary expenditures such as 
staff salaries. This changed after 2000, and included resources to strengthen systems; 
however, the proportion of this aid is small. At its basic conception, aid is the transfer of 
resources from one country to another. However, before the 1970s, effectiveness was not 
considered, because as an additional resource, aid was always assumed to be a positive 
contribution (Glennie and Sumner, 2016). Aid can correspond to cash transfers, research 
and development, direct investment, in-kind transfers, infrastructure, and capital projects, 
and the projects have different lengths, scopes, context, conditions, and goals. Its intrinsic 
nature is therefore highly varied (Glennie and Sumner, 2016).10 
According to Fearon (2006), all aid that achieves humanitarian goals, such as poverty 
reduction or providing relief to refugees of a natural disaster or conflict, can be considered 
10 The 2005 Paris Declaration of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the 2008 Accra 
Agenda for Action were broad commitments to harmonize and align all aid delivery for effectiveness and to the priorities of 
recipient governments (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008). However, there is a debate on 
how this is being implemented and if the recipients’ agendas are really prioritized (Banerjee and Duflo, 2012; Booth, 2012; 
Hayman, 2009; Sjöstedt, 2009). Liberia became a case study for a dual-track funding strategy and long-term development 
assistance (Save the Children, 2009). Section 1.3 on Liberia’s post-conflict recovery discusses this further. 
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humanitarian. Indeed, as Fearon (2006, p.3) notes, “[A]id from rich to poor countries for the 
purpose of promoting economic development is humanitarian aid in this ordinary sense.” 
However, there is an official distinction in the aid industry, where development aid and 
emergency relief are separate categories with separate funding streams. Therefore, 
humanitarian aid is, “the response to emergencies as opposed to attempts to improve the 
normal state of affairs,” (Fearon, 2006, p.4). Fink and Radaelli (2011) also make this 
distinction: 
The main objective of ODA [development assistance] is the eradication of poverty and its principal causes, which implies 
considerable involvement of recipient countries in the negotiation and implementation of intermediate to long-term policies 
and projects. Humanitarian assistance, on the other hand, is meant to provide rapid assistance and distress relief to 
populations temporarily needing support after natural disasters, technological catastrophes, or conflicts, generally classified 
as “complex emergencies.” (Fink and Radaelli, 2011, p. 742). 
Fink and Radaelli (2011) also say that development assistance is resources channeled 
through the state, while humanitarian aid is channeled at the community level. 
Moyo (2010) classifies aid into three broad categories. ‘Humanitarian or emergency 
relief’ aid, which is quickly disbursed in times of disaster; and second, charity aid is released 
by organizations on the ground in the affected areas. Third, ‘systemic aid’ is paid directly to 
governments through either bilateral (government to government) or multilateral transfers 
(institutions, such as the World Bank, to government). In addition, there are also other sub-
categories of aid, such as ‘food aid,’ which deals solely with supplementing nutritional needs 
(Jaspars, 2018). Emergency or humanitarian aid is dispensed for short-term relief, but 
sometimes, there are no clear transitions from short-term to long-term assistance, leaving a 
gap. Likewise, humanitarian assistance may be extended for long periods, like in a 
protracted war (Jaspars, 2018; Keith and Cadge, 2010). These distinctions are not always 
made clear in the literature. Sometimes aid is bypassed in states with weak governance for 
institutions with stronger governance, so it may also be non-state entities delivering 
services.11 Sierra Leone and Liberia have had different types of aid, such as charity and relief 
aid provided by humanitarian organizations at the community level for decades and 
development aid acquired through complex bilateral and multilateral negotiations. 
11 The type of aid resources is determined by donors’ perceptions of institutions in the affected region. As mentioned in 
Keith and Cage (2010), fragile states with weak institutions can change donors’ preference on the type of aid to give or 
according to Dietrich (2013), channel aid resources through bypassing a weak government for private actors. See Acht, 
Omar Mahmoud, and Thiele (2015) and Dietrich (2013; 2016) for more on aid bypass. 
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Additionally, the providers of aid also have distinct terminology that is not always 
made clear in the literature or informant interviews. Broadly, there are ‘philanthropists,’ 
‘donors,’ ‘funders’, and ‘charities.’ However, for clarity in the thesis, the term ‘faith-based 
charities’ and ‘NGOs’ generally refer to humanitarian aid providers such as the Red Cross or 
Samaritan’s Purse. ‘Donors’ refer to government agencies, such as the United States Agency 
for International Development or International Finance Institutions (IFIs), such as the World 
Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, sometimes the literature and 
informants’ interviews use a different term like, ‘external partner or support’, ‘aid 
resources,’ or ‘donors’ without specifying which type. 
 
1.2.1 Aid Governance 
 
Donors, Funders, and NGOs are concerned about their aid being effective and 
achieving the goals that were set. The question of how to effectively channel aid resources 
into low-income countries has challenged academics, philanthropists, and donors over the 
last three decades.12 There have been numerous studies attempting to determine how aid is 
working or not working (Benes, 2017; Booth, 2012; Easterly, Levine, and Roodman, 2004; 
Farang et al., 2009; Gulland, 2014; Hayman, 2009; Sridhar and Batniji, 2008). The discussions 
have focused on policies, conditionalities,13 or decisions donors and organizations enforce 
to channel aid resources (Abbott, Andersen, and Tarp, 2010; Chhibber, Laajaj, and Bain, 
2006; Dietrich, 2013; Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston, 2009; Hayter, 2005; Hilary, 
2010; Kersting and Kilby, 2016; Kilby, 2009; Stone, 2004; Vreeland, 2004). 
However, for this thesis, we are concerned with the impact of aid to low-income 
countries and that is the phenomenon of ‘good governance.’ This has broadly shaped post-
conflict development of Liberia and Sierra Leone and their health systems, and therefore, 
contextualizes how the health systems functioned before the 2014 Ebola epidemic and why 
it could not initially contain the disease outbreak. 
                                                          
12 Governance is the pattern of rules or practices of governing (Bevir, 2016). It is normally applied to understanding the 
power of the state. However, it can refer to a system where a state is dependent on, such as the UN. Therefore, there is 
international or global governance or global health governance by the WHO. See also Bevir (2012). 
13‘Conditionality’ is an agreement for development loans if the borrower (a) maintains an adequate macroeconomic 
framework, (b) implements its overall program in a manner satisfactory to the World Bank, and (c) complies with the policy 
and institutional actions that are deemed critical for the implementation and expected results of the supported program 
(World Bank, 2005, pp. 3-4). 
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Tirman (2005) says that policies of good governance and small government intended 
for economic growth, which may subsequently bring health and education development, 
lack economic sense. For example, the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in the 1980s 
and 1990s encouraged privatization of state assets such as hospitals. This negatively 
impacted socioeconomic development. This era in aid is called the Washington Consensus.14 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the SAP has affected the supply and 
demand for health services, slowing improvements or even worsening the health statuses of 
people in these countries (World Health Organization, 1995; World Health Organization, 
2017b). It mandated that recipient countries of foreign aid make macroeconomic changes to 
their economy and government, such as privatizing state enterprises and devaluing national 
currencies. Also, it required countries to join free trade agreements that usually disrupted 
the agriculture sector by having local farmers compete with large corporations (Bromley, 
1995; Simms, Rowson, and Peattie, 2001). 
Reforms suggested by the IFIs are meant to improve state institutions in developing 
countries. The 2002 World Development Report discusses strategies to build institutions for 
market efficiency and productivity. The report says the state is to provide institutions to 
support a market economy and if a state can do so successfully, it has ‘good governance’: 
 
Good governance includes the creation, protection, and enforcement of property rights, without which the scope for market 
transactions is limited...And it includes the provision of sound macroeconomic policies that create a stable environment for 
market activity. Good governance also means the absence of corruption, which can subvert the goals of policy and undermine 
the legitimacy of the public institutions that support markets. (World Bank, 2002, p. 99) 
 
The era of the post-Washington Consensus is said to expand development policies 
beyond economic growth to include social issues such as health, education, gender equality, 
and peace. Donors also encourage recipient countries to ‘own’ development projects by 
writing Poverty Reduction Strategy papers (PRS) (Mathews, 2007). In 1999, the IFIs created 
the PRS to address criticisms of the SAP (Navarro, 2007). However, the PRS was aligned to 
the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which is a United Nations (UN) endeavor 
and not specific to each country’s needs. The conditionalities still exist on concessional loans 
and often, recipient countries are asked to privatize and reduce government spending 
(Bayliss and Cramer, 2001; Birdsall and Fukuyama, 2011). Harris (2013) succinctly says that 
                                                          
14 This era is called the Washington Consensus, partly because the IFIs are in Washington D.C., but also because the 
strategies are based on a neoliberal economic ideology as Tirman (2005) describes. These were recommended for recipient 
countries of aid without always considering the local context. 
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the Washington Consensus of the 1980s and 1990s saw the state as part of the problem, 
whereas in the post-Washington consensus it is part of the solution. However, even in this 
recent era, recipient governments of aid still have to reform to the liberal economic 
ideology of small government and free-market institutions. 
Recipient countries of aid have had their healthcare systems largely defined by three 
health-related MDGs: eradicating HIV, Malaria, and Tuberculosis, reducing childhood 
mortality and reducing maternal infant mortality (MMI).15 The effectiveness of aid resources 
was determined by these performance-based indicators, largely supplied by vertical 
interventions. As for the supply-side of health –related aid resources, the liberalization of 
aid has also affected the global health platform and how providers supply health 
interventions into low-income countries. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
1.2.2 Health as a Human Right 
 
The declaration of the 1978 Almá Atá Conference under the WHO and the United 
Nations Children’s Fund sponsorship was agreed by 136 countries to bring universal primary 
healthcare (World Health Organization, 1978a). Then there was the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights to grant access for health to all by 2000. All countries, except for Somalia and 
the United States, were signatories on this declaration (Hall and Taylor, 2003; Kaplan and De 
Carmago, 2016; Kickbusch, 2005; Meier and Onzivu, 2014). The right to health was to be 
achieved through the principles of the Almá Atá declaration which focused on equity and 
engagement of communities. However, the timeline for Universal Health Coverage (UHC) 
has passed and not all countries achieved this. Primary healthcare principles were not 
implemented due to global investment in targets, instead of health systems more broadly; 
and investing in economic growth as opposed to broader socioeconomic issues (Werner and 
Sanders, 1997). 
                                                          
15 There are 15 MDGs and three are health-related goals. MDG 4 was to combat childhood mortality (defined as under age 
5). MDG 5 was to decrease maternal and infant mortality (defined as 1 year or younger) and MDG 6 was to combat 
HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and other infectious diseases (United Nations, 2015). However, most resources went to HIV/AIDS, 
Malaria, and Tuberculosis. The MDGs were an aggregation of global trends condensed to specific targets to be achieved by 
2015. Therefore, the numerical targets were set in line with global trends since 1990, and not based on actual trends for 
any region or country. For example, the HIV/AIDS target was guessed, since there was no actual tracking of infection rates 
beforehand. Additionally, Asia had been reducing poverty and MMI rates since the 1990s, and the MDGs reflect the 
progress that they had already been making. However, in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), poverty and MMI increased between 
1990 and 2001. These articles ask whether SSA is missing the targets for the MDGs or are the MDGs not well-targeted for 
SSA (Berg and Qureshi, 2005; Vandemoortele, 2008). The Sustainable Development Goals came after the MDGs to continue 
tackling poverty. However, since this came after the outbreak it is not discussed in this thesis. See Lim et al. (2016) on this 
new agenda and Smalle (2017) on issues of implementing these goals in Sierra Leone. 
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There are multiple perspectives on how health should be prioritized on the global 
agenda, and these perspectives can encompass a wide net of actors and stakeholders (Bond, 
2008; Dodgson, Lee, and Drager, 2002; Fauci, 2007; Horton and Lo, 2014; Iwelunmor and 
Airhihenbuwa, 2013; Kay and Williams, 2009; Kickbusch, 2005; Kickbusch, Silberschmidt, 
and Buss, 2007; Koplan et al., 2009; Lee and Brumme, 2012; Lee and Kamradt-Scott, 2014; 
Parks, 2014; Picazo, 2014; Poku and Whiteside, 2002; Ruger, 2005; Smith et al., 2003; Vineis, 
2017). These sources agree that the WHO is the lead international agency on all health 
matters, at least on paper. However, aid for health interventions in low-income countries 
has been dominated by other organizations, companies, charities, and individuals,16 such as 
the emergence of public-private partnerships with pharmaceutical companies and research 
institutes. These partnerships have ethical dilemmas as they place profits above human 
rights. Some of these companies have more financial resources at their disposal than the 
WHO’s annual budget (Bluestone, Heaton, and Lewis, 2002). In this sense, the WHO is a 
humanitarian organization with different missions and values than for-profit businesses. 
 
1.2.3 From Human Rights to Cost-Effectiveness 
 
Some argue that other organizations are shaping the global agenda on health, while 
the WHO’s capacity has waned (Frenk and Moon, 2013; Lidén, 2014). One donor that is 
discussed frequently is the World Bank, as it is the main provider of concessional loans to 
low-income countries (Picazo, 2014; Poku and Whiteside, 2002; Ruger, 2005). These loans, 
as part of the PRS, were often used for the narrowly defined health goals in the MDGs.17 
While there are other sources of aid, such as humanitarian aid for health and could provide 
broader health services; these are much smaller than the funding received from IFIs. Poor 
countries carry the global burden of 10 infectious diseases and aid for these few diseases 
has impacted domestic health policies and service delivery (Bluestone, Heaton, and Lewis, 
2002; Chu et al., 2014). 
                                                          
16 As recently as the 2018 Astana Declaration, the principles of the Almá Atá declaration continue to be reconfirmed 
(World Health Organization, 2018d). However, some issues, such as equity, have been overlooked in the implementation of 
programs. 
17 Although World Bank loans are aligned with the PRS, the bank has been influencing health policies since the early 1990s. 
It created a report that focused on the economic impacts of health by preventing the “economically productive” 
population from getting sick (human capital), this encouraged many countries to focus on these “priority illnesses”. See 
Picazo (2014), Ruger (2005), and World Bank (1993). 
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Another example of the shift in health as a universal right to a neoliberal ideology is 
the 2000 G8 summit.18 This convention invited Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal, and the WHO for 
the first time; this is significant because the G8 had not discussed health or health as a 
development issue before this (Schifferes, 2005). According to Kurokawa et al. (2009), a 
strategy was created to combat health conditions that cause and perpetuate poverty. This 
was followed up with statements made by G8 leaders on the critical importance of health 
within the context of strategies for poverty reduction (Bruntland, 2001). Although the 
Director-General of the WHO at the time, Gro Harlem Bruntland, was encouraged by the 
renewed efforts of researchers, developing nations, and activists in the health-for-all-
movement, couched within these statements was the ideology that had been shaping global 
health governance (GHG)19 from the human rights-based model to one of cost-effectiveness 
and short-term goals. For example, Bruntland (2001)’s statement discussed making 
globalization work for the poor through public-private partnerships with research institutes 
and pharmaceutical companies to create more drugs and vaccines, combating infectious 
diseases, and working with international trade laws. This does not specifically say aid; 
however, it is referencing the same ideology of a free-market approach in health. 
Thus, donor pledges to fill the gap in the healthcare system have been clinical 
interventions that are cheap and easy to administer. This is opposed to broad horizontal 
interventions to target the underlying social and economic conditions of the community 
(Harman, 2015; Kickbusch, 2005). This is termed the ‘social etiology’ of health, which 
examines health status beyond the absence of disease (Kelman, 1975). This includes factors 
like living conditions, environment, nutrition, and education. Kelman (1975) is critical of the 
neoclassical economic view on health as ‘human capital’ or earning capacity. He argues that 
this conceptualizes health as building a productive workforce. This concept later appears in 
                                                          
18 The G8 is an intergovernmental political forum led by the world’s highly industrialized economies: Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia (until 2014), the United Kingdom, and the United States (Waterfield, Dominiczak, and Blair, 
2014). There is no formal administrative structure or offices for members, like in the WHO or UN. The presidency rotates 
among members and a range of topics of mutual or global concern are discussed at the meetings (Laub, 2014). 
19 Global Health Governance has many definitions and terms including global governance for health and governance for 
global health, each denotes levels of involvement in health activities. For instance, the WHO has an explicit mandate to 
govern health, so it falls in the GHG category; global governance for health refers to an institution that does not have a 
mandate but impacts health regardless, such as the World Trade Organization and trade policies on drugs. See Kickbusch 
and Cassar Szabo (2014), Lee and Kamradt-Scott (2014), and World Health Organization (2016g) for definitions. For more 
on trade policies and health see Bluestone, Heaton, and Lewis (2002), Cheru (2002), and Shadlen (2007). GHG is used 
throughout the thesis as a general umbrella term for governing health at the global level. 
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some development policies with quantifiable indicators, such as the DALYs20 and the MDGs, 
where aid was directed at diseases that primarily affect males between the ‘productive’ 
ages of 15 and 49 (e.g. HIV/AIDS). However, these specific health conditions may not reflect 
the health needs of the broader population (De Waal, 2003; Johnston, Deane, and Rizzo, 
2015; Parks, 2014). 
A well-known example of the outcomes between health and development aid 
policies are interventions for HIV/AIDS. Many countries had to show ownership of 
development projects by writing a PRS paper, and there were very few health-related 
causes that international donors would fund, such as the MDG number six (HIV/AIDS). So, 
many recipient countries of aid had resources to address HIV/AIDS, but not other health 
problems such as diabetes or malnutrition. The political economy of HIV is briefly discussed 
below. 
1.2.3.1 HIV/AIDS Intervention as an Example 
 
According to Harman (2015), HIV/AIDS21 initiatives in Africa have been centered on 
‘positive progress’ and high-profile campaigns where the ‘results’ get lost. However, the 
discourse of ongoing progress is necessary to maintain donations. While it is unrealistic to 
assume that a strategy will succeed on its first try, the ongoing discourse of ‘positive 
progress’ (usually backed by data showing the measured targets or performance-based 
indicators) hides the real results of health disparities and socioeconomic inequalities 
(Harman, 2015). And, as money flows in, it creates a distortion in a country’s health sector, 
as health policy and planning are centered on HIV services rather than the general needs of 
the population. The resources poured into specific health initiatives, termed vertical 
interventions, discriminate against people with other illnesses and conditions. 
This is an example of how donor-sponsored initiatives negatively impacted the poor. 
In general, vertical interventions separate the specific disease or condition from the 
                                                          
20 The Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) was introduced by the World Bank’s 1993 report. It is an econometric tool to 
determine which disease burden is hindering economic growth but redefined its stance on access to healthcare. It 
acknowledges that governments can not provide all services to everyone, but that the market approach to exclude the 
poor was also bad. Therefore, major disease burdens should be prioritized, and services provided to the general population 
based on these priorities (Chorev, 2013; Parks, 2014; World Bank, 1993). 
21 HIV stands for Human Immunodeficiency Virus and it is the virus that causes AIDS: Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome. While it is sometimes used interchangeably or without distinction, these are two different things. The virus 
(HIV) damages the immune system to weaken it. However, with today’s medical advances, one can be infected with the 
virus (i.e. HIV positive), but not have the immune system severely weakened. If it does become severely damaged to where 
even a minor infection such as a cold is life-threatening, then this is AIDS (Cobo, 2014; Whiteside, 2008). 
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generalized health crisis of the society (Mustapha, 2006). This separation is due to donor 
institutions22 focusing on fiscal performance and not social outcomes. In other words, the 
policies focus on the clinical and medical side of disease intervention and not the social 
etiology of disease. Thus, in health interventions, the supply-side of the aid market tends to 
focus on bringing clinical resources for quantifiable results and does not always address the 
demand-side barriers. 
This is in part because the econometrics favored at the time did not measure social 
determinants. For example, in prevention-oriented strategies such as condom distribution, 
perinatal testing and drug treatment, and (in very few places) needle exchange programs, 
only what Johnston (2015) calls “bad behaviors” are analyzed, whilst issues surrounding 
power, poverty, and ecology of HIV/AIDS are ignored. Additionally, these programs use 
performance-based indicators (e.g. how many condoms were given out, how many 
pregnant women tested…etc.) which gives quantifiable results. While this specialized 
market has changed over the years to increase the number of people who can access 
services (HIV and sexually transmitted infections, HIV and Cancer, HIV and nutrition…etc.), 
social and political determinants are often not addressed. 
This section briefly discussed the supply-side of the aid market, and specifically, 
health-related aid resources. There are many challenges and factors that donors and 
humanitarians contend with to deliver aid, along with competing priorities. Sections, 1.3 and 
1.4 discuss the case study countries and their outcomes under these development 
interventions. Each section introduces a brief history and the conflict period, and then 




Liberia did not follow the same pattern of colonialism and independence as other 
countries in Africa and Asia. It was ‘founded’ as a settlement for repatriated American slaves 
whose descendants are called Americo-Liberians (Bøås, 2009; Harris, 2012). The American 
Colonization Society, which was founded in 1816 and funded by abolitionists and prominent 
politicians, sent free African Americans to Monrovia. It was believed they would live a better 
life there rather than face legal and social discrimination in the United States. The Americo-
                                                          
22 It is not specified in this literature whether the term ‘donors’ exclude or include NGOs and humanitarian agencies. 
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Liberians brought Western culture to Monrovia (a republican political system and 
Christianity) and virtually intermarried within their community. This minority ethnic group 
became the governing elite and the affairs of the indigenous Africans were largely ignored 
and not included (Harris, 2012). Today in 2020, only two of Liberia’s presidents come from 
an indigenous ethnic group (there are 16 ethnic groups in Liberia): Samuel K. Doe, who 
gained power through a bloody coup d’état in 1980, and current President, George Weah, 
who succeeded President Johnson-Sirleaf in the 2017 general elections.23 
Liberia evolved from a commonwealth of various Americo-Liberian settlements to a 
centralized state with Monrovia as the seat of power in the 1800s. It was the first country in 
Africa to declare its independence in 1847, and the second free Black republic, after Haiti 
(Office of the Historian, 2016). According to Harris (2012), before the civil war, the country 
experienced an economic boom in the 1950s and 1960s. However, this did not translate into 
widespread socioeconomic development; by 1960, less than 10% of the population in the 
rural counties was literate. By 1970, over 70% of businesses in the country’s major trade 
industries were foreign-owned and political power belonged to a one-party state, led by the 
True Whig Party. This party was dominated by the Americos from 1884 until 1980, the 
moment of Doe’s coup (Harris, 2012). 
 
1.3.1 Conflict and Aftermath 
 
Liberia fell into civil war from 1989, until Charles Taylor ascended to the presidency 
in 1997. Taylor led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia in the fight against President Doe’s 
government (Harris, 2012). While violence slowed down intermittently, it did not really end, 
and the unrest escalated again from 1999 until 2003. President Taylor was also accused of 
war crimes in Liberia and for his involvement with neighboring Sierra Leone’s civil conflict 
(Bøås, 2001). The twenty years of conflict had devastated the infrastructure and 
communities. This generation had lived longer under violence rather than living under a 
functioning government, civil service sector, education, and healthcare system. In 2003, 
Liberia and the international community, led by United Nations Mission in Liberia, created 
an interim government called the National Transition Government of Liberia (NTGL) and 
                                                          
23 Presidents Charles Taylor (1997-2003) and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (2006-2018) are of mixed ethnic heritage, but were 
raised and socialized in an Americo-Liberian environment. 
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issued its economic governance plans, The Governance and Economic Management 
Assistance Program (GEMAP) (Bøås, 2009). 
Bøås (2009) says this was essentially a ‘trusteeship’ approach to governance. The 
NTGL was manufactured by the international donor community, without considering how 
the previously warring factions would come together and govern. Some elitists may be 
implicated for their involvement, such as former President Johnson-Sirleaf, who supported 
Taylor’s rebellion in the early 1990s (Harris, 2012). However, they are rarely brought to 
justice and are often included as the solution for peace and rebuilding. Therefore, when it 
comes to the International Criminal Court pursuing those for war crimes, justice can 
sometimes be unclear (Harris, 2012). In 2005, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected president in 
the country’s first post-conflict elections and had to balance Western donors’ and experts’ 
expectations with the local political elite and Liberian citizens, including the indigenous 
ethnic majority (Bøås, 2009; Harris, 2012). GEMAP inserted international experts in key 
advisory positions throughout President Johnson-Sirleaf’s administration for at least three 
years. Liberia, or specifically the Bank of Liberia (the trustee), had every economic and 
operational decision signed off by an expert who was chosen by the IMF (Bøås, 2009). 
However, with little negotiating power, Liberia had to accept these terms, especially as the 
fragile state needed foreign development assistance to recover and rebuild. 
 
1.3.2 Post-Conflict State-Building 
 
Many authors discuss the challenges of bringing a liberal democracy to Liberia as 
part of its post-conflict development (Harris, 2012; Kieh, 2017; Mulbah, 2018; Nyei, 2014; 
Pailey and Harris, 2017; and Sawyer, 2005a). Sawyer (2005a) says that elections have been 
controversial and trigger violence because of the zero-sum nature of Liberian politics. Harris 
(2012) says elections were held as part of the peace agreement after the war, but elections 
do not signify a shift or adoption of democratic values or institutions. Indeed, Kieh (2017) 
argues that the Johnson-Sirleaf administration adopted a hybrid governance system of 
authoritarianism and democracy. If its grip on power was threatened, it curtailed civil 
liberties in the name of security. And Pailey and Harris (2017) say that only half of Liberians 
feel their country has a strong democracy or one with only minor problems. Elected and 
appointed positions are often seen as a gateway to accumulating personal wealth and 
Johnson-Sirleaf’s administration was no stranger to allegations of corruption. 
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Although good governance reforms such as GEMAP were implemented, there were 
long-standing structural issues that made the decentralization of power difficult. Liberia has 
several administrative and local units such as counties and districts and an appointed 
superintendent for each county. Nyei (2014) argues that these local divisions did not 
redistribute power and decision making, but rather acted as apparatuses for the central 
government to function: 
 
Reforms after crises are targeted at ensuring good governance of the public sector and creating effective regulatory 
mechanisms for the private and non-profit sectors. Good governance itself is often a catchword in contemporary 
development discourse. (Nyei, 2014 p. 1) 
 
The 1986 constitution had entrenched such a powerful central government that it 
made decentralization difficult after the war. For example, the role of the county 
superintendent is an anomaly to good governance reforms, because this is not an elected 
official, but rather someone appointed by the president of Liberia. This role does not have a 
relationship with other line ministries or with service deliveries (Nyei, 2014). Additionally, 
chiefs and clan leaders were gradually merged into the state and became agents of the 
centralized government, enforcing the laws created in Monrovia (Nyei, 2014). 
Pailey (2017) says that vertical state-building in Liberia has been an internationally-
driven development policy focused on legitimizing state institutions through neoliberal 
macroeconomic reforms. Therefore, this ignored non-state institutions or even undermined 
local political solutions to development, or in this case, the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Likewise, 
there is also a call to caution between internal and external validity and presumptions on 
reforming or introducing institutions for economic growth (Adam and Dercon, 2009). Adam 
and Dercon (2009) ask whether development practitioners should examine if existing 
institutions are there for a good reason, as opposed to automatically changing everything to 
mirror Western states. Thus, it is useful to briefly examine Liberia’s local non-state 
institutions in this section, however, we will discuss rural institutions further in chapter two, 
where the theoretical framework is laid out. 
1.3.2.1 Non-State Actors 
 
According to Logan (2013)’s analysis of a multi-country 2008-2009 Afrobarometer 
survey, chiefs and clan leaders enjoy extensive popular support. In Liberia, 60% of 
respondents said traditional rulers had an important part in modern society and 58% said 
that these leaders should play a bigger role. In a 2014-2015 Afrobarometer survey, 49.8% 
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say they trust traditional leaders a lot/somewhat but only 30.1% said the same about the 
President (Afrobarometer, 2019).24 This supports the argument that vertical state-building 
policies do not always bring legitimacy, including the holding of elections (Harris, 2012; 
Mulbah, 2018; Pailey, 2017). Traditional leaders enjoy popular legitimacy, even among both 
genders (Logan, 2013). Logan (2013) says this could reflect the conservative attitudes of 
women. However, the author did not consider that Liberia has traditional institutions for 
women too: secret societies. This is where women organize and can climb the ranks for 
social status and power (Moran, 1989). Thus, local institutions do not leave out women as 
there are also designated spaces for them. They are discussed as part of community 
engagement efforts in chapters two, four, and five. 
 
1.3.3 Rebuilding the Healthcare System 
 
By 2003, 354 of the 550 health facilities that existed before the war were 
functioning, and about 80% of those were operated by an NGO or faith-based charity; the 
clinical workforce measured at 3,100 persons, including private and nonprofit staff (Lee et 
al., 2011). The greater economy had an annual government revenue where spending on 
public services was at about $25 dollars (USD) per person (Lee et al., 2011). President 
Johnson-Sirleaf’s administration announced a suspension of user fees for those accessing 
the health facilities in 2007 (Meessen et al., 2011; Yates, 2009). 
The introduction of the 2007 Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) was a dual-
track design where government efforts would not duplicate where external partners were 
already funding services (Meessen et al., 2011). The BPHS was one component of the 
National Health Plan and delivered maternal and newborn health from antenatal care to 
postpartum and newborn care; child health services that included expanded immunizations, 
childhood illnesses, and infant and young child feeding; also, reproductive and adolescent 
health, which targeted HIV and other sexually transmitted infections (Government of 
Liberia, 2011). It targeted the major disease burdens as defined by the WHO, and maternal, 
infant, and childhood mortality rates. The administration increased health human resources 
(HRHs)25 by using off-budget funding to employ workers and get around the employment 
                                                          
24 There are tables in section 1.5 from the 2014-2015 Afrobarometer survey comparing both countries before the end of 
the Ebola epidemic. 
25 ‘Health Human Resources’ or ‘Human Resources for Health’ refer to the health labor force, from frontline and support 
workers to managerial staff (World Health Organization, 2006; World Health Organization 2016h). The thesis focuses on 
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ban instituted by the World Bank and IMF conditionalities that restricted funding for 
government personnel (Varpilah et al., 2011). However, by 2008, Liberia was very 
dependent on external funding (80%) and the provision of health services presented 
challenges and competing priorities (Kruk et al., 2010). In addition, mental health and 
emergency care services were part of the BPHS, but not fully integrated. Kruk et al. (2010) 
say that the government’s goal of having 70% of all health facilities offering all BPHS services 
by 2010 was unlikely. 
The Liberian government, donors, funders, and humanitarian partners worked 
together from 2006 to 2009 to rebuild the healthcare system and maintain access to 
services (Newbrander, Waldman, and Shepherd-Banigan, 2011). Thus, with donors 
supporting humanitarian agencies to deliver services, the Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare (MHSW)26 was able to focus on long-term strategies such as training and 
accreditation of schools. The four components of the National Health Plan - which included 
the BPHS, human resources, infrastructure, and support systems - was the framework used 
to align stakeholders with national priorities (Newbrander, Waldman, and Shepherd-
Banigan, 2011). So, health interventions were led by MHSW. Liberia was one of the top ten 
countries for infant mortality from 2000 to 2010 (Lawn et al., 2012), but infant and 
childhood mortality (MDGs 4 and 5) had dropped significantly by 2010 (World Health 
Organization, 2012b).27 However, non-MDGs health services, such as mental health 
mentioned above by Kruk et al. (2010), were not well integrated or targeted. 
The Liberian health sector pool fund was created in 2007 and it was one of the first 
of its kind. A state ministry oversaw health priorities, directed county health teams, and 
coordinated dozens of NGOs in the country (Abramowitz, 2014). According to Abramowitz 
(2014), the fund came with a mandate to decentralize the health sector as part of the 
country’s overall democratization reforms. However, the structure of MHSW was still very 
bureaucratic and hierarchical; except for directors and program managers, all senior-level 
employees were appointed by the President (Nyenswah, Engineer, and Peters, 2016). The 
chain of command would start with a director or manager to the assistant minister of a 
                                                          
direct care staff, but support staff, such as security workers and cleaners at the health centers were also exposed, infected, 
and some died from EVD during the outbreak. 
26 The ministry restructured and changed its name after the 2014 Ebola outbreak to Ministry of Health, but MHSW is used 
in the thesis to prevent confusion with other health ministries (An act to establish the Ministry of Health 2015, 2016). 
27 This is shown in tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 in section 1.5.1. 
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division, to the deputy minister of a department, then to the minister of MHSW, and then 
the President. According to Nyenswah, Engineer, and Peters (2016), this made it less 
efficient, limited engagement with stakeholders, and made it difficult to assume leadership 
during a crisis. Additionally, there were challenges with supply chain management in 
community-based services. According to Miller et al. (2018)’s study, the persistent stock-
outs of drugs had resulted in community health services stopping in three out of the four 
study districts before the Ebola outbreak. This situation was more severe than in Guinea and 
Sierra Leone in this same study (Miller et al., 2018). 
A study conducted in rural Nimba County of northern Liberia showed that, as of 
2015, about half of survey respondents were not confident they could obtain health care if 
needed (Svoronos, Macauley, and Kruk, 2015). This study shows that prior experience with 
formal healthcare correlated with the confidence of obtaining healthcare, rather than 
proximity to facilities or quality of medical equipment. The poor and less educated had less 
confidence in the formal health sector meeting their needs. Thus, even though Liberia had 
secured a funding pool and chose its priorities, there were still demand-side challenges in 
getting consumers to access care. According to the MHSW 2011 to 2021 strategy, the 
healthcare system was not responsive or results-oriented due to low utilization and 
anecdotal evidence of the low quality of care (Government of Liberia, 2011). Service 
decentralization was proposed as a solution, but no goals or plans were stated. In terms of 
financial constraints, facilities are funded by government block grants and not performance-
based funds. Therefore, services are facility-oriented rather than tailored to the needs of 
the local population. Additional revenue sources such as sin taxes28 or piloting of social 
health insurance plans are suggested but these were not implemented nationally before the 
2014 Ebola epidemic (Government of Liberia, 2011). 
Thus, there were integration problems as external partners do not always work with 
county health teams, opting in favor of vertical interventions and thus, creating a parallel 
healthcare system. Before the Ebola outbreak, there were thousands of community health 
volunteers and development committees made up of trusted local leaders and peers to 
conduct community health services, such as administer Vitamin A and deworming 
                                                          
28 Sin taxes are state-sponsored taxes to discourage the consumption of vices such as tobacco, alcohol, or gambling. The 
use of these goods or services bears a social cost on society and thus generating revenue this way can also off-set this cost. 
Social cost is discussed in chapter two, see Becker and Becker (1997) and Reubi (2016) for further reading. 
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medication (Bedford and Miller, 2017). However, Bedford and Miller (2017) report that 
MHSW says that these projects are largely led by external partners and receive little support 
from the ministry. This could lead to implementation problems as found in Petit et al. 
(2013). 
This study of the BPHS found that limited engagement between health workers and 
policymakers posed this challenge (Petit et al., 2013). In interviews with health workers, 
they find that the low uptake of sexual and reproductive health services was due to 
demand-side barriers related to sociocultural challenges in the community and the role of 
traditional midwives.29 However, policymakers attributed this to supply-side factors, 
resulting in asymmetrical policy planning. Policymakers focused on expanding the list of 
BPHS services offered, instead of addressing poor working conditions and constraints with 
the health workers to improve the services already offered (Petit et al., 2013). 
This also presents a conundrum in medical humanitarianism, as there can be a gap 
between the community’s needs, front line workers, and NGO decision makers. In 
Abramowitz (2015)’s research on Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF)’s withdrawal from three 
major Liberian hospitals, demonstrates that NGOs operate sovereignly from the health 
system. They often make decisions irrespective of the health consequences, local needs, or 
sentiments, especially if they perceive that their mandate has ended. A hasty withdrawal or 
“turnover” to MHSW could result in a gap in health services if development aid is not yet in 
effect. 
 
1.3.4 ‘Good Governance’ in Liberia 
 
President Johnson-Sirleaf’s administration had succeeded in promoting Liberia as a 
model for post-conflict development, with advancements in health and governance 
indicators, at least on paper (Nkwanga, 2015). It was heralded as making the greatest 
progress in its health status as it had the highest increase of life expectancy in the world of 
19.7 years from 1990 to 2012 (Nkwanga, 2015, World Health Organization, 2014b). 
                                                          
29 Traditional midwives, also known as traditional birth attendants (TBAs), tend to be older women in the community who 
assist mothers before and after pregnancies. Initially, there was a policy to integrate TBAs into primary healthcare policies 
(World Health Organization, 1978b); however, these traditional healers were partly blamed for high MMI rates. There has 
been a movement to make pregnant women deliver in a health center with a “skilled birth attendant” (Dodgeon, 2010). 
However, there is a debate on how this impacts rural women and access to healthcare; see Chi and Urdal (2018), Choguya 
(2015), Rishworth et al. (2016) Rudrum (2015). At the time of fieldwork, Sierra Leone and Liberia had laws banning at-home 
birth, which criminalizes the work that these women do. 
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According to Keith and Cadge (2010), this progress was due to political commitment and 
leadership from the President’s office, Ministry of Finance, and MHSW for promoting and 
coordinating partnerships between donors, national and international NGOs, charities, and 
the returning Liberian diaspora. And, according to a UNAIDS report, Liberia had 30,000 
people living with HIV/AIDS as of 2013 and has had a significant decline in AIDS-related 
mortality since 2005 (UNAIDS, 2018a). Between 2003 and 2011, Liberia halved infant 
mortality rates despite having fewer than 0.2 HRHs per 1000 persons (Keith and Cadge, 
2010). When user fees were dropped, the government had 4 million USD to run the 
healthcare system and weak capacity as mentioned, because much of the health 
infrastructure was destroyed during the war (Keith and Cadge, 2010). The 2007 national 
health plan also committed to spending 15% of its national budget on health, which was in 
line with the Abuja Declaration of 2001 (Lee et al., 2011). Keith and Cadge (2010) say that 
these commitments amounted to an investment of 20% of its national budget into the 
healthcare system. Thus, before 2010, Keith and Cadge (2010) and Newbrander, Waldman, 
and Shepherd-Banigan (2011) believe that Liberia had a horizontal strengthening of its 
health system. 
Johnson-Sirleaf’s first term in office had economic growth rates up to 8% per annum 
and 16 billion USD of foreign direct investment, but 64% of Liberians live below the poverty 
line (Pailey and Harris, 2017). Transparency International credited Liberia as achieving 
“remarkable progress in the fight against corruption” (Chêne, 2012) since 2003. This was the 
result of the combined efforts of the international community, specifically GEMAP, which 
helped to promote accountability, transparency, and responsibility in key areas of the 
country’s governance, according to Chêne (2012). However, President Johnson-Sirleaf has 
publicly said that the experience of GEMAP is mixed, it helped to address some issues of 
financial mismanagement, but it did not integratewell into other sectors (Government of 
Liberia, 2007). 
 
1.4 Sierra Leone 
 
Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, was initially a colony ‘founded’ by British 
abolitionists, freed and escaped slaves, and poor Black individuals whose descendants are 
called Krios (also the national language). The Krios’ influence and power never really 
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extended outside of Freetown. The southern and eastern parts of the country are heavily 
dominated by the Mende ethnic group and the Northern area is dominated by the Temne 
and Limba ethnic groups (Harris, 2012). 
Sierra Leone was a one-party state, which its leadership used a clientelist system to 
stay in power (Allen, 1995; Harris, 2012). From 1968 to 1992, the All People’s Congress 
(APC) party ruled; it was founded by the country’s first prime minister and then president, 
Siaka Stevens, who personally ruled until 1985 (Harris, 2012). Many working in government 
positions came from the same regional or ethnic group as the party leaders in power. Allen 
(1995) describes this clientelist model present in some African countries with strong 
centralized executive branches; however, ongoing corruption and spoils politics led to the 
breakdown in the state and military intervention in Sierra Leone. 
The country had to transform from a ‘big spending state’ to a small liberal 
government when its economy collapsed in the late 1970s (Williams, 2004). According to 
Mustapha (2006)’s research of Sierra Leone and Uganda, retrenching the state in developing 
countries had significant impacts. The introduction of administrative reforms via the IMF’s 
SAPs exacerbated an already declining economic condition under Stevens’ administration. 
The SAPs led to layoffs of educators, healthcare workers, and other administrative 
professionals, and the private sector was neither able to absorb this workforce nor deliver 
adequate services where the state had rescinded its support (Mustapha, 2006; Zack-
Williams, 1999). By the 1980s, APC supporters in public positions were laid off and President 
Joseph Momoh lost favor within his network, leaving him vulnerable for a coup d’état (Allen, 
1995). 
These reforms also meant that professionals had their savings shrunk as the country 
devalued the currency. Thus, with social and economic inequality rising, a black market and 
smuggling arose in the border towns of Sierra Leone, which in turn created political and 
security concerns. Mustapha (2006) says the rebellion which launched and brought the 
country into conflict in 1991 was a result of these conditions. 
 
1.4.1 Conflict and Aftermath 
 
The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was formed in 1991. This was a rebel force 
mainly made up of youths and supported by President Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia. It launched a rebellion to overthrow President Momoh (Harris, 2013; Human Rights 
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Watch, 1999). The RUF recruited children, villagers, and those in refugee camps, sometimes 
through coercion. A South African mercenary group, Executive Outcomes, was hired in 1995 
by the government to fight the RUF, alongside the Sierra Leonean army (Harris, 2012). 
However, between the start of the civil conflict and the government’s response, it was local 
resistance by the Kamajors in places like the Kailahun and Kono districts that fought the RUF 
and the military forces too (Harris, 2012; Mustapha, 2006). The Kamajors started as a 
grassroots militia with the mission of protecting families and villages, but as the organization 
grew larger, there were some problems with corruption and impeding the government 
forces (Harris, 2012). Harris (2012) says the army has a long history of being ineffective, 
mainly because the state did not scale up and equip it. In the 1970s and 1980s, the army 
reflected, in terms of ethnic and regional demographics, Temne and Limba northerners. 
Thus, it became a northern-based enclave to promote loyalty to the APC. Additionally, 
elements of the army and the RUF collaborated to loot towns and villages, with the head of 
state admitting that at least 20% of the army was disloyal (Harris, 2013). Thus, the average 
Sierra Leonean may have seen the army and the RUF equally as threatening (Harris, 2012). 
There was a break in the fighting in 1996, after a coup led by Brigadier General Julius 
Maada Bio. Although this was a military coup, General Bio only stayed in power through the 
national elections in 1996 and stepped down afterward (Harris, 2012).30 There is a debate 
about how and why Sierra Leone fell into civil war, as Bellows and Miguel (2009) and Harris 
(2012) do not believe ethnic tension was the source, even though it played a role in creating 
factions. However, the RUF did use diamonds and acquired land to fund their rebellion, 
which leads one to ask whether this was a greed-based or a grievance-based cause of 
conflict. In other words, there is a debate over whether the rebels were greedy for power 
and money, or whether they had grievances due to the lack of development and social 
mobility in life.31 
1.4.2 Post-Conflict State-Building 
 
                                                          
30 Bio was recently elected in the 2018 elections and is currently serving his first presidential term. 
31 Harris (2012; 2013) explores the debate on the conflict and the role of blood diamonds in Sierra Leone. He does not 
believe these were the cause of the war but played an important role in financing efforts. 
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Peace and stability after the war have been major concerns for Sierra Leone in 
particular, and the Mano River region in general.32 Mustapha (2010) argues that Sierra 
Leone has been in a state of negative peace since the Lomé peace accord. He describes this 
as, “a situation characterized by the absence of direct violence (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, 
and Miall 2005)—having failed thus far to put in place the conditions for sustainable, 
positive peace,” (Mustapha, 2010, p. 145). However, the problems in Sierra Leone reflect 
global inequities that are a result of global capitalism. Mustapha (2010) says that neoliberal 
policies have not only created global inequity, but they also recreate inequality at the local 
level. For example, there was a proliferation of jobs brought in by NGOs at the end of the 
war, but these required an educated and technically savvy workforce. Consequently, many 
young people are finding themselves unemployable: a similar situation before the war 
(Mustapha, 2010). Economic and infrastructure resources are highly centralized to urban 
areas, which also mimics the global political economy in terms of underdevelopment in the 
rural periphery. 
Recreating these inequities at the local level could bring conflict again. For instance, 
Richards (2005) argues that the international community may not fully understand the 
nuances of why there was a rebellion in the first place. He says that there were grievances in 
the rural communities that stemmed from archaic customary laws and lack of education and 
occupational opportunities. Therefore, donors and development practitioners should 
prioritize agrarian and land tenure reforms to encourage young people into farming. 
However, liberalizing trade policies meant that import markets were flooded with cheap rice 
from Asia (a staple crop food), which made it difficult for local farmers to compete (Hanlon, 
2005). Additionally, training provided to ex-combatants to become tailors, farmers, and 
other craftsmen were not enough for them to viably continue the trade and there was not 
enough demand in the local market for their services (Hanlon, 2005). 
Since independence, Sierra Leone had a highly centralized system with a strong 
executive office; Siaka Stevens abolished all forms of local government in 1972. After the 
war, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah’s administration started decentralization and held local 
elections (Jackson, 2006). However, there is a debate about whether the decentralization 
                                                          
32 Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea are part of the Mano River Union and sometimes these countries are 
collectively referred to as the Mano River countries or the Mano River region. It started in 1973 between Liberia and Sierra 
Leone and expanded after the civil wars (Mano River Union, 1973). 
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process is democratizing the state or reinstituting ineffective local institutions. Conteh 
(2017) says that, despite being nearly two decades after the peace accord, the healthcare 
system remains centralized and vulnerable to corruption. This would give us a better 
perspective if we understood the context of decentralization and governance reforms. 
Hanlon (2005) argues that the internationally-led development policies may be 
reinstating the same corrupt and ineffective institutions and macroeconomic policies that 
brought Sierra Leone to war in the first place. Specifically, these were the rushed elections 
at the national and local levels, including for paramount chiefs and IMF austerity measures 
targeting wage caps. The latter was flagged by the World Bank as a hindrance to recruiting 
and motivating the civil sector. Corruption at the state, parastatal, and private sectors were 
not addressed; the reintegration of ex-combatants and job creation were not priorities for 
the government or the IMF since wages were cut (Hanlon, 2005). However, unlike Liberia, 
the rebels of the RUF were not part of the transition, which may have had implications for 
reintegration (Harris, 2012). 
The 2002 elections, which reinstalled Kabbah in office – the donor community’s 
‘favorite’,33 were rushed before peace could be consolidated (Hanlon, 2005). The donor-led 
‘race to the polls’ before establishing peace was also seen in the 1996 elections and 
subsequent return to arms (Hanlon, 2005; Harris, 2012; Zack-Williams, 1999). Hanlon (2005) 
says President Kabbah led a corrupt and partisan administration and his reinstatement of 
paramount chiefs went against advice to decentralize and democratize.34 Hanlon (2005), 
Jackson (2005), and Richards (2005) say that paramount chiefs are an important cause of 
the war, by having alienated youth and women, and are authoritarian and corrupt.35 
Although Sawyer (2004; 2005b) argue that traditional leaders can help mediate conflict and 
resolve disputes. These local institutions are discussed further in chapter two. 
However, Jackson (2006) says that the government wanted to build on its election 
victory and hold local elections early to keep the momentum. There was a nationwide 
                                                          
33 Hanlon (2005) defines Kabbah as a puppet of the international donors, he received endorsements or resources to help 
with campaigns. Kabbah was elected in 1996 and removed via a coup but reinstated in 1998 with international support. 
34 In 2017, President Koroma increased the number of chiefdoms from 149 to 190 to deepen decentralization efforts with 
the support of the World Bank (All Africa, 2017; AYV Media Empire, 2017; Cocorioko, 2017; Concord Times, 2017; Kamara, 
S., 2017). See Cambayma (2017) for a dissenting view on this. 
35 There is a debate on how the chieftaincy institution was the main source of civil conflict as they are mainly led by older 
men, and thus, whether including this institution in post-conflict recovery will trigger another war. However, as mentioned 
earlier, traditional institutions for women were not considered in this debate. This is discussed in Chapter two, on page 71. 
See Fanthorpe (2001; 2006), Jackson (2005), Peters and Richards (1998) and Sawyer (2008). 
24 | P a g e  
 
consultation financed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), however, 
the results of these consults did not lead to radical change. No district voted to remove the 
chiefdom institution, and some wanted more representation. A local electoral government 
was created with strong supervisory powers from Freetown. Jackson (2006) predicted slow 
devolution of powers, which as mentioned in Conteh (2017), is still slowly happening. 
Paramount chiefs have a central role in local government as administrators, and effectively 
control the entire bureaucracy for the district councils. However, the councils have the 
authority to set local tax rates and decide how tax funds will be spent, including whether to 
distribute funds to the chiefdoms (Jackson, 2006; Sawyer, 2008). 
1.4.2.1 Non-State Actors 
 
According to the 2014-2015 Afrobarometer survey, 65.5 % of respondents trust 
traditional leaders a lot/somewhat, while 51.8% gave the same answer when asked about 
the President. In terms of elected local councils that were created after the war only 31.5% 
had this level of trust (Afrobarometer, 2019). In the 2011-2013 survey, trust for the 
President was higher at 69.9% (a lot/somewhat) and for elected local officials at 44.1% 
(Afrobarometer, 2019). However, this question was not asked for traditional leaders in this 
survey. So, it seems that from 2013 to 2015, trust declined in state institutions. In addition, 
trust is higher for non-state institutions, demonstrating that at least since the end of the 
war, the chiefdom institutions have popular legitimacy. 
 
1.4.3 Rebuilding the Healthcare System 
 
Sierra Leone had an HRH shortage and 70% of its health facilities were not 
functioning by the end of the conflict (World Bank, 2003). The economic and security 
uncertainties led to a migration of healthcare professionals from Sierra Leone to other 
countries recruiting them. Over half of doctors born in Sierra Leone are now working in 
OECD countries, such as the United States or the United Kingdom (Sharples, 2015). 
According to Bertone and Witter (2015), in 2011 there were .0071 doctors and .0631 nurses 
per 10,000 people in the public sector. However, the 2014 Ebola epidemic killed many 
health workers, estimated at 21% of its HRH (Government of Sierra Leone, 2015; Raven, 
Wurie, and Witter, 2018). 
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Between 2003 and 2010, the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MOHS) allocated less 
than $4 USD per person per year for healthcare resulting in a collapse of these services and 
consequently, the highest child mortality and MMI rates (Keith and Cadge, 2010). Although 
the national policy was to provide health for mothers and children for free, this was not 
implemented until 2010, with support from the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID). Following this investment in health and the abolition of user fees for 
mothers and young children, Sierra Leone began reducing its child mortality rates (Keith and 
Cadge, 2010). 
This program is referred to as the Free Health Care Initiative (FHI). However, the 
policy had the unintended consequence of threatening the livelihoods of traditional birth 
attendants (Dodgeon, 2010). Attendants used to receive a portion of user fees for referring 
pregnant women to a health center, but after the FHI, some centers found it difficult to 
persuade them to continue the referrals. Bertone and Witter (2015) say that the FHI had a 
lack of resources, training, and ineffective management that led to a mistrust of the 
healthcare system. Health workers reported not being paid on time (or at all) nor were 
provided with the necessary resources such as gloves, bandages, or fuel for generators. 
Some reported charging fees for treatment and supplies that the government should have 
been providing. This stagnated the state’s attempt to prevent the poor from choosing 
between health care or financial distress (Bertone and Witter, 2015; Sharples, 2015). MOHS 
also set up a Facility Improvement Team to assess the readiness of health centers to 
implement the FHI. According to Abdullah and Kamara (2017), by July 2013 only a few 
centers met the minimum required standards (e.g. piped water, hospital beds, drugs, 
staffing…etc.). By July 2014 at the height of the Ebola epidemic, no facilities in the country 
passed the standards. 
The FHI is administered through the MOHS and is executed by its district-level 
offices. Yet, there have been many logistical challenges. For instance, there is a shortage of 
trained HRHs and many facilities are under-equipped to handle the services covered under 
the FHI (International Monetary Fund, 2011b). Especially at the launch of the program, 
many facilities were unprepared to handle the sudden influx of new patients (M’Cormack-
Hale and M’Cormack, 2016). MOHS was supposed to provide monitoring of district health 
facilities and teams. However, during Bertone and Witter (2015)’s fieldwork, they saw that 
state institutions set regulations and practices across the country, but at the district level, 
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informal practices emerge. Quarterly monitoring and evaluations are inconsistent if they do 
happen at all. Also, local councils and the district health management teams are not 
involved in recruiting staff or payment, as that comes from Freetown (MOHS). 
The problems with the decentralization of recruitment, resources, and payroll to the 
district level may be related to the funding sources of the country’s healthcare system and 
local political issues (Conteh, 2017). According to the 2011 PRS, the government 
acknowledged that its spending needed to increase to make the healthcare system 
sustainable and create a mechanism to pool donor funds. It also says that 95% of national 
response is donor-funded and that there are many civil service organizations and NGOs 
involved in the response, and this is a problem to keep track, coordinate, and monitor. 
Monitoring and evaluations are grossly underfunded and under-resourced to implement all 
poverty-reduction initiatives mentioned throughout the report (International Monetary 
Fund, 2011b). 
However, Fanthorpe, Laval, and Sesay (2011) report that quantitative and qualitative 
indicators show a material impact of decentralization. Between 2005 and 2007, local 
councils that managed service deliveries showed improvements in primary health care. The 
qualitative data showed that other services improved such as more schools, sanitation, 
more roads, and the roll-out of the FHI. 
The health system also relies on volunteers through health management committees 
throughout the country. They have different names, such as ‘development committee’ or 
‘village committee’ and are funded through different NGOs, charities, funder and donor 
agencies (McMahon et al., 2017). Committees have different focuses and structures, but 
some are there to support health promotion and integrate community voices. In focus 
group discussions with committee volunteers in the Bo and Kenema districts conducted by 
McMahon et al. (2017), informants discuss close relationships with local health workers and 
the community, which included counting new inventory that arrived for the sake of 
transparency. Also, some informants discussed passing bylaws via the paramount chiefs to 
encourage healthy behaviors, such as leveraging a fine on lactating mothers who miss a 
postnatal appointment. 
The FHI has made positive contributions and it is very popular among citizens (Witter 
et al., 2016). It is reliant on external funding, which is feasible because the initiative was 
designed to achieve MDGs 4 and 5. There are many NGOs on the ground providing health 
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services today in Sierra Leone, but these are often service-specific (like childhood 
immunizations or HIV/AIDS testing) and thus, do not serve the broader public. Not only may 
these NGOs not represent the greatest health need of a village, but they sometimes will 
siphon local health workers to work for them, leaving state-sponsored clinics understaffed 
or closed (Bertone and Witter, 2015). Moreover, senior health workers are placed in 
administrative capacities where they are no longer using their much needed clinical skills 
(Abdullah and Kamara, 2017). 
Herrick and Brooks (2018) also discuss the challenges of donor-recipient36 relations 
in the health sector in Sierra Leone. While the term ‘partnership’ implies an equitable 
relationship on paper, the reality is different. Western volunteers learn that although 
‘partnership’ is used, local health workers expect donors to bring everything; even though 
MOHS is supposed to bring some equipment. However, since the hospital has a sponsoring 
partner, such as Kings College from the United Kingdom, MOHS resources are bypassed to 
another facility, ideally one without an external partner. This is the fungibility of aid (Farang 
et al., 2009),37 where sometimes aid replaces as opposed to supporting current systems. 
Fungibility could imply that the demand for health resources is not being met. Bertone and 
Witter (2015) and Herrick and Brooks (2018) present these challenges of implementing the 
FHI and developing the healthcare system horizontally. 
According to Sharples (2015), there would be enough financial resources to provide 
UHC if the government had stronger management of taxation on its extractives industry. 
Governments of low-income countries, like Sierra Leone, could provide UHC at a minimum 
of $86 USD per person per year. The author estimates that taxation could raise between $94 
to $199 million USD per year, which is short of the minimum $524 million USD needed in 
Sierra Leone; but, this could help supplement UHC efforts, along with aid (Sharples, 2015). 
However, the author says that $1.1 billion USD was pledged to combat the EVD outbreak in 
the country. This shows the disparity in donors’ preferences38 to channel aid, as it seems 
there are financial resources to strengthen the healthcare system, but rather, they react to 
                                                          
36 This article broadly uses the term ‘donor.’ 
37 For instance, there is a concern of fungibility and its impacts on sectors in low-income countries’. Fungibility is, 
“when government offsets donor spending for a particular purpose by reducing its expenditures on the same purpose 
and therefore aid substitutes rather than supplements local spending,” (Farang et al., 2009, p. 1045). The health and 
agriculture sectors tend to be the most affected by the substitution of aid funds resulting in reduced services. If a 
middle-income country receives aid and decreases its spending on a sector, it does not impact it as negatively as a low-
income country. This is because wealthier countries tend to spend more on their sectors. 
38 This report uses the terms, ‘donors’ and ‘donor aid.’ 
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an acute emergency while overlooking the broader picture. This highlights a difference in 
the priorities made on the supply-side (providers of aid) and demand-side (recipients of aid) 
in the aid market. 
According to the last PRS papers before the EVD outbreak, the macroeconomic 
overview showed a growing trade deficit because the country’s exports declined in the 
global markets (International Monetary Fund, 2011b). Although it had improved since 2012, 
the economy is still very weak to compete in the global market (International Monetary 
Fund, 2012). Additionally, its primary exports are in the mining and agriculture sectors, so it 
remains exposed to the volatility of international commodity markets (International 
Monetary Fund, 2011b). Therefore, advocating for UHC to be heavily reliant on a narrow 
extractives industry may make service delivery more challenging than it already is, especially 
if commodity prices fall. 
 
1.4.4 ‘Poor Governance’ in Sierra Leone 
 
According to its 2005 PRS, poverty was a pervasive factor throughout society, 
standing at 70% (International Monetary Fund, 2005), the government aligned its policies of 
addressing underdevelopment by adopting the framework of the MDGs for “bold and 
appropriate sectoral policies, measures and institutional reforms that achieve economic 
growth, increase food security, increase job opportunities and provide better basic social 
services, as well as effective social safety nets for the poor and vulnerable.” (International 
Monetary Fund, 2005, p. 75). However, this does not mean these were implemented during 
this time. Jackson (2011, p. 208) says that Sierra Leone has been considered a success story, 
in terms of the state being “reconstructed by the international community” however, that 
does not necessarily mean a strengthening of local governance. 
Sierra Leone has been called one of the worst places in the world for a child to be 
born (Keith and Shackleton, 2006; Mason, 2016; VSO International, 2019) or one of the 
worst countries to live in (Abdullah and Kamara, 2017). This is regarding it consistently 
having one of the highest MMI rates since the 1990s. It also ranked very high for child 
deaths (under age five mortality); according to Keith and Shackleton (2006), the death rates 
for women and children were largely attributed to user fees. Malaria, which can be fatal in 
young children, cost £4.24 GBP or 18,000 Leones to treat. However, the average Sierra 
Leonean would have to work for 14 days to earn this, the equivalent of a British citizen 
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paying £700 GBP for Malaria treatment (Keith and Shackleton, 2006). Before the creation of 
FHI, out of pocket expenditures on health services were over 80%, which according to 
Witter et al. (2016) was worse than most, if not all, low-income countries.39 Jain, Brown, and 
Johnson (2015) say that one in ten women risk dying during pregnancy or childbirth and 
almost one in every three children, under the age of five, dies. Creating the FHI was a 
positive step to improve health governance (Dodgeon, 2010; Witter et al., 2016). Prior to 
2010, Keith and Cadge (2010) and Keith and Shackleton (2006) believe that Sierra Leone 
relied on vertical interventions in its healthcare system and not horizontal strengthening. 
 
1.5 Reflections on Post-Conflict Recovery 
 
Guttal (2005, p. 73-74) says that post-conflict recovery is about setting up a market-
based capitalist economic system with a political regime to support and defend the free-
market. Success or failure of these development efforts are not measured by broad social, 
economic, political, or security trends of the domestic population, but rather if countries are 
complying with the externally-determined standards of a market economy, ‘good 
governance’, and liberal democracy. Therefore, these policies keep states in a persistent 
condition of failure, rather than recovery. 
The MDGs were part of the global governance indicators that low-income countries 
used to define and assess overall poverty reduction and development strategies; this was 
created by the UN and the PRS funded the implementation of the MDGs (International 
Monetary Fund, 2011a). The PRS tends to have a lack of clarity around financial resources 
available for health, including how PRS-related debt relief will partly or fully replace 
government funds for health. The PRS was created for aid effectiveness and good 
governance, but in many cases may lead to aid fungibility (Farang et al., 2009). 
Vertical interventions, often led by Western-derived NGOs to do selective health 
services, such as HIV/AIDS or Malaria treatments were preferred. This is in the context of 
liberal economic reforms, as these were cost-effective interventions rather than system-
wide strengthening. Although Liberia had a pooled funding mechanism and was able to 
                                                          
39 Out of pocket expenses vary widely between countries, but catastrophic spending on health (defined as greater than 
40% of income after subsistence needs are met) are higher in low-income countries. This could be the causal link between 
ill health and impoverishment, if one has to choose between healthcare expenses and other needs (Xu et al. 2003). 
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prioritize its health services for a few years after the war, based on the indicators below, it is 
unclear how this impacted the health system broadly or in the long-term. 
 
1.5.1 Comparing Health Indicators 
 
Table 1.1 is health workers per 10,000 persons from 2005 to 2010 (World Health 
Organization, 2012b). This demonstrates a significant shortage of HRH. Just as a comparison, 
the United Kingdom, which has UHC, had 27.4 physicians and 101.3 nurses/midwives per 
10,000 during this period (World Health Organization, 2012b). If a country has at least 2.5 
health workers (all professions) per 1000 persons (25 per 10,000); achieving 80% coverage 
for immunizations or skilled delivery of infants is more likely (Chen et al., 2004). 
 
Table 1.1 HRH Density per 10,000 persons 
Health Workers Liberia Sierra Leone 
Physicians 0.1 0.2 
Nurses/Midwives 2.7 1.7 
Dentists <0.05 <0.05 
Pharmaceutical workers 0.8 0.3 
Public Health workers 0.1 0.2 
Community Health workers N/A 0.2 
Psychiatrists <0.05 <0.05 
 
Table 1.2 shows a decrease in infant mortality and childhood mortality rates over 
two decades. This is to be expected as it starts from the conflict period. The data are from 
the World Health Organization (2012b). 
 
Table 1.2 Infant and Childhood Mortality Rates per 1000 live births 
Year Infant Mortality Rates Under Age 5 Mortality Countries 
1990 151 227 Liberia 
1990 162 276 Sierra Leone 
2000 115 169 Liberia 
2000 142 233 Sierra Leone 
2010 74 103 Liberia 
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2010 114 174 Sierra Leone 
 
Table 1.3 is from the Global Health Observatory on the WHO’s website. This recent 
data for infant and childhood mortality rates per 1000 live births (World Health 
Organization, 2016b; World Health Organization, 2016c). 
Table 1.3 Global Health Observatory on Infant and Childhood Mortality 
Year Infant Mortality Rates Under Age 5 Mortality Countries 
2012 65.4 89.7 Liberia 
2012 99.8 145.6 Sierra Leone 
2015 59.3 80.1 Liberia 
2015 88.1 122.2 Sierra Leone 
 
After 2010, Sierra Leone saw improvements in some health indicators such as 
childhood, infant, and maternal mortality. This partly due to the implementation of the FHI 
(Witter et al., 2016). Whereas, in Liberia, funding and support began to decrease after this 
period from NGOs and donors (Newbrander, Waldman, and Shepherd-Banigan, 2011). 
Nonetheless, indicators on childhood and infant mortality rates show both countries had 
improved infant and child health since the conflict period. However, it is difficult to discern 
which country improved its health system based on these quantitative indicators alone. For 
example, the tables below examine access to health services and health inequities for 
nonMDG-related indicators. 
Table 1.4 shows the percentage of DTP3 Immunizations among one-year olds, this 
vaccine is not part of the MDGs (World Health Organization, 2012b). Sierra Leone had 
higher coverage of this vaccine to children from poorer families and rural areas. 
CATEGORIES Place of Residence Wealth Quintile Education level of Mother 
 Urban Rural Lowest Highest None Secondary or Higher 
Liberia 70% 41% 30% 72% 47% 70% 
Sierra Leone 70% 58% 56% 73% 57% 76% 
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Table 1.5 shows the percentage of children under age five who are stunted, this is 
not assessed as part of the MDGs (World Health Organization, 2012b). Both countries are 
comparable in this indicator, although Sierra Leone has slightly lower rates. 
CATEGORIES Place of Residence Wealth Quintile Education level of Mother 
 Urban Rural Lowest Highest None Secondary or Higher 
Liberia 29% 41% 43% 25% 40% 28% 
Sierra Leone 28% 38% 35% 22% 38% 23% 
 
1.5.2 Liberia as a Model of Post-Conflict Development 
 
Liberia made progress in life expectancy indicators from 1990 to 2012 (Keith and 
Cadge, 2010; Nkwanga, 2015). In addition, it improved in other indicators such as health 
financing and some of the 2015 MDGs. However, that is not to say that Sierra Leone had not 
improved. The interpretation of these indicators needs more nuance, as we see that both 
countries had different starting points. Petit et al. (2013) say that initial good results should 
be expected as the BPHS are executed and monitored via quantitative indicators, but 
system-wide challenges could be hidden if we only rely on these indicators to assess 
governance. 
Relying on a few indicators can also distort service delivery (prioritizing a massive 
amount of funding on a singular issue) and create an illusion of progress, regression, or 
stagnation. This may explain why Liberia initially had good results (Petit et al., 2013). 
Moreover, it is also used to label countries as having poor or weak governance, such as 
Sierra Leone in maternal, infant, and child mortality indicators. This does not only happen in 
health governance but development policies broadly, such as claiming Sierra Leone as one 
of the world’s fastest-growing economies (Fofana, 2014a; International Monetary Fund, 
2012);40 while numbers do not lie, the truth can be hidden. 
For example, there is still more aid available for HIV/AIDS or Malaria than there is for 
mental health; which according to Liberia’s former minister for MHSW, is desperately 
needed in a post-conflict state that only has one certified psychotherapist (Kruk et al., 
2010). Liberia achieved many indicators on the global health agenda and was seen as a post-
                                                          
40 After the war, activity in the mining sector resumed in Sierra Leone. This led to a 20% GDP growth from 2012-2013. 
However, more than half of the country’s six million citizens live on less than $1.25 USD per day (Fofana, 2014a). 
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conflict success story, but the health system struggled to identify and contain the spread of 
EVD in 2014 (Pailey, 2017). 
1.5.3 Building the State Institutions 
 
Post-conflict development and health interventions have different stakeholders, but 
there is some overlap as much of the financing comes from IFIs, and thus, macro-political 
and economic conditionalities are imposed for recipient countries. These have also resulted 
in increased inequalities and social polarization in some cases, as only a few will benefit 
from market opportunities (Guttal, 2005). Mulbah (2018) says that state-building in Liberia 
has followed a modern and Weberian understanding of what the state is, and hence, 
rendering local and traditional institutions invisible. These institutions have been portrayed 
as developmental delays, rather than as an artifact of the state. The international 
community’s development practices comprise of a standard set of reforms and projects 
delivered to low-income countries: 
 
State-building can also be categorised into tasks of political development, building administration, justice, PFM and 
security (Call 2008), which correlate with the apparent normative objectives of state-building: security, democracy, 
economic development and the rule of law. The four thematic areas of the state translate into empirical state-
building practices, namely SSR [Security System Reform] and human security (i.e. security); elections and 
democracy support (i.e. legitimacy); IFI policies and PRS (i.e. economic policy-making and public finances); and 
judicial reform, SSR and the training of the police force (i.e. rule of law) (Mulbah, 2018, p. 71). 
 
In Sierra Leone and Liberia, peacebuilding, elections, peacekeeping missions, and 
even international criminal court trials are practices meant to bring security and legitimacy 
to the state. However, both countries have dual systems of justice, governing, and security 
through indigenous or traditional institutions (Conteh, 2013; Harris, 2013; Tokpa and 
Yengbeh Jr., 2012; UNDEF, 2014). These reforms are meant to introduce and build new 
institutions for capitalist-led economic growth, but not for broader socioeconomic 
development (Gray, 2016). These indicators measure how state institutions are governing 
but not non-state institutions like the chiefdoms. Therefore, it is important to understand 
how citizens see themselves in relation to the state and traditional institutions. 
The tables below are generated from the 2014/2015 Afrobarometer surveys, from 
the organization’s website, using the data comparison tool (Afrobarometer, 2019). 
Table 1.6: How satisfied are respondents with the way democracy works in 
____country? 
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Category Total  Liberia  Sierra Leone 
Country is not a democracy 1.1% 1.0% 1.1% 
Not at all satisfied 19.8% 23.2% 16.3% 
Not very satisfied 23.4% 26.8% 20.0% 
Fairly satisfied 22.2% 28.8% 15.6% 
Very satisfied 14.0% 14.5% 13.5% 
Don’t know 19.6% 5.7% 33.5% 
(N) 2,386 (100%) 1,195 (100%) 1,191 (100%) 
 
Table 1.7: How much do you trust the President? 
 
Category Total  Liberia  Sierra Leone 
Not at all 24.7% 31.5% 17.8% 
Just a little 31.6% 37.5% 25.7% 
Somewhat 16.8% 16.0% 17.7% 
A lot 24.0% 14.1% 34.1% 
Don’t know 2.8% 0.9% 4.7% 
(N) 2,390 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 1,191 (100%) 
 
Table 1.8: How much do you trust the local government councils? 
 
Category Total  Liberia  Sierra Leone 
Not at all 28.3% 23.8% 32.9% 
Just a little 36.4% 43.6% 29.1% 
Somewhat 20.6% 21.9% 19.3% 
A lot 10.5% 8.8% 12.2% 
Don’t know 4.2% 1.9% 6.6% 
(N) 2,390 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 1,191 (100%) 
 
Table 1.9: How much do you trust the army? 
 
Category Total  Liberia  Sierra Leone 
Not at all 18.6% 22.8% 14.4% 
Just a little 27.9% 32.4% 23.4% 
Somewhat 25.0% 27.4% 22.5% 
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A lot 25.3% 15.7% 34.9% 
Don’t know 3.3% 1.7% 4.8% 
(N) 2,389 (100%) 1,198 (100%) 1,191 (100%) 
 
Table 1.10: How much do you trust the courts of law? 
 
Category Total  Liberia  Sierra Leone 
Not at all 27.5% 25.4% 29.6% 
Just a little 34.4% 41.4% 27.4% 
Somewhat 22.1% 24.1% 20.1% 
A lot 9.8% 7.5% 12.2% 
Don’t know 6.2% 1.7% 10.7% 
(N) 2,390 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 1,191 (100%) 
 
Table 1.11: How much do you trust parliament or national assembly? 
 
Category Total  Liberia  Sierra Leone 
Not at all 31.4% 30.0% 32.9% 
Just a little 33.7% 38.3% 29.2% 
Somewhat 21.4% 22.3% 20.5% 
A lot 9.7% 8.5% 10.9% 
Don’t know 3.7% 0.9% 6.6% 
(N) 2,390 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 1,191 (100%) 
 
Table 1.12: Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the President performed 
his/her job over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? 
 
Category Total  Liberia  Sierra Leone 
Strongly disapprove 26.7% 32.7% 20.6% 
Disapprove 28.4% 33.3% 23.4% 
Approve 28.2% 23.9% 32.6% 
Strongly approve 13.6% 8.7% 18.5% 
Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough 3.1% 1.3% 4.9% 
(N) 2,388 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 1,189 (100%) 
 
Table 1.13: Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the member of national 
legislature performed his/her job over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard 
enough to say? 
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Category Total  Liberia  Sierra Leone 
Strongly disapprove 35.1% 34.3% 36.0% 
Disapprove 34.7% 34.6% 34.7% 
Approve 20.1% 24.1% 16.0% 
Strongly approve 6.2% 5.9% 6.5% 
Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough 3.9% 1.0% 6.7% 
(N) 2,388 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 1,189 (100%) 
 
Table 1.14: Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the member of the local 
council performed his/her job over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough to 
say? 
Category Total  Liberia  Sierra Leone 
Not at all 28.3% 23.8% 32.9% 
Just a little 36.4% 43.6% 29.1% 
Somewhat 20.6% 21.9% 19.3% 
A lot 10.5% 8.8% 12.2% 
Don’t know 4.2% 1.9% 6.6% 
(N) 2,390 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 1,191 (100%) 
 
Table 1.15 Do you think that leaders of political parties in this country are more 
concerned with serving the interests of the people, or more concerned with advancing their 
own political ambitions, or haven’t you heard enough to say? 
Category Total Liberia Sierra Leone 
More to serve their own political ambitions - strongly agree 47.6% 35.9% 59.4% 
More to serve their own political ambitions - agree 27.4% 32.0% 22.8% 
Neither agree nor disagree 5.7% 7.0% 4.4% 
More to serve the people - agree 8.1% 14.1% 2.0% 
More to serve the people - strongly agree 6.9% 8.6% 5.3% 
Don’t know 4.3% 2.5% 6.1% 
(N) 2,382 (100%) 1,191 (100%) 1,191 (100%) 
Table 1.16 How many of the following people do you think are involved in 
corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? The President and officials in 
his office. 
 
Category Total  Liberia Sierra Leone 
All of them 23.9% 32.7% 15.1% 
Most of them  31.8% 30.5% 33.1% 
Some of them  33.4% 31.8% 35.1% 
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None 3.7% 3.4% 4.1% 
Don’t know 7.1%  1.6% 12.6% 
(N) 2,390 (100%)   1,199 (100%) 1,191 (100%) 
 
Tables 1.6 to 1.16 demonstrate lukewarm trust towards state institutions, except for 
the presidency in Sierra Leone during this year; there are high disapproval ratings on official 
performance for the past 12 months of each level of government. Trust is an important 
component in building a nation on common grounds. Additionally, it is needed for 
leadership in a public health emergency (Morse et al., 2016). Development policies are 
limited in building trust between people and their governments. This is not to say that the 
relationship between the state and the people are hopeless, but rather, changes in service 
delivery and accountability are needed to build trust. And not all of these can be externally 
led. In Sierra Leone, the majority still trust and approve of the president, while nearly half 
believe that all or most officials in the office are corrupt (Tables 1.7 and 1.16). It could be 
the way the question is phrased, as trust and performance approvals are centered on the 
person, while the question of corruption is asked about the office. So, one may see cabinet 
members and associates as corrupt but not the president. Or, as we will discuss in the next 
chapter, respondents may view elected officials as self-serving and not accountable; this is 
an unintended consequence of democratic reforms. Chapter two, section 2.2.1.2, discusses 
the argument that elections will clear out corrupt candidates, but the reality is more 
complicated. 
In terms of traditional leaders, Afrobarometer asked these following questions in the 
2014/2015 surveys Tables 1.17 to 1.19 (Afrobarometer, 2019): 
Table 1.17: How much do you trust traditional leaders? 
 
Category Total  Liberia Sierra Leone 
Not at all 13.0% 15.0% 11.1% 
Just a little 25.8% 33.1% 18.6% 
Somewhat 29.3% 29.5% 29.1% 
A lot 28.3% 20.3% 36.4% 
Don’t know 3.5% 2.2% 4.8% 
(N) 2,387 (100%) 1,196 (100%) 1,191 (100%) 
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Table 1.18: Do you approve or disapprove on how traditional leaders performed 
their jobs in the past 12 months? 
 
Category Total Liberia  Sierra Leone 
Strongly disapprove 14.9% 17.5% 12.2% 
Disapprove 21.0% 25.1% 16.8% 
Approve 41.3% 40.0% 42.6% 
Strongly approve 18.0% 14.0% 22.0% 
Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough 4.8% 3.4% 6.3% 
(N) 2,387 (100%) 1,199 (100%) 1,189 (100%) 
 
Table 1.19: Involvement in corruption? 
 
Category Total  Liberia  Sierra Leone 
None 11.0% 8.6% 13.4% 
Some of them 44.3% 47.6% 40.9% 
Most of them 25.4% 25.6% 25.2% 
All of them 12.6% 15.3% 10.0% 
Don’t know 6.7% 3.0% 10.5% 
(N) 2,386 (100%) 1,195 (100%) 1,191 (100%) 
 
Tables 1.17 to 1.19 show relatively more positive attitudes towards traditional 
leaders than elected officials. 65.5% of Sierra Leonean respondents say they trust traditional 
leaders a lot/somewhat in table 1.17. This is higher than trust ratings for the President at 
51.8% (Table 1.7) or local elected officials that were installed after the war (31.5% in table 
1.8). 49.8% of Liberians trust traditional leaders in table 1.17, compared to the President at 
30.1% in table 1.7 or 30.7% who trust local elected officials in table 1.8. In Sierra Leone, 
35.2% of respondents believe that most or all traditional leaders are corrupt in table 1.19, 
compared to 48.2% when asked about the executive office in table 1.16. In Liberia, 40.9% 
believe that all or most traditional leaders are corrupt compared to 63.2% when asked 
about the executive office in tables 1.19 and 1.16 respectively. Thus, there needs to be an 
examination of why there are more positive perceptions of traditional institutions that are 
not democratically elected, and in some cases, people may prefer nonliberal forms of 
government (Fanthorpe, 2006). 
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Voors and Bulte (2014) say there is scant evidence-based research to support 
evolutionary or design-based theories of institutional quality.41 The design-based theories 
are the development models such as the good governance reforms. The authors say when 
there are internal pressures such as violence or shocks, this would create bottom-up 
changes to institutions: a change in local preferences and beliefs. They found no evidence 
that NGO or state-led interventions impact institutional quality. Also, changes due to 
internal pressure are not always positive, such as those exposed to violence have a worse 
view of the state (police, army…etc.). However, Bellows and Miguel (2009)’s research on 
collective action in Sierra Leone demonstrates that chiefdoms and households that 
experienced violence are more likely to be politically involved in post-conflict recovery, in 
terms of mobilization, engagement, and public goods contribution. For example, Sawyer 
(2008) observed paramount chiefs participating in national and local elections after the war. 
Section 1.5 gives enough contextual information to understand the state of affairs in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, including the challenges and successes in reforming the state for 
development. Non-state institutions are not discussed in depth in the broader good 
governance framework, however, this will be conceptualized in the next chapter. The 
beginning of the chapter discussed priorities and challenges on the supply-side of the aid 
market. Therefore, this final section gives a brief introduction to the EVD outbreak and the 
macro-level discussion regarding the response from the international community and 
challenges in the supply-side of the aid market. 
 
1.6 Introduction to the 2014 Ebola Epidemic 
 
Ebola is a filovirus, which is a taxon of viruses that consist of a single strand 
ribonucleic acid; and is one of the oldest pathogens known, dating back to tens of millions of 
years ago (Taylor, Leach, and Bruenn, 2010). It is fragile but one of the more lethal 
pathogens known to man. Before 2014, this was a neglected tropical disease that broke out 
in obscure places (Preston, 2012). AIDS, which “kills much more slowly than Ebola” (Preston, 
2012, p. 66), is one of the largest and active pandemics in our history. However, Ebola, for 
several months, paralyzed an entire region and spread fear among the global community. 
                                                          
41Voors and Bulte (2014) define institutional quality in these four criteria: rights security, appreciation of local political 
institutions, rule of law, and social capital. Social capital is defined as trust and cooperation. Some of these concepts of 
institutions and institutional quality will be discussed in the next chapter on the theoretical framework for this thesis. 
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On March 23, 2014, the WHO issued its first response regarding the prevalence of 
EVD in West Africa (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2019). It said that the initial 
case was a small boy who had encountered a fruit bat, then died in December 2013 in the 
Guéckédou prefecture in southern Guinea. This province borders northwestern Liberia and 
eastern Sierra Leone. There were suspicions of a hemorrhagic fever in the southern forested 
region of the country (Tounkara, 2014). Finally, the Guinean health officials announced on 
March 22nd that EVD was present in the country and had already killed 34 people since 
February 9th (Africaguinee, 2014). Liberia had started investigating suspicious cases since the 
beginning of 2014 and Sierra Leone started around April. Liberia confirmed its first EVD case 
on March 30th in the northern county of Lofa and by May 25th, Sierra Leone’s first confirmed 
case was announced in the eastern district of Kenema42 (Davies and Rushton, 2016; 
DePinto, 2016). 
For this thesis, I divide the Ebola epidemic into two periods: phase one and phase 
two. The first phase is from December 2013 to September 2014, a month after the WHO 
declared the EVD outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). The 
second phase is from October 2014 until the WHO declared the entire epidemic finished in 
2016. The second phase saw a scale up of aid and donor resources, where international 
agencies and countries promised resources and several intervened. Although it is called a 
‘scale up’ it is not to depict billions of dollars flooding in immediately. Bullard (2018)’s 
research shows that many donors and NGOs took longer to arrive, some coming as late as 
December 2014. Furthermore, although resources, such as field hospitals and ambulances 
were promised, not all were brought in or built (Nyenswah et al., 2016). And, as mentioned 
earlier, both countries already had aid resources providing services when the outbreak 
began and some continued to deliver services throughout the epidemic. 
The epicenter of the EVD outbreak was in a heavily forested region of southern 
Guinea, eastern Sierra Leone, and northern Liberia. According to Bausch and Schwarz 
(2014), this area regularly has high mobility where humans encounter different kinds of 
animals and creatures. At the time, some experts believed this outbreak represented a few 
‘firsts’ for EVD. For instance, the first time since the disease was discovered that it affected a 
densely populated urban area and it is also the first time EVD was reported in West Africa 
                                                          
42 The patient was from the eastern district of Kailahun but went for a blood test in the Kenema District, where the EVD 
diagnosis was confirmed. 
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(Gatherer, 2014). However, the urban city of Kikwit in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
experienced a serious EVD outbreak in 1995 (Epstein, 2014). Furthermore, there was an 
isolated case in Liberia where someone tested positive with Ebola antibodies, meaning she 
or he was previously infected (Knobloch, Albiez, and Schmitz, 1982). Afterward, there was 
an isolated case in Côte d'Ivoire, where an ethologist was infected while performing a 
necropsy on a chimpanzee (Formenty et al., 1999; Le Guenno et al., 1995). 
1.6.1 The WHO’s Response 
 
There is a debate regarding the challenges on the supply-side of the response. 
According to McInnes (2016 p. 381), the WHO’s initial response was “anemic”, where the 
main actor advocating for resources and mobilization efforts to West Africa was MSF. They 
even testified at a UN Security Council (UNSC) hearing about the crisis and weak response. 
The WHO was struggling to keep up with the demands of this outbreak, and 
outbreaks elsewhere, as its budget had been cut in the years before (Boseley, 2014; Gostin 
and Friedman, 2014; Kamradt-Scott, 2016). Additionally, other international organizations 
have been influential in health interventions for many years, especially since they had a 
greater capacity to respond. Thus, parallel agencies were created, such as the United 
Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, resulting in a complex network of actors 
(Benton and Dionne, 2015; Kickbusch and Reddy, 2015). These first two arguments would 
be the outcome of liberalizing global health, as discussed in section 1.2.2. 
A third argument suggests structural problems at the WHO made it slower to 
respond (Kamradt-Scott, 2016; Kickbusch and Reddy, 2015; Moon et al., 2015). The 
organization behaves as seven separate components instead of one and there is 
bureaucratic red-tape to enact PHEIC. The agency is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland 
but the seven regional entities each have their staff, administration, resources, and separate 
funding. For example, the Pan-American Health Organization, which is in the United States 
and monitors health trends in North and South America, is older than the headquarters in 
Geneva (PAHO/WHO, 2018.). It also has more resources at its disposal than say, the AFRO 
regional office located in Brazzaville, Congo. News sources reveal that senior officials in the 
WHO had wanted to enact the PHEIC as early as June 2014 as they understood the 
circumstances in West Africa (Cheng and Satter, 2015). Perhaps, bureaucratic challenges 
hampered a response. 
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Another argument suggests the agent shirked its responsibilities. If the WHO 
secretariat is the agent and its members, the 193 nations, are the principals, then its 
response could be regarded as agency slack (Kamradt-Scott, 2015). This is when the agent 
develops divergent interests or concerns from the principals and acts on them. This is not 
the first time there was an agency slack during a public health intervention (Godlee, 1994; 
Graham, 2014; Kamradt-Scott, 2015). For example, Kamradt-Scott (2015, p.77) says that the 
success of the Smallpox eradication program in the 1960s and 1970s was partly due to the 
WHO’s “hands-off and more decentralized” approach. It continued with this in other disease 
eradication programs (Tuberculosis, Polio, etc...). It shirked its responsibility as the 
international lead technical agency to instead rely on member states to invite them in. 
Regarding the WHO’s role in emergency outbreaks, this was former Director-General 
Chan’s response to the New York Times in September 2014 (Fink, 2014). This could be 
regarded as an example of agency slack: 
Q. You managed the SARS emergency in your former position as the director of health of Hong Kong, so you’re obviously 
well acquainted with outbreaks. Can you lay out the chronology of the W.H.O.'s response to the current Ebola outbreak, 
once the W.H.O. was notified of it in March? 
A. First and foremost, people need to understand W.H.O. W.H.O. is the U.N. specialized agency in health. And we are not 
the first responder. You know, the government has first priority to take care of their people and provide health care. 
W.H.O. is a technical agency. 
Q. How do affected countries work with the W.H.O.? 
A. They will invite W.H.O. to provide technical advice and also technical support. Now, what does that mean? For example, 
if they have a cholera outbreak, if they have you know an Ebola outbreak, they would ask us: “What are the good practices 
to control the outbreak? If the countries say, “Well, we may need an epidemiologist or we may need some laboratory 
support,” then W.H.O. will call on our partners, which would include countries or include scientific organizations, like the 
C.D.C…So this is how we provide services. We are not like international N.G.O.'s, for example M.S.F. [Doctors without 
Borders], Red Cross, Red Crescent or local N.G.O.'s who are working on the ground to provide, you know, direct services. 
(Fink, 2014) 
Kamradt-Scott (2015) says the agent (WHO secretariat) shirked during the 2014 EVD 
epidemic and failed to intervene properly. The different arguments presented above range 
from structural to political constraints. These factors and others such as knowledge sharing 
are discussed in an autopsy report by an independent panel (Moon et al., 2015). Kamradt-
Scott (2015) says that the 2014 EVD outbreak may be the WHO’s biggest failure since the 
response to HIV/AIDS in the 1980s. Both epidemics started in Africa, in poor fragile states 
that did not have the health infrastructure to identify, contain, and respond to disease 
outbreaks. 
1.6.2 Lessons for GHG and the Outbreak 
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Thus, in comparing the response to HIV/AIDS, there are parallels and lessons learned 
on the challenges of GHG (Drain, 2015; Keneally, 2014; Rabkin and El-Sadr, 2015). For 
instance, the HIV/AIDS pandemic became securitized as a regional and global threat and it 
was elevated before the UNSC as a health security problem.43 So was EVD, which led to the 
creation of a separate UN Mission (McInnes, 2016). 
The response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic was also largely focused on preventing and 
correcting ‘bad behaviors’ (e.g. condom distribution for performance-based indicators) and 
promulgated the stereotype of hypersexualized Africans spreading STIs (Caldwell, Caldwell, 
and Quiggin, 1989). This discourse helped to depoliticize and distract from the 
socioeconomic and political determinants of health, by racializing and stigmatizing persons 
with HIV/AIDS (Johnston, 2015; Mustapha, 2006). During the EVD outbreak, the Western 
media also focused on ‘bad behaviors’ of local people continuing to bury loved ones, 
avoiding the health centers, or escaping from them (Moran, 2015). Behaviors or decisions 
that were not seen as rational to Western observers were classified as religious or 
superstitious (Gerlach, 2016; Grundy, 2014). However, these reactions may actually indicate 
a barrier in addressing demand-side challenges in the market and the donors’ and 
humanitarians’ limited capabilities to address cultural, religious, social, and logistical factors 
on the ground. The demand-side barriers will be explored in the next chapter. 
The intervention also relied on mostly biomedical methods, such as the building of 
Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs),44 developing mobile diagnostic units, and the use of 
experimental drugs and treatments, which did not address the social etiology of this 
outbreak. This was a similar response to HIV/AIDS before it evolved (Pisani, 2011). Like AIDS, 
EVD has no vaccine or cure. However, there was huge pressure to create pharma-medical 
resources. According to Gericke (2015), this raised serious ethical dilemmas as there was a 
rush to treat people with experimental drugs and vaccines. Although the experimental and 
limited drug, ZMapp, was mainly used on repatriated health workers from Western 
                                                          
43 Security has been used to justify cooperation into public health matters. In fact, the bill that created PHEIC was based on 
the premise that there is a security risk if the WHO does not intervene. In addition, resources deployed such as the military, 
may not have experience conducting health interventions. See Aldis (2008), Bond (2008), Davies and Rushton (2016), De 
Waal (2010; 2014), and Kamradt-Scott (2015) for further reading on health security. 
44 Different countries and sources refer to these as Ebola Treatment Centers using ETCs as an abbreviation. However, 
ETU(s) is use throughout the thesis for consistency. 
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countries while also injecting a serum made from the blood of EVD survivors.45 In addition, 
the focus on drugs may mean that these resources would only be available to rich countries 
or privileged persons in Africa and not everyone else (Pollack, 2014). Post-epidemic, there is 
a competition to conduct clinical vaccine trials in the affected countries (Kennedy et al., 
2017). However, there is still a concern about whether poor people will benefit once these 




Despite years of development and humanitarian interventions, Liberia’s and Sierra 
Leone’s health systems were still fragile and vulnerable to a disease outbreak. Section 1.2 
described the diversity of aid resources and how this shaped health policies in recipient 
countries. This gives an understanding of supply-side challenges and priorities of aid 
providers. Aid had evolved over the years to a neoliberal economic ideology that has also 
impacted how health interventions are conducted, like targeting only a few health issues 
(Johnston, 2015; Kickbusch, 2005; Mustapha, 2006). Although the WHO is the only 
international body that has a mandate on health, the plurality of actors, priorities, and aid 
resources has distorted low-income countries’ healthcare systems to prioritize development 
on a few quantitative indicators (Chorev, 2013) rather than horizontal healthcare system 
strengthening to bring UHC, which is the WHO’s position (World Health Organization 1978a; 
2018d). 
The next two sections discussed Liberia and Sierra Leone, where Liberia was a model 
for post-conflict recovery and Sierra Leone was not. These sections dissected the good 
governance reforms: state-building, macroeconomic reforms, and post-conflict elections as 
a tool for democracy. In both countries, we see that there were system-wide challenges that 
were not being addressed by vertical reforms. Guttal (2005) says that implementing 
neoliberal economic and political orders ensured that these countries remain in a persistent 
condition of state failure, rather than rebuild lives. Additionally, rural-based non-state 
institutions, such as traditional leaders were largely excluded thus, asking whether these 
reforms penetrated to the community level (Adam and Dercon, 2009; Mulbah, 2018). 
                                                          
45 The perceptions and ethics of experimental drug testing is a complex debate especially why these were only made 
available to Western volunteers. The director of Caprisa, an AIDS research center in South Africa responds to these 
criticisms, “It would have been on the front-page screaming headline: ‘Africans used as guinea pigs for American drug 
company’s medicine’,” (Pollack, 2014). 
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Section 1.5 reflected on how most donor-led interventions impacted the countries. 
The supply-side of these interventions are meant to create state institutions that can govern 
for economic output but do not widely address socioeconomic factors (Gray 2016; Guttal, 
2005; Mulbah, 2018; Pailey, 2017). This gap is important to keep in mind for the next 
chapter. It further discusses why externally-led policies do not always lead to long-term 
changes, using the theoretical framework of New Institutional Economics. It then extends 
the theory to look at social outcomes. 
The last section introduced the 2014 Ebola epidemic and criticisms of the 
international community’s response (Kamradt-Scott, 2015; McInnes, 2016; Moon et al., 
2015; Nunes, 2016). This section analyzed the supply-side barriers and how this follows a 
pattern in global health governance. There was an “anemic” response (McInnes, 2016 p. 
381), and ongoing challenges to get a plurality of actors who have different priorities, to 
cooperate in this public health emergency. Additionally, these strategies do not address the 
complex social etiology of disease and often rely on a biomedical paradigm. These are the 
outcomes of the neoliberalization of GHG in the last few decades, and it helps us to 
understand the literature on public health emergencies in the next chapter, section 2.6. This 
literature tends to feature biomedical resources as resolving both supply and demand 
barriers. The last section in the next chapter discusses the demand-side barriers during the 










































CHAPTER TWO: Theoretical 







Exploring the gaps in the literature and developing an approach to fill the gaps. 




The central question this chapter examines is how do rural-based institutions govern 
and what are their impacts? Institutions are the shared norms and rules that people abide 
by (Oström et al., 2001). In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the customs and laws governed by 
paramount chiefs, chiefs, clan leaders, councils, monarchs, youth leaders, and secret society 
leaders are collectively called traditional local institutions (TLIs). The thesis broadly fits into 
two debates, a theoretical debate on the governance and outcomes of traditional leaders 
(Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson, 2014; Baker, 2007; Baldwin, 2015; Casey, Glennerster, and 
Miguel, 2012; Dia, 1996; Pande and Udry, 2005; Sesay, 2019; Tokpa and Yengbeh Jr., 2012; 
UNDEF, 2014; Unsworth, 2010). And the empirical debate on local governance of the 2014 
Ebola epidemic (Abramowitz et al., 2015; Boland and McKay, 2018; Enria, 2017; Parker and 
Allen, 2018; Parker et al., 2019; Perry and Sayndee, 2017; Richards, 2016; Van der Windt 
and Voors, 2020; Wilkinson et al., 2017). A market approach examines how institutional 
quality impacts economic growth (Gray, 2016; North, 2003), however, information failures 
and social costs may be addressed by TLIs for social outcomes. Thereby extending the 
original framework of institutional quality. Thus, a review of potential market failures during 
the outbreak such as rumors, misinformation, and ‘risky’ behaviors reveals that aid 
resources alone did not address these demand-side barriers. Rather, these are governed by 
community leaders. 
The first three sections: 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 are the theoretical literature on institutions. 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 discuss the New Institutional Economics Framework and how this has 
been used in development studies (North, 1990; North, 2003). Section 2.4 debates how TLIs 
contribute to or hinder development and democratic reforms. This section also includes 
specific studies on traditional leaders in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Section 2.5 examines 
market efficiencies for social outcomes, which is meant to move away from the wealth-
maximizing approach of short-term gains in the original framework. The rest of the chapter 
critically reviews the literature on public health emergencies through Scott (1992)’s 
concepts of “public and hidden transcripts.” In section 2.6, the public transcripts say donors 
and aid organizations address disease outbreaks mainly through clinical resources. The final 
section debates the community engagement strategies from the outbreak. The thesis holds 
there is a hidden transcript of communities self-organizing to resolve the epidemic. 




Institutional theory is an approach to studying anthropology, economics, history, 
international relations, law, political science, or sociology. There are different branches of 
institutional theory and the branch that the thesis discusses is the New Institutional 
Economics branch with key thinkers such as Douglass C. North, Elinor Oström, Ronald Coase, 
and Daron Acemoglu. Broadly speaking, this branch uses economic theory to understand 
social and legal norms. According to Coase (1998), these institutions govern the 
performance of an economy, which defines the new institutional economics approach. 
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction,” (North, 1990, p. 3). The people or team 
of individuals are defined as “organizations,” which are, “groups of individuals bound by 
some common purpose to achieve objectives,” (North, 1990, p. 5). Without these 
constraints there would be chaos, hence, the key aspect of institutions is the rules on what 
individuals can or cannot do. 
While this is not the only definition of an ‘institution,’ according to Oström et al. 
(2001) it is the shared norms and rules that people abide by that all definitions of 
‘institution’ have in common. Institutions have authority because of the shared belief and 
trust among people to follow the rules or laws that are governed by institutions. The rules 
are predictably enforced, and agents monitor behaviors and impose sanctions where 
needed (North, 1990). These rules can also be made to govern resources or ‘common goods’ 
as well as prevent overexploitation of common goods (Oström, 1990); or to oversee the 
delivery of goods such as health and education. By reducing uncertainty, institutions 
facilitate people’s engagement in complex forms of cooperation and agreements (North, 
2003). This is based on a game-theoretical model, where it pays to play and, if one party 
does not cooperate, it will be punished by another party (enforcement). However, if it pays 
to defect or essentially violate the rules (corruption), then according to North (2003) this 
can be considered, “at the very heart of the failure of poor societies to develop,” (North, 
2003, p. 6). 
There are institutional failures such as market failure or government failure 
(Acheson, 2000). There are a variety of institutions and each can fail in getting people to 
cooperate or solve a complex problem. According to Acheson (2000), when it comes to 
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environmental resource management and conservation problems, four basic institutions 
have been proposed as a solution over the years: private property, government, communal 
management, and markets. However, he argues that none of these institutions on its own 
can be a general solution, as there is bound to be a conservation problem that each would 
fail to address. North and the remaining literature, except for Oström (common goods), use 
a market approach to discuss institutions and measure how institutions perform. 
 
2.2.1 Polycentric Institutions 
 
A branch from the new institutional economists is led by Oström (1990; 2010), she 
examines how institutions develop complex arrangements to overcome governing 
challenges. While trust and cooperation are the goals for every institution, there are 
complex motivational structures that drive human beings’ interactions in today’s societies. 
The rational choice model only explains behavior in a competitive environment for private 
goods and is not a broad theory to explain every decision of all individuals (Oström, 2010). 
Oström argues that reputation, trust, and reciprocity can overcome temptations of short-
term self-interest (on-going cooperation, rather than just a one-off). Collective action in this 
sense is used in the broader political science term to refer to how people deal with social 
dilemmas, whether they are politicians or peasants. 
2.2.1.1 Definition of Polycentrism 
 
A polycentric institution is a multitier governing arrangement where “specific 
institutions can be designed at various levels of governance to meet specific governance 
challenges (V. Ostrom 1999). This framework involves institutional arrangements that go 
beyond ‘deconcentration’, as has typically been the outcome of decentralisation initiatives 
in Africa (Barkan 1998).” (Sawyer, 2004, p. 457). In these arrangements, each institution is 
responsible for governing specific challenges, such as a supply-side or demand-side 
challenge that will be explored below in section 2.7 and further in chapter five. 
The literature on polycentric institutions tends to focus on how local communities 
cooperate to prevent overexploitation of communal goods.46 This is different from the 
                                                          
46 Public Goods are goods of a common concern. These goods are nonrivalry in consumption and nonexclusive. However, 
most goods have some partial exclusivity and rivalry (land, water, and livestock...etc.) these are ‘common-pooled 
resources’ and others, known as ‘club goods’ are non-rival but excludable (cable/satellite TV or intellectual property rights). 
See Brousseau, Dedeurwaerdere, and Siebenhüner (2012) and Smith et al. (2003) for further reading. 
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market approach (supply and demand factors) of the thesis, so this is briefly defined. 
Common goods (or common-pooled resources) are goods that are rivalrous, but 
nonexcludable, such as a river where anyone can fish from (nonexcludable), but two people 
cannot catch the same fish (rivalrous) (Brousseau, Dedeurwaerdere, and Siebenhüner, 
2012). Therefore, renewable resources such as agriculture and fisheries, are usually 
examined in this framework. For example, land is a communal resource in West Africa that 
is governed as a common good through customary laws; traditional leaders allocate land for 
farming or other needs like building a school (Bulte, Richards, and Voors, 2018; Pande and 
Udry, 2005). 
2.2.1.2 Building a Cooperative Environment 
 
Rule enforcement is not about being authoritarian or heavy-handed with severe 
punishments, it is also about reciprocity. If an individual agrees to abide by a set of rules and 
it is contingent on others following the rules, then there will be social benefits. For example, 
Oström (1990) discusses the social dilemma of limited land for cattle to graze in Törbel, 
Switzerland. An ordinance was passed in 1517 to limit the number of cows a farmer can 
send to the pastures in the Alps, to prevent overgrazing on the land. This was still in effect 
through the late twentieth century, with the penalty of a fine. This is a law that requires 
everyone’s cooperation for the common benefit of everyone’s cows. If few people or no one 
cooperated, then the land would have depleted, and everyone would suffer because the 
cows would die. So, in a cooperative environment, an institution can guarantee reciprocity: 
those who cooperate share in the common benefits, while those who do not, will receive 
retribution, like a fine. However, Oström (1998) says that extreme cases of retribution 
would be a disaster, and, in some cases, it would not make sense to have retribution (e.g. 
cartels). If an institution has reciprocity as demonstrated above, then it can have a positive 
reputation of benefiting the cooperators and deterring the defectors. 
Looking beyond the forestry, agriculture, or water systems, Sawyer (2004) argues 
that having a general government jurisdiction for service delivery is not enough for Sierra 
Leone and Liberia. Specific task jurisdictions that focus on the delivery of public goods 
should also be created locally and across provincial lines too, especially task-specific 
peacekeeping institutions across the borderlines that can prevent disputes from arising. This 
would extend to creating jurisdictions for education or health services, while including 
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traditional authorities to operate in their specific tasks, such as elders mediating interethnic 
conflict. These local and regional governing institutions should be constitutionally 
empowered, and this can transform a centralized autocratic state if implemented (Sawyer, 
2004). This does not mean the state is eradicated, as state institutions are still needed to 
support local institutions (Mansbridge, 2014). Moreover, this is not decentralization as these 
institutions would not be an extension of the state, but rather semi-autonomous decision 
making entities. 
Baldwin (2015)’s research47 has similar findings on long-term cooperation as 
traditional leaders usually rule for life. She argues that short electoral cycles encourage the 
rational choice of short-term gratification as politicians will only be concerned with surviving 
the next campaign cycle and not invest in policies that extend beyond them. Chiefs are 
invested because they are known by name by their subjects. Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 
(2014), Adjei, Busia, and Bob-Milliar (2017), Baldwin (2015), Bulte, Richards, and Voors 
(2018) and Sawyer (2004; 2005b) agree that chiefs have greater social capital with citizens 
because the relationships are personal. However, Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014) 
view traditional institutions negatively, arguing that a type of social capital, patrimonialism, 
can lead to negative developmental outcomes. Oström (1998) explains how personal 
relationships through communication can build cooperation in local communities: 
 
In noncooperative game theory, players are assumed to be unable to make enforceable agreements. Thus, communication 
is viewed as cheap talk (Farrell 1987)… From this theoretical perspective, face-to-face communication should make no 
difference in the outcomes achieved in social dilemmas. Yet, consistent, strong, and replicable findings are that substantial 
increases in the levels of cooperation are achieved when individuals are allowed to communicate face to face. (Oström, 1998, 
p. 6). 
 
Oström (1990; 1998; 2010) argue for social benefits that are defined as material 
gains, such as access to land for economic opportunities. However, in a public health 
emergency, there is the social dilemma of protecting the common good versus restricting 
individual freedoms (Pellecchia et al., 2015). For example, the debates around quarantines 
(Enria, 2017), or implementing mandatory cremations (Perry and Sayndee, 2017). In section 
2.7, the literature on the Ebola outbreak discuss rules and fines implemented to guarantee 
reciprocity (stopping Ebola). Additionally, the concept of polycentric governance is useful to 
understand how multiple institutions governed the outbreak in this case study. This is 
further discussed in chapters four and five. 
                                                          
47 Baldwin (2015) does not write about polycentrism. 
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2.2.2 Institutional Quality 
 
North (1981; 1989; 1990; 1991; 2003) has written about the impact of institutions on 
economic performance and how the performance of economies over time is shaped by the 
way institutions evolve. In the theory of production, North analyzes the role of institutions 
in the performance of economies by understanding the ‘cost’ of enforcing rights. These 
‘transaction costs’ are the costliness of measurement and enforcement, such as transacting 
over property rights; and “property rights are the rights individuals appropriate over their 
own labor and the goods and services they possess,” (North, 1990, p.33). Khan (2017) 
describes it as any social interaction and the rules are designed to govern those interactions 
to achieve better results. Institutions need to keep transaction costs low, and this depends 
on the type of technology employed, and thus brings us to the institution’s role in 
production. The dilemma, according to North (2003), is preventing people from moving 
from personal (cooperation or following rules) to impersonal (abandoning rules) exchanges, 
but as the markets get bigger, it is harder and costlier for institutions to enforce these rules. 
Especially if someone can defect in one contract and move to another market without 
punishment. This argument is based on the rational choice model, that actors are self-
interested or profit-maximizing individuals, and use this approach to solve collective action 
problems (Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
Ideally, the state provides low-cost enforcement and protection of property rights 
through the judiciary system. However, states with weak institutions in place, create an 
environment of uncertainty where it may pay to defect or cheat, rather than play by the 
rules. Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston (2009, p. 775) identify factors of institutional 
quality that drive economic agents underground: bureaucracy, regulatory discretion, rule of 
law, corruption, and a weak legal system. They say this is based on a pessimistic view of a 
leviathan government that exploits citizens. “Although economic agents may be willing to 
incur a reasonable fiscal burden, they are not willing to accept extortionate demands.” 
(Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston, 2009, p. 775). This is also part of the theoretical 
knowledge of the good governance policies discussed in chapter one and why fragile states 
were reformed in this manner. 
However, it is crucial to note that North’s notable work on institutions pioneered the 
field of cliometrics. Cliometrics is the study of history using econometric methods. This 
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framework was created to understand how societies historically achieved economic growth 
via high institutional quality. And, the growth model he used (the protection of property 
rights and low transaction costs) specifically follows a capitalist-led growth pattern as 
examined by Gray (2016). North believed that institutions provide the incentives aspect for 
investment (from an economic history perspective), and historical change of economies 
whether it is growth, decline, or stagnation, could be traced back to whether institutions 
were creating an investment climate. So, because this is looking at a very specific growth 
pattern, this framework has largely been used to explain the evolution of Western 
economies. While today, many countries around the world have adopted market-based 
macroeconomic policies, especially in the developing world through conditionalities 
imposed by donor organizations (Dreher, 2004; Stubbs et al., 2017b), this does not 
necessarily mean that they have developed the institutions to protect property rights (e.g. 
trademark, copyright, or wage laws) or to monitor and enforce rules for capitalist growth. 
Therefore, North’s work had implications for our historical understanding of 
economic change and our contemporary understanding of the development of low-income 
countries. Historically, the use of transaction costs as a determinant as to why some 
societies choose one institution over another can be misleading. A case in point is the 
comparison between the feudal system in Europe, in which labor from serfdom was used, 
and slavery in the United States. Milonakis and Fine (2007) explain that North argues that 
serfdom had lower transaction costs for the institution rather than slavery, hence why it 
was a rational choice for feudalism in Europe. However, the authors argue that high 
transaction costs of enforcement and supervision of slaves, make serfdom seem like a 
voluntary contract and ignores the repression, enforcement, and supervision that took place 
there too. So, sometimes relying on this interpretation of historical institutions can neglect 
real human or even inhumane experiences. 
2.3 From Economic History to Economic Growth 
 
The World Bank adopted North’s key concept of transaction costs in the formulation 
of a definition for ‘good governance’. This framework is used by the World Bank to create 
institutions that are conducive to market-led economic growth and indicators are used to 
measure institutional quality by ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ governance performance. These 
indicators are (a) voice and accountability, (b) political stability and absence of violence (c) 
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government effectiveness, (d) regulatory quality, (e) rule of law, and (f) control of corruption 
(World Bank, 2017). These institutions mirror Western countries’ governance parameters 
and, these are presented as prescriptive to achieving positive economic change: that is 
growth. The 2002 World Development Report devises strategies to build institutions for 
market efficiency and productivity. However, according to the report, building and supplying 
institutions is only the first step; the next is to create change and demand for these 
institutions within the countries: 
 
What limits market opportunities? Transaction costs from inadequate information, incomplete definition and enforcement 
of property rights, and barriers to entry for new participants. What increases them? Institutions that help manage risks from 
market exchange, increase efficiency, and raise returns. (World Bank, 2002, p. 5). 
 
However, such a framework and especially its implementation are not free of 
contention. 
As mentioned in the first chapter, vertical state-building policies led by the 
international development community focused on legitimizing and securing the state and 
not necessarily bringing human security. Human security is defined as access to food, 
health, education, jobs, and freedom from conflict; thus, these are the rights and freedoms 
at an individual level. This is vital to peacekeeping and nation-building, as human insecurity 
is a threat to the state too (Conteh-Morgan, 2016).48 The good governance framework 
discredited state-led interventions, in favor of market-based ones. It has also been argued 
that these new institutions are not necessarily conducive to development, democracy, or 
human rights, but rather they facilitate the correct functioning of markets (Navarro, 2007). 
In some cases, good governance reforms have led to poor governance. In the case study of 
Mozambique’s economic changes in the 1990s to the 2000s, World Bank researchers found 
“that foreign aid can induce corruption,” (Hanlon, 2004, p. 747). Hanlon (2004) argues that 
despite good governance rhetoric, donors are prepared to tolerate corruption if these 
policies are implemented, and macroeconomic indicators show growth. 
                                                          
48 The concept of human security is used in multiple disciplines. This nomenclature suggests ‘securitizing’ at the individual 
or community level. However, the concept of human security challenges the traditional notions of national security by 
prioritizing resources in a people-centered way. Therefore, it is a human rights approach and one that emphasizes freedom 
from conflict, freedom from hunger, or freedom from insecurity. Or in its broadest definition it, “Encompasses human 
rights, good governance, access to education and healthcare and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and 
choices to fulfill his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving 
economic growth and preventing conflict.” (Annan, 2001, p. 1). Annan, 2001; Conteh-Morgan, 2016; Piccone, 2017; United 
Nations Development Programme, 1994). 
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However, Navarro (2007) and Hanlon (2004) were each published before the 2008 
Accra Agenda for Action and the 2005 Paris Declaration respectively, which were 
agreements to align aid along the needs of recipient countries, rather than donor priorities. 
Thus, this may have changed aid governance in the last decade. 
Rodrik (2004) also says that indicators of measuring institutional quality tend to 
favor the perceptions of investors, who generally feel positive when the economy is doing 
well. This often leads to the conclusion that high institutional quality is when investors feel 
private property rights are protected or the rule of law is upheld. However, we do not know 
which rule of law specifically or what the intended outcome of said law is. Rodrik (2004) 
gives the example of Russia and China; in the former, an independent judiciary protects 
private property rights, whereas until recently, private property rights did not exist in China. 
However, in the mid to late 1990s, investors gave China higher marks on the rule of law. 
Therefore, a private property regime is not necessary for high institutional quality, but a 
sense of safety and stability for investors. Likewise, relying on the perceptions of investors 
excludes other perceptions of institutional quality, whether the outcome is economic 
growth or something else. This is the second contentious point regarding both North’s work 
and the ‘good governance’ framework deriving from it. Indeed, it appears that both adopt a 
narrow focus on economic growth specifically, which leaves out various important 
indicators of socioeconomic development. Nor do we fully understand how rule of law, in 
and of itself, leads to economic growth. 
 
2.3.1 Developing Institutions for the State 
 
Navarro (2007)’s concept of the economy as a pie, helps us visualize the difference 
between economic growth and socioeconomic development. Development policies like the 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) have largely 
focused on economic growth, and if we imagine the economy as a pie, these policies try to 
make the pie bigger. However, the problem is that socioeconomic development may not 
improve, even in economies that are growing. So, the question is whether everyone gets a 
bigger slice of the pie while the pie grows or if the growth means that a few people get giant 
slices, while the majority poor share the crumbs (Navarro, 2007). For instance, in Hanlon 
(2004)’s case study of Mozambique, he reports that the country indeed had the best-
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performing economy in SSA, with 8.4% GDP growth49 in the 1990s. But most of the 
Mozambique population did not share in that tremendous performance. 
This brings us to the third contentious point, which relates to the way the World 
Bank has extended North’s framework, by including free elections as part of its state-
building strategy (World Bank, 2002). It assumes that elections are meant to discipline 
politicians and an electorate would not tolerate corrupt politicians. If elections are free and 
fair, then politicians will be held accountable. However, there is a difference between 
elections and democracy. Harris (2012), Mulbah (2018), Mustapha (2010), Mustapha (2016), 
and Pailey (2017) discuss how Liberia and Sierra Leone held elections in the transition from 
war to recovery, but this did not actually translate into democratic institutions. Mustapha 
(2016) says that democracy has not consolidated in Sierra Leone as the press is not free and 
industrial actions are usually met with police force. And, as noted before in chapter one, 
only half of Liberians feel they are living in a democracy (Pailey and Harris, 2017). Elections 
are sometimes followed by periods of violence, as well as corrupt funding of campaigns, 
however international agencies have declared Liberia and Sierra Leone’s elections since the 
wars to be fair (Harris, 2012; Mustapha, 2016). Problematic, but fair. The World Bank 
(2002)’s report does not unpack democracy theories and what it means to have a 
democratic society to bring development and human rights, instead it focuses on elections 
to keep out corrupt politicians and freedom of the press to give information. This is a 
market-based analysis that the more information that is available, then voters can make 
informed decisions and elections are competitions to bring more desirable candidates. 
However, this analysis is limited, as shown in the Afrobarometer (2019) surveys in the prior 
chapter, there is quite a high tolerance for corruption in public administration. 
The literature interprets this differently, such as a culturally-determined definition of 
corruption. Hellsten and Larbi (2006) say that Western perceptions rely on individualist 
cultural and moral obligations. However, in other societies, there is no separation in identity 
between one’s professional and personal life. So, what may be perceived as corrupt in one 
society may not in another, especially where patrimonialism is used to govern. However, 
Pailey and Harris (2017) say that entering state politics is often a way to increase financial 
wealth in Liberia. It is not to generalize that Africans are more corrupt. Rather, since these 
                                                          
49 Gross Domestic Product is the broadest measure of a nation’s total economic activity; it is the market value of all final 
goods and services produced. See Bank of England (2018) for further reading. 
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state institutions (implemented via development efforts) are not seen as legitimate by the 
people, then corruption and even state-capture are expected as politicians are not 
accountable to the local constituency, despite having elections.50 In other words, the 
assumption that elections will keep out corrupt politicians did not consider the local 
constituency’s views on corruption or the position of state office. And this assumption is not 
only misplaced in SSA, but also Western countries such as the United States.51 
Therefore, holding elections becomes a ritual to give a sense of local ownership and 
civic participation in SSA, but liberal democratic values have not consolidated (Carothers, 
2002; Harris, 2012; Omotola, 2010; Mustapha, 2016; North et al., 2015). In the worst-case 
scenario, elections are used as a cover for authoritarian regimes. 
North extends the framework of institutions to further examine problems in 
development, specifically through the concept of Limited Access and Open Access Orders 
(North et al., 2015). Limited Access Orders (LAOs) are defined as the natural state where 
leadership is built through personal relationships and face-to-face interaction. However, 
hierarchies of elites are formed (religious, military, economic, and political) and they control 
access to resources through rent-creation.52 This also helps to control violence in a society, 
because elite rents are reduced if violence breaks out (North et al., 2013). This also means 
that these societies will be more sensitive to change as dynamics could result in violence, 
such as violent clashes after an electoral cycle. Open Access Orders (OAOs) proscribe 
violence to an organization, such as the military or police, and have an impersonal citizens’ 
relationship. In this state, individuals can pursue their economic interests through 
organizations. Rents do exist in this order but are temporary since there will be increased 
competition. The social order is maintained through the interaction of competition, 
                                                          
50 See Table 1.15 on p. 36, on the perceptions of political leaders in office to serve their own ambitions and not the people. 
51 Many Americans believe that corruption is widespread through government and the 2016 presidential elections saw 
accusations of conflicts of interest and corruption on the leading candidates: Clinton and Trump (Devlin-Brown and Dee, 
2017). Nonetheless, Rothstein (2016) argues that Trump was elected because he promised to fight against ‘favoritism’ as a 
form of corruption, as White Americans believe that racism against Whites is a bigger problem than racism against Blacks 
or Latinos. In other words, that ethnic minorities were being ‘favorited’ in government policies. Thus, Trump’s well-known 
business connections in foreign countries, refusal to reveal his financial history through tax returns, and refusal to divest 
himself from his companies if he won, did not hinder his success. 
52 In modern economics, rent is the surplus amount paid on top of the actual price of a good or service. This is not the 
same as ‘renting’ a property or asset. An example of economic rents would be a waitress earning a tip or someone 
accepting a bribe. Therefore, rent-seeking/creation behavior is when a policy is manipulated to make a profit. See Rogers 
(2016) on the manipulation of Sierra Leone’s housing policy, which uses international aid funds to build luxury style homes; 
this excludes the majority poor and does not address homelessness as it was intended. 
58 | P a g e  
 
institutions, and beliefs (North et al., 2013). OAOs can handle change better because their 
organizations and institutions are freer (not controlled by elites) to adjust when needed. 
OAOs are high-income countries like the United States and those in Western Europe 
and LAOs tend to be low-income countries like Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. However, it is noted that exceptions to these categories exist, such as Singapore, 
which is a high-income country but is classified as an LAO for being less democratic or 
authoritarian (North et al., 2015). LAOs can also transition, like Mexico or Korea in the 
1990s. North et al. (2015) are also critical of the Washington Consensus approach to 
development and feel that the failure in policy is because donors saw low-income countries 
as incomplete OAOs and not as societies purposely structured to prevent violence as an LAO 
(North et al., 2015). This is similar to Reno (1995)’s analysis regarding access in the 
patrimonial state, where he discusses President Taylor’s use of foreign and elite networks to 
maintain power and exclude any potential or real rivals in Liberia. However, Reno (1995) 
argues that patrimonial states use systematic violence to maintain the social order (like an 
LAO) instead of a legitimate bureaucracy (like an OAO). 
North et al. (2015) argue that policy recommendations need to be nuanced and take 
local context into account, as these policies only focus on entry into the market and 
increasing competition, and governance indicators are designed to measure OAO 
institutions in LAO countries. In terms of democracy, through the nine case study countries 
in this work, the electoral process in the global south is not the same as democracy in the 
Western world. Also, moving to democracy too quickly can destabilize LAOs, but holding 
elections can be a stabilizing ritual, even if the results do not express the will of the people. 
The authors argue that this could be a trade-off, but elections in LAOs can still fail to 
transition a country to an OAO and may just perpetuate the status quo. 
The cases cited such as Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Korea in 
the 1960s, show that there should not have been a race to hold an election, but institutions 
should have been in place first; even if these elections are unfair (North et al., 2015). This 
conclusion contradicts the World Bank (2002) report that increasing electoral competition 
would bring democratic reforms. It also supports Pailey and Harris (2017)’s Mulbah (2018)’s, 
Mustapha (2016)’s arguments that state-building initiatives did not do enough to build a 
nation and bring reforms to the community-level. 
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However, North et al. (2015) conceptualizes economies in a linear fashion, as the 
purpose of this work is to think about how development policies can transition countries 
from limited access to open access orders. This places OAOs as the ideal for all countries to 
achieve, even though there are exceptions in his case study, such as Singapore (North et al., 
2015). This country has a strong economy and strong social development trends, but 
politically, it does not have a liberal democracy like the Western world. Other countries that 
are missing from his case study include wealthy Middle Eastern countries and notably China. 
In fact, some African studies scholars argue that SSA should consider the ‘Chinese model’ to 
development (Amtaika, 2017). Therefore, when we factor in these exceptions, we see a 
wider spectrum of countries that have achieved economic growth and social development 
but without opening access to the individual. And while North’s conceptual model focuses 
on the internal factor of building strong institutions, it leaves out other external factors that 
could affect economic growth such as trade imbalances that leave low-income countries as 
peripherals in the global market (Mustapha, 2006; Mustapha, 2010; Pailey, 2017). 
2.3.1.1 When ‘Development’ Delegitimizes State Institutions 
 
North et al. (2015) say that with respect to democratic reforms, LAOs are less flexible 
to change than OAOs. The changes that the authors are discussing, are the development 
policies discussed in chapter one. These were largely externally-led and do not necessarily 
reflect how dynamic or static institutions are in LAOs. 
The literary debate on this has centered on state institutions, and Gray (2016) says 
that these institutions have been built for the governance of private capital accumulation, 
meaning for economic growth. “Formal institutions, the most important of which are the 
protection of private capitalist property rights, are broadly aligned with and sustained by 
the social, economic and political power that capitalists have, based on capitalist profits,” 
(Gray, 2016, p. 70). However, designing neoliberal state institutions for economic growth 
can raise a problem with legitimacy and authority. 
In general, the branches of institutional theory, do not question the legitimacy of 
institutions, as there is an assumption that these are institutions that are organically grown 
within the society or at least willingly adopted. However, as mentioned in chapter one, on 
the Afrobarometer surveys and in the upcoming section 2.4 on traditional institutions in 
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West Africa, there are higher rates of distrust and dissatisfaction with the state and judiciary 
processes and some preferring non-state institutions. 
According to Adjei, Busia, and Bob-Milliar (2017), the legitimacy and authority of the 
Western state are derived from a legal-rational concept. This means there is an impersonal 
legal system that society members adhere to and obey. They distinguish this from 
traditional authority, in which chiefs claim their authority on traditional customs that have 
always existed. The obedience is aligned to the person occupying the chieftaincy. This 
means that traditional leaders rely on personal relationships and reputation to gain trust. 
Trust and reputation are what bring people together to cooperate (North, 1991; North, 
2003). Thus, any type of state-building should include local institutions, as most people in 
the rural areas are already socialized into traditional customs. Or, in other words, they are 
‘institutionalized’ into the chiefdom institution and any development initiative that does not 
include them could lack legitimacy (Adjei, Busia, and Bob-Milliar, 2017). 
Pailey (2017) argues that the Liberian government followed the donors’ strategy of a 
“peripheral capitalist path to development” (Pailey, 2017, p. 653) by neoliberalizing services 
and retrenching the state. They were not supported to build a strong healthcare system as a 
way of legitimizing themselves in the eyes of the constituency.53 When the 2014 Ebola 
epidemic began, many did not believe the government’s messaging and therefore, “twilight 
institutions” arose, which consisted of collective action and individuals who had public 
authority (where the government did not) to assist. 
Sawyer (2004) argues that in the process to end the civil war in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia, institutional mechanisms of peacebuilding were not implemented in the post-
conflict governance reforms. Both countries have returned to overcentralized 
administrations with patron-client networks. There have been high-level reconciliation and 
international court trials for high-profile actors such as Charles Taylor or Foday Sankor; but 
reconciliation and peace need to be implemented at all levels of governing. Otherwise, the 
region may continue to be unstable. “The tendency to see constitutions as predetermined 
legal moulds can be a source of flawed institutional arrangements and eventual institutional 
failure. Each society has to create its constitutional paradigm, and craft appropriate 
institutions for democratic governance responsive to its circumstances.” (Sawyer, 2004, p. 
                                                          
53 However, Keith and Cadge (2010) argue against this and say that health services were prioritized by the Liberian 
government to strengthen the health system horizontally. This was mentioned in chapter one, section 1.3.4. 
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454). This supports Adam and Dercon (2009)’s warning from chapter one, about reforming 
existing institutions for economic growth or ignoring them because they do not fit the 
external methods of validation. 
North (2003) says that reputation lowers as markets evolve since it is harder to 
maintain personal relationships of trust when these markets expand (hence the need for 
low transaction costs to enforce rules). This may explain why neoliberal state institutions 
that are built with qualities that emphasize economic growth but not social development or 
welfare, have legitimacy problems. Therefore, vertical state-building policies that exclude 
non-state local institutions (Adjei, Busia, and Bob-Milliar, 2017; Sawyer, 2004) or fail to 
deliver services to the people may lack trust and reputation (Pailey, 2017). This point will be 
evident in chapter four’s interviews with key informants. 
2.4 Traditional Local Institutions (TLIs) 
 
The extension of North’s framework of New Institutional Economics into the good 
governance development policy to build new institutions for economic growth has not 
always brought strong development trends (Gray, 2016). However, the original framework is 
still useful for alternative paradigms, where institutions are rooted in traditions or customs 
and derive legitimacy and authority from this. The institutional debate has not thoroughly 
examined traditional local institutions (TLIs) like paramount chiefs because they have been 
seen as an impediment to modernization (Fanthorpe, 2001; Jackson, 2011), or perhaps 
because this institution is not part of the capitalist growth model (Gray, 2016). There is one 
aspect of the framework that can be extended to analyze this and that is the concept of 
institutional quality. 
This section analyzes the literature on traditional institutions and how governance is 
assessed. The theoretical debate is synthesized in section 2.4.6 and this is the first of two 
debates that the thesis fits in. Then section 2.5 discusses how institutional quality can be 
extended to a new framework to assess how TLIs could have good governance. 
 
2.4.1 Definition of TLI 
 
This thesis uses these definitions of traditional, community, and state institutions for 
analytical purposes that will be used throughout the thesis. Traditional Local Institutions 
(TLIs) are the norms and customs that are governed by traditional leaders, termed 
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paramount chiefs, chiefs, clan leaders, councils, monarchs, youth leaders, and secret society 
leaders.54 Religious leaders are not included because within the case study many chiefdoms 
are secular, but that is not universal across all societies. Community-level institutions are 
norms and behaviors in local communities, this is broader than traditional leaders as it can 
include community organizers or other respected members. State institutions are rules and 
regulations governed by the state. 
2.4.1.1 Women in the Definition of TLIs 
 
Some scholars say that traditional authorities are gendered and leave out women, 
however much of the literature on traditional authorities focus on the chiefdom and not the 
broader political elite (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson, 2014; Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen, 
2013; Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen, 2014; Hanlon, 2005; Jackson, 2005; Peters and 
Richards, 1998; and Richards, 2005). Secret societies are included in this definition because 
these are prevalent throughout West Africa and have political and social roles in the 
institution (Harris, 2013). The male society is called the Poro in the Mano River region (Little, 
1947; Little, 1949). The women’s secret society is called Sande in the Mende ethnic group or 
generally known as Bondo (Moran, 1989). There are other societies and single-sex systems 
though, for various ethnic groups, like the Gbangbani for Limba boys (Goguen and Bolten, 
2017). 
There are various studies examining power through the female societies. For 
example, in Liberia the Sande organized a public protest regarding the allocation of land for 
commercial farming activities (cash crops and normally performed by men), which left less 
land for subsistence farming (labor performed by women). In some places, female leaders 
are elected along with a paramount chief or king or in areas where there are no secret 
societies, there exists a single-sex system for collective action (Moran, 1989). Among the 
Mende and Sherbro ethnic groups, women could assume the status of paramount chief by 
inheriting it from their husbands or via elections autonomously (Day, 2012). At the time of 
Hoffer (1972)’s research, about 10% of chiefdoms had a female leader. The author says that 
women are respected and seen as active and able for leadership roles, which contrasts with 
Western culture that sees women as passive and unable due to “biological disabilities of 
reproduction” (Hoffer, 1972 p. 163). However, Moran (2012) says that the patriarchal 
                                                          
54 Full definition was discussed in the introduction on page xiii. 
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system still operates in the overall society and is also reflected in the Sande, Poro, and other 
secret societies. For example, in Sierra Leone, women have been marginalized in the 
customary courts, although this varies in the north and south (Jackson, 2011). 
Furthermore, the broad inclusion of stakeholders in this definition reflects the 
traditional political decision making processes that include various stakeholders, such as the 
chiefs’ councils, women leaders, and youth leaders (Oosterhoff, Mokuwa, and Wilkinson, 
2015). 
2.4.1.2 The Definition May Understate Power 
 
Unsworth (2010) says that TLIs and state institutions can interact and impact each 
other’s realm. For example, in Sierra Leone and Liberia, TLIs have been formalized in the 
years since the conflict period as part of good governance reforms. In Sierra Leone, 
paramount chiefs are part of the national parliament but do not have jurisdiction in 
Freetown (Conteh, 2013). In Liberia, paramount chiefs have been decentralized to the sub-
district levels and incorporated into the executive branch (Tokpa and Yengbeh Jr., 2012). 
Ubink (2008) examines the authority and power of chiefs across many African 
countries, and like Adjei, Busia, and Bob-Milliar (2017), she argues that traditional leaders 
enjoy cultural legitimacy that is based on tradition, but also play a role in dispute resolution 
and they are an alternative where state institutions are weak or failing. Likewise, in Iyanya 
(2018)’s case study of the Igede in post-independence Nigeria, this minority ethnic group 
used the democratic processes to elect an Igede traditional leader to represent them at the 
local level. Thus, although these are termed, ‘traditional’ they are dynamic and modern 
institutions, governing in contemporary politics. 
The organizations of paramount chiefs are elite and powerful groups that have 
thrived for centuries. The ruling families or chiefs control land resources in many places and 
are vital in local and national politics. The definition of TLIs distinguishes them from the 
state institutions that have been created through years of vertical state-building; however, 
this definition is not completely accurate, as chiefdoms in Africa and Asia have been 
manipulated through colonialism and postindependence, by the state. 
It also distinguishes them from the literature on collective action, as Scott (1992) and 
Oström (1990) view micro-level mobilization and rulemaking as a collective action, whether 
in Scott’s view to subvert power from the dominant or in Oström’s view to prevent 
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overexploitation of natural resources. However, these organizations are not an oppressed 
minority, nor will TLIs always come together with a shared interest or purpose. They are a 
ruling political class that has historically received less attention in the literature, than state 
institutions, when it comes to policy-making and development. This has latterly changed 
with the involvement of chiefs in community-based donor programs (Chhibber, Laajaj, and 
Bain, 2006; UNDEF, 2014). However, sometimes donor programs have the intention to 
create social and political change, but with mixed success. This last point is explored in the 
next section. 
 
2.4.2 TLIs in Local Development 
 
Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein (2009) examine the effectiveness of a 
Community Driven Reconstruction (CDR) project in northern Liberia in increasing social 
cohesion. The establishment of CDRs in post-conflict countries is to “support the 
establishment of new local institutions in order to promote social reconciliation,” (Fearon, 
Humphreys, and Weinstein, 2009 p. 287). The findings suggest the CDR program improved 
community cohesion; the treatment communities raised significantly more money than the 
control communities. Social cooperation was high across all villages in the sample, 71% of 
households contributed the maximum amount in treatment communities, while 62% 
contributed the maximum amount in control communities. 
Thus, while brief outside intervention can make changes to a community’s cohesion, 
the authors note that it was done without fundamental changes to either the structure of 
economic relations or to more macro-level political processes. This could also explain why 
the direct impact of the CDR program on welfare was modest as it did not change the power 
structure, so the impacts of long-term development or even democratic governance are still 
unknown. 
Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel (2012) discuss a community-driven development 
program in Sierra Leone that was created to promote democratic decision making, 
transparent budgeting, and participation of socially marginalized groups. This was to foster 
local coordination and cooperation through the setup of village development committees 
that would decide and execute development projects. However, the results showed a 
limited impact on institutional change. According to the authors, democratic decision 
making did not spill over into village life, nor did the program train villagers in project 
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management skills to take on other opportunities after the program ended. Also, traditional 
authorities maintained their positions in these development committees too. The authors 
mention a paradox; this project was meant to implement, and ideally institutionalize, a 
participative democratic process to local development. However, in some places, project 
implementation was expedited when TLIs were leveraged. 
Baldwin (2015) analyzes this paradox by conceptualizing traditional leaders as 
development brokers. Although they are selected by a limited electorate and rule for life, 
they have more incentives to deliver public goods. Therefore, they could be beneficial for 
democracies in SSA. Drawing on her fieldwork in Zambia, she explains that elected leaders in 
state institutions often need community cooperation to engage with local development 
projects. They maintain good relationships with traditional leaders as they would have the 
authority to organize communal labor, like making bricks to build a school. Baldwin (2015) 
says that these leaders are also self-interested actors and this research is not to romanticize 
them, but they have deep social and economic interests in the development projects since 
they live in these communities too. 
Van der Windt et al. (2018) say that these programs (Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 
2012; Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein, 2009), were designed to constrain the power of 
traditional authorities and empower local people. However, through structural modeling, 
they find that support for state institutions do not replace support for TLIs. Rather, these are 
complementary and subject to external shocks, such as weather episodes or conflict (Van 
der Windt et al., 2018). This means that support for one authority may rise or fall if the 
value in another one changes. This finding builds on Baldwin (2015)’s argument of state and 
traditional authority collaboration. 
Thus, TLIs may have more incentives to make upfront investments in local projects. 
Or as Adjei, Busia, and Bob-Milliar (2017) argue development projects are not seen as 
legitimate unless TLIs are involved. 
2.4.3 Customary Law and the Traditional Justice System 
 
In the socio-legal debate, many African countries are pluralistic legal societies, where 
traditional leaders govern customary law and state leaders govern received law55 (Allott, 
                                                          
55 Received law is defined in the literature as the common law (in some former English colonies) or civil law system that 
was implemented in the country, depending on the colonial history (Ndulo, 2011). Some scholars also consider Islamic or 
Sharia law to be a received law as it is not based on local traditions. 
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1984; Frémont, 2009; Maimela, 2019; Ndulo, 2011). In countries with large Muslim 
populations, there is also Islamic law. However, some scholars say this is separate from 
customary law (Allott, 1984; Ekhator, 2019; Ogwurike, 1966); while others examine this and 
include it, like in the case of northern Nigeria where it was once part of customary law 
(Ladapo, 2008). Thus, while customary law is used very broadly to discuss the traditional 
unwritten African legal system, the laws greatly vary from one group to another (Allott, 
1984; Bwire, 2019; Ndulo, 2011; Ogwurike, 1966). This term is a description that covers 
many different legal systems (Ndulo, 2011), but for the purposes of this thesis, a brief 
description and analysis is offered here. 
These systems are based on local ethnic and cultural groups, and usually, only 
operate in the area occupied by the ethnic group or in a case that involves a group member 
(Ndulo, 2011). However, there are some generalizations on how customary law operates 
across Anglophone and Francophone African societies. Bwire (2019) writes that the legal 
philosophy of traditional African justice is a restorative justice that emphasizes restitution 
and is not really about punishment. Hence, the purpose is to heal community relationships 
that was harmed by a crime or a dispute. In Sierra Leone, Sesay (2019) also observes that 
the traditional justice system and local bylaws, which evolved exogenously from the state, 
are still favored by local communities to resolve social infractions, rather than going through 
the state justice system, which is slow and punitive. 
While state institutions are slow and out of reach for many rural dwellers, authors on 
this side of the debate argue that these legal philosophies reflect the social and cultural 
mores of the people. For example, in examining corruption in Nigeria, Ekhator (2019) argues 
that traditional oath-taking and customary courts should be incorporated in anti-corruption 
measures. Although these are currently tried in the state criminal justice system,56 the 
evidence suggests that community members prefer traditional structures to curb crime. 
Ekhator (2019) argues that belief in traditional spiritualism is high, despite many who 
identify as Christian or Muslim. Therefore, the fear of a curse or other negative spiritual 
repercussions could help deter crime. 
For example, there was an incident where a market in Benin City caught on fire and 
afterwards, people looted the property. The traditional leader invited the chief priest to 
                                                          
56 Ekhator (2019) says that Nigeria does not allow customary courts to try criminal law cases, so one would have to be 
created under the constitution. 
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publicly place a curse on the criminals. By the next morning, the looted goods were returned 
(Ekhator, 2019). The author argues that if traditional oath-taking are allowed in criminal 
cases, just like a statutory oath, or if one could take an oath in front of traditional rulers, this 
could improve anti-corruption efforts.57 
Customary law also holds communitarian values, whereas (English) common law 
tends to prefer the individual (Frémont, 2009; Maimela, 2019; Mqeke, 1996). Thus, it is 
important to note that the New Institutional Economics theory emphasizes individual 
property rights for good governance and economic growth, which is based on common law 
too. Hence, the need to extend the theory to understand governance of TLIs as not being 
(poor or low) institutional quality, but rather, based on group or communitarian-oriented 
values. According to Frémont (2009), the most important value is the preservation of social 
peace in communities, hence, the restorative justice model discussed above. However, the 
rights of the group are how individual human rights (including gender and children’s rights) 
are framed in customary law. Maimela (2019) says that the group interest is key to survival 
and growth in SSA, and individuals are more empowered when they are in a group instead 
of advocating alone. In examining Francophone Africa, Frémont (2009) says that many of 
the rights in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights existed in pre-colonial Africa 
such as freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom to participate, and universal 
education for children. In terms of children’s rights, these came with a “paternal authority” 
of the group to be responsible for children’s education (Frémont, 2009). 
Therefore, when we examine the local response to the Ebola outbreak in section 2.7, 
the literature briefly touches on this concept of rights of the individual versus the group 
during a public health emergency (Pellecchia et al., 2015). This is especially concerning 
among critics who feel that the passage of bylaws were authoritarian and restricted 
individual rights (Boland and McKay, 2018; Enria, 2017; Wilkinson et al., 2017). These 
authors above would have likely argued that the bylaws are based on the social mores of 
collective integrity and social cohesion. 
Indeed, Ozoemena and Hansungule (2009) also argue that traditional systems were 
equal, and in some instances, surpass current international and national legislations on 
                                                          
57 Since criminal court cases cannot be tried in customary courts in Nigeria, the traditional oath would be done in front of a 
traditional ruler. However, the downside is that many people would “opt” to take the oath instead of going to court. 
Ekhator (2019) argues that the state judiciary system is very slow and ineffective at trying corruption cases anyway, and 
radical reforms (in traditional and state procedures) are needed to tackle corruption. 
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human rights. The authors say that gender justice is not alien to customary law and that 
common law has sometimes acted detrimentally against women. For example, in the 
dissolution of marriage in the Igboland, neither party is entitled to the other’s property. 
However, in common law proceedings, the contributions made by the woman via 
subsistence labor is quantified differently than what was originally intended under 
customary laws (Ozoemena and Hansungule, 2009). 
Moreover, on examining the atrocities of European settlement and legal institutions 
in Africa, Maimela (2019) argues that for most of the history of South Africa, the imposed 
European legal system did not guarantee human rights for Black Africans. 
However, Bennett (1994) argues that since customary law is based on patriarchy, 
much like common law, there still needs to be modifications to promote gender equality 
(just as there was with the 1993 South African constitution to add an ‘equality clause’). 
These suggestions are in specific areas on the rights of women in marriage, divorce, and 
guardianship. Additionally, Bennett (1994) suggests that as a temporary fix, in judicial cases 
where customary law may potentially discriminate, common law can be applied for the 
decision. Thus, Bennett (1994) does not argue to abolish customary law, but rather to 
reform it. 
Finally, customary law is evolving and in West Africa it is codified into state law 
(Chieftaincy Act, 2009; Local Government Act, 2015; Local Government Act of 2018, 2018; 
The Local Government Act, 2004). Sanders (1987) asks how ‘customary’ is customary law in 
today’s context? As not only do customs naturally evolve, but also SSA has a long history of 
Western influence during the colonial and post-independence eras. For instance, the 
development reforms to change local institutions for ‘good governance’. Additionally, 
Ogwruike (1966) writes that state courts are also turning customary law into state law via 
verdicts, demonstrating the dynamics of TLIs. Therefore, it stands to argue whether the 
traditional and the modern are so distinct. The next two subsections give insight into TLIs in 
their local dynamic political contexts. 
2.4.4 TLIs in Liberia 
 
Indigenous people were largely excluded from citizenship rights until President 
William Tubman’s administration in the mid-twentieth century. Article 56 (B) of the 1986 
constitution of Liberia, allows for paramount chiefs, clan chiefs, and town chiefs to be 
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elected by the constituency (Johnson, 2016). However, there has not been an election for 
these chiefs since 1986. Instead, most paramount chiefs and the local commissioners have 
been appointed by the President (Bulte et al., 2012; Government of Liberia, 2018). The 
National Election Commission has focused most of its resources on the presidential and 
legislative elections, while these local authorities have ascended through selection of the 
executive office or those appointed officials acting on behalf of the executive mansion 
(Johnson, 2016). 
Consequently, some argue that the civil war was primarily led by young people who 
felt excluded from opportunities within traditional and state institutions (Mulbah, 2018; 
Tokpa and Yengbeh Jr., 2012). Traditional leaders tend to be older and male, but state 
leaders fall into this category too, while most are also Americo. This raised concerns that 
state-building and good governance reforms that are supposed to be more democratic and 
bring socioeconomic development to the most vulnerable, also exclude marginalized 
populations such as women, youths, and indigenous ethnic groups. According to Beekman, 
Bulte, and Nillesen (2013), Liberian society is hierarchical with evidence that sometimes 
chiefs misuse their status and power for personal gain. Especially in their experiments to 
detect corruption, they speculate that resources may be misappriopriated to feed into 
patron-client networks (i.e. patrimonialism). Today, chiefs are nominated by elders in the 
community, then elected by community members, and this is approved by the government. 
However, since there have not been chiefdom elections, some believe that traditional 
leaders are not always accountable to their constituency (Johnson, 2016). 
Experimental research in rural communities shows that corrupt chiefs can 
undermine key economic activities (Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen, 2013; Beekman, Bulte, 
and Nillesen, 2014). These experiments build on the theory that poor governance, in the 
form of corruption, can undermine local development and economic growth. Corruption is 
measured in a forensic economic approach of looking for missing expenditures; in this 
design, weighing seeds before and after storing them in the chiefs’ home. This is called a gap 
measure (Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen, 2013). If the bag of seeds weighed less than before 
bringing it to the chiefs to store them, then the missing amount is considered diverted. In 
this study, 36% of observed communities had missing seeds before being distributed to 
community members for an agrarian project. In these communities, members were also less 
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likely to engage in trade activities and they planted fewer crops, which affects economic 
development. 
In a separate experiment for public goods, Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen (2014) find 
that communities with corrupt chiefs will invest less to provide a public good or service. This 
was designed as a game where random and anonymous community members were given 
tokens assigned a monetary value and could determine how much to put into the public pot 
for a good or service and how much to keep for themselves. Communities with corrupt 
chiefs had lower voluntary contributions to the public pot. However, they are also aware 
that the seeds could have been diverted into patron-client networks to fortify the position 
of the chief by giving to the neediest. Thus, they do not address if lower voluntary 
contributions could be due to those in need already receiving distributions from the chief. 
The authors argue that in this sense, having a corrupt chief was like paying a distortive tax. 
Overall, these experiments build on the theory that the quality of institutions is correlated 
with economic growth and investment. Corruption, which is an indicator of poor 
institutional quality can hinder growth. 
Baldwin and Mvukiyehe (2015) examine sectoral and electoral processes that took 
place for clan chiefs that were eliminated at the end of the war (death or left). The study 
shows that when elections are introduced to traditional institutions, this may decrease 
collective action and public good provisions. This may be because elections end up creating 
a parallel system of governing, rather than replacing traditional institutions. Therefore, 
elected leaders must collaborate with traditional leaders to organize collective action and 
contributions. The authors say that other field experiments show higher contribution levels 
(e.g. taxes), but that is when participants get to vote on the rules beforehand. In this 
scenario, the rules were imposed on the control groups through an external process with 
little preexisting legitimacy in these communities (Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015). 
In the debate of modernizing Liberia, questions have arisen regarding the relevancy 
of chiefs. There is a view that traditional authorities are not relevant, outdated, and may 
even hinder development. As well as there is another perspective that despite its 
weaknesses, traditional leaders are indispensable (Tokpa and Yengbeh Jr., 2012). Tokpa and 
Yengbeh Jr. (2012) also identify a third approach, historically, chiefs have been used as an 
extension of authoritarian rule (either colonial or in Liberia), but today they can promote 
democratic governance. However, state reform of TLIs may not always improve its function; 
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the Liberian government created ‘native or tribal courts’, which tend to be more 
authoritarian or coercive than the house palavers (customary law courts) that exist in town 
quarters (Sevareid, 1993). The house palavers are favored, as these aim for reconciliation 
rather than an adversarial legal procedure because positive relationships among the clan are 
more important than “the vindication of private rights” (Sevareid, 1993, p. 75). 
Former Liberian politician and scholar, Amos Sawyer (2005b), argues that Liberia can 
benefit from polycentric governance where there are multiple institutional layers. In other 
words, including non-state institutions in the development and democratic processes for 
self-governing. This concept would not be unusual for Liberia as traditional governance was 
historically led by an indigenous deliberative democracy (Mulbah, 2018). Therefore, Sawyer 
(2005b) would argue that state-led reforms of TLIs in Liberia is not necessary, as these local 
institutions can self-govern. 
Indeed, despite the prior research above, demonstrating corruption as a present 
factor in some Liberian TLIs and alledged cause of the civil war, they are still popular. Logan 
(2013)’s findings show that age and education had significant effects as the more educated 
showed less support, but younger people tended to have more support for TLIs. This 
challenges past assumptions of young people feeling disenfranchised by TLIs and the 
assumption that support for traditional rulers correlates with (perceived) failings of the 
state. Many respondents felt that traditional rulers had an important part in modern society 
and some even felt that they should play a bigger role too. 
 
2.4.5 TLIs in Sierra Leone 
 
Richards (2005) and Hanlon (2005) discuss abuse and corruption of the paramount 
chiefs from the colonial days and trace uprisings against the chiefs as far back as 1955. 
Richards (2005) traces this abuse of authority to 19th century colonial laws that gave the 
chiefs the power to induce forced communal labor that had been in effect until the 
contemporary era. However, Fanthorpe (2006) argues that these historical practices should 
not be confused with today’s communal labor, which often focuses on projects that benefit 
the community such as schools, roads, and controlled brush fires. Richards (2005) says that 
customary laws should be reformed as well as the chiefs’ courts. He argues that the state’s 
judiciary system should have oversight of their rulings, but Sawyer (2008) says that this is 
problematic for two reasons. First, the customary laws are still highly valued among the 
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population, and second, state institutions are not trusted. For example, the traditional 
justice system and local bylaws evolved exogenously from the state and are used today to 
resolve social infractions, rather than going through the state justice system (Sesay, 2019). 
Therefore, the donors’ approach to post-conflict development was to recommend 
generic liberal political and economic reforms without considering why the rural poor may 
prefer nonliberal forms of governing (Fanthorpe, 2006). 
Richards (2005) and Hanlon (2005) argue that the chiefdoms tend to be autocratic 
and question if reinstating them in post-conflict recovery would hinder development, 
especially for marginalized groups. However, at the time of writing, the authors did not 
consider other TLIs where women and youth gain power and social status. As mentioned in 
section 2.4.1.1, secret societies coexist with chiefs and play a major role in governance and 
politics at the local and national levels. Chiefs are usually members if not head, of the secret 
societies and so are elected politicians (Conteh, 2013). However, customary law in some 
parts of the country arbitrarily defines youth (anyone under 35) and this can limit 
opportunities (Fanthorpe, Lavali, and Sesay, 2011). 
Much of this debate has focused on the persistence of these institutions, or in the 
case of Richards and Hanlon, on their ineffectiveness, but not how these institutions 
evolved. During the war, 63 paramount chiefs died and thus elections were held in 2002 to 
fill these vacancies (Hanlon, 2005). Furthermore, in the case of a significant event such as a 
war, there are some institutional changes, and subsequently, changes in institutional quality 
(Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Voors and Bulte, 2014). Many post-war elected chiefs are from a 
contemporary generation and may have a more modern outlook. Today, this institution 
persists and retains popular support, according to the surveys presented in chapter one. 
There is no evidence that this institution has remained archaic, as all institutions are 
dynamic and change along with contemporary society. However, after the war, the 
government looked to the 1950s for a model of decentralization and the chieftaincy, instead 
of reforming the local government system for modern governance (Fanthorpe, Lavali, and 
Sesay, 2011). On the other hand, donors did not want to invest in a decentralization plan 
that has a strong chieftaincy institution (Fanthorpe, Lavali, and Sesay, 2011). 
Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014)’s case study finds that political competition 
(i.e. an election) functions as a market competition to promote efficiency, and areas with 
low competition result in lower development outcomes. However, support and bonding 
73 | P a g e  
 
between citizens and chiefs may have to do with social capital, where fewer ruling families 
may have higher social capital. The authors argue that patrimonialism is a form of social 
capital, which encourages support for the chieftaincy institution but does not bring 
development. Rather, it locks villagers in a dependent relationship with their chiefs.58 
However, Bulte, Richards, and Voors (2018) critique Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 
(2014)’s assumption that chiefs are rational choice profit maximizers with political 
competition as the only factor to constrain their power. The authors concede there is some 
support for the hypothesis that chiefs who face greater political competition invest more in 
education and public health: public goods are positively correlated with multiple families. 
However, there could also be other factors that affect service delivery, as the number of 
ruling families was determined during the colonial era. 
Also, scholars who thought that the paramount chiefs were responsible for the 
conflict (grievance-based reasons described in chapter one), or those who argue the rebels 
wanted access to diamonds or other natural resources (greed-based), an econometric 
analysis revealed that neither factors could readily explain the cause of the conflict (Bulte, 
Richards, and Voors, 2018). Harris (2013) argues that there were several factors of the neo-
patrimonial state which left people with grievances and a need to exploit the social, 
political, and economic opportunities that come with war. 
Thus, while social capital is an important concept to understand power and 
governance, Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014)’s interpretation of paramount chiefs 
being tied to the land and therefore locking in their constituents, may actually disempower 
rural villagers and stereotype them as unsophisticated citizens. Baldwin (2015) argues how 
rural citizens are sophisticated decision makers, whether it is in voting (instead of 
stereotyping chiefs as vote brokers) or resisting a chief. 
2.4.6 The Debate on Governance and Chiefs 
 
We cannot generalize that every chief governs fairly or effectively, as some chiefs are 
corrupt or may have despotic tendencies (Mamdani, 1996). Additionally, Acemoglu, Reed, 
and Robinson (2014), Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen (2013; 2014) Hanlon (2005), Jackson 
                                                          
58 Tangri (1980) also argues that colonial and postcolonial structures made the chieftaincy a wealth-maximizing office. 
However, most of that wealth is redistributed through patrimonial networks, and thus, it is only in a few chiefdoms (i.e. 
those with mining licenses) where the spoils are of a considerable amount. The chiefs are expected to be a paternal figure 
and dispense assistance, but their salaries do not permit them to live up these social expectations. 
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(2005; 2006; 2011), Peters and Richards (1998), and Richards (2005) say that traditional 
leaders tend to be corrupt, and in the earlier debate, were partly responsible for the civil 
war in the Mano River region. However, some argue that the chiefdom should be dissolved 
in order for these societies to develop peacefully and democratically (Hanlon, 2005; Jackson, 
2005; Jackson, 2006;59 Richards, 2005), while others argue that they play an important 
social and customary role, and not to mention, have popular legitimacy (Adjei, Busia, and 
Bob-Milliar, 2017; Fanthorpe, 1998; Fanthorpe, 2001; Fanthorpe, 2006; Logan, 2013; Sesay, 
2019; Ubink, 2008). However, for this thesis, this is binary and abstract, because the 
chiefdoms still exist many years after this on-going debate and we are interested in how 
they govern and this link to institutional quality. Moreover, the trend in the region is to 
integrate TLIs into state institutional structures, codifying and legitimizing their authority. 
2.4.6.1 Problems with the Binary Debate 
 
The literature has a largely theoretical and abstract debate of removing traditional 
authorities for ‘better governance and development’ or has argued that they are relevant 
for cultural and religious significance and therefore still have a role to play because of this. 
However, in many countries, traditional authorities are still in power and are participating in 
governance reforms or democratic reforms at the state and local levels (Baker, 2007; 
Baldwin, 2015; Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012; Dia, 1996; Neuffer, 2000; Tokpa and 
Yengbeh Jr., 2012; UNDEF, 2014). Therefore, it is not clear how the decades-old debate on 
removing tribal authorities have had an impact on today’s societies. 
Furthermore, some of the literature that has been cited in favor of this, the authors 
have evolved their arguments. For example, Mamdani (1996) has been referenced in much 
of this literature for generally referring to chiefs as despotic. However, his discussion was 
largely on the manipulation of traditional authorities during the colonial era and how their 
powers were consolidated and made more authoritarian or how new authorities were 
created by colonial administrators. His broader thesis is that colonialism defined ‘customary 
law’ and ‘ethnic identity’ in a way that did not exist pre-colonialism (Mamdani, 2001). 
Consequently, chiefs are a symptom of a wider problem in SSA, a kind of identity politics 
                                                          
59 Jackson (2005; 2006) discuss reforming the chieftaincy. Specifically, to depoliticize it and have chiefs act as “opinion 
formers and mobilizers” (Jackson, 2006, p. 108), which seems to contradict depoliticizing them. However, Jackson (2005; 
2006) is critical of the internationally-led reforms in Sierra Leone but he supports external pressure on the Sierra Leone 
government to make reforms. 
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that is building nationalism and grants those as ‘indigenous’ with extra rights called 
‘customary rights,’ that nonindigenous people do not have (Mamdani 2001; Mamdani, 
2019). This is using Rwanda and its history between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups60 or in 
Uganda regarding the expulsions of Asians under President Idi Amin, as Asians were not 
seen as indigenous (Mamdani, 2001). Thus, while we discussed identity politics in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone in chapter one, the mainstream belief is that this was not equitable to 
genocide like in Rwanda.61 
Richards (2005) and Peters and Richards (1998) have also been referenced for 
arguing that paramount chiefs in Sierra Leone are authoritarian and possibly a hindrance to 
post-conflict recovery. However, this could be contextualized into the specific debate of 
state-building in Sierra Leone, as later works from the main author, Paul Richards, do not 
criticize the governance of chiefs (Bulte et al., 2012; Bulte et al., 2013) and then support the 
role of the TLIs in governing the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak and other matters 
(Bulte, Richards, and Voors, 2018; Richards, 2016). 
In addition, Jackson (2005; 2006) argue that decentralization and state-building 
policies in Sierra Leone were reinstating these institutions that have poor governance. 
Consequently, this could lead to a return to violence, since former combatants have few 
prospects and access to patrimonial networks. However, in later research, Jackson (2011) on 
discussing legal pluralism, argues for reforming the chieftaincy by empowering the 
marginalized within local power structures. He still supports externally-led changes and cites 
a justice program led by the United Kingdom Department for International Development 
(DFID) as an example of this. This program may be a more productive way of engaging with 
chiefs, as the success of local initiatives is directly tied to them (Albrecht, 2010). 
The arguments that support the role of chiefs have relied on cultural and religious 
positions to explain why they will always be needed despite how the state develops (Adjei, 
Busia, and Bob-Milliar, 2017; Fanthorpe, 1998; Fanthorpe 2001; Fanthorpe, 2006; Logan, 
2013; Sesay, 2019; Ubink, 2008). The thesis does not disagree with the premise of this 
argument, although cultural and religious authority varies from state to state and within 
states. Nonetheless, rooting the legitimacy and authority of the chiefs in cultural and 
                                                          
60 The Rwandan civil conflict started in 1990 and became known for the Rwandan genocide, with mass slaughter against 
the Tutsi people. See Mamdani (2019) for further reading. 
61 See section 1.4.1 in chapter one, discussing how Bellows and Miguel (2009) and Harris (2012) do not believe ethnic 
tension was the cause of the war, but later, did help to create factions. 
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religious foundations is the beginning of understanding their authority and role in the 
community and not the entire picture. 
The literature has largely confined paramount chiefs as having authority over 
customary law (Adjei, Busia, and Bob-Milliar, 2017; Bulte et al., 2013; Castillejo, 2009; 
Fanthorpe, 2001; Fanthorpe, 2006; Khan and Mehmood, 2016; Mamdani, 2001; Richards, 
2005; Sawyer, 2008; Seidler, 2014; Sevareid, 1993; Ubink, 2008). However, in many states, 
their powers and jurisdiction are more broadly defined, and they do act on behalf of state 
institutions, for example, to collect taxes (Chieftaincy Act, 2009; Local Government Act, 
2015; Local Government Act of 2018, 2018; The Local Government Act, 2004). Or, in another 
example, Liberia recently passed a legislative act through the senate to formalize bylaws as 
legal regulations by the chiefs and district authorities (Local Government Act of 2018, 2018). 
This also means that mechanisms of enforcement could involve state institutions (police and 
judiciary) and not just TLIs. This would support a polycentric approach to governing, where 
state institutions support local institutions’ agendas (Mansbridge, 2014; Oström, 1990). 
2.4.6.2 A Third Approach 
 
In this cohort, authors are aware that there is a broader discussion on whether 
traditional leaders should stay in power or be dissolved. However, their mostly evidence-
based research focuses on how these leaders currently govern and the measurable impact 
or outcomes. Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014), Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen (2013; 
2014), and Pande and Udry (2005) examine the institutional quality with an interest in 
economic outcomes. The first three are concerned with how corruption can impact local 
investment and found that areas with corrupt chiefs or chiefs with less political competition 
(from other ruling families) had worse investment and development outcomes. 
Pande and Udry (2005) say that the main body of literature on institutional quality, 
change, and economic growth mainly use indicators that are faced by businesses and 
individuals in the formal and urban sectors. This literature also takes a broad country-level 
analysis, which can overlook various institutions at the micro-level. The authors examine 
rural institutions for institutional quality, acknowledging that mechanisms for contract 
enforcement differ from a business. However, this still uses low transaction costs as a 
determinant of institutional quality. Thus, for many agrarian societies, land tenure (property 
77 | P a g e  
 
rights)62 is key for economic opportunities. In Ghana, it is the responsibility of the chief to 
ensure that land is available for the subjects. A chief can sell land to outsiders and this has 
happened, especially in urban areas (Pande and Udry, 2005). However, the authors say that 
this is rare and when attempts to sell have happened, it resulted in the overthrow of a chief. 
In Ghana, the land is transferred through matrilineal inheritance and the chief is 
incentivized to make sure that poor subjects have access for farming. The chief will set 
conditions to allocate this land such as not allowing it to fallow.63 This will weed out rich 
people in the area as cultivating land is very labor-intensive and income from nonfarming is 
much higher. Therefore, only poorer citizens will accept the land under these conditions and 
the chief can stay in power. Land reform is needed to guarantee long-term security, but for 
now, more conditions are placed on the land to mitigate population pressures. According to 
Pande and Udry (2005), this micro-level examination helps us understand the institutional 
changes that may affect economic growth. 
There are some who suggest that TLIs can be reformed or part of better governance 
and local development efforts (Baker, 2007; Baldwin, 2015; Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 
2012; Castillejo, 2009; Dia, 1996; Jackson, 2011; Sesay, 2019; Tokpa and Yengbeh Jr., 2012; 
UNDEF, 2014; Unsworth, 2010). However, the approaches and focus vary. For example, 
Baker (2007), Jackson (2011), and Sesay (2019) write on the dual judicial system, a formal 
one by the state and the customary courts led by the chiefs. Community-based policing 
methods have provided security in post-conflict states, where order, conflict, and behaviors 
are monitored by the community. This tends to be more important in states that have a 
negative perception of state policing because of the role of the state during the civil conflict 
(Baker, 2007). Castillejo (2009) and Jackson (2011) argue that customary courts in Sierra 
Leone can abuse their power, passing arbitrary bylaws that citizens may be unaware of, or 
punitive measures that violate human rights. However, Sesay (2019) says that customary 
courts and bylaws may have greater legitimacy at the community level. Thus, post-conflict 
reforms should take into account social practices governed by TLIs that are helpful for 
cohesion and conflict mediation and differentiate between the harmful ones. 
                                                          
62 Land is treated as a communal good in most SSA countries and not private property rights, but Pande and Udry (2005) 
still count it as property rights as the individual can economically gain from it. 
63 In agriculture, this refers to farmland that is left for a long period without being sown in order to restore fertility. 
Sometimes, fallowing is done purposely to avoid surplus production. 
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Baldwin (2015), Tokpa and Yengbeh Jr. (2012), UNDEF (2014), Unsworth (2010) 
broadly discuss how TLIs can be used in local development efforts. Baldwin (2015) gives an 
example of how chiefs have worked with elected officials to organize communal labor to 
make mud bricks for a school. The elected official managed to secure funding to build a 
school but needed bricks, hence, he had to work with the local chiefs to organize the 
community as the response would not have been the same if he organized it himself. 
However, Unsworth (2010) says that the effectiveness of these local leaders varies either by 
working well with state institutions or sometimes undermining their efforts. She believes 
that this could partly be explained by colonial origins, whether TLIs were ruled directly or 
indirectly by European powers. 
However, politics could be another explanation. Logan (2013) and Ubink (2008) say 
that although traditional leaders still have popular legitimacy, how would integration affect 
democracies in SSA? Indeed, this literature suggests that TLIs may be beneficial to 
democracies, however, this is only in the form of delivering public goods. As a political 
theory, liberal democracy also includes human rights issues, such as gender equality, 
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, a trial by peers, and other notions of 
individualism, liberty, and justice (Carothers, 2002; Harris, 2012; Hellsten and Larbi, 2006; 
Omotola, 2010; Mustapha, 2016; North et al., 2015). On the one hand, one must consider 
the norms, principles, and ethics that are valued in individual societies. As discussed in 
section 2.4.3 regarding customary law, these rights are exercised with communitarian 
values. However, TLIs do not always deliver or promote these, and these liberal democratic 
values are weak in state institutions too. 
Baldwin (2015), Bulte, Richards, and Voors (2018), and Fanthorpe (2006) say that 
chiefs are accountable to their constituency through nonelectoral means. This would mean 
that there are ways of good governance outside the World Bank (2002)’s limited electoral 
strategies. Bulte, Richards, and Voors (2018) argue that West African chiefs are brokers of 
multiple institutional orderings, such as government, justice, village, and development. They 
argue that a chief can only carry out his or her duty with the respect and confidence of 
electors from landowning families. And those that tend to be autocratic will be met with 
stubborn resistance. Baldwin (2015) says that historically, people who did not like their 
leader could vote with their feet. A depleted population would mean less tributes (or taxes) 
paid to the chief; and this would economically and socially hurt his or her standing. 
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Nowadays, “bad chiefs would be the subject of gossip and ridicule, and subjects would 
refuse to provide customary tribute or to work on their farms.” (Baldwin, 2015, p. 26). 
Indeed, Fanthorpe (2006) discusses two unpopular chiefs in Sierra Leone, who won their 
elections because of patronage from the All Peoples Congress party (APC), and not through 
the normal electoral process, and as a result, lacked legitimacy. One so lacked the support 
of his constituency that he could not even organize a community meeting, and another had 
to live outside his chiefdom for many years. Thus, despite weak state institutions, there are 
checks and balances on the power of traditional leaders. This is congruent with what North 
(1991; 2003) says about cooperation being maintained by reputation, “the reputation may 
be political, moral, spiritual, or even idiosyncratic, or, often enough, all four at once,” 
(North, 1991, p. 104). Even though many countries are developing bigger markets, 
reputation in rural communities may still crucial for cooperation. 
It is in this debate on governance and institutional quality of TLIs where this thesis 
fits. It demonstrates how TLIs have the institutional quality to affect development from 
Pande and Udry (2005) and Unsworth (2010), but also, how good governance can be seen 
differently from liberal policies as discussed in Baldwin (2015), Bulte, Richards, and Voors 
(2018), and Fanthorpe (2006). The next section discusses how institutional quality can be 
extended for social outcomes. 
 
2.5 Extending Institutional Quality 
 
Hanlon (2012) argues that ‘good governance’ defined by the International Finance 
Institutions (IFIs) is supply-side economic management and increased inequality, while social 
welfare policies that are considered ‘poor governance’ (e.g. cash-transfers) are demand-led 
and equity-based development solutions. Thus, locally-derived solutions, such as in Brazil or 
China, to correct demand-side barriers are not seen as good governance in the current 
development models. 
If we understand (good or high) institutional quality as low transaction costs, 
enforcement, and protection of property rights for economic growth, then we see why the 
debate has mainly focused on state institutions and the mixed performance of development 
aid resources. What is missing is the discussion of institutional quality as low social costs to 
protect social development and welfare. If the qualities for state institutions for economic 
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growth are preferred, then it stands reason to ask, what are the qualities needed for social 
development and humanitarian welfare and extending this theory to explain market failures 
and corrections during the Ebola epidemic. 
 
2.5.1 Market Failures and Social Outcomes 
 
The thesis holds that there are two market failures that TLIs can correct. In the 
literature highlighted below in sections 2.6 and 2.7, in a public health emergency, there is 
sometimes a lack of knowledge about specialized equipment or disinfectants to make 
activities safer and prevent the spread of an infectious disease. When there is a degree of 
misinformation or lack of knowledge that affect consumers’ choices, this is called an 
‘information failure’ in the market (Jha and Chaloupka, 2000). When there is an information 
failure, consumers (i.e citizens) may not demand products such as chlorine or new 
boreholes for Cholera prevention. Lack of knowledge of early symptoms or personal 
protective equipment (PPE) to prevent infection can also lead to under-consumption, even if 
these resources are available for free by donors or humanitarians. Citizens may not use 
them because they are unaware that such products are needed to act safely during an 
emergency. This concept expands on Jha and Chaloupka (2000)’s work on information and 
regulation of tobacco in low-income countries. They argue that there is an assumption that 
consumers are educated about risks and benefits on the goods or services they consume. In 
their study, they argue that consumers are not knowledgeable of tobacco risks or under 
appreciate the gravity of smoking on their health, to choose not to consume tobacco 
products. Therefore, government intervention via regulations and information is needed to 
lower the demand; thus, preserving the health and welfare of the population. 
The second market failure is ‘social cost.’ According to Becker and Becker (1997), 
negative health behaviors such as tobacco smoking or alcohol consumption bear many costs 
that are not only absorbed by the consumer. When an individual chooses to consume these 
products, there is first a private cost that the individual bears. However, his or her actions 
can contribute to costs that other individuals bear, such as the potentially fatal 
consequences of driving while intoxicated (from alcohol consumption) or the costs of 
tobacco-related morbidity on health insurance programs. According to Reubi (2016), 
information failure and social costs can lead to economic inefficiencies that must be 
corrected through government intervention (regulations). In this paper, the regulations that 
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were passed to correct these market failures were sin taxes and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) 2003 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Reubi, 2016). The 
upcoming literature review of the 2014 Ebola epidemic discusses information failures that 
caused challenges for aid resources to perform. During this outbreak, some behaviors such 
as hiding sick people or performing unsafe undertaking and burials, not only had an 
individual cost, but also a social cost because these behaviors prolonged the disease spread 
(Carter et al., 2017; Dietz et al., 2015; Richards and Mokuwa, 2014). This affected 
communities and the economy, as production stopped. That is until TLIs intervened with 
regulations. Unlike the concept of ‘social benefits’ discussed above (Oström, 1990), the 
thesis takes a market approach to discuss the reduction of social costs. This is about 
reducing negative externalities and not necessarily gaining an economic opportunity. 
For instance, Parker and Allen (2018) and Parker et al. (2019) discuss Mathiane 
village in Sierra Leone where ‘secret burials’ and home care of the sick took place, despite 
laws against this. According to their interviews, the people heard public health messages on 
the radio but did not feel that they could relate to them and did not trust that hospitals 
would safely care for their loved ones. On the surface, this seems that there was a distrust 
of health and state institutions and people ignored the information given by public health 
officials. However, Richards (2016) and Chandler et al. (2015) explain that much of the 
information channeled through state institutions was theoretically correct and conceivable 
but did not fit the local context. So, it is still misinformation for neoclassical analysis because 
the information given must fit the local context and culture. This is further reviewed in 
section 2.7.3 on the Ebola outbreak literature. 
2.5.1.1 Institutional Quality for TLIs 
 
Understanding institutional quality in this light, the theory is still the same, meaning 
there needs to be trust and enforcement of the rules under these institutions (North, 1990; 
North, 1991; North, 2003; Oström et al., 2001). Conteh (2013), Logan (2013), Sesay (2019), 
Tokpa and Yengbeh Jr. (2012), and Ubink (2008) say that mediation and judicial processes 
are still carried out under TLIs. Rulemaking, defined as bylaws, are laws in every legal and 
judicial sense that we understand lawmaking. These institutions also have the authority to 
impose fines and penalties for those who do not follow the rules (Chieftaincy Act, 2009; 
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Local Government Act, 2015; Local Government Act of 2018, 2018, 2018; The Local 
Government Act, 2004). 
However, if we focus on broader issues of social outcomes and human security such 
as education and health, this too can bring economic growth (Aldis, 2008; Piccone, 2017; 
Werner and Sanders, 1997). In this perspective, these indicators are instrumental to 
economic growth, but institutional quality does not focus on market-led economic growth.64 
 
2.6 Public Health Emergencies 
 
When it comes to emergency management, communities are referenced as ‘key 
resources’ but are often overlooked in proactive and reactive stages of emergency 
management (Murphy, 2007). While there is literature (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson, 
2014; Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012; Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein 2009; 
Ubink, 2008) discussing TLIs and their governance, their voices and perspectives are not 
included.65 Fewer published works (Baldwin, 2015; Pedi et al., 2017; Richards, 2016), 
interview or include the perspectives of these leaders. There could be many reasons, such as 
lack of access in the field or even lack of ability to conduct fieldwork in rural areas in low-
income countries (Piccolino and Franklin, 2020). Scott (1992) argues there are two sets of 
transcripts regarding how those in power engage with marginalized communities. First, a 
public discourse that is overwhelmingly used in academia that portrays a sense of harmony 
and cohesion between those in power and the powerless. This concept is demonstrated 
below, where we discuss community engagement strategies in public health emergencies. 
The dominant narrative is that humanitarian agencies went into communities and 
‘organized’ them or trained a select group of ‘community stakeholders.’ This transcript has 
disempowered and rendered TLIs silent in the literature. Second, there is a hidden transcript 
that is used within groups (Scott, 1992). Not many scholars have access to observe and 
converse within local groups to analyze the latter. 
                                                          
64 To further emphasize this importance of social outcomes; production stopped, and the economy shrank during the Ebola 
outbreak (World Bank, 2014). The thesis only examines EVD deaths as a social cost, but other health services stopped too. 
Huber, Finelli, and Stevens (2018) estimate a million fewer children were vaccinated against measles, which may lead up to 
16,000 more measles-related deaths in subsequent years. So, resolving the disease outbreak led to a return of economic 
activities in the short-term and prevented further negative long-term impacts. 
65 Secret societies are hardly mentioned in this literature except in Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014), Harris (2013), 
Jackson (2006; 2011), and Richards (2016). 
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Scott (1992) defines this hidden transcript as the language for subordinated groups, 
meaning those who are powerless. However as explained above, TLIs have been very 
influential in local politics for centuries despite colonialism, post-independence, and even 
post-conflict reforms to manipulate or eradicate them. Therefore, in their local 
communities, they are not powerless, but their knowledge and voices have not been well 
integrated into the public transcript of the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Scott (1992)’s analysis is 
useful for us to think about how emergency interventions have been published; depicting 
international and state institutions leading the response and community stakeholders 
rendered as passive apparatuses. The 2014 Ebola epidemic has brought more research 
regarding community-level organizing, which will be discussed section 2.7, revealing a 
hidden transcript that contradicts the public one. 
 
2.6.1 Definition of Public Health Emergency 
 
To understand how aid performance is related to local governance and participation 
of community stakeholders, we must first define the event of the 2014 Ebola epidemic and 
what the current research says about engaging local communities during an outbreak. The 
Ebola virus is known as a Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF) in which we currently know five 
subtypes (Marí Saéz et al., 2015). EVD is highly infectious and has mostly occurred in remote 
areas with fatality rates up 90% (Pourrut et al., 2005); thus, an outbreak of this virus has 
usually warranted some level of organized assistance and response. However, in 2014, the 
outbreak had spread to populous urban areas in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone affecting 
thousands of people. Given the massive and unseen before prevalence, the WHO declared 
this a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on August 8, 2014 (World 
Health Organization, 2014c). 
‘Public health emergency,’ is defined for this thesis as an outbreak of an infectious 
disease that poses a threat to the security and stability of the state and requires an 
international response.66 However, the literature is not limited to events where PHEIC was 
declared. Before the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHRs) came into effect in 2007, 
if a nation had a public health emergency, it invited the WHO, technical expertise, and 
coordinated aid resources (Kamradt-Scott, 2015). 
                                                          
66 Full definition was discussed in the introduction on page xvi. 
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At this level of literature, we come to the first conceptual understanding of local 
participation and aid effectiveness in this context. The aid resources are humanitarian 
assistance that is usually mobilized quickly and for the short-term to stabilize a situation 
during an emergency. This distinction of aid was discussed in chapter one.67 
 
2.6.2 The Public Transcript on Emergency Interventions 
 
In a case study published by DFID and Oxfam on the October 2010 Cholera outbreak 
in Haiti, this public health emergency came as a direct result of a massive earthquake that 
displaced over three million people ten months beforehand in January (U.K. Department for 
International Development, 2011). According to the report, DFID and Oxfam along with the 
Haitian Ministry of Health designed a health education strategy on water and sanitation 
management. They trained community health workers to go door-to-door to deliver key 
messages on better hygiene practices to reduce the spread of Cholera (U.K. Department for 
International Development, 2011). This practice is called community sensitization and we 
see it deployed as a strategy for public health. It is limited around health education and 
health promotion to change behavior and does not take local knowledge into account. 
Gabon experienced three waves of EVD outbreaks between 1994 and 1997, with the 
first wave having confirmation of patients co-infected with Yellow Fever (Georges et al., 
1999). A team from the Centre International de Recherches Médicales de Franceville 
assisted in the response, however, their perspectives on the community and demand-side 
barriers were very limited in this paper. “It is important to note that during this 
investigation, we continually faced many difficulties (e.g., logistics problems and cultural 
and political constraints) in the collection of data and management…” (Georges et al., 1999, 
p. S65). The authors discuss a technical and biomedical approach to identify and prevent the 
spread of EVD and the need for better diagnostic equipment to rapidly identify any VHF. 
They conclude that from a public health point of view the best way to prevent an outbreak 
of this type is simple barrier nursing methods.68 
                                                          
67 See the first section on aid in chapter one starting on page 3. 
68 Barrier nursing method refers to infectious disease control. There are different methods depending on how infectious a 
patient may be. ‘Simple’ methods may refer to basic PPE such as gloves and masks, while ‘strict or rigid’ may refer to more 
protective barriers like a full bodysuit or isolation of patients. See BMJ (1966) and Landers et al. (2010) for further reading. 
In chapter four, some informants also refer to this as the Infection Prevention Control (IPC) training they undertook during 
the 2014 EVD outbreak. 
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In Angola, a 2007 Marburg Virus outbreak (another VHF similar to Ebola) had 
humanitarian agency, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) responding to the crisis with the 
Angolan Ministry of Health and the WHO (Roddy et al., 2007). They say there is a typical 
biomedical paradigm to address infectious VHFs, such as the use of specialized equipment, 
epidemiological surveillance (also known as contact tracing),69 and biomedical information 
to help contain the spread of the disease. However, despite the agency bringing the best 
technical expertise and equipment, the authors acknowledge that their aid would be less 
effective without community support. Therefore, the international team changed its 
community engagement strategy to make social practices, such as burial rituals and home 
care safer; this is to reduce stigma and the spread of the Marburg virus. Although cultural 
practices are considered in this example, community members are viewed as passive 
recipients of aid intervention using ‘cultural interpreters,’ and not engaged participation. In 
addition, they learned that biomedical education needed to de-emphasize a disease’s 
fatality and place more emphasis on prevention and early treatment. Indicating an 
information failure during the outbreak. 
In 2000, there was an EVD outbreak in the rural village of Rwot-Obillo, Uganda that 
spread to neighboring districts. According to Okware et al. (2002), the WHO and a 
coordinated response team worked with the Ministry of Health to stop the outbreak. A 
biomedical paradigm is explained of infection control, PPE, along with health education and 
community engagement efforts. However, just like the preceding examples, local health 
workers and volunteers are trained to sensitize the community and this information was 
disseminated daily and managed through the centralized national taskforce with the 
government. According to the authors, government commitment and decentralized 
mobilization efforts to educate and surveil the communities for potential sick persons for 
early treatment (contact tracing) was an effective response. 
In addition, there are other disease outbreak reports, which discuss interventions 
from the supply-side of the market, such as augmenting nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) support and clinical resources. However, they do not address how the donors or 
humanitarians fixed social or cultural challenges (demand-side barriers) or how specific 
                                                          
69 Contact tracing is from the WHO’s resource on managing EVD outbreaks. It is the identification and follow-up with 
persons who may have encountered an EVD patient. These persons are monitored for at least 21 days for any symptoms. 
See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2016b) and World Health Organization (2015e). 
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community leaders were able to lead in this capacity (Allaranga et al., 2010; Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2007; Enserink, 2005; Lamunu et al., 2004; Msyamboza et 
al., 2014; Muñoz, 2017; Onyango et al., 2007; World Health Organization, 2007; World 
Health Organization, 2009). Some broadly discuss social and cultural challenges (Enserink, 
2005; Msyamboza et al., 2014). Some focus on biomedical strategies solely, such as clinical 
resources or delivering public health information (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2007; Muñoz, 2017; World Health Organization, 2007; World Health 
Organization, 2009). 
Allaranga et al. (2010) is a systematic review of several VHF outbreaks and it 
suggests that these and future outbreaks are best addressed through integration and 
coordination between local health officials and wildlife officials, as VHFs are a class of 
zoonotic diseases.70 Lamunu et al. (2004) discuss the 2000 EVD outbreak in Uganda too, 
however, the experiences with WHO officials and community support differ from Okware et 
al. (2002). The outbreak response was prompt (48 hours after detection) and community 
stakeholders were mobilized and trained soon afterward. However, this still did not change 
the overall EVD death rates compared to previous outbreaks, because most exposures and 
deaths happened before the virus was detected and confirmed, and this took about six 
weeks. Thus, it seems the response from international actors was not effective in reducing 
deaths (social costs). 
In the recent EVD outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Médecins Sans 
Frontières (2018a; 2018b; 2019) has written project updates about the agency’s work in the 
field to contain the disease outbreak. The topics on trust and community relations were 
reviewed, and the predominant narrative is that trust was built through the supply of clinical 
resources such as sanitation and waste management, “honest” information on disease, and 
free medical screenings, not just for Ebola. Families are also able to visit EVD patients too, to 
help dispel any myths or rumors. So far, the literature has focused on biomedical resources 
as the solution, and moreover, highlight the use of a new vaccine in this recent outbreak 
(Cohen, 2018; Ilunga Kalenga et al., 2019; Moran, 2018; Nkengasong and Onyebujoh, 2018; 
World Health Organization, 2018e). All sources note that responders conducted some kind 
of community engagement strategy but do not give further details. 
                                                          
70 A zoonotic disease can be transmitted between animals and humans (Marí Saéz et al., 2015; Pourrut et al., 2005). 
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In the above examples, the interventions during a public health emergency mainly 
included sensitization efforts to, first, give out the right information in a market where there 
is misinformation or none. In the example of Haiti, community members were not drinking 
clean water and did not know how to properly disinfect their local water supply after the 
earthquake damaged the infrastructure. In Angola, family members were taught safer 
practices to care for sick relatives to prevent transmission of the Marburg virus. And, public 
health education about EVD symptoms helped to trace sick persons for case management in 
Uganda. In these cases, community engagement strategies are integrated into a biomedical 
paradigm for emergency intervention. Specifically, the strategy is to train or give biomedical 
knowledge to bring about a specific behavioral change, such as bringing a sick relative into 
the health facility or consuming goods that are available for health and hygiene, such as 
chlorine tablets or oral rehydration solution packets. However, community engagement 
strategies vary as some efforts do not include traditional knowledge from the local 
communities, and sometimes their voices are not integrated beyond training for behavior 
and consumption changes. Therefore, these are top-down interventions, which contradicts 
the 1978 declaration of the Almá Atá Conference on wider community engagement (World 
Health Organization, 1978a). 
Second, in these examples, engagement with the community was limited to health 
education and promotion to avert ‘risky’ behavior for disease transmission (e.g. drinking 
unclean water or caring for a highly infectious loved one at home). ‘Risky behavior’ in this 
sense includes cultural rites and customs that may not have been as risky at times without 
an infectious disease outbreak (e.g. funeral rites).71 The strategies of these agencies are 
designed to promote the supply of aid resources (e.g. latrines, chlorine, or treatment units) 
via health sensitization methods. This is a strategy deployed through an interagency 
communication toolkit designed by the WHO, the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (World Health Organization, 2012a). This toolkit helps 
identify community perceptions and behaviors that may have a negative or positive impact 
on disease prevalence. It uses a situational market analysis and based on any underlying 
market failures, aid resources are deployed through a type of community engagement 
                                                          
71 Some VHFs such as Marburg or EVD are highly infectious on a corpse that died from the disease (Preston, 2012). 
Therefore, during an outbreak, some response measures included mass cremation or other strategies to avoid common 
funerals (Enserink, 2005; Hewlett and Hewlett, 2008; Richards, 2016; Roddy et al., 2007). 
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campaign. Unsworth (2009) says that aid resources tend to be viewed as apolitical and 
supply-driven approaches (e.g. building schools, roads, or bringing equipment); however, 
while supply-side factors may be apolitical,72 the demand-side barriers are very much 
cultural and political, and that includes how externally derived resources perform or 
become efficient. 
Third, the role of TLIs is not defined or discussed in the case studies, except as being 
consulted with or recruited for training (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007; 
Enserink, 2005; Lamunu et al., 2004). When NGOs and multilateral agencies respond, they 
usually do so through state institutions such as the ministries of health mentioned above. 
The WHO cannot enter and provide aid unless it is invited through state institutional 
channels, or in extreme cases it declares PHEIC. There have been cases where experts at the 
WHO know of an active outbreak through the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network 
(GOARN), a medium where NGOs and partners in various countries report unusual 
occurrences (Kamradt-Scott, 2015). However, without an official invitation, the WHO cannot 
intervene unless there is a significant security risk to the region, hence why the IHRs were 
designed in 2005 (Kamradt-Scott, 2015). The literature broadly says community 
stakeholders are helpful for cooperation and behavior changes, but it is not always specified 
who consist of the community stakeholders and TLIs are not examined for governing the 
outbreak. The public transcript (Scott, 1992) of how disease outbreaks have been resolved, 
is that agencies or organizations intervened and simultaneously corrected supply and 
demand barriers through their strategies. Or demand-side barriers are mentioned, but not 
explored, implying these were not significant to preventing or eradicating the disease 
(Allaranga et al., 2010; Georges et al., 1999). 
For this reason, the thesis will add a missing branch to this operational level of the 
literature. These community engagement strategies do not fully explain how humanitarians 
and donors are resourceful during a public health emergency. Institutions at the community 
level define behaviors and norms of the people, and a top-down situational market analysis 
cannot implement behavior change alone. Nor will giving the right message, as we will 
explore what happened during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. 
                                                          
72 The notion of aid being apolitical is challenged by many sources discussed in chapter one in section 1.2 on the 
conditionalities and impact on health. These sources claim that aid has followed a neoliberal ideology (Chorev, 2013; 
Kickbusch, 2005; Mathews, 2007; Navarro, 2007; Tirman, 2005). 
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The literature reviewed in this section includes reports and papers from NGOs and 
government agencies. The positive aspect is that these are first-hand accounts from the 
field with access to local stakeholders that many scholars from the United States or Europe 
may not have. Knowledge and deep insight from these communities are invaluable 
contributions to the overall academic debate. Some of these sources cited are not writing in 
a critical light or conducting research for scholarly fashion; they are writing for a different 
audience. The journalistic styling of the reports, emphasis on the NGO’s positive impacts, 
and appeals for more resources suggest an audience of donors. This may explain why the 
NGO is often highlighted as the lead actor, while community stakeholders are relegated into 
supporting roles. Also, government agencies (like DFID) have a similar style suggesting an 
audience of taxpayers where the agency’s humanitarianism can be used for political self-
promotion. Nonetheless, the use of these sources is crucial to understanding how strategies 
evolved and its reflection on aid effectiveness. 
In addition, there are many charities and aid organizations that have provided 
services for decades but do not publish their work for the wider audience. Thus, a veteran 
aid or humanitarian worker may have intrinsic knowledge on community engagement and 
demand-side barriers that is not available in the academic or gray literature. So, there can 
be another hidden transcript regarding how humanitarian agencies and charities operated 
and engaged with the community. 
The biomedical strategy was not so effective during the 2014 Ebola epidemic (Perry 
and Sayndee, 2017; Richards, 2016). There are epidemiological reasons for why this 
outbreak was different, however, epidemiology does not fully capture what changed the 
disease spread. In the case studies above of Haiti, Angola, Gabon, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, and Uganda, the public transcript (Scott, 1992) says that top-down community 
engagement and clinical resources helped the response, but once local communities 
‘cooperated.’ This may imply that these strategies were just not effective in the recent West 
African epidemic for lack of cooperation, knowledge, and/or cultural rituals that seem ‘odd’ 
to international responders. 
2.6.3 An Emerging Transcript 
 
In between Scott (1992)’s concept of a hidden transcript and public transcript, some 
sources are critical of the dominant narrative. However, do not completely give the 
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perspectives of how community and traditional leaders governed an outbreak. For example, 
Hewlett and Hewlett (2008) are medical Anthropologists who travel to outbreak epicenters 
to research cultural norms and disease outbreaks. They explain that demand-side barriers 
for international humanitarians and local government officials happen often. They position 
the work of medical anthropologists as an important broker between Western biomedical 
interventions and culturally sensitive health education. As an example of the importance of 
their work, they explain how international teams were evacuated twice during the 2002 EVD 
outbreak in Gabon because medical anthropologists were not sent in first to initiate 
community engagement and conduct cultural liaison. Thus, an ‘emerging’ category is 
created to analyze this literature. 
Leach and Hewlett (2010) discuss “outbreak narratives” that tend to be associated 
with VHFs, with a focus on EVD and Lassa Fever. The first is a “global threat” narrative 
where these diseases are depicted as a deadly threat in a highly mobilized world, specifically 
to Western countries as this is where this narrative dominates. Additionally, this narrative 
presents Africans with “bizarre cultural practices” such as eating monkeys and tribal rituals. 
This narrative also has a policy implication, as the role of doctors, nurses, scientists, and 
government officials are emphasized in containing the disease. “Publics are rarely shown or 
discussed in these narratives and when they are, they are often represented as either as 
ignorant and backward (especially in African settings) or as panicked and ineducable 
(especially in European and American ones)” (Leach and Hewlett, 2010, p. 51). 
Another narrative discusses VHFs as long-term diseases that are endemic to African 
societies, rather than then “short-term or sporadic” outbreaks. This looks at structural 
issues in the community that make societies vulnerable to a VHF. For example, Lassa fever is 
transmitted by certain rats that feed on rice, and hence, people who live or store rice in 
poor structures may be vulnerable. Underequipped health centers can hinder VHF 
containment along with the pressures of urbanization and population migration. According 
to Leach and Hewlett (2010) in this narrative, one cannot separate the issues of poverty 
from equitable health in addressing VHFs. 
Hewlett and Hewlett (2008) and Hewlett and Amola (2003) discuss how communities 
have managed EVD outbreaks in some areas like Uganda or the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, using the local term, gemo. These communities had developed protocols to care for 
EVD patients and bury them safely since the pre-colonial days, according to their interviews. 
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They also describe spiritual rituals to chase away spirits. However, this is not to say that 
there is a lack (or rejection) of biomedical knowledge as sometimes caregivers would 
purchase antibiotics too, to help treat symptoms. Rather, spiritual rituals are about social 
cohesion and urging people to remain calm during an outbreak. People would also refrain 
from close contact during outbreaks, such as dancing and sex. Protective sequestrations73 
are recorded in these rural communities when an outbreak is suspected in the village: 
 
The community decides to close the village, and nobody enters or leaves. The protocols discourage movement of any kind 
and place barriers on roads and trails leading into the village. The chief and his appointees monitor who comes into or goes 
out of the village. Close (1995) describes several instances during the original Ebola outbreak in Yambuku where nuns and 
priests traveling along the roads encountered barriers outside of villages where they had to plead with the chief to let them 
drive through the village (Hewlett and Hewlett, 2008, p. 136) 
 
Hewlett and Amola (2003) discuss other local emergency management protocols 
when gemo is suspected, such as a short isolation period once EVD survivors stop showing 
symptons. Subsequently, these survivors are tasked to care for the sick and bury the dead 
outside the village. Back then, it was not known in the medical community how long 
immunity lasts. Only recently did a study show that EVD survivors may be immuned from 
the disease for decades (Rimoin et al., 2018). 
2.7 Transcripts from the 2014 Ebola Epidemic 
 
This section discusses the local governance challenges of the 2014 West African 
Ebola epidemic. The introductory chapter gave a brief timeline of key events and the path of 
EVD. Then, the first chapter gave an introduction of the epidemic, from a macro-level 
perspective of the response. That chapter analyzes the challenges on the supply-side of the 
market. In this section, the literature debates failures and successes in the community 
engagement strategies, hence, focusing on the demand-side barriers. 
However, as mentioned in the introduction, community engagement is used as an 
umbrella term for different emergency interventions that agencies and donors employ to 
change behaviors.74 The literature conceptualizes community sensitization, community 
participation, community engagement, social mobilization...etc., differently. However, it is 
                                                          
73 ‘Protective sequestration’ is a term used in public health to describe when healthy people isolate themselves to prevent 
illness. ‘Quarantine’ is defined as isolating people who were exposed to a disease (European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control, 2009). The term protective sequestration implies that this is voluntary, but the literature does not always 
make a distinction. Moreover, not all informants interviewed for this research specified between the social isolation 
policies. Therefore, since these policies were enforced by local and domestic authorities, the thesis uses ‘restrict 
movement’ or ‘isolation’ throughout to refer to any policy that banned movement and personal contact. 
74 See page xv for terms on community engagement. 
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not within the scope of the thesis to define these terminologies or argue which strategy 
works best. Each donor and humanitarian organizations has its strategies and it is not 
governed or enforced by any single international agency, despite the passage of the 1978 
Almá Atá Declaration to engage equitably with local communities and the Sphere Standards 
(Sphere Association, 2018; World Health Organization, 1978a). Therefore, because these 
actors have different understandings of community engagement, this led to different 
approaches and different understandings of what is possible in emergencies (Oosterhoff, 
Mokuwa, and Wilkinson, 2015). Nonetheless, the terminology may be conflicting and 
confusing if one source shares the same label with another source, but the agencies 
implement their respective strategies differently. 
The literature also uses various terms to refer to external partners (donors, NGOs, 
humanitarians, responders…etc.). However, when discussing their strategies in a critical 
light, it is not always clear if they are referring to actors who came to West Africa just for the 
EVD outbreak or actors who had a presence in West Africa beforehand and aided in the 
response too. Donors and NGOs with a long-term presence in local communities may have 
had a different knowledge or relationship within these communities. 
2.7.1 Structural Violence and Community Resistance 
 
Chapter one discusses the debate on the 2014 Ebola epidemic framed as a failure of 
development policies, and to a lesser extent, a failure of international intervention. 
However, at the community level, we also see arguments of failures of integration due to 
colonial, political, and economic exploitation by the domestic political elite and the 
international community. The thesis does not argue against the historical and 
socioeconomic legacies of exploitation, but this critical analysis may remove agency from 
local actors. For example, Nunes (2016 p. 543) says the 2014 EVD outbreak centered on 
“neglect”. He describes how health issues emerge as something to be governed or ignored 
at the international level. Neglect is produced in the context of power-laden global relations 
and structure. By framing the epidemic as an exotic and racialized phenomenon, it was 
enveloped in a media and political spectacle, which resulted in short-term crisis 
management results while deep-seated neglect continued. However, at a macro 
perspective, it may seem that neglect continues by global and domestic decision makers, 
but it does not give agency to community-level leaders who did not neglect the immediate 
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or systemic problems in the healthcare system. Neglect is also a form of structural violence, 
as the remaining literature examines below. 
Fairhead (2016), Leach (2015), and Wilkinson and Leach (2014) view the 
communities’ resistance to the government and aid workers as a response to structural 
violence. This means an accumulation of decisions and reactions over time that led to 
inequalities in the economic, education, health, and social infrastructure of these 
communities. In this region, there is a history of structural violence by international and 
domestic actors. Wilkinson and Leach (2014) describe how post-conflict development in 
West Africa decimated healthcare systems, while promoted annexing land for mining and 
agricultural investment for private and usually foreign entrepreneurs. This has displaced 
many people and impacted their livelihoods. Additionally, these were largely through 
international donor policies encouraging foreign direct investment that has integrated 
national and local institutions, including the chiefdoms. Thus, donor and aid organizations 
are also partly responsible for implementing and sustaining structural violence in these 
communities (Fairhead, 2016; Leach, 2015; Wilkinson and Leach, 2014). Wilkinson and 
Fairhead (2017) discuss how communities in Sierra Leone were noncompliant by practicing 
social customs in secret such as burial rites, while in Guinea there was active resistance 
where communities would (sometimes violently) drive away aid workers who came to do 
contact tracing. EVD started in the remote forest regions in both countries, which have a 
history of economic and political marginalization, hence resistance is a response to 
structural violence. 
Wilkinson et al. (2017) say that although international responders changed their 
approach at some point in the intervention to engage with communities and respect local 
customs, they may persist with unequal power structures within the societies. They argue 
there needs to be a reconsideration of the concept of ‘community.’ In the public health 
realm, communities tend to be reduced to geographical catchment areas of those at risk for 
a disease (Wilkinson et al., 2017). However, these are externally derived definitions and may 
not match how people perceive themselves to be a part of a community (Chambers, 1997; 
Wilkinson et al., 2017). They warn there can be a romanticized vision of people being 
socially bound to communities or community leaders being completely altruistic. Some 
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community engagement strategies75 are one-size-fits all packages, which may not fit the 
community in question. Wilkinson et al. (2017) say that some public health interventions 
can reinforce or create social hierarchies that are resented. 
For example, in Guinea, external partners identified local leaders such as village 
chiefs and district officials, but the community resented many of them. However, after three 
days of interviews with local people, a list of trusted community leaders was created, and 
this was completely different from those who were identified by external partners. 
However, Wilkinson et al. (2017) do not contextualize this article into their prior work of 
structural violence in Guinea, in which there was a lack of trust of state and some 
community institutions (Leach, 2015; Wilkinson and Leach, 2014). This can be problematic 
for policy recommendations where earlier they argued that there was a mistrust of state 
and district officials due to historical legacy, but now some traditional leaders too. NGOs 
depend on state institutions to gain access to remote villages and often work through them. 
Bypassing the state to work exclusively with community leaders may create a parallel or 
dual system to channel aid (essentially recolonizing). 
The authors do not compare resistance movements with Liberia, probably because it 
does not share the same colonial history to support this argument of historical legacy; 
although, there is a history of marginalizing indigenous ethnic groups from the rural interior 
(Harris, 2012; Mulbah, 2018). However, there were problems with integrating local 
communities and reports of resistance when the government established quarantine, such 
as in West Point and mandatory cremation of bodies (Epstein, 2014; Fallah et al., 2016; NPR, 
2014). In addition, there were low levels of trust in government institutions, despite the 
outbreak mostly affecting the capital area (Blair, Morse, and Tsai, 2017). Research shows 
that lack of trust correlated with behavior change, meaning those that did not trust the 
government and its policies were less likely to comply with control measures such as safe 
burials (Blair, Morse, and Tsai, 2017). However, lack of trust did not correlate with 
biomedical knowledge, meaning those that did not comply with emergency management 
still understood the risk factors of EVD. These challenges also appear in future outbreaks.76 
Historical analyses of SSA countries may not be able to explain everything, as focusing on 
                                                          
75 These are the community engagement strategies discussed in section 2.6. 
76 Vinck et al. (2019) conduct a similar survey on trust in the 2018 EVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Community trust and support can be undermined when they see a contrast in the rapid mobilization to contain EVD, but 
the failure to protect civilians from chronic conflict or other long-term crises. 
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colonial legacies may leave out a country like Liberia as an anomaly, but it is very similar in 
many respects. 
Liberia was promoted as a model for post-conflict development, but the outbreak 
revealed that state-building policies were limited (Abramowitz, 2014; Pailey, 2017). 
Abramowitz (2014) narrates how an entire family succumbed to EVD. Relatives had called 
the state-run Ebola hotline, but no one came to transport the sick. Only afterward when 
they passed, did a burial team come to remove the corpses. A surviving relative said that the 
state cared more for dead bodies than for the living. However, the problems were structural 
according to Abramowitz (2014). This means that despite international support and MHSW 
prioritizing health issues, there still lacked investment in meso-level health administration, 
such as having someone to answer the phones. Thus, local efforts in Liberia, such as triaging 
sick person at homes, isolations, or door-to-door health sensitization, were to compensate 
for the collective failures of state and international aid institutions. These were responses to 
structural violence (Abramowitz et al., 2015). 
Pailey (2017) builds on the narrative of structural violence and argues that individual 
actors assumed public authority to respond to the crisis. These are actors in Liberia and 
from the Liberian diaspora. Ordinary Liberians used individual and collective resources that 
complemented and competed with government efforts. This also means that external 
organizations in the United States and United Kingdom had public authority over the 
government, which argues that a parallel system of service delivery worked. However, she 
argues that these are Liberian-owned solutions since these are affiliated with the diaspora. 
These solutions such as safe burials and caregiving provisions, were community-centered 
and built on a collective identity. 
The key message from this section of literature is the demand-side perspective of 
the “bad behaviors” explained in chapter one (Johnston, 2015).77 Local communities 
continued with the ‘risky’ behaviors not solely because of cultural and religious mores, but 
because the government and aid response failed them. 
 
2.7.2 Supply Resources and Engage with the Community 
 
                                                          
77 The discussion on how global health governance policies performed in the EVD outbreak and other health interventions, 
such as HIV/AIDS in section 1.2.3 and 1.6.2. 
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According to Cenciarelli et al. (2015), Fallah et al. (2016), Fu, Roberton, and Burnham 
(2015), and Lokuge et al. (2016), the initial challenges included working with untrained local 
healthcare workers to manage suspected and confirmed cases of EVD. Additionally, securing 
trust from community members and addressing rumors, misinformation, or 
miscommunicated messages that were part of the information failures in the market. 
Dhillon and Kelly (2015), Fu, Roberton, and Burnham (2015), and Laverack and Manoncourt 
(2016) say that the use of dynamic communication strategies such as peer education or 
“listening” to the community, and respecting local perspectives were key strategies to 
changing behaviors and gaining compliance from “resistant people”. They also say key 
stakeholders, such as village elders and chiefs can act as brokers so that humanitarian 
agencies can enter and engage in public health interventions. 
This discussion depicts a dialogue with the community and local perspectives are 
considered. In a sense, the community’s voices are heard, and knowledge was produced to 
change perceptions. However, according to Laverack and Manoncourt (2016, p. 81), “We 
observed that one reason why the outbreak has persisted may have been that overall, the 
response did not deliver bottom-up approaches that could build a dialogue and promote 
self-management, to convince those families and communities that were unwilling to 
change their traditional practices.” Although Laverack and Manoncourt (2016) describe the 
Anthropological approach of engaging in dialogue as bottom-up participation, they do not 
capture how community stakeholders’ voices were scaled up in a coordinated fashion. 
Elemuwa et al. (2015) say that EVD in Nigeria was contained partly because of the 
active involvement of community and traditional leaders in the development of 
communication and social mobilization activities and materials.78 However, in their 
summation of the key principles that made this a successful strategy and what can be used 
for other EVD outbreaks, this principle was ignored. Six out of the 11 points were biomedical 
interventions, including the use of an experimental vaccine. The only principles related to 
the demand-side barriers were changing the message to emphasize treatment and social 
mobilization via print and social media (Elemuwa et al., 2015). These public transcripts 
acknowledge community engagement and participation, but do not examine how central 
these efforts are to systematically stop EVD transmission and deaths. 
                                                          
78 This article uses the term, ‘social mobilization’. 




Fallah et al. (2016) discuss how community-based initiatives in Liberia worked 
instead of top-down policies of quarantines and body collections mandated by external 
partners and the government. They say that decision makers in Monrovia do not often 
consult with local communities who are affected by these policies. Therefore, these 
procedures tend to be insensitive to the community’s needs and infrastructural constraints 
can make policy implementation nearly impossible, such as the lack of running water and 
overcrowding in the slums of central Monrovia. Instead, community, religious, and 
traditional leaders were invited to an open meeting in September 2014 to discuss the EVD 
response in this district and contribute their thoughts. Of the people who came, they were 
recruited and trained for surveillance and outreach efforts. 
In late November 2014, focus groups were held in Monrovia to try and understand 
how to make the response efforts better. Initially, the WHO and the government wanted to 
offer cash incentives to encourage contact tracing and referrals (Kutalek et al., 2015). 
However, participants said that would disrupt social cohesion in communities and instead 
suggested that better resources are provided to isolate communities and health centers, in 
addition, to set up reliable communication networks between patients at the Ebola 
Treatment Centers (ETUs) and their families, and to include EVD survivors in mobilization 
and outreach efforts (Kutalek et al., 2015). However, like Fallah et al. (2016) and Laverack 
and Manoncourt (2016), it is not clear how these are bottom-up approaches. 
MSF argues that by collaborating with the community, training health workers and 
health promoters, and bringing clinical resources had resulted in a decline in EVD cases in 
Lofa County as early as August 17, 2014 (Sharma et al., 2014). One of their strategies, 
influenced by community engagement, was to build the local ETU without high opaque 
walls. Families could visit by either speaking with patients across a fence or be inside while 
wearing PPE. This made families more willing to bring sick persons to the ETUs. They 
recommend engaging more with the community to change health seeking behaviors.79 
The first NGO-led meeting with traditional leaders was in January 2015, nearly a year 
after EVD was identified in the country (Ministry of Information, Cultural Affairs, and 
                                                          
79 Health seeking behavior is any action taken by individuals, who perceive themselves to have a health problem, to find an 
appropriate remedy. See Oberoi et al. (2016), Peng et al. (2010), and White and Dull (1997). 
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Tourism, 2015). However, in some remote areas such as southeastern Liberia, a chiefs’ 
taskforce was created, along with the county health team and NGOs to handle smaller 
outbreaks (Hagan et al., 2015). They used available public health resources and social capital 
to implement contact tracing, even though the bulk of aid resources was concentrated near 
Monrovia. The authors say this demonstrates the effectiveness of public health resources 
when TLIs exercise political and legal authority during a crisis. Indeed, there is a correlation 
between social capital and emergency management in communities that were studied 
elsewhere such as the North American blackout of 2003 (Murphy, 2007). However, 
resiliency depends on the type of social capital and external factors too. Nonetheless, Hagan 
et al. (2015) encourage replication in other remote areas where central administration 
resources are unable to reach the people. 
However, the Liberian government created emergency management regulations, 
such as quarantines and often did not consult with TLIs (Pellecchia et al., 2015). These 
regulations included penalties for violators and possible prosecution under the state (NPR, 
2014). Although there were recommendations for working with community leaders (Hagan 
et al., 2015; Kutalek et al., 2015; Sharma et al., 2014), it is not clear if these strategies 
became national policy or in some cases, who the community stakeholders are. Nyenswah 
et al. (2016) say a coordinated national campaign to engage traditional and community 
leaders was not enacted until November 2014; however, it was mainly by providing 
traditional leaders with mobile phones to report suspected cases. 
2.7.2.2 Sierra Leone 
 
The WHO and MSF established an office in Kailahun and they implemented a 
biomedical strategy. However, they faced community resistance, making their efforts less 
effective (World Health Organization, 2014a). By July 2014, more paramount chiefs were 
recruited to the Ebola district taskforce and trained alongside other volunteers for disease 
surveillance. “We went to see all the others to convince them to join the fight,” recalls Dr. 
Yoti. “We also included the head of the interreligious council, so mosques and churches 
would also spread the appropriate messages,” (World Health Organization, 2014a). 
According to this narrative, it was the WHO and other NGOs that discovered this “Kailahun 
approach,” and began applying it to other affected areas. However, this contradicts the 
interview that the Director-General gave to the New York Times, regarding the role of the 
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WHO quoted in chapter one, section 1.6 (Fink, 2014).80 Lokuge et al. (2016) also describe 
the successful control of EVD through community engagement in Kailahun.81 MSF recruited 
and trained contact tracers and community health workers alongside the District Health 
Management Team. They also recruited community health promoters, described as 
respected individuals to, “conduct health promotion activities in the village, focused on 
behaviour change related to risk factors for EVD transmission (caring for sick people and 
burial practices), prevention, health seeking behaviour and the services provided by the 
EMC,” (Lokuge et al., 2016, p. 7). 
In Olu et al. (2016), an epidemiological survey of contact tracing was analyzed in the 
Western Area District along with ten informant interviews from June 2014 to August 2015. 
The study reveals weaknesses in contact tracing activities in this region, such as missed 
contacts, lack of community trust, and movement after the quarantine was enacted in 
September 2014. The Western Area82 is a mainly urban region and is dominated by state 
institutions. Thus, it is not clear in this paper how community-level leaders were involved. 
Weaknesses in community engagement and coordination could have been due to a 
dysfunctional response in the first year, as examined by Ross, Welch, and Angelides (2017). 
When the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MOHS) was leading the response, informants 
reported in-fighting over money, lack of data sharing (e.g. Ebola cases), and poor strategic 
planning. Additionally, this ignored an existing response infrastructure within the Office of 
National Security that incorporated traditional authorities, local structures, and MOHS. By 
the end of 2014, the National Ebola Response Center was created to lead efforts, however 
this created tension between MOHS officials who felt sidelined and those working under the 
new response umbrella. For example, the WHO recruited 25 persons from a district council 
without realizing they were in an intrapolitical fight against the APC party leadership for 
divesting from their budget; thus, they sabotaged contact-tracing efforts in many districts 
(Ross, Welch, and Angelides, 2017). 
                                                          
80 See page 42 for the excerpt from the interview where the Director-General said the WHO is not a first responder. 
81 This article uses the term ‘community engagement,’ but it describes strategies that are top down, like the case studies in 
section 2.6.2. Local knowledge is not integrated but community leaders are recruited and trained to give biomedical 
information. 
82 The article uses the term Western Area District, but this contains two districts. The Western Area Urban district, which is 
only Freetown and the Western Area Rural district, which contains peri-urban communities. There are no chiefdoms in 
Freetown. 
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In developing standard operating procedures (SOPs) in community engagement, 
research on assessing knowledge, attitudes, and practices of 250 participants from seven 
districts, reveals knowledge values and expectations for the roles for external partners and 
community leaders (Pedi et al., 2017). For example, paramount chiefs raised concerns about 
operations and mobilization occurring in their jurisdiction without their knowledge, but the 
authors do not explain why that would be a concern given the legal and political structures 
in Sierra Leone. In addition, the study is limited to geographical regions in the north and 
west: Western Area Urban and Western Area Rural, Port Loko, Kambia, Moyamba, Tonkolili, 
and Bombali districts. As explained in chapter one, EVD started in the east but the areas 
studied in this paper were mobilized during phase two. Additionally, there were reports as 
late as March 2015 that TLIs had still not been integrated into the district level response 
teams (Ross, Welch, and Angelides, 2017). Therefore, Pedi et al. (2017) misses some of the 
perceived failures of the response during the initial stages of the epidemic that could have 
been included in drafting universal SOPs for community engagement. 
2.7.3 Hidden Transcript: Community Leaders Corrected Market Failures 
 
Richards (2016) discusses a different narrative of community engagement in Sierra 
Leone. He focuses on the concept of “a people’s science”; which is an analysis of how local 
knowledge and beliefs shape understandings of illness. In addition, he discusses how 
cultural rites such as funerals, were modified during the Ebola epidemic. His thesis is that 
communities led the efforts to eradicate EVD. Parker and Allen (2018) and Parker et al. 
(2019) build on this argument that local knowledge was what changed behaviors to 
eradicate EVD. This section conceptualizes the market inefficiencies of information failure 
and social cost into this debate on the EVD outbreak. 
2.7.3.1 Information Failures and Social Costs 
 
Richards (2016) argues that top-down analyses and community engagement 
strategies were not effective in West Africa. As described in section 2.6, there is a 
biomedical strategy for handling a VHF outbreak. Thus, while guidance, such as do not eat 
bushmeat83 may be theoretically correct in preventing EVD, but it was not applicable 
                                                          
83 Bushmeat is any wild game. However, the only wild animal thought to be a reservoir of EVD are some species of fruit 
bats, while apes and few other nonhuman primates can be infected and transmit EVD too (Bonwitt et al., 2018; Pourrut et 
al., 2005; Pourrut et al., 2007; Preston, 2012). However, there have been serological studies to see if other animals can be 
infected with filoviruses such as pigs (Fischer et al., 2018), and dogs (Allela et al., 2005). 
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because of the context of this outbreak. Mass communicated messages, like stop eating 
bushmeat were emphasized more than other messages, such as handwashing. This 
misinformation created a distortion in the market. 
Handwashing is just as effective at preventing EVD and other diseases, rather than 
avoiding bushmeat alone, which was a major source of protein for many rural villagers and 
did not fit the epidemiology of EVD in West Africa (Bonwitt et al., 2018; Richards, 2016; 
Seytre, 2015). In other words, after the first case in Guinea in December 2013, all 
transmissions of EVD was human-to-human. 
According to Richards (2016), state institutions were reading from a script written 
abroad and not following the actual disease path in West Africa. This is not a conspiratorial 
analysis, as the WHO has technical guidance and fact sheets for different disease outbreaks 
listing standard protocols and health education on their website (World Health 
Organization, 2019a). However, these were implemented without considering the local 
context. Emphasizing handwashing in the earlier stages may have saved more lives (reduce 
social costs) than prohibiting bushmeat consumption (Richards, 2016). Additionally, because 
the ban was affecting the livelihoods of some rural villagers, some people even pressured 
their chiefs not to enforce the ban on hunting, so that they could continue subsisting 
(Bonwitt et al., 2018). 
The message of “not touching” a sick person is seen as unethical and inhumane in 
West African society and arguably, in most societies. Home care of children, older relatives, 
and spouses are necessary and would have been negligent, if not done (Perry and Sayndee, 
2017; Richards, 2016). On the other hand, advocating for home care is unethical in Western 
culture, as the norm is to bring a sick person to a health center for the ‘best treatment’ 
(Richards, 2016). Thus, home care and distributing PPE in the community had been 
discouraged by DFID experts predicting it may not decrease EVD deaths (Whitty et al., 
2015). Richards (2016) presents this demand-side barrier due to a clash in culture and 
mores. 
Bulte, Richards, and Voors (2018) explain social obligations in an institutional 
framework, stating that visiting and helping to care for the sick is a community obligation. 
For example, preparing and bringing food to someone in the hospital. Many ETUs banned 
relatives from bringing food or visiting patients when normally it is expected for a patient to 
come with a relative. This led many families to choose home care instead. 
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Chandler et al. (2015) say that public health experts need to design messages that 
are more culturally sensitive and engage with the communities that are expected to change 
their behaviors; rather than solely working with state and international officials. Information 
containing only biomedical content and framed in a Western context (usually to dissuade 
people from continuing their ‘traditional practices’) has not shown to lead to healthier 
behaviors (Chandler et al., 2015). Also, it could be argued that only biomedical information 
can be misleading and inaccurate. 
For example, the initial information described the very visible symptom of 
hemorrhaging, however, very few EVD patients displayed this (Dallatomasina et al., 2015; 
Richard, 2016). This could be why many people did not believe that EVD was present in the 
communities if many patients did not have this symptom. In addition, Parker and Allen 
(2018) and Parker et al. (2019) discuss some information failures and mistrust of state 
institutions, as referenced earlier in section 2.5.1.84 They build on Richards (2016)’s 
argument that communities internally adapted their behavior for safer home care and safer 
burial methods. Biomedical knowledge did not reduce the spread of the disease, and thus, 
did not correct information failures in the market as theorized in the communication toolkit 
(World Health Organization, 2012a). Rather, this demand-side barrier may infer trust issues, 
instead of lack of biomedical knowledge as discussed in Blair, Morse, and Tsai (2017) and 
Vinck (2019). 
Abramowitz et al. (2015)’s fieldwork in Liberia also found information failures related 
to caregiving. Community leaders felt that training and knowledge about EVD would help 
reduce fear in the community; however, the information given did not reduce this. This is 
because the information focused on the etiology of EVD, instead of practical messages of 
what to do or how to keep safe, especially when caregiving. Community members already 
believed in Ebola and had enough biomedical knowledge to be afraid of it but did not know 
enough on how to respond (Abramowitz et al., 2015). 
Parker and Allen (2018) argue that communities were adapting caregiving practices 
after volunteers from Uganda demonstrated how to rehydrate an EVD patient safely. They 
say many people treated at home survived and those that did not were given a dignified 
burial. From this perspective, we see that communities were not resisting all aid workers or 
                                                          
84 This was a brief discussion of messages communicated on the radio from page 81. 
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interventions. Instead, they received information that was practical and relevant to them 
(safer caregiving practices) and implemented them. However, Boland and McKay (2018), 
Enria (2017), Wilkinson et al. (2017), and Wilkinson and Fairhead (2017) view these safer 
caregiving practices as ‘resisting’ or ineffective governance from local leaders to stop 
caregiving and funerals. 
Thus, putting these concepts together with Jha and Chaloupka (2000)’s work on 
information failures and healthy behaviors, one must be careful with how we regard 
information and knowledge to change behavior. Biomedical content was not enough, as 
communities wanted information on how to best protect themselves, like being trained to 
use PPE as discussed in Abramowitz et al. (2015). Or, they are not willing to (potentially) 
starve if there is not a risk perception of getting EVD from bushmeat (Bonwitt et al., 2018). 
Additionally, the source of the information matters, as some cases noted distrust of the 
source (Blair, Morse, and Tsai, 2017; Morse et al., 2016; Vinck, 2019).85 Any of these factors 
could cause an information failure in the market and lead to high costs. 
2.7.3.2 Community-led Efforts in Sierra Leone 
 
This literature on community-led engagement in Sierra Leone focuses on the bylaws 
and community-level leaders. The bylaws were a central component of emergency response 
as these were scaled up to national emergency laws. However, key community leaders such 
as chiefs, secret society leaders…etc. were responsible for enforcing them and maintaining 
social cohesion. Thus, this places local communities as central actors of the response. 
Richards (2016) describes how a paramount chief from the Jawei chiefdom in the 
district of Kailahun, who is also a trained nurse, implemented a set of bylaws and fines after 
the first EVD case was confirmed in May 2014. However, although the paramount chief can 
be very influential, he could not just make the bylaws and expect everyone to obey or 
enforce them, especially those laws prohibiting secret society rituals and burials, as these 
are not governed by the chiefs.86 The paramount chief must deliberate with society leaders, 
religious leaders, youth leaders, village elders, and lower chiefs to agree on the bylaws. This 
chief also contacted other paramount chiefs in the Kailahun District to discuss collectively 
                                                          
85 These studies say trust is a determinant in health seeking behavior during a crisis. However, Morse et al. (2016) find that 
outside a public health emergency, trust is not a determining factor. 
86 As mentioned in section 2.4, some chiefs are secular and religious leaders govern funerals and other rites of passage. 
However, this varies and Richards (2016) was specifically discussing the Mende ethnic group in Sierra Leone. 
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implementing bylaws in their respective chiefdoms (Richards, 2016). These rules were 
eventually implemented to other parts of the country, when President Ernest Bai Koroma 
declared a national emergency on July 30, 2014 (Barbash, 2014). 
Van der Windt and Voors (2020) describe EVD as a disease of social intimacy since 
caregivers are most at risk for infection. Therefore, there needed to be internal dynamic 
changes that only local institutions can implement. They use epidemiological data to show 
that chiefdoms in Sierra Leone that implemented the bylaws in phase one had lower EVD 
case incidences87 than other areas. 
However, because of the intimate nature of the disease, O’Kane and Boswell (2018) 
argue that this enhanced the desire for dignity. The authors say that an EVD death can be 
dehumanizing, where the deceased lay in excreta, vomit, and blood. No one wants to see his 
or her loved ones laid out this way. Thus, corpses are hastily washed and dressed before 
burial teams and sympathizers see them. Given this, the literature below engages on how 
effective the bylaws were in various communities. 
Health development committees were engaged during the EVD outbreak to support 
health workers and the community (McMahon et al., 2017). These committees existed long 
beforehand and are supported by various NGOs and donors. The volunteers performed a 
range of tasks such as record keeping, contact tracing, community outreach, road 
checkpoints, and burials. Focus group respondents from the Bo and Kenema districts discuss 
the high efficacy of the bylaws that were passed by paramount chiefs at the request of 
health workers and their roles in door-to-door education of these laws (McMahon et al., 
2017). 
However, Goguen and Bolton (2017) argue that the EVD outbreak was a political 
crisis and not a biomedical one, which may have hampered the response efforts. The 
community’s response to Ebola had not to do with an acceptance of biomedical 
information, but from their own intimate experiences with the virus, such as learning to 
avoid close contact. They argue that the bylaws shaped the popular response, it created the 
right practice without necessarily changing beliefs to have peace and reconcile after the 
crisis (‘social forgetting’ of Ebola). 
                                                          
87 In epidemiology, ‘incidence’ is the rate that new cases are diagnosed within a given period, while ‘prevalence’ is the total 
number of cases alive during a given time (Coggon, Rose, and Barker, 2003). 
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In comparing two nearby villages in a northern district, the authors discuss the tense 
political relations between two chiefs, Pa Ibrahim and Pa Mohamed. The first chief had a 
weak claim to the chieftaincy, so he tended to govern more democratically. Pa Mohamed’s 
claim to the throne was secure; he also had close relationships with NGOs and governed 
more authoritarianly (Goguen and Bolton, 2017). However, Pa Mohamed was a lesser chief 
to Pa Ibrahim and when an EVD case came to the area, Pa Ibrahim decided not to tell 
anyone outside the village, but more people became sick. Pa Mohamed found out and 
alerted the government, which led to the ousting of Pa Ibrahim. This broke relations 
between both villages as it was seen as an attempt to usurp Pa Ibrahim. Pa Mohamed 
implemented the bylaws and enforced them in his village. Goguen and Bolton (2017) say 
that there were no reported EVD cases in Pa Mohamed’s village, whereas 25% of Pa 
Ibrahim’s village was affected by EVD. In an interview with Pa Ibrahim, he did not think he 
could enforce the bylaws and change behaviors since he had a weak claim to the chieftaincy 
and thought it was better to protect his reputation as a democratic leader despite the 
amount of EVD deaths. Thus, political considerations could have affected how chiefs 
enforced the bylaws. Indeed, Richards et al. (2015) discuss a circumstance where villagers 
pressured a chief for a funeral for a well-known person, despite the knowledge of risks. 
In terms of mitigating some of these political considerations, DFID responders routed 
all calls for body collections and burials to the District Ebola Response Centers and would 
sometimes take calls themselves to alleviate political pressure from local leaders (Ross, 
Welch, and Angelides, 2017). Nonetheless, both villages needed to reconcile after the crisis, 
hence a ‘social forgetting’ of EVD (Goguen and Bolton, 2017). The emergency period sowed 
mistrust among local communities and exacerbated social and political relations. 
These trust issues could have affected how the bylaws were enforced. The 
government created community-based Ebola care centers, which allowed people in rural 
communities to isolate themselves if they suspect EVD. However, when these were 
introduced to the eastern district of Kono in early 2015, they were used to impose the 
bylaws, such as checking that visitors were not sick (Oosterhoff, Mokuwa, and Wilkinson, 
2015). According to the authors, this reflected distrust and security problems in the district. 
In interviews with community health workers in the Kailahun and Kenema districts in 
the eastern province and Bombali and Tonkolili districts in the northern province, Miller et 
al. (2018) find that community leaders played an important role in brokering relations 
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between the health workers and community members. This included the passage and 
enforcement of bylaws. Indeed, this analysis complements UNESCO’s strategy to include all 
community leaders, including traditional leaders, in a counter-EVD response (O’Kane and 
Boswell, 2018). However, traditional healers were perceived as “super-spreaders” of the 
disease, and bylaws suspending traditional healing practices helped in this regard in Guinea 
and Sierra Leone (Miller et al., 2018, p. 9). In response to this, traditional healers said they 
should have been incorporated because of their role and influence in the communities. This 
indicates that not all key stakeholders may have been included in emergency management. 
2.7.3.3 Community-led Efforts in Liberia 
 
This literature on community-led engagement in Liberia discusses various strategies 
undertaken by different individuals and groups. A scaled-up strategy into national policy was 
not observed in Liberia, but the literature examines how community-level leaders assumed 
responsibility to care for their families and neighbors and maintain order. Thus, this places 
local communities as central actors of the response. 
EVD cases in the country began to decline since September 2014 (Kirsch et al., 2017). 
This is a few weeks after PHEIC was declared. Construction started on 25 ETUs, but three 
never opened and many were not fully used. Eighty lower-level community care centers 
were planned to help isolate cases in the rural counties, but fewer than ten became 
operational (Nyenswah et al., 2016; Nyenswah, Engineer, and Peters, 2016). Kirsch et al. 
(2017) and Nyenswah, Engineer, and Peters (2016) say that when aid came, it was too little 
and too late to make a substantial impact on EVD cases. 
Bedford and Miller (2017) say that community health volunteers and development 
committees shifted to community engagement efforts during the EVD outbreak since the 
infrastructure (existing committees and support) already existed. However, many did not 
receive support from NGOs or donors to do this work but continued to monitor their local 
communities. Consequently, community engagement88 results varied from community to 
community with some volunteers treated with suspicion and others that were trusted. It 
may have depended on the type of work the volunteer was doing, such as contact tracing or 
health education. 
                                                          
88 This paper uses the term ‘social mobilization,’ although it says that these were community-led strategies and not always 
through an NGO or donor. 
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According to Perry and Sayndee (2017), the international response in Liberia was 
top-down and did not consider local knowledge on EVD in a culturally sensitive context. 
Therefore, various communities enacted emergency management protocols such as 
isolations, improvised PPE, and better hygiene practices. For example, Liberian nursing 
student, Fatu Kekula, treated her ailing relatives wearing homemade PPE from black 
garbage bags to prevent EVD transmission. This made international news and was seen as a 
safe alternative for caregiving. However, the authors’ analysis of how or why communities 
organized, and why different protocols were enacted is not clear. Rather, they situate the 
2014 Ebola epidemic in the context of development policies as exploitive and local efforts 
achieving better results than the government’s laws. 
Rapid response and prevention efforts of local communities can have an impact. 
Under these extreme circumstances, caregivers can change how they give care, triage sick 
persons, or even suspend these practices all together (Abramowitz et al., 2015). According 
to the researchers, culture is dynamic and flexible during emergency periods. Community 
leaders discussed their optimal plans for containing EVD in their neighborhoods, such 
measures included isolation and a surveillance team to report and care for sick persons and 
perform burials (Abramowitz et al., 2015). 
 
2.7.4 Opposing Views to the Hidden Transcripts 
 
There is a debate on how (in)effective were the bylaws (Boland and McKay, 2018; 
Enria, 2017; Wilkinson et al., 2017). However, while for theoretical purposes the thesis is 
primarily focused on the bylaws, it is not the end-all of how traditional leaders participated 
during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Likewise, since this phenomenon was only observed in 
Sierra Leone, it overshadows how TLIs and community leaders organized in Liberia. 
Wilkinson et al. (2017) argue that the bylaws were not effective everywhere and the 
chieftaincy can be subject to elite capture. They specifically say that the emergency bylaws 
were selectively used by chiefs for corrupt purposes, but there seems to be a discrepancy in 
the content they discuss, and the source referred to for this information. The paper 
references Paul Richard’s work from 2003. As discussed in section 2.4, prior work from 
Richards was critical of the paramount chieftaincy and its role in the conflict and subsequent 
governance reforms. Richards had discussed corrupt practices of forced labor and woman 
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damage cases that were common up to the mid-twentieth century but are not common in 
today’s context (Fanthorpe, 2006). 
Nonetheless, Wilkinson et al. (2017) say that the bylaws mobilized authoritarian 
structures and were not community-led or owned. Enria (2017) says there was an 
announcement imposing fines and jail time for those who violate state emergency laws in 
June 2015 in Kambia. According to the informants interviewed, the decision to increase 
security came from government officials in Freetown, who were under pressure to eradicate 
EVD in the last remaining districts of Port Loko and Kambia. Thus, this resulted in 
authoritarian measures to enforce this. Wilkinson et al. (2017)’s and Enria (2017)’s analyses 
are based on one northern district in Sierra Leone and describe enforcement as 
authoritarian but did not examine the indigenous deliberative democratic processes 
described above by Richards (2016). In other words, the formulation of bylaws through 
deliberation with a council of local stakeholders. These leaders are internally identified and 
trusted to make such decisions, as discussed in section 2.7.1 from Wilkinson et al. (2017) 
regarding identifying trusted leaders. Thus, per this concept of community-led engagement, 
it seems as if it were community-owned unless the authors feel (but was not explicitly 
stated) that the paramount chiefs were not part of these communities. 
In Enria (2017)’s discussion of the bylaws in Kambia district, she briefly touches on a 
longstanding debate of an individual’s rights versus the collective during an emergency. She 
argues that because of the political presentation of the crisis, the responsibility became 
individualized and an argument for containment was made. In some respects, this is true 
but does not consider the longstanding socio-legal foundations of customary laws and 
norms in these communities. As discussed above in section 2.4.3, customary law does 
preserve human rights via the collective and paternal responsibility (Frémont, 2009; 
Maimela, 2019; Mqeke, 1996). Therefore, while the group has a responsibility towards an 
individual’s rights, an individual has the responsibility for the group’s collective wellbeing. 
The concept of human rights through collective identity is not a feature of emergency 
management specifically but represents the communitarian values of the society that is 
reflected in their legal system. 
Wilkinson and Fairhead (2017) briefly mention how bylaws helped to bring 
compliance to stop ‘risky’ behaviors. However, they say that these laws were forcefully 
imposed by President Koroma to all the paramount chiefs. The premise of the article is that 
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local communities were resisting Western-led interventions due to structural violence. 
However, there is not an analysis of why it was forcefully imposed and not a collaborative 
response or if this is part of the structural violence witnessed in local communities. 
Additionally, between Enria (2017), Wilkinson and Fairhead (2017), and Wilkinson et al. 
(2017), the analyses of why the bylaws were ineffective are confusing. On the one hand, 
they argue that it was authoritarian structures (paramount chiefs and military) that 
mobilized and implemented this, and thus were not community-owned (Enria, 2017; 
Wilkinson et al., 2017). On the other hand, they say that this was forced by the 
democratically elected government in Freetown (Enria, 2017; Wilkinson and Fairhead, 
2017). However, neither sources provide further analysis on the governance of the TLIs or 
the state institutions on the bylaws or how the political structure allowed the state to force 
TLIs to do this. 
Boland and McKay (2018) respond to Parker and Allen (2018)’s blogpost about the 
bylaws and community-led interventions during the Ebola epidemic. They disagree “that the 
interventions of national and international agencies were somehow unhelpful, secondary, 
or separate to community-led interventions” and that community leadership was 
consistently effective (Boland and McKay, 2018). They say that Parker and Allen (2018) 
presented a dichotomy of insiders and outsiders when most volunteers were Sierra 
Leoneans working in their communities. However, Boland and McKay (2018) do not clarify 
how they derive this definition of community to definitively say that the volunteers were 
internal community members. Nonetheless, they agree that every community experienced 
EVD differently, as communities affected during phase one did not benefit from a scaled up 
coordinated response from the government and NGOs, versus a village during phase two. 
They agree that the wider response may have failed Mathiane if this village was one of the 
earlier ones affected, but to limit aid resources broadly as a policy could have deadly 
consequences. Boland and McKay (2018) argue for more aid resources but do not analyze 
the response of TLIs and rulemaking. Thus, it is unclear why TLIs may not have always been 
effective and how more aid resources could have replaced poor governance. 
The narrative in this section is that the bylaws passed in Sierra Leone were not 
effective everywhere, which may be true. However, the authors do not conduct a full 
analysis into which aspects of the bylaws were ineffective or how governance from TLIs was 
ineffective. Goguen and Bolton (2017) and Richards et al. (2015) offer a possible explanation 
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as to why some chiefs may choose not to enforce them, due to political circumstances or 
preferring a more democratic form of governing. However, the latter would be 
contradictory to our concept of good governance if it led to more EVD deaths (social cost).  
This nuances the concept of rulemaking and enforcement in determining poor or 
good governance, as sometimes local leaders may succumb to political pressure from 
constituents. Or, sometimes as part of an emergency response, authorities may need to 
improvise or rework their knowledge to fit the current situation (Mendonça, Beroggi, and 
Wallace, 2001). Although institutional quality depends on rulemaking and enforcement, 
these are sensitive to external factors or new knowledge acquisition. 
The literature focuses on two bylaws, the banning of funerals and at-home 
caregiving as evidence of poor governance since these continued in some places. However, 
Van der Windt and Voors (2020) have an appendix that lists several bylaws that were scaled 
up to national regulations, which demonstrate a comprehensive set of behavior changes. 
Whether these other bylaws were effective or not, has not been examined yet in the 
literature. The thesis fits into this debate on the empirical literature regarding local 
community engagement during the 2014 EVD outbreak, including how passing the bylaws in 




The thesis reviewed three levels of literature and identified a gap at each level. The 
first level of literature was on the new institutional economics theory. This framework 
assesses market-led economic growth, decline, or stagnation via rules and norms (North, 
1990). However, this does not fully explain why people choose to cooperate. Thus, the 
concept of social capital helps us to understand that institutions need trust and legitimacy, 
but sometimes this can take the form of patrimonialism too, which can harm local 
development (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson, 2014). Additionally, since institutions are 
designed to address specific challenges, there is not one institution that can address all 
problems (Acheson, 2000). Thus, this section also discussed polycentric governance, which 
are multitier institutions that govern specific challenges (Ostrӧm, 1990; Ostrӧm, 1998; 
Sawyer, 2004). The thesis identified a gap of assessing institutions for social outcomes: the 
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reduction of social costs and correcting information failures (Becker and Becker, 1997; Jha 
and Chaloupka, 2000; Reubi, 2016). 
The second level of literature discussed public health emergencies using Scott 
(1992)’s concept of public and hidden transcripts. The public transcript is usually accepted 
as the norm and a hidden transcript is rarely brought to the surface and accepted as 
mainstream. The thesis holds that the public transcript of public health emergencies 
described biomedical aid resources brought in by predominantly Western-derived 
international responders, resolved these disease outbreaks. This narrative did not 
thoroughly examine how traditional and community leaders responded. They are lumped 
into a general category of community stakeholders and their governance is not discussed 
(Allaranga et al., 2010; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007; Cohen, 2018; 
Enserink, 2005; Georges et al., 1999; Ilunga Kalenga et al., 2019; Lamunu et al., 2004; 
Médecins Sans Frontières, 2018a; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2018b; Médecins Sans 
Frontières, 2019; Moran, 2018; Msyamboza et al., 2014; Muñoz, 2017; Nkengasong and 
Onyebujoh, 2018; Okware et al., 2002; Onyango et al., 2007; Roddy et al., 2007; U.K. 
Department for International Development, 2011; World Health Organization, 2007; World 
Health Organization, 2009). Thus, because of this absence, this thesis will add the missing 
branch to this operational level of the literature too (section 2.6). Institutions at the 
community-level define behaviors and norms of the people and a top-down situational 
market analysis (World Health Organization, 2012a), cannot implement behavior change 
alone. 
The third level of literature is the transcripts of the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The hidden 
transcripts challenged the narratives of the public transcripts, as it showed that efforts to fix 
the demand-side barriers through the biomedical paradigm did not work well. Therefore, it 
implied that NGOs and donors had poor governance of the 2014 Ebola epidemic by not 
fixing these market failures. The literature repeatedly mentioned specific challenges such as 
rumors, misinformation, ‘secret burials,’ and at-home caregiving (Abramowitz et al., 2015; 
Boland and McKay, 2018; Enria, 2017; Parker and Allen, 2018; Parker et al., 2019; Perry and 
Sayndee, 2017; Richards, 2016; Van der Windt and Voors, 2020; Wilkinson et al., 2017). The 
hidden transcripts revealed that traditional authorities in Sierra Leone passed emergency 
management regulations to govern the crisis. In Liberia, community leaders organized in 
their communities with various intervention strategies. There is a debate on whether 
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community leaders were effective in resolving Ebola cases and reducing deaths. However, 
this debate predominantly focuses on traditional leaders in Sierra Leone (Boland and McKay, 
2018; Enria, 2017; Parker and Allen, 2018; Parker et al., 2019; Richards, 2016; Van der Windt 
and Voors, 2020; Wilkinson et al., 2017). At this level of literature, there is a gap in how the 
local governance of community and traditional leaders during the outbreak constitute high 
institutional quality. 
The following chapters will support this theoretical framework with evidence 
collected from the field. First, there were high information failures and social costs during 
the 2014 Ebola epidemic, despite the WHO and domestic governments delivering correct 
biomedical information. Second, the response- especially during phase one, did not help to 
fix these market failures and local community leaders responded to do so. Third, community 
and traditional leaders had a role in governing this outbreak that demonstrates high 
institutional quality by fixing these market failures. Finally, a multitier institutional response 
was observed regulating supply and demand barriers; this can provide lessons for the next 
disease outbreak. The next chapter is the methodology chapter. This discusses data 




















































All research projects have a systematic process for collecting and analyzing information to 
answer a question. 




The findings presented in the subsequent chapters are based on a comparative case 
study of two countries in West Africa that were the epicenter of the 2014 Ebola epidemic. 
One-on-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with health workers and 
community stakeholders in three provinces in each country. This thesis developed its 
research methods through a checklist created by the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme 
(CASP): a critical appraisal tool available for eight study designs (Critical Appraisal Skills 
Programme, 2018). The tool used was the qualitative study checklist to ensure a robust and 
problem-based approach, thereby strengthening the research design and methodology of 
the thesis. These methods help to understand the role played by traditional local institutions 
(TLIs) and aid resources during a public health emergency. The rationale and justification of 
the decisions made by the investigator are in response to challenges in developing the 
theoretical framework, data collection, and conducting data analyses. 
This chapter demonstrates how an idea was conceived and molded through 
hundreds of hours of literature review to generate a viable evidence-based research project 
in the field. It is organized according to the CASP qualitative study checklist. Section 3.2 
discusses qualitative research, its purposes and why this methodology can help answer the 
research question (Creswell, 2014; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Section 3.3 discusses the 
research design, including how the research question was redesigned as a response to 
challenges in theoretical development after data collection. Section 3.4 discusses the 
methods used during fieldwork. Section 3.5 discusses ethical considerations for conducting 
fieldwork. Section 3.6 discusses how the data were analyzed and structured thematically 
(Vaismoradi, Turunen, and Bondas, 2013). Section 3.7 discusses how the findings are 
considered rigorous and robust in qualitative research (Morse et al., 2002). The final two 
sections discuss how the findings will be disseminated and the limitations of the thesis. 
 
3.2 Qualitative Research 
 
Qualitative research is, “a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It 
consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible.” (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005, p. 3). This is a scientific process that cuts across many disciplines and 
theoretical paradigms in the social sciences. It has even been a source of inquiry itself, as 
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Denzin and Lincoln (2005) discuss the development of historical and critical approaches in 
qualitative methodology. The empirical materials, such as case studies, interviews, texts, 
artifacts, observational, or interactional sources can be interpreted to give a picture of 
someone’s life. Through these materials, the world is transformed into representations of 
the observer(s) during a specific time frame. Qualitative research gives researchers a 
window to view and interpret a specific event or situation. 
Denzin and Lincoln (2005) describe the qualitative researcher as a quilt maker. The 
researcher could be an anthropologist, film maker, journalist, or social critic who is piecing 
together patches of empirical material to make a quilt. This process is scientific as much as it 
is aesthetic. Different tools (e.g. sampling methods) may be used to design the quilt and 
sometimes new tools are invented. The methods of interpretation may not be decided 
before conducting the research, sometimes, it can be done inductively. This means that 
interpretation can happen once the data are collected and analyzed, to draw a hypothesis. 
 
3.2.1 How Qualitative Research differs from other Methodologies 
 
Creswell (2014, p. 4) defines quantitative research as, “an approach for testing 
objective theories by examining the relationship among variables. These variables, in turn, 
can be measured, typically on instruments,” while qualitative research is used for, 
“exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or 
human problem.” And finally, mixed methods research involves, “collecting both 
quantitative and qualitative data, integrating the two forms of data, and using distinct 
designs that may involve philosophical assumptions and theoretical frameworks.” (Creswell, 
2014, p. 4). In short, quantitative research will result in numbers and statistics that provide 
breadth and test a theory to be true; this can be useful in a theory confirming case study. 
Odell (2001) describes this as a least-likely scenario where conditions or factors are highly 
unlikely to confirm an existing theory, yet the effects or results still confirm the theory’s 
validity. Qualitative research makes use of the experiences and beliefs of people from their 
perspective (subjective analysis), giving depth and adding the human experience. Odell 
(2001) says a descriptive case study, which aims to document an important event, aligns 
well with qualitative research. 
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Indigenous methodology views knowledge as relational, and therefore it cannot be 
discovered or owned (Wilson, 2001). Research in this framework goes beyond ‘culturally 
sensitive’ because traditional research paradigms are imperializing and Eurocentric. 
Therefore, these do not justly convey the knowledge and experiences of indigenous persons 
(Hart, 2010). In this paradigm, the perspectives of indigenous persons are not presented vis-
à-vis Western worldview, but these are part of an ontology and epistemology, hence, 
needing indigenous research methods to convey them. Smith (2012) says that this is not a 
total rejection of all theory, research, or Western knowledge; however, the theories and 
methods used should be critically contemplated before applying them. In other words, as 
researchers, we should ask if current methodologies and theories help us understand the 
phenomenon or the human subjects, or perhaps, disempower them. 
3.2.1.1 Disadvantages with Qualitative Methodology 
 
However, there are some disadvantages to conducting qualitative research. One 
example is the time-consuming procedure of data processing (Franklin, 2019). When 
designing the research project and fieldwork for data collection, most researchers will plan 
for time to collect the data (such as conducting the interviews or focus groups) and time to 
analyze the data, however, it can take time to process the data too. For this research, all 
interviews were audio recorded and transcribed into written transcripts before being 
imported into a data analysis software. Transcribing can be a long and tedious process, 
especially if interviews are longer than thirty minutes, which is the case for most of the 
interviews for this research. On average, it took about four hours to create a written 
transcript and there are field notes and a diary that also contains observational and 
interactional materials too. It takes time to create the data, whether it is done after each 
interview session as brief notes or as a bi-weekly diary entry, time must be allotted to create 
the qualitative data and add these to the analysis. 
As qualitative research can be time consuming, it generally means that studies are 
smaller than the ones in quantitative research. For example, some quantitative research 
projects that use statistical modeling can involve hundreds or maybe even thousands of 
sources that are inputted into a software for analysis. However, it is rare to find qualitative 
research that involves a high number of participants or informants who were interviewed. 
Many qualitative studies also tend to be geographically centered in a specific location, such 
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as a neighborhood, village, or township. Research, like this one, where informants come 
from different towns within a country as well as from different countries, are rarer and 
hence more valuable. However, qualitative research can be harder to generalize to other 
scenarios (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008). 
Another disadvantage is that data can sometimes be contradictory or maybe even 
wrong. By this, I mean the informants interviewed may have imperfect memory or only 
remember events from his or her perspective. However, these limitations are not only 
found in qualitative methodology. To help mitigate this, informants were sourced from 
different locations and key facts such as dates are referenced against the literature when 
possible. 
As described below, this thesis and data collected are based on a qualitative 
methodology, in which one-on-one interviews were conducted with key informants about 
the healthcare system during specific time sets: after the civil conflict period, during the 
2014 Ebola epidemic, and present day. The data are written transcriptions, where words 
and phrases were analyzed to draw themes. Once the data were processed and analyzed, 
the themes and concepts were used to draw a hypothesis. 
 
3.2.2 Choosing Qualitative Methods 
 
A qualitative approach is preferable for an in-depth understanding of the human 
experiences and relationships between institutions. To achieve the research objectives of 
understanding the role and effectiveness of TLIs and aid, a statistical or numerical output 
would not fully answer these questions. For example, a quantitative study that took place in 
the Kailahun District of Sierra Leone used epidemiological data and mathematical modeling 
to assess the impact of control measures placed in the district (Lokuge et al., 2016). It found 
that community-level response activities, such as contact tracing and health promotion 
were vital to control the disease outbreak. It briefly described these measures, but only in a 
cursory manner to demonstrate how community behavior correlated with a disease spread. 
The causes, motivations, or relationship between stakeholders and the community were 
absent. Data on community engagement would have provided a more in-depth 
understanding of significant contributing factors to the impact of these measures. 
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Furthermore, there is a shift to include qualitative data and methods in Institutional 
Economics. Skarbek (2020) argues that in general, Economics is a discipline defined by its 
quantitative methods, rather than a singular topic and using these methods for institutional 
analysis may not provide us with all factors of causal mechanisms. This is because these 
methods reduce the factors to simple variables and lose crucial parts of their meaning. 
Therefore, qualitative data is preferred to provide a ‘thick description’ for generating new 
theories and analyses. And by ‘thick,’ we mean an understanding of multifaceted and 
multidimensional characteristics (Skarbek, 2020). 
This research uses qualitative methodology because the thesis was exploratory, 
meaning that, coming into the field, there was not a well-defined research question, but one 
that was open to being shaped by emerging themes and categories. Thus, as explained in 
section 3.4.1, a broad open-ended questionnaire was developed to collect information, and 
responses were long and in narrative form, often with probing questions added. It is also 
why the project was designed as a case study, as explained in this section, there was an 
initial intrigue regarding a specific event: the 2014 Ebola epidemic. A comparative case 
study was designed to explore the parallels and differences in the response and outcomes 
of the cases. Since the case study was investigative and exploratory, qualitative research is a 
good option as it generates considerable information, especially some that may go beyond 
the original research question. 
 
3.2.3 Selection of the Countries 
 
Liberia and Sierra Leone are fit for comparison because they have a similar recent 
history, being embroiled in civil wars and have lost an entire generation due to a lack of 
health, education, and prosperity opportunities (Bøås, 2001; Harris, 2012; Wright et al., 
2015). They both experienced the 2014 Ebola epidemic in which thousands of people were 
affected and the healthcare systems were overstretched. They share similar regional 
features and are heavily indebted poor countries as defined by the World Bank (World Bank, 
2012); hence, they are both at a stage of post-conflict recovery and development. 
However, as discussed in chapter one, in sections 1.3.4 and 1.5, Liberia was heralded 
as making the greatest progress in its health status, as it had the highest increase of life 
expectancy in the world of 19.7 years from 1990 to 2012 (World Health Organization, 
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2014b). According to Nkwanga (2015), international donors used this achievement as proof 
of the success of the development/systemic aid programs. On the other end of the 
spectrum, Sierra Leone was found to continue having the highest maternal and infant 
mortality (MMI) rates in the world (Sharples, 2015). However, under pressure from 
international advocates, the government released the Free Health Care Initiative (FHI) in 
2010 to provide free health services to pregnant and lactating women and children under 
five to improve these indicators. However, despite the discrepancy in these health 
indicators, neither country was prepared to identify and contain the Ebola Virus Disease 
(EVD) in those crucial primary stages in the Spring of 2014. 
Thus, given the historical, geographical, and economic similarities, combined with 
the intriguing differences in development and health indicators, designing the project as a 
comparative case study seem likely to reveal some interesting and previously unknown 
findings. 
3.3 Research Design 
 
In the social sciences, a research design is an overall strategy or procedure used to 
collect, measure, analyze, and integrate different components logically and coherently (De 
Vaus, 2001). The research question determines the type of design that will be used. There 
are many types of designs: a case study design, causality study, cross-sectional study, or 
systemic review, to give a few examples (De Vaus, 2001). This thesis uses a comparative 
case study design. 
 
3.3.1 A Comparative Case Study Design 
 
The design is a comparative case study approach in which two countries are being 
examined to answer the research question. Qualitative methods are employed to uncover 
opinions and perspectives on the problems of mobilization of people and resources during a 
public health emergency. According to Odell (2001), a comparative case study can create an 
interesting puzzle for research. A case is selected because as researchers, we are interested 
in the effect of an event or situation, and therefore look to analyze the causes and how they 
are correlated. When two cases are selected to illustrate a difference in causes and effects 
(Odell, 2001), it makes for a comparative case study. 
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Some comparative methods are employed too, specifically, a comparative analysis of 
field data and secondary data are used in this study, such as official epidemiological data 
from the World Health Organization (WHO) and data from Afrobarometer surveys. These 
are discussed in section 3.3.4, below. Thematic analysis is used to compare the primary data 
from the semi-structured interviews. The case study method relies on the use of multiple 
sources of evidence to investigate the research question. This includes analysis of economic, 
health, and governance data in both countries; these secondary data were compared in 
chapter one. 
The thesis did not take a fully deductive approach to conduct a comparative case 
study, but rather it adopted a sequence of inductive and deductive approaches, and the 
initial research question was informed by previous research into the existing theoretical 
backgrounds. Initially, there was interest to look at the three countries that were mainly 
affected by the 2014 Ebola epidemic: Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. However, as 
mentioned above, Liberia and Sierra Leone have striking similarities in their history and 
legacy, and due to the time and word limitations of a Ph.D. thesis, it was decided that 
comparing two countries already pushes the upper limits of these constraints. Another 
advantage of doing a comparative case study in qualitative research is that the findings are 
more likely to be generalized and, if there are patterns across two or more cases, then we 
can think differently about how a policy or strategy is or is not working. 
 
3.3.2 A Re-Design of the Question 
 
At the beginning of this doctoral research, the approach was a multilevel analysis of 
macro (global), meso (domestic/state level), and micro (local or community) health 
governance arrangements comparing interventions and strategies of the chronic disease 
pandemic of HIV/AIDS and the 2014 Ebola epidemic. However, after fieldwork in both 
countries, there was a lack of access to global and national level actors. Thus, it was decided 
to narrow the scope of the project to compare responses during the outbreak from 
community-level leaders. 
The major themes drawn are from what informants discussed regarding the role of 
TLIs during a time when state institutions and international actors did not adequately 
respond or deliver resources to contain the EVD spread. A framework was theorized with 
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the concepts of public health emergencies, community engagement, polycentric 
governance, and institutional quality. The nexus of these concepts are institutions, and the 
contribution that this research makes is how TLIs govern during a public health emergency. 
 
3.3.3 The Literature Search 
 
The literature surveyed for this work are from diverse perspectives drawing from the 
fields of African studies, anthropology, biomedicine, conflict/security studies, development 
studies, economics, epidemiology, foreign policy studies, governance, history, international 
relations, philosophy, political ecology, political economy, public health, public policy, and 
sociology. Public health crises in developing countries and the role of donors and external 
agencies is a widely explored field, however, the examination of traditional leaders at the 
micro-level is less explored and even less understood for health promotion. The broadness 
of this literature was mainly from the first and second year of research, where sources were 
recommended or sought through the references. 
Once the major concepts of the thesis were identified, an intensive literature search 
narrowed the literary sources that identified those concepts of a public health emergency, 
aid resources, traditional institutions, and community engagement. These sources discussed 
in chapter two were academic sources, gray literature, and news sources. The literature 
review discussed institutions in the new institutional economics framework, understanding 
behavior change in rulemaking, monitoring, enforcement, and social capital during public 
health emergencies and the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The findings of this thesis regarding 
bylaws and rulemaking address a gap in these two levels of literature. 
In addition, because this research is an evidence-based case study, the thesis fits into 
two debates as demonstrated in the second chapter. The first level is the theoretical debate 
on governance outcomes of rural-based institutions and the second level is the empirical 
literature on the community engagement during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. 
 
3.3.4 The Secondary Data 
 
One source is Afrobarometer and it was discussed in chapter one (Afrobarometer, 
2019). These surveys analyze broader perceptions of governance, society, and include local 
government and traditional leaders. Thus, when we compare both countries’ institutions, 
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we can appreciate the complexity and depth of how local citizens view democratic and 
governing structures. This gives a more nuanced picture than the World Bank’s governance 
indicators. Liberia and Sierra Leone are comparably similar, in that state institutions, local 
and national, are viewed less favorably than traditional ones. 
Second, there are epidemiology data, which are drawn from a variety of sources 
(World Health Organization, 2012b; World Health Organization, 2016b; World Health 
Organization, 2016c; World Health Organization, 2016d). Most of these were discussed in 
chapter one as an overview of health status in the case study countries and perceptions of 
health governance. Many of the indicators are aligned with the United Nations’ Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Therefore, recipient countries of aid, receive support for 
vertical interventions for specific diseases or conditions and not a horizontal strengthening 
of healthcare systems. Any improvements in these performance-based indicators are seen 
as favorable changes in health governance. And these indicators align to the overall 
governance strategies for recipient countries of aid, as the MDGs are part of and funded via 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). 
The epidemiology data contextualize governance and health infrastructure, except 
for the WHO’s Ebola situation report, which was published during the outbreak. We 
understand how healthcare systems were monitored and evaluated and how this may not 
have captured the entire picture of health governance. Furthermore, data from 
Afrobarometer depict broader governance performance of state and traditional institutions 
that can be discussed along with primary findings. 
The WHO’s Ebola situation report will be discussed in the following chapters (World 
Health Organization, 2016d). The report gives an on-the-ground assessment of the 
emergency response and total of epidemiology cases: new cases and death cases due to 
EVD. However, there were limitations in collecting the data, as the WHO officially 
intervened nine months after the index case in December 2013. It was up to local ministries 
of health to trace, confirm, and follow up with EVD cases. In addition, the WHO uses 
different definitions of ‘suspected, probable, and confirmed’ cases than what the local 
ministries use. 
The number of deaths was divided by the total number of those affected by EVD and 
multiplied by one hundred. This was done to yield a percentage number of EVD deaths. This 
method is also used for calculating the case fatality rate or case fatality ratio in 
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epidemiology (Gordis, 2009; Harrington, 2019; Kanchan, Kumar, and Unnikrishnan, 2016; 
Liu, 2018). This information can tell us disease severity, as well as environmental factors, 
such as available treatments and quality of care (Harrington, 2019). Thus, this can be used 
to interpret the environmental factors that differed in Liberia and Sierra Leone, such as 
getting EVD cases into care. However, because the data were not collected by the principal 
investigator and the disease outbreak lasted for a few years, accuracy cannot be completely 
certain. Nonetheless, the WHO is an internationally recognized and trusted entity for 
technical guidance and policies. Therefore, this is the most accurate and widely sourced 




This section discusses strategies used in the field to develop a data collection tool 
(questionnaire), data collection, and leaving the field in an ethical manner. Access to key 
informants was gained through field supervisors and gatekeepers as well as various 
sampling methods. Fieldwork was conducted in West Africa from January 2017 until July 
2017, arriving in Sierra Leone first and then traveling by air to Liberia in mid-March. Access, 
quality assurance, and administrative clearance were overseen through field supervisors in 
each country. 
 
3.4.1 The Data Tools 
 
The data tool is a questionnaire of open-ended questions that were broad and 
chronologically based to elicit a narrative response. The first five questions discuss the 
baseline, they ask about the current challenges that health workers face and how the 
healthcare system evolved since the end of the conflict period. Both countries ended their 
civil conflict a year apart from each other. The next four questions ask the informants about 
the 2014 Ebola epidemic and how she or he would evaluate what happened. The remaining 
questions discuss the present day since the outbreak, how health workers see themselves as 
governing the healthcare system, and their perspectives about the future of health in their 
respective countries. In total, there are seventeen questions, not including the probing 
questions. This questionnaire was developed before going into the field, believing there 
would only be a chance to speak with clinical professionals. However, after a discussion with 
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the field supervisors, it was revealed that there would also be an opportunity to interview 
local community members who assisted during the outbreak in a nonclinical setting. 
A different questionnaire was drafted because, as community members, they may 
not have known detailed information about the health facilities. In addition, it included 
broader questions about health policies and community engagement in health 
interventions. This separate questionnaire had only nine open-ended questions. It began 
with a baseline question regarding the evolution of the healthcare system, then it asked 
informants to discuss what happened during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. It also engaged 
participants on matters of political decisions and relationships, community expectations, the 
stigma of survivors, and perceived challenges to quality healthcare. Copies of the surveys, 
pre- and post- pilot are in Appendix A. 
The data tools were created broadly because there was not a strong predetermined 
theoretical framework before entering the field. However, the questions on the 2014 EVD 
outbreak and post-outbreak were designed to be evaluative on governance and 
performance, and hence, to elicit more theoretically driven data. Additionally, broad and 
open questions helped to obtain a narrative response, and probing questions were used to 
explore certain themes or issues that came up. The advantages are that the information 
revealed could give new insight into a problem or even generate further questions for 
research. However, the disadvantage could be the lack of consensus or major themes to 
develop, if the interviews are not guided or probed deeply enough. However, experience in 
interviewing techniques could help mitigate this by staying within the topic and probing 
questions. 
 
3.4.2 Data Collection 
 
Data collection consisted of one-on-one semi-structured interviews with key 
informants on site that provided reliable and comparable data. A semi-structured method is 
a formal interviewing process but provides flexibility to go off-topic, as this may reveal 
different aspects of the problem, or a new way of seeing the solutions (Low, 2013). The 
main finding regarding bottom-up rulemaking from TLIs was not the main question that 
initially was to be investigated. The original purpose was to investigate the causes of the 
2014 Ebola epidemic and possible linkages to global health governance and development 
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interventions. However, soon after hearing about the bylaws and integration of these laws, 
it was evident that an expansion of the informants’ pool to include community 
stakeholders89 was needed. Also, a different data tool was created to find out more about 
their role in the outbreak specifically and the healthcare system more broadly. All interviews 
were conducted one-on-one unless the informants requested an interpreter. Each person 
was interviewed once. 
A one-on-one interview format was chosen for confidentiality, comfort, and time 
availability of the informants. Having a one-on-one conversation rather than a focus group 
can take less time to organize. In focus groups, one would have to coordinate the schedules 
of multiple people as well as take into consideration of who is in the room. Some people 
may not feel comfortable speaking up in a group setting or some voices may overpower 
another, especially where language barrier is a concern. This may lead to someone who felt 
more comfortable conversing in English to speak for the group. A one-on-one format 
creates a more relaxed environment where the informant feels like she or he is having a 
conversation with the researcher. Moreover, the informant may divulge information that 
may not have been revealed in a setting where multiple parties are present. It is also easier 
to redirect the conversation if the topic goes too far off-track. Also, since the interviews 
were audio recorded as opposed to video recorded, one-on-one interviews were preferred, 
because if there are too many voices on tape, then it can make transcribing difficult to 
discern which informant is speaking. 
 
3.4.3 Field Supervision 
 
There were two field supervisors whom each had experience conducting research in 
the selected countries, and thus, understood the local administrative, ethics, and cultural 
settings to collect high quality data. Prof. Marda S.T. Mustapha from The College of Saint 
Rose for supervision in Sierra Leone and John S.M. Yormie Jr., Executive Director of the 
Liberia Research and Development Network for supervision in Liberia. This included the 
                                                          
89 Community stakeholders are key informants who volunteered, organized, or assisted during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. 
Some of the stakeholders may be knowledgeable on health issues, but do not work as a health worker in a clinical setting. 
Chapter four presents a breakdown of their roles. No informants were identified as ‘service users.’ The term, ‘community 
stakeholders’ is used to throughout the thesis when referring to nonclinical informants, unless otherwise specified. 
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advantages and challenges of mapping and choosing locations, interview questions, 
communication challenges, and sampling methods for accessing key informants. 
A pilot interview was conducted with each field supervisor. However, the 
questionnaire had already been drafted and reviewed by the ethics committee at the 
University of Westminster. The pilot interviews helped determine if the questions were 
appropriate, how they would be understood, and any areas that may come up for probing. 
Question number ten, “How did health workers organize during the outbreak?” was 
changed to, “What are the incentives to keep health providers working?” The word 
‘organize’ may not be understood in this context and it broadened up the question. This got 





The role of the gatekeeper was very important in gaining access to health workers 
and other key informants. In short, gatekeepers control access at every level of the research 
process, in formal settings, such as government institutions or in informal settings (Franklin, 
2019; Mandel, 2003; Reeves, 2010). The gatekeepers introduced me to many key 
informants in the field, who were interested in the research project. Also, they made 
introductions to people who engaged in contextual conversations with me, regarding the 
specific event of the 2014 Ebola epidemic and the development process at large. These 
ranged from senior aides in the executive office to community people who were affected by 
the disease. It was the field supervisors who introduced me to a few gatekeepers. 
In Sierra Leone, there was a main gatekeeper who knew the rural provinces well and 
understood the local Mende dialect and traditions, especially when approaching the 
paramount chiefs and district medical officers. Paramount chiefs are the local political elite 
who operate with great authority and respect in these communities. So, in these instances, 
a gatekeeper led to another gatekeeper. In Liberia, I had a gatekeeper in the Ministry of 
Health in Monrovia that provided introductions to the county health officers, who in turn 
gave access to the officer-in-charge of the health facilities. In the rural provinces of Sierra 
Leone and Liberia, gatekeepers who were affiliated with nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) were also approached for access to key informants. 




Three geographical provinces that were initially and heavily affected by EVD, were 
selected in each country (BBC News, 2016; Bullard, 2018). In Sierra Leone, these were the 
districts of Bo, Kailahun, and Kenema, and in Liberia, these were the counties of Lofa, 
Margibi, and Montserrado. 
In Sierra Leone, the fourteen districts are secondary levels of government 
administration, this means that the country is divided first into four regions: North, East, 
South, and Western Area. Under that, each region holds a few districts, in the eastern area 
are the Kailahun, Kenema, and Kono districts; and Bo District is part of the south. Under 
each district are chiefdoms, this is where the paramount chief has jurisdiction over his or 
her constituents. Resources are channeled through the districts, so each district has a 
district medical officer and district medical health team and these local actors know the 
health facilities and community stakeholders in the district. Each district has a headquarter 
city. For example, Bo Town is the headquarter city of the rural district of Bo in Sierra Leone. 
Thus, Bo Town would be an urban setting, while Gerihun or Telu, which are located outside 
the headquarter city, but within Bo District are considered rural settings. The definitions of 
urban and rural were discussed with the field supervisors and gatekeepers in both countries. 
In Liberia, the first level of government administration is the county level and there 
are fifteen; each county has a county health officer and the county health department. Each 
county is further divided into districts and the districts have councils and a district health 
officer; then there are cities and then chiefdoms headed by a paramount chief. Hospitals 
tend to be in the urban areas and were converted into Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) during 
the outbreak. Each county in Liberia has a capital city and these are defined as urban areas. 
However, since two urban counties were selected, then all cities visited in Margibi and 
Montserrado County are urban. The only rural county, Lofa, has rural townships from which 
to select informants. 
The capital of Liberia, Monrovia, is included in the Montserrado County mapping, 
which was initially and heavily impacted by EVD. However, the capital of Sierra Leone, 
Freetown, did not fit the criterion and was not included. Thus, the mapping and sampling 
skew rural dominant for Sierra Leone and urban dominant for Liberia. This mapping is 
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similar to another comparative case study that visited sites that were highly affected by EVD 
(Miller et al., 2018). 
 
3.4.6 Sampling Methods 
 
Key Informants were sampled with two methods: snowballing and target sampling, 
depending on the size of the health center. These are called purposeful sampling methods 
and are preferred as there was a specific criterion of people to be interviewed: primarily 
healthcare workers and if possible, volunteers or authorities who participated in the 
response. 
Purposeful sampling is, “a technique widely used in qualitative research for the 
identification and selection of information-rich cases for the most effective use of limited 
resources (Patton 2002),” (Palinkas et al., 2015, p. 534). Thus, the selection was not random; 
I was seeking individuals who have knowledge regarding a specific phenomenon, so a 
randomized selection would not fit the scope of the research. Furthermore, one must 
consider the target population too. The first chapter discussed how health human resources 
(HRHs) were very low in these two countries, especially since the conflict period displaced 
many people. In addition to that, health workers (and caregivers) were the main victims of 
the EVD outbreak. At the time of fieldwork, the population of health workers was fewer and 
farther between. 
A variety of purposeful sampling methods were used to seek informants for 
interviews, and the definition of a health worker was broadened up. In the beginning, it was 
planned to only speak with doctors and nurses, however, we encountered very few doctors, 
especially in the rural areas, and more nurse’ aides, community health workers, 
pharmacists, and laboratory workers. Since, in these areas, it is common practice for a 
patient to visit the laboratory for blood tests and be given a prescription for medication, 
laboratory workers were included in the sampling. 
3.4.6.1 Snowballing or the Chain-Referral Method 
 
Thus, because the population is small and can be difficult to access, snowballing is a 
helpful way to recruit informants who fit the criterion (Heckathorn, 2011). Snowballing or 
chain-referral sampling means a researcher asked the participant or informant if she or he 
could make an introduction to another potential person that would participate. Used since 
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the 1960s, it is sometimes seen to have bias and is also called a ‘convenience method’. 
However, the intent of recruiting from a select pool where people are similar is the purpose 
of the research. The only limitation is that the chains did not get very long, so another 
health worker was approached to see if another chain may get started again. The only place 
where the chain-referral was exhausted was in the Kenema District in Sierra Leone, and 
therefore, another facility was visited to try and get close to ten interviews for the area. 
In settings where more than seven employees were present, snowballing was used. 
However, when the chain of referral was broken, then I approached another employee at 
random and asked if she or he would be interviewed. In medium to large facilities, this 
method is preferred as the researcher is introduced by a trusted colleague and it helps to 
identify those with expert knowledge, such as the experience of working in the ETUs or with 
an NGO as a volunteer. However, the chains did not get longer than three persons before 
being broken, and therefore needing to approach another health worker at the facility. 
3.4.6.2 Devising a Target Sampling Method 
 
A strategy was devised for smaller clinics where less than five employees were 
present. Everyone at the facility would be approached for an interview, hence targeted. 
Some units have very few personnel at the facility which meant that after arriving and being 
introduced to the officer-in-charge, it did not make sense to do a chain referral. Everyone 
knew a researcher was there and was usually available to speak. Targeting is a purposeful 
method, as the units fit the criteria. This means a unit (health center) was targeted and 
everyone within that unit was approached for an interview when we visited. 
As for the interviews with stakeholders, all these informants were purposefully 
targeted and approached for an interview, again this is to seek a defined subpopulation with 
knowledge regarding a specific phenomenon. After discovering that there would be a 
chance to interview community stakeholders and creating a new data tool, these informants 
were sought after because of their role in the response. Their narratives gave another layer 
of validation to what health workers believed were strengths and weaknesses within the 
healthcare system too. Therefore, with the consultation of field supervisors, gatekeepers, 
and after mapping, targeting, and chain referral, key informants who had specific 
information for the research project were sought and interviewed. The sampling excluded 
community members who had no role in assisting during, or in governing the outbreak; and 
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thus, the findings do not include a strictly ‘service user’ perspective. At least one 
stakeholder per district in Sierra Leone or per county in Liberia were interviewed. In Sierra 
Leone, more stakeholders were interviewed than Liberia, because of the unique 
circumstances of bottom-up rulemaking that was part of the national response. 
 
3.4.7 Leaving the Field 
 
Leaving the field, after conducting qualitative research, involves complex emotions 
of fatigue, intellectual enthusiasm, sadness, and a new perspective on the world. Thus, for 
ethnographers, field participants, and other researchers who engage in relationship-building 
and narration during the data collection, concluding the field research is more than a wrap 
up of notes. Bloor and Wood (2006) describe this as a social process of withdrawing, which 
can disrupt relationships, especially ones that were built to access key informants. A 
researcher’s departure can be seen unfavorably and may hamper future field projects, with 
participants less willing to engage (Shaffir and Stebbins, 1991). This can be concerning for 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, where the EVD outbreak has also brought a huge surge of research 
interest. Gallmeier (1991) acknowledges this challenge but also remarks that disengagement 
may not have always been due to a lack of engagement on behalf of the researcher. 
Sometimes, it can be too arduous to keep up with new relationships acquired from field 
research. 
Coffey (1999) says that it is rare for ethnographers to leave the field totally 
unaffected, and the literature only engages on the researcher and human data within the 
limited scope of ethical principles, such as harm, informed consent, and voluntary 
participation. I was not trained on the social process of withdrawal from fieldwork, so it was 
not expected that key informants and gatekeepers would want to build relationships with 
the researcher or even remember to ask for me and how I was doing after leaving West 
Africa. As an early career researcher, it can be daunting on how to navigate these 
relationships that are personal for professional purposes and there should be some space to 
discuss this outside the ethical framework. “This is less about the contamination of the field 
by the researcher than about the ways in which fieldwork relies upon the interactions, 
relations and situatedness of the researcher and the researched.” (Coffey, 1999, p. 7). 
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Stebbins (1991) argues that researchers do not ever leave the field. While one may 
physically pack a suitcase and depart from the area, many researchers still stay engaged 
with their subjects and gatekeepers long after data collection ends. Taylor (1991) also writes 
that he continues active engagement with his research through political and policy 
discussions, and thus, continues the relationships with his informants, who are part of a 
marginalized or vulnerable community. He argues that as researchers, we develop a moral 
obligation to our participants to not disengage our relationships, especially after we 
encouraged them to get close to us. Continuing relationships can also bring new insights or 
clarify something, long after data collection is completed. In this respect, the researcher 
never completely leaves the field. 
3.4.7.1 Building and then Disengaging the Relationships 
 
My network in West Africa was complex, as I was based in the capital city areas in 
both countries, but traveled extensively into the rural interiors, to places where hotels were 
nearly nonexistent. I often stayed in people’s homes, usually a friend or a distant relative of 
my companion or field supervisor. As mentioned before, there were multiple gatekeepers to 
access key informants and some of these relationships were intentional, meaning I wanted 
to meet this person and get to know him or her, so I can speak with informants. Other 
times, it was by happenstance, such as arriving at the car lot in the town of Gbarnga, Liberia, 
only to have missed the last taxi of the day heading north to Lofa County. I, therefore, had 
to hitch a ride in a private vehicle with an NGO worker, who so happened to work 
extensively with health centers in that community. We got to know each other well over 
that 12-hour trip and even in the weeks after returning to Monrovia, Liberia. Some 
informants texted me and asked if I would return to their village again or would call me 
while I was in the country. However, it did not feel final until a day or two before leaving for 
the airport, when I contacted them to say goodbye. At the time, I felt that I was completing 
my professional obligations but later, I realized that I had lost something more personal. 
Consequently, the experience of disengaging from field relationships and the 
fieldwork took several weeks to process. On the one hand, there is excitement and 
enthusiasm about exploring and analyzing the data and the many possible contributions to 
knowledge. Fieldwork also shaped a new perspective as many of the important topics raised 
by key informants had not been covered by the literature review conducted beforehand. On 
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a personal note, it changed my worldview, as I understood that not everything different was 
wrong and things that were the same were not always right. I also made friendships that I 





Ethics approval was granted by the University of Westminster in November 2016 for 
the fieldwork, and subsequently, an amendment was made and approved in May 2017, the 
application numbers are ETH1617-0176 and ETH1617-1450. The university has authority 
over all research ethics across the three major colleges. A risk assessment and overseas 
travel forms were submitted along with the standard ethics application. 
Two events were not initially accounted for and that was the possibility of access to 
community stakeholders, such as NGO workers, village elders, chiefs, and a Sande society 
leader. A separate data tool was created as these informants may not have known about 
the specific procedures of a health center. The second incident was falling ill for a few 
weeks, and thus, falling behind on transcribing the interviews and writing draft chapters. For 
both these incidences, I requested an amended ethics application. 
All potential informants were introduced with the following information: full name 
of the researcher and interpreter (if needed), affiliation with the University of Westminster, 
and contact information for the researcher and supervisor at the university. Each person 
was asked if she or he would voluntarily participate as an informant. Each person was 
shown a participant information sheet that had full contact details, nature of the project, 
and their rights as a confidential informant. This included the right to participate or opt-out 
during the interview at any time without penalty. The details of the information sheet were 
verbally discussed with each informant beforehand and given to him or her to read. Each 
person was asked if they had any questions before starting the interview. Those who agreed 
kept this information sheet and signed a consent form, the consent forms were kept under 
lock and key. All those who agreed to be interviewed were asked if he or she felt 
comfortable speaking in English or wanted a translator. For those with limited English 
proficiency, the gatekeepers who were familiar with the questionnaire were available to 
interpret. Copies of the information sheet and consent form used are in Appendix B. These 
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forms were developed using templates from a research ethics guidebook (Kruger, Ndebele, 
and Horn, 2014). 
All informants were over the age of 18 and were able to provide informed consent 
for him or herself to participate in this study. All interviews used for this study were audio 
recorded, no video footage nor pictures of the informants were taken. However, audio files 
will not be available for request, only the written transcriptions. 
A summary of the findings will be sent to gatekeepers for distribution. 
 
3.5.1 Data Security 
 
All interviews were audio recorded with a recording device that encoded AES 256-bit 
level encryption for data security, in case the recorder was lost or stolen. Each audio file and 
corresponding written transcript were anonymized with an eight-digit alphanumeric code. 
Each written transcript was also encrypted using the 2016 Microsoft Word encryption 
feature and stored on a password-protected laptop. In addition, there are back-up copies of 
the transcripts on the university’s secure cloud drive. This provides a double level security 
feature, as someone would need a password to access the laptop and then would have to 
know the separate passwords to access the written transcripts. Audio files were held for the 
duration of the Ph.D. project. 
The audio recorder came with software to play the recordings on a laptop or 
computer to help with transcribing. A local university student was hired and trained to 
transcribe the interviews into Microsoft word on the laptop. I listened to each audio 
recording, whether transcribed by the student or me. Written transcripts were kept as close 
to word-to-word as possible, and only in some cases were texts in brackets inserted for 
clarification. All interviews had been transcribed, imported, and analyzed at the time of 
writing this chapter. The data were imported into the Nvivo software for coding and 
thematic analysis. The coding and analysis is described in section 3.6. 
 
3.5.2 I, the Researcher 
 
As much as we may not want to admit it, every researcher has biases and the best 
way to conduct scientific research, especially when involving human subjects, is to be aware 
of these biases and address them. 
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3.5.2.1 My Preconceptions 
 
I grew up in New York City to immigrant parents who had lived in poverty, under a 
dictator and his special paramilitary force, the Tonton Makout, where people would 
disappear.90 My upbringing was very different from my parents and my experiences visiting 
a developing country had been limited to recreational excursions in the Caribbean and 
Mexico. This research was the first time that I stayed long-term in a regular home in a post-
conflict country. 
In terms of preconceptions, before leaving the United States there were a few. I was 
concerned that no one would want to speak with me or take time to ‘participate in a 
research study.’ I equated myself to those annoying 1-800 telemarketers who called to ask 
everything from what you are eating to your credit card number. I was concerned about 
safety and understood that law enforcement was weak in these countries. However, one 
significant preconception that I had was that I would arrive and find everything failing: a 
weak healthcare system, failing development, failing democracy…etc. I believe this was 
connected to the literature review that was conducted beforehand, which focused on 
negative attributes of development. Most of what I read had a very critical stance of 
progress, and as mentioned, a critical interpretation of performance-based indicators that 
were used to demonstrate progress. My original research approach was to examine and 
understand more about the weaknesses and possibly what failed in the response. It was 
after arriving at my research destination, that these preconceptions changed. 
I was hoping for the best but prepared for a worst-case scenario. However, after my 
first day in Freetown, I was already wandering outside the compounds of my temporary 
home. A couple of weeks later, I was trying to interact as much as possible with my 
neighbors. Informal conversations about the research gave deep insights from those 
affected by EVD. Many people were open and interested in the thesis and more willing to 
engage in contextual discussions regarding their perceptions and experiences. 
3.5.2.2 Working with Informants 
 
                                                          
90 President François ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier was elected in 1957 in Haiti and there was an attempted coup in 1958. He 
stopped trusting his army and law enforcement agencies and became increasingly totalitarian. In 1959, he started his 
personal police force called, cagoulards, but they were soon nicknamed Tonton Makouts after people started disappearing. 
They were named after a folklore boogeyman that abducts children. See Chochotte (2017), Dernis (1976), and Sprague 
(2012). 
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Questions on the data tools were broad and exploratory to elicit long narrative 
responses. I kept the language as simple and plain as possible and showed the data tool to 
field supervisors and gatekeepers for any minor suggestions on language and style. For 
example, for the term ‘human resources,’ I instead said, ‘man power’ or ‘staff.’ As these are 
more commonly used in the local dialects. This will also appear in the text in the next 
chapter. Also, because of my accent, some words like ‘law’ had to be spelled out during the 
interviews, and the word, ‘governance’ had to be explained as, ‘decision making and 
accountability,’ especially since ‘governance’ sounds close to the word, ‘government.’ 
The criteria were well-defined and inclusive, especially since I had someone to 
interpret and guide me around the provinces. I spoke to people whom I may not have felt 
comfortable approaching on my own. In Sierra Leone, significantly more male informants 
participated than female informants, this may partly be explained by access since more 
tertiary facilities (hospitals) were visited there. However, I did not consciously factor gender 
when I was selecting informants in the field, given the high constraints of medical 
personnel. 
However, this is not to say that the gender of the informants was irrelevant, but I 
had to expand the definition of health workers, just to make sure that I could speak with 
enough informants in each area. I observed that men (in both countries) tended to work in 
the laboratories and pharmacies, and I did not interview any female doctor, although they 
do exist. When it came to visiting health workers in the administrative offices of the county 
or district health offices, these were overwhelmingly male. The places visited, and health 
centers targeted, could reflect the gender stratification of the local society. 
In the words of James Ferguson (2006, pp.33-34): 
 
[T]hat a culturalized and relativized notion of modernity tends to allow the material and social inequalities that have long 
been at the heart of African aspirations to modernity to drop out of the picture. In their eagerness to treat African people as 
(cultural) equals, Western anthropologists have sometimes too easily sidestepped the harder discussion about the economic 
inequalities and disillusionments that threaten to make any such equality a merely ideal or sentimental one. 
 
In other words, these societies have always had inequality, discrimination, and 
injustice before and after the colonial periods. Modernizing or westernizing will not fix this, 
as it has not fixed this in Western countries. I care about development, but sometimes it is 
easy to overlook the inequalities that are already inside the culture and not address them 
directly. I try to include these factors in my interpretations. 
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The communities reflect the urban/rural divide and the challenges that come with 
this. Informants living in an urban environment, with access to amenities and opportunities, 
have biases regarding those who live in the rural parts or ‘the bush.’ Likewise, those in rural 
areas have preconceptions of life and expectations in the urban towns. In addition, there 
are aspects of local politics that I try to address in the interpretations. Speaking with health 
workers, village elders, chiefs’ council members, appointed officials, NGO representatives, 
researchers, and community organizers presented a multitude of views, which I hope, 
provide a balanced perspective of local voices. 
3.5.2.3 Reflections as a Researcher on the Data 
 
The narratives from the informants were personal, deep, and sometimes the 
informants were vulnerable when discussing tragic events, and for some, this included the 
civil war. These emotions can impact the data and the interpretations for any interviewer. 
However, the data were sourced from different locations and a variety of local actors for 
reliability. If I received inaccurate or false information from an informant, this helped 
mitigate the impact during the interpretation of findings. 
I believe the interviews conducted with the informants are reliable in that they are, 
whom they said they were; and gave honest answers to the best of their abilities. Some 
health workers were young and had only been in the system for a few years, while others 
had provided decades of service. They were from urban and rural areas, some believed 
themselves to have a more sophisticated view or knowledge on these matters, and others 
felt more comfortable talking about their own experiences. Some had traveled abroad to 
participate in training and others felt they may never build on what they learned. This is 
what makes qualitative research so much richer and deep; the questions of society, politics, 
and development are complex and multifaceted, and the approach to studying it must be 
equally as comprehensive. 
 
3.6 Data Analysis 
 
This section discusses the processing and analysis of data, such as coding, 
interpretation, and triangulation. 
 
3.6.1 Coding in Nvivo 
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The software used was Nvivo Plus version 11 for coding and analysis. Two projects 
were created, one for the Sierra Leonean interviews and one for the Liberian interviews. 
There are two levels of coding in Nvivo, the first is a ‘node’ and that is used for identifying 
and classifying key concepts in the transcript. These nodes were used to create any themes 
that will be discussed in the next chapter. Each node was created and defined by me in the 
following list below. The last nodes that are marked with an asterisk are specific to the 
Liberian sources, as these concepts were only mentioned by the Liberian informants.91 
In Nvivo, the nodes were manually written and defined, as opposed to the software’s 
word query function. Five nodes were created and defined when working on the Sierra 
Leonean interviews first, these are listed below: 
• Aid Resources 
• Bylaws 
• Information Failure 
• Social Cost 
• State Institutional Failures 
The search function was used to find texts that can be coded with one or more 
nodes. For example, to code for ‘Bylaws,’ searches for ‘law’ and ‘chief’ were performed, and 
I visually scanned through the results and coded the relevant texts. For ‘Aid Resources,’ 
searches for: ‘aid,’ ‘NGO,’ ‘partner,’ and ‘donor’ were performed, and relevant texts were 
coded. For the node, ‘State Institutional Failures,’ searches for ‘Government’ or ‘Ministry’ 
were performed. ‘Information Failure’ was coded by looking for the words: ‘trust,’ 
‘information,’ ‘sensitization,’ ‘news,’ and ‘lies.’ ‘Social Cost’ was coded by searching words 
and phrases like, ‘fight the disease,’ ‘spread,’ ‘believe’, ‘trust’, ‘died,’ and ‘won.’ The in-text 
search function was set to ‘With synonyms’ so more generalized results could be produced 
and therefore creating larger search results. 
After doing this for the Sierra Leone project, it was repeated for the Liberian 
interviews, however, with different results - as three new nodes were created. ‘TLIs Not 
Involved’ referred to traditional leaders not being involved in the response and this 
appeared once. ‘Community Organizing’ and ‘Top-Down’ nodes were also created. These 
nodes were then introduced to the Sierra Leone project, and only results for ‘Top-Down’ 
                                                          
91 There are some concepts that were found in one case country, but not mentioned in another. Thus, while this marks 
interesting differences between the two countries, it is not how all health workers or stakeholders feel. 
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were produced and coded. Thus, TLIs Not Involved* and Community Organizing* were 
nodes that were unique to the Liberian sources. 
After achieving these preliminary findings and having discussed it with my 
supervisor, I was encouraged to return to the data and find out why there may have been 
problems with trust during the outbreak. Subsequently, two more nodes were created and 
searched for in both Nvivo projects: ‘Prior Mistrust’ and ‘Prior Trust.’ These were coded 
after searching for these words: ‘trust,’ ‘mistrust,’ ‘belief,’ ‘come to,’ ‘visit,’ ‘seek’ and 
‘prior.’ However, the queries did not produce many results as it was difficult to determine 
trust semantically but may sometimes be perceived in the themes. In other words, very few 
informants discussed trust issues explicitly, however, one may see this concept broadly in 
the narratives. Another reason for trust-related nodes not to appear often in the transcripts 
is because the original framework and research question did not explore trust issues 
critically. It was not brought up by informants as an issue to probe further, except in these 
few instances. I also returned to the data again to add ‘Fear’ as a node and this revealed 
several results. 
 
Most appeared nodes: 
• Bylaws 
• Aid Resources 
• Information Failure 
• Social Costs 
• State Institutional Failure 
• Fear 
 
Least appeared nodes: 
• Community Organizing* 
• Top-Down 
• Prior Mistrust 
• Prior Trust 
• TLIs Not Involved* 
 
3.6.1.1 Definitions of the Nodes 
 
Aid Resources: 
Financial, in-kind resources, human resources, or capacity-building, supplied through 
external partners and donor countries. 
Bylaws: 
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Community members working to maintain order and stop the spread of EVD during 
the outbreak, this does not entail legal rulemaking. 
 
Fear: 
Informants stating that they were afraid to perform in their role or the perception of 
fear in the community. 
 
Information Failure: 
This is when consumers (community members) received misinformation about the 
health centers or the extent of the Ebola epidemic. This includes rumors or information that 
they were told or heard. 
 
Prior Mistrust: 
This is when informants state that community members did not trust the formal 
health facilities or health workers before the 2014 Ebola epidemic. 
 
Prior Trust: 
This is when informants state that community members trusted the formal health 
facilities or health workers before the 2014 Ebola epidemic. 
 
Social Cost: 
This is a behavior or action of an individual that comes at a personal cost and a cost 
for someone else, in this case, putting another person at risk for EVD. This includes the 
undertaking of dead bodies, burials, long-distance traveling, violating isolation, close contact 
without personal protective equipment (PPE), caring for sick relatives at home without 
protective material, or healthcare providers not working. 
 
State Institutional Failure: 
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Defined as a situation where government institutions fail to deliver services or 
respond effectively to challenges. 
 
TLIs Not Involved*: 
Traditional leaders were not involved in the decision making or community 
engagement efforts during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. 
 
Top-Down: 
This is defined as when an informant says that most of the decision making and/or 
rulemaking came from the top (central government) and down to them. 
 
3.6.2 Thematic Analysis 
 
Thematic analysis allows data to be used in principal concepts or themes for 
qualitative research (Vaismoradi, Turunen, and Bondas, 2013). This helps to bring order and 
structure to the findings that can be objectively interpreted, and it is used across a range of 
epistemologies (Nowell et al., 2017). Thus, for research projects with large data sets, it helps 
the researcher (especially novice ones) to create an organized and well-structured report. 
However, Nowell et al. (2017) say that a disadvantage to this approach is that the 
researcher cannot make claims about language use and while flexible, it may also lead to a 
lack of coherence when developing the themes from the data. 
Using these nodes, three themes were created to structure and interpret the data: 
‘Government’s Response and Community Reaction,’ ‘Local Institutional Intervention,’ and 
‘Governing the Outbreak.’ However, while the themes are applied to both countries, the 
nodes that comprise them are different for each case.92 The coding corresponded with the 
quotes from the transcripts, and thus, these reflect positive or negative perceptions, while 
the themes were created broadly to encompass the responses from individuals and across 
                                                          
92 In the Sierra Leone project in Nvivo, the nodes ‘State Institutional Failures,’ ‘Information Failure,’ and ‘Social Cost’ were 
used for the theme of ‘Government’s Response and Community Reaction,’ while in Liberia, this same theme is derived 
from the nodes of ‘State Institutional Failures,’ ‘Information Failure,’ and ‘Top-Down.’ For the theme ‘Local Institutional 
Intervention,’ the nodes for Sierra Leone were ‘Bylaws’ and ‘Top-Down’. In Liberia, the nodes ‘Community Organizing’ and 
‘TLIs not Involved’ were used. For the theme ‘Governing the Outbreak’ in the Sierra Leone project, the nodes used were 
‘Aid Resources,’ ‘Bylaws,’ ‘Fear,’ and ‘Social Cost.’ In the Liberia project the nodes used were ‘Aid Resources,’ ‘Community 
Organizing,’ ‘Fear,’ ‘Information Failure,’ and ‘Social Cost.’ 
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the sample. Indeed, thematic analysis depicts changes in governing and response from 
institutions and the community. 
The nodes of ‘Prior Mistrust’ and ‘Prior Trust’ were used to give a baseline 
assessment of the informants’ perceptions regarding the state of the healthcare system 
since the end of the conflict period. The next chapter gives excerpts, and these are grouped 
by the themes mentioned. 
The subthemes consist of examples drawn from the informants’ interviews and can 
be used to saturate the themes (Vaismoradi et al., 2016). As demonstrated in table 3.1 




Government’s Response and Community 
Reaction 
Response from the government was ineffective. 
Information and protocols were confusing. 
Health workers and community members were 
afraid. Community members avoided the 
health centers. 
Local Institutional Intervention Conducting Health Education. Stopped 
Movement. Setting up Checkpoints. Referring 
sick persons into healthcare. Rulemaking. 
Reintegration of EVD survivors. 
Governing the Outbreak Aid Resources supplied clinical resources. How 
international responders related to the 
communities. Community intervention helped 




Triangulation is a strategy that consists of a multimethod approach to collecting data 
(Denzin, 2007; Denzin, 2012). For example, both quantitative and qualitative data can make 
the findings more rigorous. Or, there can be investigator triangulation, where multiple 
researchers will collect and process the data too. This strategy helps to control for biases of 
the researchers (Carter et al., 2014). Data source triangulation is a method of collecting data 
from different types of people from different communities (Carter et al., 2014). 
However, Denzin and Lincoln (2005; 2008) argue that qualitative research is already 
multi-method, but triangulation can be seen as an alternative to validation. As explained 
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above, qualitative research consists of empirical materials, such as artifacts, texts, 
observations, interactions…etc. In other words, this strategy is adopted as a way of gaining 
an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon and not as an attempt to validate one 
objective reality, “triangulation is the simultaneous display of multiple, refracted realities,” 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2008, p. 8), and thus, can be used to bring these realities together and 
show a broader picture. 
The epidemiology data from the WHO’s Ebola situation report on the outbreak were 
triangulated with the primary data, all of which are discussed in the next chapter. 
Triangulating the primary data helps control for inaccurate or false information, as 
responses are sourced between health workers and community stakeholders in different 
locations and facilities. The quantitative secondary data can draw broad comparisons 
between the case studies. 
 
3.7 Rigor and Robustness 
 
In all research, whether qualitative or quantitative, it is useless unless the data are 
valid and reliable. However, how we determine the robustness of the data is markedly 
different in qualitative and quantitative methodology. 
Quantitative research focuses on the breadth, meaning one gathers a large data set 
that covers many variables and the findings or conclusions from the sample can be 
generalized to the population at large. In contrast, qualitative research identifies a single 
phenomenon and gains a deep and close-up point of view (Thomas and Magilvy, 2011). The 
‘validity’ of the research depends on the application of the methods and the precision with 
which the findings reflect the data. ‘Reliability’ describes the consistency of analytical 
procedures (Noble and Smith, 2015). However, Noble and Smith (2015) say that for new 
researchers in qualitative methods, it can be difficult to establish these as there are no 
accepted standards to which the research can be evaluated. Thus, they draw on Lincoln and 
Guba (1985)93 to offer some alternative terminology and concepts to evaluate qualitative 
research. 
 
                                                          
93 Lincoln and Guba (1985)’s Naturalistic Inquiry has been cited in the literature on evaluating qualitative research. 
However, the original terminologies and definitions have been updated and refined over the years, hence the preferred 
use of these verification strategies for this thesis. 
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3.7.1 Evaluative Terminologies in Qualitative Research 
 
‘Truth value’ replaces ‘validity,’ in that multiple realities exist, and the researcher 
outlines his or her personal experiences and viewpoints (in a reflexive section, under 3.5.2) 
and accurately presents the participants’ perspectives. Thomas and Magilvy (2011) refer to 
this as ‘credibility,’ and that the data set should reflect the human experience that would be 
recognized by other people who also shared that experience. 
‘Consistency,’ according to Noble and Smith (2015), relates to the trustworthiness of 
the methods undertaken and the researcher leaving a decision trail, or sometimes called, 
‘transparency.’ Golafshani (2003) also refers to this as ‘dependability,’ which examines the 
process and product of research for consistency. This is supposed to mirror ‘reliability’ in 
quantitative research and account for personal and research method biases. 
‘Applicability’ considers whether the findings can be applied to other contexts, 
settings, or groups (Noble and Smith, 2015). Thomas and Magilvy (2011) refer to this as 
‘transferability’ and give the example of a study that was first performed on African 
American women then repeated on Hispanic women with similar results. 
Next is ‘confirmability’ or ‘neutrality,’ which is when ‘truth-value,’ ‘consistency,’ and 
‘applicability’ have been addressed. Noble and Smith (2015) say this is based on 
acknowledging complex relationships with the participants and how the undertaking of the 
research is grounded on the researcher’s philosophical position and perspective. Thomas 
and Magilvy (2011) say ‘confirmability’ mirrors ‘objectivity’ in quantitative research. This is 
where the researcher makes a conscious effort to follow and not lead interviews and is 
reflective during the data collection and not only afterward. 
However, Morse et al. (2002) say that the focus on evaluating research at the end, 
and not during the process, risks missing serious threats to its rigor until it is too late to 
correct them. Likewise, some post-hoc evaluations do not really lend credibility or 
trustworthiness to the findings such as member checking.94 Morse et al. (2002) say that 
most of the time, “with the exception of case study research and some narrative inquiry, 
study results have been synthesized, decontextualized, and abstracted from (and across) 
                                                          
94 ‘Member checking’ is when interpretations of the data or findings are returned to the informants to see if these are 
recognized as accurate representations of their experiences (Thomas and Magilvy, 2011). Gatekeepers, who were not 
interviewed but shared the experiences of the Ebola outbreak, gave their feedback on the findings. the feedback is in 
Appendix C. 
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individual participants, so there is no reason for individuals to be able to recognize 
themselves or their particular experiences (Morse, 1998; Sandelowski, 1993).” (Morse et al., 
2002, p. 16). However, all the authors agree that within qualitative research, rigor and 
robustness rely on the responsiveness of the investigator, and the lack of responsiveness is 
the greatest hidden threat. 
Nonetheless, findings were sent for member checking to gatekeepers in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, as this is still one of the more common ways to verify the accuracy of 
interpretations. However, for the rest of this section, the verification strategies used in 
Morse et al. (2002) during the research are discussed. 
 
3.7.2 Methodological Coherence 
 
This ensures congruence between the research question and the methods used to 
conduct the research (Morse et al., 2002). The research aims to understand the parallels 
and differences between the two countries during a specific phenomenon. Since this 
research is regarding an in-depth study of a single event and context, qualitative methods 
and a comparative case study design were chosen to achieve the research aim. There is no 
hypothesis or theory testing in this project; however, the findings should lead us to a better 
understanding of the phenomenon and theoretical implications. There is a coherent 
strategy in choosing these methods to research this event. 
 
3.7.3 Sampling and Saturation 
 
As explained in section 3.4.6, sampling was expanded during the fieldwork to achieve 
a deeper insight into the phenomenon in question. Another data tool was created to 
interview community stakeholders. Saturation occurred when there was replication in the 
categories and themes across all informants. Morse et al. (2002) say that new investigators 
commonly believe that data saturation occurs when the same participants are interviewed 
multiple times until nothing new presents itself, as opposed to expanding the sampling pool 
to include different people. Therefore, geographic and demographics expansion during 
fieldwork helped to saturate the data. The sampling pool also includes negative cases, 
where informants did not share the experiences along the themes interpreted, such as the 
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involvement of traditional leaders during the response or the benefiting from aid resources. 
Including this in the data analysis helped to provide a more robust explanation. 
 
3.7.4 Data Analysis 
 
Data collection and analysis were not conducted in a linear way, but concurrently. 
Preliminary analysis and categorization happened in the field during the data collection. 
Interviews were replayed and transcribed usually within days after collection, for reflection 
and theoretical thinking to generate new ideas. This helped me to probe questions better 
and elicit longer and clearer responses. In addition, new literature was reviewed whilst in 
the field, to try and connect macro and micro perspectives in an attempt to develop the 
theoretical framework. And, as mentioned earlier, I abandoned this framework after 
realizing it did not fit with the data nor help to understand and explain the phenomenon. 
 
3.7.5 Theory Development 
 
The theoretical framework was developed as an outcome of the data and research 
processes, and this can be used for further studies of institutions. According to Morse et al. 
(2002), valid theories are developed, informed, comprehensive, logical, and consistent. 
Arguments are sophisticated in a way that these are “complex yet elegant, focused yet 
profound, surprising yet obvious.” (Morse et al., 2002, p. 19). 
Developing the theory was not linear and required responsiveness from the 
investigator, such as redesigning the research questions, framework, and re-analyzing the 
data for more insight. Studying a social phenomenon that is as complex as the humans 
involved, the arguments in this thesis encompass many factors – historical and 
contemporary, to arrive at its conclusions while maintaining the focus on how and why 
institutions performed in particular ways. The findings were initially surprising, but with a 
comprehensive understanding of historical, social, economic, and political factors, the 
results began to make sense when we examined how the course of action unfolded. 
Morse et al. (2002) argue that, when combined, the strategies discussed above build 
the validity and reliability of the research and ensure rigor of the qualitative inquiry. This is 
because the research will go beyond just ‘answering the question’ and provide evidence 
that contributes to our knowledge. 
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3.7.6 Member Checking 
 
As mentioned above, member checking is still a common evaluative tool, performed 
towards the end of qualitative research. The Liberian findings and interpretations were sent 
to a person in Liberia for feedback. Likewise, the Sierra Leonean findings and interpretations 
were sent to a person in Sierra Leone. The feedback from member checkers regarding data 
interpretations and how each person was able to see his or her experiences in these 
findings, are in Appendix C. 
 
3.8 Dissemination of Findings 
 
Findings will be distributed in literary and academic publications and related events. 
The major publication will be this Ph.D. thesis at the University of Westminster. Sections of 
the thesis will be adapted and submitted as at least one to two research papers. Findings 
will also be distributed at a major conference either in Europe or the United States at least 
once. Additionally, a feedback document will also be prepared and sent to gatekeepers in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
 
3.9 Limitations of the Research 
 
Generally, there are limitations when interviewing people. Human beings have an 
imperfect memory; sometimes there are communication barriers, lack of knowledge, or 
people may give inaccurate information (Low, 2013). While control measures were put in 
place to minimize such occurrences (such as the size of the study, the availability of an 
interpreter, the use of open-ended questions to field narratives as opposed to positivistic or 
absolute responses), it is not unusual for problems to occur during interviews. 
Another limitation is the bias of the researcher in selecting the informants and the 
interview format, hence the choice of a semi-structured format. Each informant was asked 
the same question, however, since these were broad questions there was also room to 
probe, or for the informant to elaborate or sidetrack a little. An unstructured format could 
have led to different informants having different guiding questions. The answers of the 
informants are presented, nearly verbatim, with only minor edits for punctuations and verb 
agreement. Readers are therefore able to see the informants’ full intent and meaning. 
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Religious leaders were not interviewed as community stakeholders, so, this thesis 
does not analyze the perspective of how religious beliefs and customs contributed to 
perceptions and behaviors during the EVD outbreak, as there is much research and 
reporting on the role of religious beliefs or superstition during the outbreak.95 While some 
informants mentioned religion as a factor, these concepts were not discussed at length, and, 
as such, not fully explored in this thesis. However, the lack of religious explanations in this 
analysis should not be taken to mean that it did not play a role at all. Furthermore, 
community members who had a role solely as ‘service users,’ without a role in assisting or 
volunteering during the outbreak, were not included. The research is focused on the 
governance of the outbreak specifically and the health system generally, thus it sought key 
informants who would give micro- and high-level details on health governance. However, 
broadly, the community stakeholders who were interviewed were people who lived and 
worked in the communities and were indeed service users too. The questionnaire included 
questions on their perceptions of service usage. 
Gender is not analyzed in this thesis, however, that does not mean it was not a 
factor in the governance or outcome of the 2014 EVD epidemic. In general, there have been 
multiple studies that have analyzed how health policies and disparities affect women (Doyal, 
1995; Gupta et al., 2019; Manandhar et al., 2018). In addition, there have also been studies 
that use gender analysis to further understand the impacts of this epidemic (Davies and 
Bennett, 2016; Harman, 2016; Nkangu, Olatunde, and Yaya, 2017; UN Women, 2014). 
Two concepts were discussed in the literature broadly, however, are not fully 
analyzed in the findings: democracy and culture. The literature review relied on many 
anthropological sources, which often uses a theoretical and analytical approach of cultural 
relativity to explain attitudes, behaviors, and perceptions of local communities. The thesis 
includes these cultural perceptions in its analysis but does not explain how culture alone 
impacts behaviors and norms, only that it can. It includes other explanations, such as 
political, economic, historical, and environmental factors to give a holistic view of how these 
different factors could have shaped decision making. 
                                                          
95 See Davies, Bowley, and Roper (2015), Grundy (2014), Richards and Mokuwa (2014), and Richards et al. (2015) for 
further reading. Richards and Mokuwa (2014) and Richards et al. (2015) discuss the significance of religious and cultural 
barriers that hampered eradication of EVD. Davies, Bowley, and Roper (2015) and Grundy (2014) discuss introducing 
biomedical information to change behaviors and overcome religious beliefs. Bullard (2018) is a day-by-day account from 
various news sources where religious and ‘exotic’ practices were reported throughout the outbreak period. 
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The literature that informs the theoretical framework discusses democratic reforms 
and democracy in a limited scope (Adjei, Busia, and Bob-Milliar, 2017; Baldwin, 2015; Casey, 
Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012; North, 2013; North et al., 2015; Tokpa and Yengbeh Jr., 
2012; Unsworth, 2010; World Bank, 2002), such as the provision of public goods or social 
and conflict reconciliation. However, this is not the whole concept of democracy as a 
political theory. Therefore, it brings in other literature that discuss liberal democratic values 
to explain that these societies in West Africa do not have the same democratic institutions 
as in Western countries such as human rights, freedom of speech and assembly, and 
individualism (Carothers, 2002; Harris, 2012; Hellsten and Larbi, 2006; Omotola, 2010; 
Mustapha, 2016; North et al., 2015). Although TLIs espoused communitarian rights as 
human rights (Frémont, 2009; Maimela, 2019; Mqeke, 1996); TLIs and state institutions 
have a history of human rights suppression and gender inequality. However, there are data 
and literature to show that TLIs are popular and play a role in contemporary African politics 
and society (Afrobarometer, 2019; Logan, 2013; Ubink, 2008), it does not necessarily mean 
that constituents do not want these institutions to reform. Research shows that 
constituents would support reformations of TLIs to be more democratic and accountable 
(Van den Boogaard, Prichard, and Jibao, 2019). Additionally, there is research to show that 
just because TLIs have stronger social capital, it may not always bring better development 
(or democratic) outcomes (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson, 2014). 
This thesis uses a market approach to explain human behavior. This approach 
universalizes the decisions of why people cooperate or not, on the assumptions of choice, 
information, access, and short-term benefits or costs. Thus, the development of the 
framework mitigates some of these assumptions made such as information or access, and 
attempts to explain the benefits and costs of cooperation beyond this. However, this 
generalizes decision making in the ‘market segment,’ and sometimes this cannot explain all 
decisions made or why, nor can it be applied to every health worker or health consumer. In 
keeping with the purposes of qualitative research, this analysis is meant to give readers 
another understanding of the phenomenon in question. 
Due to the scope of the research, this thesis does not explore the full impact of civil 
conflict on TLIs. However, it refers to studies that have researched this and subsequent 
institutional changes (Baker, 2007; Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015; Bellows and Miguel, 
2009; Sawyer, 2008; Voors and Bulte, 2014); broadly, how communities that experienced 
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violence perceive the state and participate in local political processes. The research for this 
thesis did not obtain primary data on the impact of conflict. Further research is needed in 
this area and on how these institutions evolved during the post-conflict period. 
The member checker from Sierra Leone discussed the 2014 census that was 
supposed to take place (Appendix C). However, it was canceled due to EVD cases in the 
eastern region of the country. This person suggested that this was a major political upset 
that contributed to why some community members denied EVD existed in the country. They 
felt that officials in Freetown, led by the reigning All People’s Congress (APC) party, did not 
want to count districts that predominantly vote for the opposition party. Specifically, it was 
believed to reduce the population before the elections. This would add another layer of 
understanding to why some people thought the government was trying to “reduce the 
population” and is not always a belief of a nefarious attempt at genocide as reported (Mark, 
2014). However, the census was not mentioned in any of the full-length transcripts, so it 
was not included in the findings of this thesis. Sierra Leone has a history of census 
manipulation for political purposes (Bockarie, 2015); and indeed, this is a topic worthy of 
future research. 
Since the phenomenon of bottom-up rulemaking was only observed in Sierra Leone 
in this case study, we cannot demonstrate if the findings are applicable to other contexts 
(Noble and Smith, 2015; Thomas and Magilvy, 2011). Research on the involvement of TLIs in 
the 2014 EVD outbreak (Guinea and Nigeria) or the 2018 EVD outbreak in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo would be worthy of future exploration. 
A geographic interpretation of community-led engagement was considered and 
discussed in an earlier draft of this thesis. However, due to word constraints, it was removed 
for future outputs. 
Due to some technical difficulties with the audio recorder, one of the interviews 
from Sierra Leone was deleted. Consequently, a full-length transcript for this interview is 
not available; instead, a summary of the discussion is used in the data analysis. Since this 
interview was interpreted by a gatekeeper, the summary was verified by the interpreter and 
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This chapter discussed the strategic design of the research to provide an in-depth 
analysis of the 2014 Ebola epidemic. A qualitative methodology was chosen as the thesis 
was exploratory and focusing on a specific phenomenon (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Odell, 
2001). Quantitative methods would not address the research aims and objectives regarding 
the mobilization of community leaders and the impact of emergency aid. Liberia and Sierra 
Leone were selected because these countries were the epicenter of the disease outbreak 
and share many common historical, social, political, and economic factors (Bøås, 2001; 
Harris, 2012; Wright et al., 2015). 
Sections 3.3 to 3.4 displayed the transparency and decision trail of the research 
processes from the initial research design through field interviews. This comprised of having 
to respond to challenges in the field, the theoretical framework, and changed aspects of the 
project, to develop more robust and rigorous findings. The process included redesigning the 
research question, redeveloping the theoretical framework, collecting secondary data, and 
expanding the sampling to include another pool of informants. Expanding the informants’ 
pool provided data saturation (Morse et al., 2002). These changes were implemented to 
accurately reflect the major themes provided by the informants on the governance of the 
2014 EVD outbreak. These findings were abstracted to consider concepts of governance and 
institutional quality and to extend the theoretical framework. 
Fieldwork was conducted following the University of Westminster’s ethics 
regulations. My perceptions and relationships in the field were discussed in a reflexive 
narrative as part of my ethical obligations to remain transparent and not let my biases 
contaminate the data. Data analysis was performed using the Nvivo software and themes 
were derived from various codes. Analyses were conducted several times during fieldwork 
in order to perform better interviews and afterward, to get more insight from the 
transcripts to develop the themes. 
There are some limitations to the thesis. Human subjects can sometimes be 
unreliable and there was researcher bias in choosing the interview format and the 
participants (Low, 2013). In addition, the scope of the research was limited to a case study 
of a specific event, although, what is limited in scope can be grounds for further research. 
The approach used to explain human behavior can sometimes generalize and oversimplify 
complex decision making processes. The intention is to provide another explanation of a 
complex phenomenon that involved many factors. The theory and its market approach 
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using supply and demand factors were developed to include social, political, and 
environmental mechanisms in its explanation, hence, a thick description (Skarbek, 2020). 
These processes were undertaken to ensure the most rigorous and robust findings 
possible; using Morse et al. (2002)’s framework for determining validity and reliability 
through methodological coherence, sampling and saturation, data analysis, and theory 
development. These methods demonstrated the responsiveness and reflexivity of the 
investigator and accurate interpretations of the data on how the 2014 EVD outbreak was 


































































Data analysis related to the social world.196 These are the principal outcomes of the 
investigation. 
                                                          
96 See Anderson (2010). 




The first theme, ‘Government’s Response and Community Reaction’ reveals 
perceptions of a generally slow and highly centralized response in the beginning stages. 
Health workers felt that the government, referring to the central administration in Freetown 
or Monrovia, had always neglected the health system and the needs of its workers. Thus, 
improvising with alternative methods to carry on with their work was not unusual. 
Information disseminated through state channels was also confusing and vague, which led 
health workers to misdiagnose Ebola patients for another common illness, such as Malaria. 
However, Malaria is treatable, so when these ‘Malaria patients’ began dying en masse, 
confidence in the health system eroded and many people stopped coming to the facilities. 
These information failures led to high social costs (Ebola deaths). The second theme, ‘Local 
Institutional Intervention’ discusses how community and traditional leaders began 
organizing and conducting outreach efforts. The interventions were mostly in response to 
inept government management to address the crisis. Furthermore, local leaders had 
witnessed the traumatic deaths of loved ones. However, the response of local institutions 
varied in Liberia; some areas enacted isolation, while others only conducted health 
education. In Sierra Leone, chiefdoms passed bylaws that promoted behavior change, such 
as reporting all sick persons to the health centers and isolation measures. This helped to 
reduce some social costs. The final theme, ‘Governing the Outbreak’ depicts how supply and 
demand factors were addressed through a culmination of aid resources and domestic 
authorities and leaders. Informants had varying views on the effectiveness of international 
aid and government resources. However, that depends on whether the informant was a 
health worker or a community stakeholder assisting in a nonclinical capacity. 
The themes give context and nuance about perceptions, behaviors, reactions, and 
responses to the disease outbreak. This deepens our understanding of how various efforts 
were coordinated, hampered, or isolated in governing this public health emergency. The 
quotes are transcribed verbatim and are in the West African dialects of English, as this 
represents the raw data. Thus, there is very minimal editing such as punctuation and this 
minimizes bias from the researcher. However, any words added to the transcripts are in 
brackets [] and there are guiding texts to explain context and meaning. 
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The chapter begins with a table of the locations visited during fieldwork in 2017 in 
section 4.2 and demographic statistics of the informants in section 4.3. The following 
section is a baseline of how informants perceived the healthcare system before the 
outbreak. After this, each heading depicts a theme, and these are in sequential order to give 
a narrative of the Ebola epidemic from the beginning. Each heading (theme) is subdivided 
into Liberia and Sierra Leone, hence making the comparison easier for the reader. These are 
from sections 4.5 to 4.7. The quotes inserted are to reinforce the thematic message of how 
these interpretations were derived. The final section contains epidemiological data 
published by the World Health Organization (WHO) (World Health Organization, 2016a). 
This supports the perspectives of the informants on how community-led engagement 
impacted the Ebola case and death rates. 
 
4.2 Interview Locations 
 
These tables summarize how many health facilities were visited during fieldwork in 
2017, and whether it was in a rural or urban township in each county or district. 
 
Table 4.1 Liberia: 
Counties Urban Health Facilities Rural Health Facilities 
Lofa Zero Two 
Margibi One Zero 
Montserrado Three (one suburban) Zero 
 
Table 4.2 Sierra Leone: 
Districts Urban Health Facilities Rural Health Facilities 
Bo One One 
Kailahun One Three 
Kenema Two Zero 
 
Figure 5 is a visual representation of the sites visited during fieldwork in both countries. 
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4.3 Demographics Statistics 
 
This section contains demographic information of the informants. The empirical 
findings are based on all sixty-seven interviews that were processed into the Nvivo software 
for analysis. 
There are two levels of coding under Nvivo: the first level consists of descriptive 
codes that were used to derive the themes. The second level of coding is what Nvivo refers 
to as ‘cases.’ Cases are observations made in the field about the person, such as gender, 
role, or location. These cases are usually self -explanatory and do not have a definition. This 
level of information is used to provide the summary statistics of the informants. This is 











Figure 5. Map of sites 
visited in the field. 
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Table 4.3 show case categories of gender, sector, role, and location. 
CASES SIERRA LEONE LIBERIA 
GENDER Man, Woman Man, Woman 
COMMUNITY 
STAKEHOLDER 
Volunteer, Government worker, or NGO 
representative. 
Community Leader:97 Any traditional leader 
or community organizer 
Volunteer, Government worker, or NGO 
representative. 
Community Leader: Any traditional leader 
or community organizer 
HEALTHWORKER Nurse, doctor, community health worker, 
midwife, pharmacy worker, or laboratory 
technician who are formally employed or 
volunteering in the formal sector. 
Nurse, doctor, community health worker, 
midwife, pharmacy worker, or laboratory 
technician who are formally employed or 
volunteering in the formal sector. 
LOCATION Bo, Kailahun, and Kenema Districts. Lofa, Margibi, and Montserrado Counties. 
NUMBERS 33 Interviews conducted. 34 Interviews conducted. 
 
In total, there were sixty-seven informants, forty-two of them were male and 
twenty-five were female. As for the community stakeholders, eleven were male and one 
was female. 
In terms of the geography of both countries, thirty-nine informants were in urban 
settings while twenty-eight were in a rural setting. The urban settings were mainly the 
urban counties of Margibi and Montserrado, and any headquartered city in a rural district or 
county. 
There are fifty-five healthcare workers in total. Forty of the healthcare workers are 
classified as a nurse, doctor, nurse aide, or a community health worker. Six informants work 
in the pharmacy or drug dispensing unit and nine informants work in a laboratory. There is a 
gender bias for male informants, as traditional leaders are usually male, and there are more 
interviews with them in Sierra Leone. Laboratory technicians, doctors, and clinical 
supervisors also tend to be male, and there was more access to laboratory workers and 
doctors in Sierra Leone than in Liberia. See charts A through C for an overview of informants 
in both countries. 
 
 
                                                          
97 For the purposes of the results a separate subcategory of community leader is created, so readers will know which 
demographic of community stakeholders are speaking in the text below. This includes the traditional leaders defined in 
chapter two and nontraditional leaders, such as a neighborhood taskforce leader. 


















Chart A: Breakdown of Roles of the Informants
Physician/Nurse/Midwife/Aide Pharmacist/Drug Dispensers
Laboratory Workers Community Organizers/Volunteers








Chart C: Total Informants by Gender
Female Male




Two-thirds of informants interviewed in Liberia were in predominantly urban areas; 
this is because two out of the three counties are identified as urban (Montserrado) and peri-
urban (Margibi). Additionally, in both counties, the interviews happened in cities, such as 
Paynesville and Monrovia, in Montserrado County. In Lofa County, two rural districts were 
visited to conduct interviews, then one district in Margibi County, and two districts in 
Montserrado County. Sites were chosen to include an array of primary, secondary, and 
tertiary level health facilities.98 Because the study is qualitative, data were collected via 
semi-structured interviews. Thirty-four interviews were conducted; and these were with 
four community stakeholders and thirty health workers at six health facilities, in three 
counties. The gender ratio is fairly even, although all community stakeholders and 
laboratory technicians were men. See chart D for the categories of informants, chart E for 
the statistic of urban and rural areas, chart F for the gender breakdown of the informants, 





                                                          
98The healthcare sector is divided into multiple levels to deliver comprehensive services. Primary health care and its 
facilities are the first point of contact, such as a dentist, nurse, pharmacist, or a family doctor. Secondary care and 
secondary health facilities tend to be specialized services that one would be referred to, such as a cardiologist, 
ophthalmologist, or an oncologist. Tertiary level care tends to be highly specialized with specialized equipment that 
requires hospitalization, such as neurosurgery or organ transplant (Multiple Sclerosis Trust, 2018; Torrey, 2019). However, 
these categories may differ in low-resource settings like Liberia and Sierra Leone. Some primary level facilities receive 
emergency patients even though, they are not equipped to handle this. I also observed secondary or tertiary level facilities 
conduct primary health services since there is a lack of these services. For example, ELWA Hospital in Monrovia has 

























Chart D: Informants in Liberia 








Because of the disease path of the Ebola epidemic, informants are primarily in 







































Chart G: Informants per counties in Liberia  
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4.3.2 Sierra Leone 
 
The demographics summary for Sierra Leone shows a fairly even distribution of 
informants in rural and urban settings. A total of thirty-three semi-structured interviews 
were conducted and these were with twenty-six health workers and eight community 
stakeholders in three districts at a total of eight health facilities. Some hospitals visited in 
the headquarter cities of the rural districts, like Kenema or Bo Town, are classified as an 
urban area. In the Kailahun District, four chiefdoms were visited to conduct interviews 
including the Jawei chiefdom where the bylaws originated. In Kenema, one chiefdom was 
visited, and in Bo, two chiefdoms were visited. More men than women were interviewed. 
This is partly due to the larger number of local community stakeholders who form part of 
the paramount chief’s councils are all men and the tendency of men being in supervisory 
positions in clinical settings. However, a female community stakeholder, identified as the 
leader of the women’s secret society was also interviewed and is the only female 
community stakeholder in the study. See chart H for the categories of informants, chart I for 
the statistic of urban and rural areas, chart J for the gender breakdown of the informants, 


























Chart H: Informants in Sierra Leone









Because of the disease path of the Ebola epidemic, informants are primarily in rural-
based locations. The next section is a baseline of the health systems before the Ebola 
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Chart K: Informants per districts in Sierra Leone
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outbreak. This is a point of reference for the thesis as it started with the contextual 
backgrounds of the case studies in chapter one. 
 
4.4 Baseline Assessment: The State of Healthcare and Confidence in the System 
 
Each country is introduced with a baseline of how informants perceived the 
healthcare system and usage before the 2014 outbreak. These perceptions touch on the 
concepts of trust because there was a high level of mistrust in the workers and the 
healthcare system during the Ebola epidemic. However, issues of trust were not explicitly 




Before the 2014 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak, informants described a 
healthcare system that was in the process of rebuilding from civil conflict such as training 
more health workers; hence, the infrastructure has improved since the war. Many 
informants did not mention if trust from the community was a major barrier before the 
outbreak since it was not explicitly asked, unless probing. Rather, some felt that the lack of 
access to the facilities and the lack of biomedical knowledge of illness and the body were 
factors. However, only two informants mentioned trust issues before the 2014 EVD 
outbreak. A health worker felt that community members trusted the staff at his facility, but 
this was only temporarily lost during the epidemic and a community stakeholder had this 
view: 
 
I think there [has] always been a distrust of government; so that [was] also one of the weaknesses before the Ebola and one 
of the weaknesses during the Ebola crisis. There’s been a distrust of government. If the government says, “There is Ebola,” 
nobody believes the government. It’s trust. So, government can come and say, “We’re doing this,” and everybody will say, 
“That’s not true,” there’s a mistrust, OK. So, communities do not trust government. Zero. Anything government comes up 
with, they don’t believe it, because they know it never, never happens in Liberia. So, because of that, communities are more 
likely to align with international organizations to be able to accomplish. (Community Stakeholder, Montserrado County) 
 
The informant suggests there is a general mistrust of state institutions and not just 
the healthcare sector specifically before the EVD outbreak. Therefore, many people did not 
believe the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MHSW) regarding EVD. There was a 
mistrust of the government and its response to the mysterious conditions happening at the 
time. 
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This also means there is a nuance to the concept of ‘believing EVD.’ Many people 
had biomedical knowledge to understand ‘illness,’ however, not believing there was EVD 
meant that people did not believe the government accurately assessed and confirmed its 
presence in Liberia. However, a confirmation from the WHO, Red Cross, or Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) could have changed this perspective. The informant says that people were 
more likely to believe an international partner. It is difficult to generalize about the 
community’s trust levels, as an individual may be trusted, while still having strong 
reservations about the system. 
 
4.4.2 Sierra Leone 
 
Informants described a healthcare system that was slowly improving and with the 
right attitude, the country can regain its position in West Africa. It is not uncommon to hear 
someone recall a time before the war when Ghanaians came to Sierra Leone to line up and 
buy toothpaste. External partners such as Catholic Charities, Samaritan’s Purse, and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have delivered services for many decades. 
However, before the EVD outbreak, many of the health facilities were in poorer condition 
than when I visited in 2017. For example, many facilities did not have running water, 24-
hour electricity, or a consistent supply of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). This builds 
on what was discussed in chapter one as ongoing problems from before the outbreak. The 
outbreak brought some resources, but it depends on the aid organization and how long 
each may stay. One person explicitly discussed how community members mistrusted the 
healthcare system before EVD, and three felt there was prior trust. 
Some communities preferred private facilities and others visited both government 
and private facilities. Also, health workers in the maternity wards described a significant 
increase of patients and associated this demand in services as trust. The increase in patients 
had to do with the Free Healthcare Initiative (FHI) passed in 2010 that gave some mothers 
and all young children free services. So, with user fees removed, there was an increase in 
the demand for health services.99 
From their training, college, and their nursing schools, they have not been receiving enough training; so that when they come 
to the field, people trust them and know what they are doing. I think for quite a while now, it has been losing credibility 
because people have been accessing the health facilities without being cared for, without having the correct service that 
they want. So, their needs have not been met. So, there is a lack in trust in the health sector. That was quite evident during 
                                                          
99 After the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone, EVD survivors were added as eligible participants to the FHI. They are supposed 
to receive free health services at any state-run health facility. 
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the outbreak. People did not go to the hospital, because they think they may get the infection in the hospital. (Health Worker, 
Bo District) 
 
This informant above says something important about prior mistrust and what 
happened during the outbreak. He says that people did not visit the hospitals because they 
were afraid of getting infected, due to prior concerns of poor training and quality of care.100 
This provides a different explanation as to why some believed that health workers were 
‘injecting’ people with EVD. It may not have always been a fear of nefarious activities, but 
rather the concerns of nosocomial transmission.101 This is repeated throughout, but it may 
not always construe that people thought health workers were purposely trying to kill them. 
 
4.5 The Government’s Response and Community Reaction 
 
This theme explores the informants’ perceptions of how the government responded 
and the community’s reaction during the EVD outbreak. Some of the concerns raised about 





Health workers expressed frustration with the working conditions, general day-to-
day management of the healthcare centers, and the initial EVD response. As mentioned in 
the first chapter, Liberia is a post-conflict country, where memories of war are still fresh in 
the society’s psyche. The sight of closed health centers and deaths was a traumatic 
reminder of a not-too-distant past for Liberians. In the beginning stages of the outbreak, 
some confusing messages gave conflicting advice to health workers on how they could still 
perform safely during the outbreak. 
Informants reported that one of the initial guidance they received from officials was 
to avoid physical contact. No touching sick relatives or friends, no touching any dead bodies, 
and for those practicing medicine, no touching patients without proper PPE like gloves, 
                                                          
100 Indeed, in past Ebola outbreaks health centers were the source of infection due to contaminated equipment and 
community members would quickly realize this and avoid visiting these places for any treatment. This is notable in the 
1976 Ebola outbreak in the Yambuku Mission Hospital in northern Democratic Republic of Congo (Breman et al., 1978). 
101 Nosocomial infection is also called ‘hospital-acquired infection or healthcare-associated infection’. This is commonly 
associated with antibiotic-resistant bacteria, such as MRSA, but can be any type of infection acquired in a health facility. 
This may be due to unclean hands, surfaces, medical equipment like catheters and IVs, or being roomed with a very ill 
patient. Proper barrier nursing/IPC training and equipment helps to prevent this. See Landers et al. (2010) and World 
Health Organization (2002) for further reading. 
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masks, and bodysuits. Many health workers recounted that their health facilities did not 
have adequate PPE needed to conduct services safely. Therefore, patients who displayed 
general symptoms such as vomiting were referred to the Ebola Treatment Centers (ETUs). 
However, it is normal for health facilities to routinely operate without a consistent supply of 
PPE: 
 
Like, when they supply us, we just have to manage because when it is finished, we will catch a hard time to get it. So, when 
it is here, when it is available, we have to take our time [in] how we will use it. We don’t really use it, like take for example, 
if you get about, maybe, they just brought about fifty of these gloves. OK [but] now for NCH we can use more gloves. You 
want to touch patients, you want to do this, you want to do that every now and then [and] we have to change gloves. So, we 
have to take our time [in] how we really use it, so it can’t finish. Because when it finishes, we have difficult time to get another 
supply. (Health Worker, Montserrado County) 
 
In this response above, the nurse explains how health workers judiciously use the 
limited resources available, using gloves as an example. They rely on MHSW in Monrovia, to 
send resources, such as gloves, masks, equipment, and drugs to their facility. However, 
these shipments often contain small amounts and do not come consistently. 
 
[B]ecause they said there was no supply, so health workers were not attending to patients. So, when they bring in, most 
people shy away saying, “I’m not going to touch you, because I have no protective clothing.” (Health Worker, Montserrado 
County) 
 
So, every word we say, we get it from the central government. “Say this” because initially there were people who said, “don’t 
touch,” [however] “don’t touch” brought more death rate. (Community Stakeholder, Margibi County) 
 
These responses above demonstrate the impact of the message to avoid physical 
contact. In the first quote, the health worker explains that due to the lack of basic PPE and 
specifically, the specially designed full bodysuits, when handling a biosafety level-4 
pathogen like EVD, health workers avoided contact with patients. In the second response, 
the community stakeholder explains how they disseminated this information, but the ‘don’t 
touch’ message was impractical because of the weak mobilization of resources; this left little 
choice for caregivers and healthcare workers. 
Another example regarding the government’s response was how the burial response 
teams were only operating out of Monrovia. However, the hotline was quickly overwhelmed 
by requests that came from across the country. Thus, for families who lived as near as 
Margibi County or as far as Lofa County, a corpse sitting for days in the home, unattended, 
was also impractical. The height of the epidemic occurred during the rainy season, where 
temperatures average 90°F (32°C). In addition, it is uncommon for the average household to 
have refrigeration, so this would attract many kinds of vermin, rodents, or other scavengers, 
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leaving families with little choice in the matter. This informant below describes it as a 
potential health hazard: 
So, if the person died and you are calling for the burial team from Monrovia, it will take one to two days before the burial 
team can come. And that body would be decomposed. So, it is not only Ebola, but it brought other contagious diseases 
because if the body is decomposed it brought another hazard. (Same Community Stakeholder, Margibi County) 
 
The response was generally characterized as slow and highly centralized in the 
beginning stages, such as the example with the burial team above. However, even those 
working in Monrovia said that mobilization from MHSW still took time, especially with 
contact tracing: 
Time. Time to trace the contacts, the Ministry took a lot of time in tracing people. If a person, “Mary”, is in place A and the 
virus took over place A; she will leave place A to go to place B before the Ministry of Health will get to know about Mary. And 
to get to Mary will be too late. Time of arrival, time to get the information, there was a break [down] there. (Health Worker, 
Montserrado County) 
 
Other than information and weak mobilization of resources, another main challenge 
that health workers discussed had to do with salary and government enrollment. Many 
health centers in Liberia are co-operated with a donor, NGO, or a faith-based charity, like 
ELWA Ministries Associations at ELWA hospital in Monrovia. Health workers expressed a 
preference for working in facilities like these since external partners provide funding to hire 
staff and other resources, such as medicines, fuel for generators, and clinical supplies. They 
believe that these facilities are not only better supplied, but workers receive higher pay and 
consistent paychecks. Informants term this, incentives. However, these quotes below 
demonstrate that this could create an unsustainable situation: 
 
There are efforts to motivate. Say for example, an NGO has a target and their target is to reduce maternal mortality in Nimba 
County, in a resource-limited area in Nimba. So, they know that [in] the urban area in Nimba, people are most likely to use 
the referral hospital, so they go and base at the less privilege area in Nimba. So, what they do is, try to recruit and retain 
staff in order to meet their target; they have to provide an added incentive. Added, in the sense that the government’s 
incentive is small, but doesn’t come; so, they provide you incentive to retain you there and make you do what you’re 
supposed to do to meet the target. So that’s what happened. In that case, there is an increased likelihood that these 
healthcare workers will stay at those sites while those international organizations are there. As soon as it’s abated, meaning 
the services end and they leave, the financial benefit is cut off and creates, it’s kind of like a revolving door. It’s not 
sustainable. That’s where I’m going with this, it’s not sustainable and it gets into a vicious cycle. So that’s what we are facing. 
(Community Stakeholder, Montserrado County) 
 
We only pray that when the year ends the government will be able to sign a new contract with the NGOs; because looking 
at it, without the NGOs too, the government will not be able to cater to all their health facilities in the country. The 
government too, needs a helping hand. (Health Worker, Lofa County) 
 
In the health facilities, ‘volunteers or incentive staff,’ means that they are working on 
flexible contracts provided by an external partner. This includes health workers who are 
working in the county health offices but are not paid by MHSW. Those who are enrolled and 
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employed by MHSW earn a low salary (e.g. a nurse makes about $100 U.S. dollars a month) 
and are sometimes paid months late. 
The problems regarding salaries continued throughout the outbreak and afterward. 
Liberia’s economy reflects the fragility of its healthcare system; prices for household goods 
are not stable. Thus, while healthcare workers’ salaries are fixed, the price for a half bag of 
rice (25 kilograms), can fluctuate several dollars from week to week. One informant 
calculated for me during an interview, an exchange rate of L$110 Liberian dollars to 1 USD 
on a Thursday can increase to L$112 or L$113 at the start of the new week.102 On its own, 
L$2 or L$3 dollars cannot purchase any goods, but a monthly or biweekly bag of rice that 
cost L$ 5,550 (50 USD) could appreciate to L$5650 overnight. This L$100 difference would 
cover commuting costs and/or smaller household purchases like tea, butter, and bread. 
There were promises of hazard pay for workers risking their lives under these conditions, 
but sometimes it did not materialize. This, along with the other factors explained above, 
resulted in some health workers refusing to come to work and some facilities closing: 
 
Yeah, during the outbreak, other health workers decided not to work. They stayed away because Government was not willing 
to pay health workers at the same time while we were in the situation…They don't want to pay. So, some health workers 
decided to go back and rest, until the outbreak of that virus can be ceased; until later, when some international NGOs came 
in to help and giving health workers a little thing [incentives] to keep on working. It is how people started coming in to work 
and help people. (Health Worker, Margibi County) 
 
As reflected in this quote above, some health workers in Liberia left their facilities 
until the outbreak slowed or until they heard an announcement on the radio for health 
practitioners to return to work. Some facilities closed due to a lack of staff to provide care. 
This was the combined impact of health workers dying and their colleagues became too 
fearful to stay. One person said that the administrators of her hospital had left, and she 
acted in-charge until its closure. The cost of health workers staying away from the facilities 
produced negative externalities for Ebola and non-Ebola patients. In a country with a fragile 
healthcare system and high maternal-infant mortality rates (MMI), it meant pregnant 
women, who were about to give birth, had fewer options for safe delivery. Also, those who 
presented with nonspecific symptoms, such as fever and vomiting, had to travel to a distant 
ETU only to find out that they did not have Ebola, but not an actual diagnosis. 
 
For me, actually, I left the town and went in the bush for my life because it wasn’t easy in the town. The town, their 
community denied, “effect of Ebola was not there because it was a man-made sickness” according to them. (Health Worker, 
Lofa County) 
                                                          
102 This exchange rate of L$110 has changed since fieldwork. At the time of writing, it was L$160 to $1 USD. 
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But after equipment and other things started coming in, then things started getting alright and the fear started going away. 
(Health Worker, Montserrado County) 
 
Phase one103 was confusing and had slow mobilization from the government and the 
international community, which led to fear from the health workers and the community 
members, as reflected in these two quotes above. Some informants said that leadership at 
the national level improved, such as the introduction of an incident management system 
and the decentralization of laboratories and ETUs into the rural counties. However, 
nineteen out of thirty-four informants say that the response was top-down because 
decisions were made in Monrovia and they were given the directives to implement it. This 
includes the perspectives from a county superintendent’s office and the county health 
offices. 
There were some positive changes, eventually, MHSW began engagements at the 
facility level to mobilize and inspire health workers. This was a change from a response that 
was initially centralized and decision makers detached from the reality on the ground, as 
depicted in this final quote of the theme: 
 
They (MHSW) asked others’ views. And then, they told them this is how we can do it, because this had to be a ground thing. 
You can’t just go, only two persons go discuss and you leave. It has to be a concession of everybody in the group, in a group 
setting. So, they got in contact with other health workers and it helped in the process. (Health Worker, Margibi County) 
 
4.5.2 Sierra Leone 
 
Informants said that the government of Sierra Leone did not effectively respond to 
the initial cases of EVD in the Kailahun District. The first case was declared in May 2014, but 
there were suspicious unconfirmed cases since April. State institutional failures did not only 
happen during the outbreak. It was an expectation that the policies created in Freetown 
would not be implemented, nor stay in place for long, before everyone did their own thing. 
The term ‘own thing’ is a common reference in West Africa, and it may sound dismissive or 
that someone is being neglectful, but it is not. Rather, it is resounding and determination to 
get on with the work, even without the proper tools or guidance. The system is highly 
centralized and thus, decisions such as recruitment, hiring, salary, distribution of medical 
supplies, are determined in Freetown. Although there are some monitoring and evaluation 
                                                          
103 In this thesis ‘phase one’ refers to the period from December 2013 to September 2014. Phase two refers to the period 
of October 2014 until the epidemic was declared over in June 2016. 
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procedures, these are not consistent and often concerns are not addressed in the peripheral 
districts. 
When EVD was detected in Guinea and Liberia, there were no safeguards put in 
place to protect the porous borders. One informant mentioned that this is how EVD came 
into Sierra Leone, via a health worker treating patients in a neighboring country: 
The response was really late; whether on the part of the Government because of the ignorance. They knew it was in Guinea 
and Liberia before it came here. Why I am blaming the Government is because when there is war in a neighboring country, 
you have to be ready, so there will not be a spillover in your own country. There are a lot of crossing borders in this part of 
the country, people migrate from there to here, and even health workers who are looking for money crossed into Liberia or 
Guinea to treat and brought Ebola back. A health worker brought Ebola into this country from Guinea into Koindu and Daru, 
then that was how it spread fast. (Health Worker, Kenema District) 
 
After the first EVD confirmation, there were no allowances made for staff, fuel, and 
medical supplies needed for the intensive case management of EVD patients. Information 
focused on staying away from bushmeat, however, when more people became sick and not 
from the bushmeat, then fear, rumors, and stigma arose. Health workers also received 
confusing protocols. Informants said EVD education and posters depicted patients vomiting 
blood and hemorrhaging from other bodily orifices. However, these symptoms only 
appeared in a small percentage of cases, if ever. Therefore, when many patients came to a 
facility with nonspecific flu-like symptoms and not the highly visible and unusual symptoms 
of hemorrhaging; there were many misdiagnosed cases in the beginning. Thus, many people 
went into the clinic for a seemingly nonlethal disease, like Malaria, only to not return home. 
It had raised suspicions and fears that health workers were doing something nefarious or 
perhaps were incompetent. 
It was devastating, in fact the community where I was working was the second chiefdom to be hit. It had started in Koindu, 
in the Kissi Tong chiefdom and we share a boundary with this chiefdom, so it came to us next. Some of us survived only by 
the grace of God, because when it came, we played with these patients [touching with no PPE]. Initially, we had an influx of 
patients with fever, diarrhea, and vomiting and we never knew it was Ebola. We touched them, we touched all their lives, 
and it was only when a sample was taken from Koindu and [then] taken to the laboratory in Kenema; that was when we 
heard it was Ebola. And the information came quickly that we should be very careful with the Ebola patients. That was the 
time when we realized that we are in a deadly situation. So, initially my health facility had seven of them, [but] there wasn’t 
enough space. So, they were lying in the waiting area and doing the little we could. At that time, we did have enough IV fluids 
and some of them were on it. We had tested them for Malaria, because that is the first thing we do when there is a fever, 
the rapid testing. We were doing it and some were negative with Malaria, so then we thought it was Cholera, but it wasn’t 
Cholera. So, after admitting those seven, I decided to refer all of them to the Kailahun Government hospital, because this is 
our point of referral. However, fortunately, one went to Kenema, but the means of transportation is a commercial vehicle 
[taxi], so it was just too dangerous. She went to Kenema and the initial results that came to us at Kailahun [here at the health 
center] was Lassa fever, not knowing that at one time this lady had Lassa fever. But when she returned and did the test again, 
the information came back that it was Ebola. The other six, instead of going to the hospital, went back into the community 
and all of them died. (Health Worker, Kailahun District) 
 
So, during the outbreak, one of things, the community people were given false information at the time. That is the IEC 
program, the Information, Education, and Communication program. They printed posters that people may be vomiting 
blood, blood running from the ears, from the eyes, are suspected Ebola cases. It came to a time now, where people never 
showed those signs and symptoms, so what happened? The community people said the health workers have failed them, 
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they have teamed up to kill them, and people lost total confidence in the health system in Sierra Leone. (Health Worker, 
Kailahun District) 
 
In the first quote above, the health worker describes what happened before the first 
case was announced. The health workers could only do limited testing, usually for Malaria 
or HIV, and if those tests are negative, then Cholera is suspected, and the patient is sent 
home with antibiotics. However, if they are still sick or several cases have similar symptoms, 
then they will refer them to the main hospital for further evaluations. However, one woman 
decided to leave the district and go to another hospital, twice. The second time confirmed 
she had EVD. However, for the remaining patients, they died before receiving their 
diagnosis. 
In the second quote above, another health worker discusses how information about 
EVD lowered trust in the community, as many EVD patients did not have hemorrhaging and 
died anyway. Leading to a belief that loved ones did not have EVD (because they did not 
have the hemorrhaging symptom) and their death was malicious. 
This led to the stigma and discrimination of health workers, as described in this 
quote below: 
 
This Ebola, it is comparable to none, no other outbreaks. In fact, to me, I said this is the worst disaster we have ever 
encountered on earth. If you see the number of people that were dying, the number of denials, the number of stigmatizations 
it was too high. There was a time when nurses were not wearing their uniforms, they hide it because if they see you on the 
street, they will throw stones at you or boo at you. It was worse than ever. If you are working in the Ebola center, they ask 
you to leave the home. (Community Stakeholder, Kenema District) 
 
Informants said that many people stopped seeking treatment for any condition in 
the health centers, and rather, treated at home or possibly sought a village healer. Some 
partly attributed these behaviors to information and state institutional failures, such as the 
message, “There is no cure.” Hospitals in West Africa are viewed in a curative medicine 
paradigm.104 If one is going to die from a disease, then why not in the comforts of home, 
rather than travel great distances and at a cost, to a hospital. So, while there was fear too, it 
is also possible that given the costs it would have taken to get to an ETU, it may have been 
seen as fruitless by some. In addition, given the conditions of the health centers and 
perceptions of quality of care, avoiding them may have been a rational choice to prevent 
                                                          
104 Curative medicine focuses on treating illnesses and conditions where it is feasible. This differs from preventative health 
efforts aimed at preventing infections. The latter includes addressing social measures; for instance, improving housing and 
sanitation to lower Tuberculosis infections in the early 20th century (‘Curative and Preventive Medicine’, 1937). This was 
also briefly mentioned in chapter one, section 1.2 as social etiology of health where underlying socioeconomic conditions 
are evaluated as part the health status, see Kelman (1975), Phelan, Link, and Tehranifar (2010), and Waitzkin (1981) for 
further reading on the social impacts of health. 
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nosocomial infection. Every health worker said they did their utmost best to save lives. 
However, the nosocomial transmission of EVD was a concern to health workers and the 
community alike. This may not be comforting to those who faced stigma and discrimination 
during this time, but it gives a deeper understanding of why some people avoided the health 
centers. 
 
However, one could say that at the start of the outbreak, one of the information that went out created a lot of discrepancy 
in information, like misinformation. Like saying, “it’s an illness that hasn’t got a cure” and people completed the sentence by 
saying “then why should I go to the hospital?” If it hasn’t got a cure, then why should I go there? Rather, I stay at home and 
die…so that was one thing. It was a weakness on the side of the system, which presented reluctance or resistance from the 
community or masses, [and] made the outbreak worst. (Health Worker, Bo District) 
 
Patients were also not coming to the hospitals because they were suspecting the health workers to have Ebola. The belief 
was, when you come, they would inject you with it and you die. So, there was that fear. (Community Leader, Bo District) 
 
The second quote may sound as if there was a conspiracy, however, given the 
context that people knew IPC was poor; this may also refer to the fear of nosocomial 
transmission and not always because of nefarious activities. 
The health workers discussed the working conditions before, during, and after the 
epidemic. Below in this quote, a health worker says that restrictive movement measures by 
the government were initially ineffective, due to misinformation and rumors about the 
mysterious illness and deaths: 
 
So, when the government started to implement some measures to actually contain the disease, politics came in there again. 
People are thinking that they want to reduce the population, of people in the Kailahun District or some constituencies. So, it 
was difficult for government to even put restrictions on people moving from the affected zone to the nonaffected zone. So, 
people who get in contact with those infected people were moving in the country without restrictions. So that [is] why you 
will see there is that sporadic explosion of cases from all over the country; because someone will get in contact with a patient 
here, and he will move to another community where people don’t know. (Health Worker, Kailahun District) 
 
Many health workers did not receive any recognition for their service, let alone a 
regular salary. This was a problem before the epidemic and had not changed during the time 
of the fieldwork in 2017: 
The [NGO name]. They told us that we should not be given any package and when we started hearing that, some people 
became very annoyed over that. But at the end, you hear some people say that we worked for our country even with or 
without [it], we can still make it up. So, they virtually left here with no compensation. (Health Worker, Kenema District) 
 
In this quote, I asked about the strengths and weaknesses of governing the outbreak. 
This person responded that one strength was the many aid organizations that came and 
recruited people, but she and others thought they would be compensated, but in the end, 
they were not. 
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4.6 Local Institutional Intervention 
 
This theme describes how local communities decided to organize to protect 




Some communities conducted collective action against EVD and what they perceived 
to be an inept government response. However, this did not always happen swiftly or with 
cooperation in communities. One informant stated that the organization of paramount 
chiefs and other traditional leaders were uninvolved in the response and ignored 
sensitization efforts from health workers. The first two quotes say that these local leaders 
were part of the initial problem of getting the community to believe them, as chiefs were 
also spreading rumors and misinformation. However, where possible, traditional leaders 
were incorporated into community engagement efforts as the third through fifth quotes 
below demonstrate: 
 
So, from the Monrovia level down to the county, they had a cordial relationship. That is, you have the county health officer 
in the county who reports to the chief medical officer in Monrovia. So, that relationship has been there, but now the issue 
of trickling down the information from the county to the communities, there was the gap at the time. There was not much 
community engagement, so the information reaching to the chiefs was difficult, because most people focus on curative 
instead of preventive medicine. But now that the outbreak came, we also look at more preventive and balance it with the 
curative services. (Community Stakeholder, Lofa County) 
 
But then, the community leaders were not really involved into it. In addition, the paramount chiefs and the women leaders 
were not really involved into it and they were like overlooking the dangers, the hazard that attach to that. (Health Worker, 
Lofa County) 
 
Yeah, a curse on you; so, you go for healing. So, we targeted the elders, the zo, the traditional healers, we also the targeted 
the religious leaders. So, community engagement helped a lot, yeah it really helped. (same Community Stakeholder, Lofa 
County) 
 
We had to do it at the community level, so after we noticed there was a lot of wasting of time from the Ministry of Health to 
come into this community. We had a team that divided a strategy of community leaders; a paramount chief in identical 
village and set up a little group. (Health Worker, Montserrado County) 
 
The chief? Yes, all the authorities became involved [with the] county health team, that of [NGO name] and other partners, 
they all joined hands to come, after they believe it now that Ebola is truth. They realized that Ebola is truth. That is when 
those people came together and join hands to help the community and by that time more people were dying. (Health 
Worker, Lofa County) 
 
A community organizer from a town in Montserrado County discussed how he 
organized door-to-door campaigns in his neighborhood. Teams of volunteers went and 
identified sick persons and escorted them to the nearby health center, he says that there 
were no Ebola patients from his neighborhood, in the quote below: 
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The community took the initiative to organize themselves, like for us, we organized ourselves. We put ourselves in a group 
and we go from house to house; we find sick people and we make sure those sick people were transferred to the hospital 
for proper care. So, as for me, my community, the ____ community105 we didn’t experience any outbreak and there was no 
symptom of Ebola in the _____ community. Because we mobilized ourselves into a group without anybody helping us. 
(Community Leader, Montserrado County) 
 
In the next quotes below, a nurse discusses a checkpoint that was set up by a team 
of community volunteers off the main road that leads into central Monrovia. Every car that 
turned off the main road for this street was stopped and the person was asked questions to 
verify if she or he lived in the area. All visitors, including relatives, were turned away. Only 
those who lived there were allowed through. Another community stakeholder agreed that 
various communities had to organize; refer sick persons into care and patrol their 
neighborhoods. In addition, this phenomenon was not unique to the 2014 EVD outbreak, as 
local communities normally organize in some way in prior outbreaks: 
 
Each person in this community will ask, “Where are you from?” “We have never seen you in this community. Please go back 
where you come from.” And you will see these people at the junction [main street intersection].106 When you enter, and 
they stop you, they won’t be hostile or anything to you, but will ask you those questions and if the person say, “Oh, I got my 
mother here” or “I got my housing place here, like, where ‘Mary’ was but decided to come back” You will not enter your 
house. You will go back to where you came from until after the crisis. So, that was how community tracing and [the] Ebola 
started to be reduced. (Health Worker, Montserrado County) 
 
But pre-Ebola, some of the past outbreaks were handled in a chaotic way, like Cholera outbreak was handled in a chaotic 
manner. No system, no structure, no coordination, no leadership, no good political will; so, it was handled at the local level 
or wherever the incident occurred. So, there was no national response to that. Maybe because they were not of a huge 
magnitude, so it was left for the locals to address. (Community Stakeholder, Montserrado County) 
 
Community-level institutions played a role in emergency management. This did not 
always include traditional leaders, but a respected peer decided to volunteer or lead 
community engagement efforts. However, the extent and depth of involvement or 
effectiveness varied. An NGO worker described sensitization and bringing in traditional and 
community leaders into the fold; in other communities, they ‘self-organized’ without 
external help because of the perception that MHSW was ineffective. Local institutions 
helped to reduce EVD case rates by referring any sick person for care and reporting any 
deaths to the burial team. 
As mentioned in section 4.5, although the hotline received many calls for burials, 
these teams were quickly overwhelmed. Thus, it is unclear how effective local institutions 
were at preventing local burials if many families waited for days with one (or more) 
                                                          
105 Location omitted to protect the identity of the informant. 
106 Street name omitted to anonymize the identifying information. 
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decomposing corpse(s). This informant below, suggested that the epidemic curve went 
down after mandatory cremations were implemented by the government. 
 
We have limited health staff in this country, okay, and what we have been doing to help disseminate information from the 
health sector to our people at the local level; so, when there is a meeting, a health meeting, we are indeed invited. You see 
the local chief go and the message is sent through the local chief of what can be done. Even though they are not health 
practitioners, but from the message, you can take some measures to save your peoples’ lives. (Community Stakeholder, 
Margibi County) 
 
The quote above explains that the information is only as good as the person giving it. 
The role and relationship with local leaders are vital to accessing the community and gaining 
trust. However, if local leaders do not believe health workers or those affiliated with state 
institutions, then this may hamper community engagement. 
This last quote below gives insight as to why some communities self-organized: 
 
It was organized from the bottom: communities were effective. We are in a system where the rich or well-to-do is not 
going to get down there, I mean they were flying out of the country. So, it was from the bottom, because the community 
was effective, so they had to take initiative. So, they became more proactive in order to save themselves and save their 
communities. (Community Stakeholder, Montserrado County) 
 
4.6.2 Sierra Leone 
 
This quote below from a health worker describes how local efforts helped 
community engagement. International volunteers were needed but would not have been 
able to access the community alone. This person says the government did not initially 
engage with health workers to be social mobilizers, but it was the WHO’s intervention that 
did. This reveals that there were still some levels of trust in health workers if they were 
involved in community engagement: 
 
Yeah, because without the health workers these things are not going out. Among the health workers, some of them were 
social mobilizers, some of them were part of the burial teams, [and] some of us were surveillance officers. We had to go out, 
these are our people. We know the language they speak, and they know us very well. Like, foreigners came, but if we leave 
them to go out into the community, they will not accept them and think this or that of them. So, they brought us together 
on the frontlines where we meet our people and talked to them and tried to bring them down [sensitization]. (Health Worker, 
Kailahun District) 
 
The Kailahun District is the most eastern part of Sierra Leone and where the first 
case of EVD was identified in May 2014. The organization of paramount chiefs in this 
district, along with other traditional and religious leaders such as the Sande and Poro secret 
societies, implemented and enforced local rules and regulations of isolation and mandatory 
reporting. Informants say this happened right after the first case was announced. These are 
called bylaws and the paramount chiefs have always had the authority to implement 
bylaws; however, to have the council of chiefs agree to implement a set of rules district-
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wide during an emergency period was unprecedented. Even more so, for the country’s 
president to later find out about these rules and adopt them nationwide, by asking every 
paramount chief to implement these in his or her chiefdom. 
Yes, those were some of the challenges and those attributes contributed a lot in breaking down the chain of transmission. If 
you see a stranger, a visitor that has not been there, and no satisfactory report about his or her coming and you harbor that 
person, you will pay 500,000 Le. (Health Worker, Kenema District) 
 
This quote above explains the mandatory reporting bylaw. Any visitor entering a 
village had to report to the chief or health center for a health history and determination if 
they would be allowed to stay. The introduction before the chief would be to ask the 
traveler of his or her travel history (to see if one traveled from or through an affected area) 
and reasons for wanting to come into the town or village. Anyone that allowed a stranger to 
come and stay, without reporting it to the authorities, had to pay a fine of 500,000 Leones 
(Le). A stranger is considered a non-resident of the village or town. So even an adult child or 
relative visiting someone had to do this too. 
Under the bylaws, all sick persons had to be reported to the chief or the nearest 
health facility. If not, then a fine of Le 500,000 was given. This is equivalent to 60 USD and to 
put this in perspective, a nurse in Sierra Leone makes about a million Leones per month or 
approximately one hundred U.S. dollars. So, for a rural farmer or someone working in an 
unskilled profession, this would be equivalent to a month’s salary or maybe more. 
Movement was also restricted, such as visiting a neighbor’s or relative’s home, even if that 
person was sick. 
When the epidemic came, it was not politics and it was not resources, it was knowledge. The nurses told them that if you 
touch a sick person you will die. So that’s what they heard…So, because of that information, everybody became scared. So, 
people are afraid of bringing their loved ones to the hospital, once you know you have a sick person and if you touch that 
person you will die, Ebola or not, that affected. Not until the bylaws were put in place that if you have a sick person you 
should take him or her to the hospital. (Community Leader, Bo District) 
 
This quote above shows that the bylaws affected social cohesion in communities as 
visiting and caring for a sick relative is a moral duty. Even for nonrelatives, it is common to 
visit and stay with someone if there is news that she or he is unwell. This demonstrates how 
institutions can influence cultural changes. In addition, the information failure brought fear 
and people avoided the health facility, but then the mandatory reporting bylaw corrected 
the social cost of at-home caregiving in this community. 
In the many rural villages, the road network is poor and, in some places, nonexistent. 
This means the main form of transportation is via commercial motorbike and their drivers 
called okadas. The isolation measures impacted this commercial industry as fewer people 
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were traveling and okadas were no longer allowed to carry any sick persons on their bike, 
something that was all too common beforehand. In addition, a curfew was implemented. 
Okadas were not allowed to transport people after ten o’clock in the evening or else, face a 
fine of Le 400,000. Community members also had a curfew and could not leave their homes 
after this time. 
Congregations were also prohibited, some towns removed public benches to 
discourage community members from congregating. Since the bylaw said “congregating” or 
“public gatherings,” this also meant that some religious services and funerals were 
prohibited. Schools were closed and so were markets too. In terms of worship, masses and 
prayers were modified to discourage touching or sitting too close together, for example, 
getting rid of the “peace be with you” ritual in the Christian services. Many areas canceled 
nonessential public events, except town halls to give updates about EVD and other 
necessary announcements. Community leaders participated in health sensitization to give 
information about EVD and other health and hygiene practices such as handwashing. 
Checkpoints were established in villages across the chiefdoms too. One informant 
revealed that the fines helped to pay for enforcers, who patrolled the village, to deter any 
offenses. Public facilities such as health centers had handwashing stations where everyone 
had to wash their hands before entering and after leaving the building. Only a few people 
could move around freely, mainly those affiliated with the emergency response, such as a 
health worker or a burial team. 
 
They told us, “Who so ever has a sick person at home should report to the nearest PHU or main practitioner that is closest 
to you.” If you don’t do that, and they realize that, they will fine you 500,000 (Le). And Mende people will fear fines so much. 
They told us that we should not touch corpses. When there is a corpse, a dead person, we should call [a] medical practitioner. 
You know the infection between your loved ones- when your love one is dead. You want to touch or clean it or so, but when 
your loved one is dead, we are infected by that, so we never touch any dead one. And travel was canceled, because if you 
traveled, they wouldn’t allow you to sleep in any other places. So, I think that saved us greatly…So the 14 paramount chiefs 
in Kailahun district came together to put the bylaws together and communicate that to the government, so that was in effect. 
So, all the districts in the country started implementing it, which worked effectively. (Community Leader, Kailahun District) 
 
No, it was from the bottom to top. We had agreed on these things in our meetings and we decided to operate it. There was 
a time we met with someone from Kailahun, [redacted] because they were the first people to start making bylaws. We called 
them to come and share their experiences with us and that one was very good. So, we had to present ours and he presented 
theirs and told us how they were able to overcome a lot of difficulties with the bylaws. So, we had to copy almost all of the 
things they agreed on and we just added few, that one was very good. So, there was even inter-district collaboration, so 
towards the end when we had more cases in other districts, people were taking from here to go and put it over there. 
(Community Stakeholder, Kenema District) 
 
The first quote above discusses some of the bylaws; mandatory reporting, 
notifications for any corpse and not to undertake a corpse for burial, and finally, isolation. 
The second quote describes how a taskforce heard about the bylaws in the Kailahun District 
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and decided to approach their paramount chiefs and asked if they could do the same. They 
deliberated and created their own set of bylaws to implement district wide. There were 
some modifications from the ‘Kailahun template’ however, the main examples the person 
gave were restricting movement and mandatory reporting. 
 
For instance, what had made Ebola to finish sooner, was number one, they restricted the movement of people from one 
place to another. Then, there were bylaws that nobody could harbor anyone from different places. If somebody comes from 
Daru [in Kailahun] to stay here in Kenema, this person may not be lodged and the chiefs or authorities need to be alerted. 
However, if you happen to hide this person, you happen not the present the stranger to the authorities, then you will have 
a special fine to pay of 500,000 Leones. People were afraid of that huge money because during Ebola, all movements were 
ceased. No one went out to search for food or work, so when the money issue were stated [fines announced] people were 
afraid about how to pay that. So, that alone restricted the movement. Then when you have gone from one place to another 
place, we had public points where you had to wash your hands, if you were allowed to move around. You needed to present 
a particular document as well as wash your hands in these public places. This also helped in the fighting of Ebola. (Health 
Worker, Kenema District) 
 
So, when those bylaws came into effect, patients were now making use of the health facilities. At that time [the deflated 
economy], having 500,000 Leones was not easy; so that was a turning point… (Health Worker, Kailahun District) 
 
Yes. Every bylaw put by the community authority, went through the health professionals. There were health advices from 
the professionals. [And] yes, [we were] very included in it. (Health Worker, Bo District) 
 
The first quote from the Kenema District says that the fines created compliance as 
economic production had stopped, so few people would be able to pay the fine if they 
violated the bylaws. The second quote echoes this too. The final quote explains that health 
workers were consulted with, regarding the kind of bylaws to enact. Thus, we see that many 
chiefdoms adopted the bylaws, and these laws were fairly similar. Additionally, the 
involvement from the community to create them varied. For example, some chiefs 
consulted with health workers, religious leaders, or secret society leaders. 
 
So, like you said, the Ebola came here in March 2014, it was not taken seriously, and the bylaws were not in place. Not until 
2015, when they started hearing it in Kenema and there were a lot of ambulances passing now so they became worried. So, 
the chiefs had to come together and make these bylaws. Especially when the military intervened and had checkpoints all 
over with the temperature tester that they point at you. So that was also scary…That is when Baoma chiefdom got together, 
after they heard of other bylaws across the country. They came together because this is the main highway where ambulances 
to and from Kenema pass with Ebola patients. (Community Leader, Bo District) 
 
In this quote above, the person was asked if he remembered when the bylaws were 
enacted, as this area of Bo District had never reported an EVD case, despite being located 
off a major thruway and having a large market. According to him, the chiefdom 
implemented bylaws later in 2015, after the phase two scale up and the Sierra Leone 
military set up checkpoints. 
 
So, part of their strategy was to prevent Ebola, they caught five bike riders and fined them 500,000 Leones each. So, that 
money was given to the security men who were looking after this town, so that helped greatly. Then, they put an end to 
every society's initiations until the end of Ebola. So, these were measures put in place to prevent Ebola from reaching here, 
this is what helped the health system…So, during the Ebola, the chiefs came together and brought bylaws. They fought very 
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hard and never had a case here in this town. So, whosoever was moving around [violating isolation] was fined 500,000 Leones 
and had to return to their hometown. (Community Leader, Bo District) 
 
This quote above from a different community leader says that to end EVD, they 
suspended initiation rituals such as female genital circumcision.107 It says that this was until 
the end of the outbreak, however, some parts that I visited still had the ban in place. This 
informant also confirms that this area did not have a single reported EVD case. The bondo 
had received much attention over the last three decades as it is a controversial ritual, 
however, this was at least suspended during the epidemic. 
All informants that discussed the bylaws referred to this as a positive governing act 
that changed the disease spread, except for the one village in Bo District that did not report 
an EVD case, so for there, it was more of a precaution. One informant from the Kenema 
District, says that the bylaws were top-down, as he referred to the President decreeing a 
national emergency, where all chiefs were asked to implement the bylaws. Informants from 
the Kailahun and Kenema districts, which were the first to implement these, reported 
significant drops in deaths, and weeks with no new EVD cases. Rules and enforcement not 
only helped to change behaviors that were ‘risky’ and costly during this time, but also gave 
protection to workers and volunteers to conduct contact tracing, safe burials, and 
caretaking in the health facilities. However, isolation measures were not universally 
accepted. For example, this informant says that they did not initially consider how food and 
supplies would get to people in isolated areas if movement was restricted. This person 
below was interviewed in Bo District but had also worked in the northern district of 
Koinadugu, which borders Guinea: 
 
One of the weaknesses of the policies, it restricted the movement of people and thereby stopping the flow of food and items. 
It kind of escalated the hunger among the population, especially those that needed materials and rely on the movement of 
goods from the urban centers, on a daily basis. It abruptly stopped. So, people were faced with starvation, having a meal was 
difficult. Those policies had not been looked into before they were implemented, like, ‘how do we provide the standing 
population with food and maybe medications.’ And one of the strengths I identified here, some regions, those that followed 
the policies, stayed off the outbreak totally. Like, I remember when I was in Koinadugu, which is far north and the people 
there, heeded to the messages and the laws that were put in place, like you should not get close to the dead or bury them, 
or people should be quarantined or reported of any suspected case to the authorities. I think it worked there and stopped 
the chain of transmission for those communities there. (Health Worker, Bo District) 
 
The traditional local institutions may have had the effect of regaining the reputation 
and trust in the community. Thus, despite health workers having a limited supply of 
                                                          
107 Female Genital Circumcision, sometimes called Female Genital Mutilation or Excision, is practiced on almost every 
continent across the three major monotheistic religions. This topic has shaped discussions on gender equality, identity, 
Western feminism, and social development. Including efforts to eradicate it. See Ahmadu (2007), Bekers (2010) (for its 
representation in literature), Miller-Bashir (1997), and Parker (1995). 
179 | P a g e  
 
resources; local institutions had an effect of not just changing behaviors but also changing 
community perceptions. 
 
4.7 Governing the Outbreak 
 
This theme takes a holistic perspective of how the EVD outbreak was governed in 
each country. This is from the informants’ views of the strength and weaknesses of the 
response, using a polycentric institutional framework. 
4.7.1 Liberia 
 
As explained in sections 4.5 and 4.6, the health centers were chronically operating in 
under-resourced and understaffed conditions before the 2014 EVD outbreak; information 
failure in terms of official messaging and state institutional failures to contain EVD initially, 
created fear, stigma, and panic. In the prior section, the theme described how some 
communities mobilized to change behaviors and educate people about EVD. However, many 
health workers were directly affected by the disease and left the centers. Per combination 
of these factors, some facilities closed during the epidemic. This social cost led to negative 
externalities as potential Ebola and nonEbola patients were less likely to get care in time. In 
addition, the risk of Ebola patients traveling over greater distances to get to an ETU may 
have exposed the virus to other people. The common factor that reversed this, according to 
health workers, was training and supply of PPE; these were attributed to external partners. 
This gave them resolve to return to work at an ETU to treat patients: 
[T]hey (NGO) advise them, the people will give their information to them, “this is what you people supposed to do.” But no 
trust, how you will advise somebody who don’t trust you? It was very difficult for us. So, the people too, they said they can’t 
do anything, otherwise. October 1st, we re-opened the clinic, they sent for all of us to come. (Health Worker, Lofa County) 
 
Health workers recounted the number of phone calls received each day regarding 
someone who died or whole departments were lost. The hospital and clinics were no longer 
viewed as places where people were treated, and lives were saved. This was not only the 
perception of nurses and doctors but also pharmacists and laboratory scientists, whom until 
the epidemic, did not consider themselves at risk for nosocomial infections because of their 
limited interactions with patients, as this pharmacist says: 
 
Like, before the Ebola, we had patients taking their own prescriptions from the prescriber and carrying it to the pharmacy to 
get their medications. That was a risk by itself, because not knowing the condition or health status of the patient and the 
patient handles the prescription to give to you. You, as a pharmacist, are not wearing gloves; so, you directly grab the 
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prescription with bare hands and serve the medication. There could be microbes on the paper that could affect you. (Health 
Worker, Margibi County) 
 
When aid resources began scaling up in phase two, announcements of charities and 
NGOs arriving with equipment and expertise were said to be the reason for returning to the 
health centers. The WHO and other international responders were viewed as trustworthy 
and reliable entities that would pick up where the government could not. These 
organizations would deliver where the Liberian government did not, and they would serve 
the community where state institutions had not. Aid resources not only brought biomedical 
resources, as explained in chapter two, but these had also brought professional 
development and benefits that MHSW did not deliver to the health workers, such as 
capacity building, training, a consistent salary, and equipment. 
 
Yes, they brought instruments and a lot of things that will help us to protect ourselves from getting Ebola. And we got a lot 
of training from the Ebola outbreak and right after the Ebola. During and after the Ebola, we had a lot of training concerning 
Ebola. How to care for patients, how to triage patients at the gate before they come in, to know between the patients who 
come first and who last, who should be first to be treated. At least the Ebola helped us, we went through a lot of workshops 
and it was successful. (Health Worker, Montserrado County) 
 
This nurse describes above the experiences with training. The training was not 
always specifically on disease outbreak management but also establishing standard 
operating procedures that one would expect to find in the hospitals such as the triaging of 
patients. She says this was a weakness in the healthcare system for many years that at least, 
the Ebola epidemic helped to rectify. 
 
After few months, we got some aid from other countries and they came. We went for several workshops and from that 
workshop what we started doing-- like, before, when somebody come, “my skin hot” and we touch them, we never use to 
do it again. Like, if your skin is hot, after the workshop, you come, we never touch you, we just go close to you and know 
your temperature. That was some of the benefit that we achieved. (Health Worker, Montserrado County) 
 
In the text above, a nurse describes how before this training, workers would 
physically touch a patient to determine a fever, but after the workshop, they use new 
protocols. Using temperature as an example, these protocols were safer for the healthcare 
practitioner. 
However, sometimes PPE and training were not always effective as discussed in the 
quote below: 
The strength was, they were able to provide a PPE for us; and the weakness was, we were not able to use the appropriate 
PPE to deal with the patient. That was our weakness to know which type to wear, to deal with the patients; but the strength 
was they provided the PPE for us to use to save our patients. (Health Worker, Margibi County) 
 
As discussed in chapter one, since Liberia is in post-conflict development, many 
NGOs and charities were already present when the Ebola epidemic began. However, some 
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were struggling to retain staff and perform community sensitization because of fear and 
stigma. Also, NGOs are normally there to fulfill a specific contract or target as described by 
the community stakeholder in section 4.5.1. So, the staff that was present may not have had 
the capacity to effectively respond. Informants mentioned that aid from non-Western 
countries, such as Uganda or the Democratic Republic of Congo, had arrived earlier in 2014. 
However, biomedical tools, drugs, and ambulances are useless with no one to operate 
them. NGOs had to reach out to health workers first, to promise the safety and security of 
their lives by providing the Infection, Prevention, and Control (IPC) training,108 PPE supply, 
and a consistent paycheck. 
A multilayered response governed this outbreak. State institutions were able to 
receive and implement aid resources to recruit personnel and local institutions helped with 
behavior changes and engagement efforts. However, the collaboration between these 
institutions was not completely coherent. Community engagement efforts were scattered 
and depended on how community leaders were recruited through aid organizations, state 
institutions, or self-organized. In the communities where local leaders were recruited by 
NGOs, it was reported that these leaders were trained and participated in supporting the 
NGO’s efforts. However, other informants discussed self-organizing in the community. In 
some parts of Montserrado County, community leaders were conducting education and 
dissemination of information to prevent EVD. However, when NGOs and state institutions 
were asked to support their efforts, community leaders and volunteers did not always 
receive help: 
 
Even during the Ebola, what we notice is that, there was some money allocated for the communities, but it was process 
through the representatives from the various districts. Like for this district, where [Redacted] is the representative, we 
learned the money was passed through those people for the district to fight the Ebola, but we didn’t see that in our own 
place. The only thing we noticed is that when we first launched our community Ebola team, invited stakeholders, we invited 
[Redacted] who is the representative for this district, and he came. When he came, he first started with L$ 10,000109 and 
then we invited Robert Sirleaf [son of President Johnson-Sirleaf] and he came in too and gave us [a] few buckets and some 
rice, to say you have a special link with the government and the community, [but] it didn’t happen that way. Then from there, 
what we did on our own was, we bought buckets and came to give it to people too, to wash their hands. We got in contact 
with a lot of NGOs, but they couldn’t come to our aid, but people benefited too, other people benefited because they have 
the Ebola there. So, they have NGOs helping that community apparently, but they didn’t come to us because we didn’t have 
[an] Ebola outbreak [here] apparently. Maybe this is the reason assistance was not coming to us. (Community Leader, 
Montserrado County) 
 
                                                          
108 Health workers discuss how this training helped to develop infection control skills, such as learning about nosocomial 
infections and how to prevent them, safe handling of sharps and other medical waste, and proper use of PPE. This was 
referred to in chapter two as ‘barrier nursing,’ however, this term may also appear in interviews. 
109 This roughly converts to about 100 USD at that time. 
182 | P a g e  
 
In areas where local leaders were not engaged, at least not in phase one, then 
efforts to contain the disease may be hampered. This is evidenced by the NGO-sponsored 
clinic that closed until October 2014. However, when multiple institutions are working 
collaboratively, it may produce a stronger response and service delivery, such as the NGO 
that engaged traditional leaders or the nurse in Montserrado County who felt that state 
institutions engaged with health workers to improve outcomes. However, while some areas 
demonstrated a strong local response such as communities self-organizing, this can assist 
with demand-side barriers by reporting sick persons and infectious corpses, but if there are 
barriers on the supply-side (like burial teams being overwhelmed and leaving little choice 
for surviving relatives), then this may also hamper efforts to contain the disease spread. 
 
4.7.2 Sierra Leone 
 
As mentioned in the first theme, misinformation and stigma lowered confidence in 
the health system. Many people avoided seeking healthcare from hospitals because of a 
mixture of fear and misinformation. In the second theme, traditional leaders and 
community stakeholders deliberated on bylaws to help address some of these demand-side 
challenges. In addition, some leaders helped in community engagement too. There was a 
coordinated effort to bring aid resources to all affected regions in the country and 
thousands of people were recruited to assist in the response. As mentioned in chapter two, 
contact tracing, early clinical intervention, and safe burials are key components for 
controlling the outbreak of a Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF). Full-body PPE, knowledge, and 
experience are also important so that health workers can identify the disease earlier. A few 
experienced NGOs had some expertise and some resources to combat the disease, but what 
they lacked was power, safety, and staff. 
 
Like I was saying, for Sierra Leone, Ebola is very new. It came in and nobody had any idea about it. Of course, we know it is 
one of the viral hemorrhagic fevers and you can prevent it in the same way you can prevent Lassa fever, and we have Lassa 
fever in this country. But the way it spreads, it’s faster than Lassa and we did not have an idea of what to really do, and again, 
there were a lot of denials. People had different interpretations of the outbreak…. Yes, like it was a kind of plan to --- it is 
hard to say. There are certain things I cannot say that connect to [redacted],110 but it had political connotations. People were 
alleging a lot of things that were not even correct, like we were collecting blood samples to send, and they are giving 
injections to infect individuals. (Community Stakeholder, Kenema District) 
 
This informant above says that there was already some expertise on VHFs, because 
of prior experience with Lassa fever and the only laboratory equipped to test for VHFs is in 
                                                          
110 Employer is redacted to protect the identity of the informant. 
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the Kenema District. However, Ebola spreads more quickly than Lassa and as the death toll 
climbed, stigma and negative perceptions developed that EVD was not a natural disease 
outbreak. However, as mentioned earlier, some people also feared nosocomial transmission 
at the health centers. People avoided the health centers, including the ones partnered with 
an NGO as stigma was formidable in the community, by then, people had received the 
information that EVD was not curable. Consequently, some did not understand why they 
were still being asked to go to the hospital for an incurable disease. So, this raised 
suspicions. As explained below, one of the strengths in the response, was the involvement 
of community leaders. The informant says that if this was done with HIV/AIDS, another 
disease with a history of stigma and discrimination, then local leaders can help to mobilize 
the communities too, and not only pass bylaws: 
 
If you are talking about successful programs in a chiefdom, we have to go through the community leaders. So, the paramount 
chief is the head, the administrative head and he has his chiefdom divided into sections and each has a chief. And each 
section has villages and each village has a chief. So, until we bring all these people together, to get this information, you will 
find it difficult for people in the village to understand [comply] with what is going on. So, the local leadership has been very 
very useful, not only in Ebola, although in Ebola it was more useful. In other areas, like what has been making the HIV project 
very difficult, the strategies we put in place during Ebola, if we put that in place in other areas, it will be very easy for us to 
eradicate other problems. (Same Community Stakeholder, Kenema District) 
 
Survivors of EVD had a difficult time re-integrating into their communities because of 
stigma, as explained by this nurse in the Kailahun District: 
 
So, the thing [about] Ebola, when you are passing, they will say that this person had Ebola or is an Ebola survivor, so people 
have to know you. However, HIV is not like that. They don’t know who is an HIV patient, and besides, during Ebola people 
were preferring to get HIV than Ebola. They thought HIV was a better illness than Ebola. (Health Worker, Kailahun District) 
 
Traditional leaders also played a role in reducing stigma, by accepting survivors in 
the community. The first quote below from a traditional leader is in response to my 
question about how survivors are perceived in his village. The second quote is from another 
community leader, regarding the presentation and acceptance of EVD survivors. And the 
final quote is from a traditional leader who was part of community enegagement and social 
re-integration of EVD survivors with an NGO. 
 
At this point in time, you cannot even identify who is a survivor, we are all the same. (Community Leader, Kailahun District) 
 
So, after the Ebola, the doctors brought the Ebola survivors and said these are our brothers, our family members. 
(Community Leader, Kailahun District) 
 
They accept the people, they know the virus is no more and it is gone. So, they accept them because they are their brothers 
and sisters. There is a village called [redacted], they have a lot of survivors there and they used to go there and talk with 
them and mix with them, so they are integrated. There is no stigmatization. (Community Leader, Bo District) 
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The bylaws regulate behavior to reduce the spread of EVD and it facilitated 
cooperation and behavior change. Early clinical intervention and safe burials were able to 
proceed, and health workers (including NGO workers) were able to work safely under the 
chief’s authority. Resources such as contact tracing, safe transportation, and clinical care 
that were brought by external partners were made more effective as explained below: 
 
Bylaws from area to area...you know when announcements go through parliament it is a process and a longer time, but with 
bylaws it is quicker here with the local chiefs. I think that is why the government also dealt with the local chiefs later; that 
they should go and man checkpoints in their localities during the Ebola. Once they were involved, they created bylaws and 
created a level playing ground for the medics to come and work protectively. (Health Worker, Kenema District) 
 
In the above quote, this worker also says that the government chose to implement 
the bylaws because the parliamentary process may have just been too slow. The bylaws 
made it easier for health workers to do their jobs and work under the protection of the 
chiefs, without fear for reprisals from the community. As mentioned in section 4.5, health 
workers reported discrimination and harassment. 
In some areas, chiefdom officials and humanitarian workers worked in tandem after 
the phase two scale up. However, in other areas, like the Kailahun District, EVD was 
resolving before the scale up of aid or government resources. This informant below 
describes that local health workers and community stakeholders worked to stop the disease 
spread. This was during phase one when the government and the international community 
did not respond effectively. When they finally did, it was in a manner that seems to take 
over or take credit rather than collaborate with local actors: 
 
They create the NERC, the National Emergency Office was created, and at the district level, the District Emergency Operations 
office was created; where there were other people that were recruited, and they were managing the Ebola. Like for this 
district, there was some conflict among the health workers, because at the time the emergency unit was created, we had 
already done away with the Ebola here. It was not actually here again. Then you take the responsibility away from the health 
workers that they were not up to expectations. So, most of us were annoyed, because we had already done the fight. Instead 
of compensating us or give us thanks, you bring in the manner that you bring people to come and take over for us. (Health 
Worker, Kailahun District) 
 
However, it cannot be said that aid was not completely present, as the interviews 
presented in this subsection depict NGOs and faith-based charities assisting but with limited 
resources. 
Community stakeholders reported that the relationship between state and local 
institutions was cordial when the bylaws were adopted at the national level. However, 
cordial does not mean without challenges or politics. For example, this health worker says 
that the initial response from the ministry, to send the military to enact isolation, was not 
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effective. Local health workers should have been consulted with first, on how to stop people 
from moving: 
For example, if you take a nonmedical practitioner and you make that person a minister of health; [but] he or she knows 
very little about health issues in the country. So, he or she may do the wrong thing. That was one of the reasons why the 
Ebola spread very quickly in the country, because then, our minister was a non-health practitioner and she was made [the] 
health minister. When she heard of Ebola, instead of sending health professionals, she decided to send military personnel, 
who don’t know anything about health. So, the thing spread very fast inside the country; not until later when they decided 
to change the entire system. Health professionals are very important in health planning, especially at national level. (Health 
Worker, Bo District) 
 
The party in power was the All People’s Congress (APC), which historically, is 
dominated by the Temne and Limba ethnic groups from the northern region, and the 
southern and eastern provinces are predominantly Mende. So, there may have been some 
identity politics in the response or, political missteps, such as the minister sending troops 
without consulting local stakeholders. However, while much had been speculated in the 
past about ethno-regional tensions in Sierra Leone, the collaboration of both institutions, 
especially since the bylaws started in the Mende chiefdoms,111 transcended this. 
The first quote below is a response after I asked about the strengths and weaknesses 
in the governance of the response. The second quote is from another health worker who 
was asked the same question regarding the strengths and weaknesses: 
 
They [government] implemented some standard operating procedures (SOPs) during that, and then there were other NGOs 
and they did some massive recruitment, which helped too. They involved the military officers and other volunteers to look 
for contacts. So, at the time, we did a lot of surveillance. There were surveillance officers everywhere, they recruited 
surveillance officers. This all helped to bring the situation down. (Health Worker, Kailahun District) 
 
So, they organized meetings with local chiefs and local authorities. We told them what to do, the things that will help 
eradicate the Ebola. So, they knew if they didn’t take it seriously, it will affect them, and it will affect the entire country. 
(Health Worker, Kailahun District) 
 
There was a multilayered institutional response addressing different factors during 
the outbreak. Aid supplied some of the technical resources, but not all health workers 
reported these resources as motivating factors to continue working, except for hazard pay, 
or to change the fear and perceptions in the community. Rather, it was the involvement of 
chiefs through bylaws and community engagement efforts that helped. This also included 
accepting EVD survivors to return to the communities. This corrected the misinformation 
that EVD was completely lethal and incurable, and restored trust. 
 
4.8 WHO EVD Surveillance Data 
 
                                                          
111 The southern and eastern regions of Sierra Leone are predominantly a Mende ethnic group. See chapter one, section 
1.4 on the history and background of the country. 
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In August 2014, the WHO declared the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). It began scaling up aid resources and keeping 
track of suspected, probable, and confirmed new EVD cases and deaths, and redefined the 
old cases from before the PHEIC. Technical assistance arrived over eight months into a 
disease outbreak, and thus, much of the data before this are sparse as there was not 
enough logistical support to keep track of EVD cases and deaths. I acknowledge that the 
data may not be completely accurate, however, given that this is the WHO’s report, it is the 
most reliable and widely accepted data available. 
Sierra Leone had 14,124 total EVD cases with 3,956 EVD deaths and Liberia had 
10,675 EVD cases and 4,809 EVD deaths from December 2013 to June 2016 (World Health 
Organization, 2016a; World Health Organization, 2016d). By dividing death rates by the total 
case numbers, this means that the death rate in Sierra Leone was 28%, while Liberia had a 
45% death rate of EVD cases, according to these figures provided. In addition, Sierra Leone 
identified more EVD cases than Liberia, at almost 4,000 more cases, but it recorded nearly a 
thousand fewer deaths than Liberia (World Health Organization, 2016a). 
The EVD cases and deaths can be interpreted via community engagement efforts of 
contact tracing, referral into care, and quality of care. Contact tracing efforts are meant to 
find each person that is connected to an EVD patient or in some villages, go door-to-door to 
find any sick person and refer him or her into care. As discussed in chapter two, the early 
treatment of a VHF increases one’s chances of survival.112 So, in a coordinated engagement 
effort, there could be higher diagnoses but a lower death rate, if more people are found and 
referred into care early. 
 
4. 9 Summary 
 
Findings from the fieldwork were categorized into three broad themes that showed 
parallels and differences in the response during the 2014 EVD outbreak. In both countries, 
informants discussed their respective government’s initial response and revealed a 
consensus of state institutional failure. This first theme achieved one of the research 
objectives in identifying the challenges of managing the EVD outbreak; these were 
information failures and social costs that hampered efforts to contain the disease. The 
                                                          
112 See the literature on prior EVD and the Marlborough virus disease outbreaks in chapter two, section 2.6.2. 
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second theme discussed interventions led by community and traditional leaders to contain 
EVD. These efforts addressed the demand-side barriers and encouraged health seeking 
behaviors and discouraged ‘risky’ behaviors, such as unsafe caregiving and burials. Liberia 
and Sierra Leone conducted community engagement differently, with Sierra Leone’s 
strategy becoming a bottom-up policy for national emergency management. 
The third theme discussed how multiple institutions governed the outbreak, 
specifically in phase two when aid resources were scaled up. Liberian informants viewed this 
more positively as making a difference in the response. However, there was a difference 
between how health workers and community stakeholders perceived this. In addition, there 
was not a consensus that aid helped in the demand-side barriers, except for providing 
health workers with resources and pay, so they can return to work. In the last section, the 
data from the WHO reflected how effective community engagement efforts were in each 
country. Thus, the findings support an interpretation that effective contact tracing led to 

























































At the end of the research, we try to understand the meaning and significance of the 
findings. 




These findings build on the arguments identified as hidden transcripts (Scott, 1992), 
which feature local community leaders responding to the outbreak with emergency 
management regulations and locally-derived solutions (Abramowitz et al., 2015; Parker and 
Allen, 2018; Parker et al., 2019; Perry and Sayndee, 2017; Richards, 2016; Van der Windt 
and Voors, 2020). Community leaders governed effectively and restored social cohesion and 
trust, and local solutions helped to stop the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak. However, 
these interventions were not always supported by external partners. The public transcripts 
(Scott, 1992) on health interventions have historically ignored local solutions (Benes, 2017; 
Mustapha, 2006); encouraged adoption of Western-derived practices to the detriment of 
local communities (Werner and Sanders, 1997); or marginalized these responses as culture 
or “bad behaviors” (Johnston, 2015; Moran, 2015). Evidence from the field extends the 
theoretical framework of institutional quality on how addressing the demand-side barriers 
reduced negative externalities. The evidence also showed that aid resources were effective 
in reducing the supply-side barriers, however, this was not without challenges and not all 
costs were addressed by aid or local leaders. These findings are not without contention, as 
some public transcripts say these local solutions were not effective (Boland and McKay, 
2018; Enria, 2017; Wilkinson et al., 2017). This research specifically, and the debate broadly, 
on the role of aid and community leaders have policy implications for future disease 
outbreaks. 
The first section, 5.2 is a synopsis of the informants’ narratives on state and 
community-level institutions during the outbreak. The discussions of self-organizing during 
the emergency period build on Hewlett and Hewlett (2008)’s arguments and the hidden 
transcripts on this EVD outbreak. The second section, 5.3 is the market approach of how 
local intervention corrected some demand-side barriers and the extension of the theoretical 
framework. In addition, it discusses some costs that could not be reduced by local 
interventions. The third section, 5.4 examines the variation in the interviews where some 
informants felt that aid resources made a significant impact while others felt that it had not. 
Additionally, it gives a holistic view of how multiple institutions governed supply and 
demand factors in the market. The final section discusses policy implications from this 
research. 
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5.2 Understanding Local Response and Perceptions 
 
This section addresses the research objective of how the response of state and 
community-level institutions differed; it explores the narratives on state institutional 
failures and the significance of the community leaders’ actions. In prior public health 
emergencies, communities had self-organized. These examples of self-organizing are seen in 
Hewlett and Hewlett (2008)’s observations of rural communities enacting emergency 
management regulations in multiple EVD outbreaks. The thesis builds on this concept of 
self-organizing communities. The last subsection, 5.2.4 engages in a critical discussion on 
how local institutional responses were perceived in the public debate about the EVD 




Community members organized door-to-door campaigns and checkpoints, often 
without external assistance, including that of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
(MHSW). However, MHSW was aware that different communities were “stepping up” and 
was supportive of this, in principle (Sirleaf, 2014). None of the informants mentioned 
curtailing burial or funerals, even though the Liberian government had banned it and 
implemented mandatory cremations. Training workshops were held in churches and other 
places to show people how to correctly do this. This builds on Perry and Sayndee (2017)’s 
findings of community-led engagement in Liberia. 
5.2.1.1 Perceptions of State Institutional Failures 
 
Communities were organizing and changing behaviors before phase two of the 
outbreak.113 According to the Liberian member checker, this largely had to do with the 
community’s reaction after MHSW announced the extent of the Ebola epidemic and advised 
people not to engage in sexual intercourse.114 Informants believed that the government was 
not responsive or did not take it “seriously”; the latter could refer to confusing headlines 
from MHSW’s announcements and guidance. According to Subissi et al. (2018), scientists 
believe there was a patient in Liberia infected with EVD via sexual transmission. This led to 
                                                          
113 Phase two starts in October 2014. This period is the scale up of aid resources after the World Health Organization 
(WHO) declared the epidemic a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) in August 2014. 
114 See feedback from member checkers in Appendix C. 
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an advisory warning EVD survivors to be cautious when engaging in sexual relations as the 
virus could be present in the semen for several months (Bullard, 2018). Therefore, it may be 
possible that this scientific discovery of the first-ever recorded sexual transmission of EVD 
could have led to some confusing headlines (an information failure). 
In past disease outbreaks such as Cholera, it was common for state institutions to 
have a weak or nonexistent response and it was always up to local communities to fend for 
themselves. Hence, leadership tends to come from the local community and not the state. 
This builds on the discussion of the rural and urban divide that was discussed earlier 
regarding the historical legacy of Liberia’s dual state system.115 The rural counties have 
rarely relied on leadership from Monrovia and political actors in Monrovia reacted to issues 
that affected Monrovia. 
However, informants in Montserrado County also said there were state institutional 
failures despite proximity to the capital. Some believe that when ‘big people’ or important 
persons were affected or threatened by EVD, this was when the state responded. Also, big 
people such as an elected official or senior hospital administrator had left the country at the 
time too; demonstrating that those who had the means could and did flee, leaving behind 
those who could not (Butty, 2014). State institutional failure is not just a failure to deliver 
goods and services, it is also a failure in accountability and trust. This reflects the 
informants’ perceptions of being abandoned and not trusting those in power to be 
accountable to those without power. 
5.2.1.2 The Role of Local Leaders 
 
Some chiefs did not assist in raising awareness of EVD. They may have even worked 
against efforts by spreading rumors and misinformation. The latter point is crucial to note 
because it demonstrates the power and influence of local institutions and whether this can 
be used for or against a specific cause. In other words, if an external actor such as an aid 
worker, health worker, or development practitioner is not able to convince local leaders to 
change a norm or behavior, then the likelihood of this happening is low. Eventually, there 
was some success in getting TLIs involved in the response and to assist with sensitization 
and engagement. 
                                                          
115 It is briefly discussed how Monrovia was a settler colony in chapter one on page 11 and the rural interior and 
indigenous ethnic groups were incorporated in the mid-twentieth century under President Tubman in chapter two on page 
68. 
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Only one community stakeholder felt there was a response from the government in 
the beginning: a county official appointed by President Johnson-Sirleaf. This person says the 
county office acted under orders from the administration. However, as mentioned in 
chapter one, the county superintendent office is an anomaly because it does not liaise with 
the ministries (Nyei, 2014). Nonetheless, this builds on Pailey (2017)’s argument that various 
actors assumed public authority, where the state lacked legitimacy to do so. This played a 
vital role and even the administration urged communities and local leaders to self-organize 
(World Health Organization, 2015b). However, this was not mobilized into a coherent 
national strategy until after a decline of major case incidences; its effectiveness to monitor 
and enforce everywhere was limited (Kirsch et al., 2017). 
 
5.2.2 Sierra Leone 
 
At the beginning of the epidemic, some facilities had access to resources that other 
facilities may not have had. This depended on who the external partner was, the 
commitment or relationship to the local community, and at what stage they were in their 
partnership contract. Some organizations left or were ending their commitments right 
before it started, and others were already there but did not have enough resources or the 
right resources to combat EVD. 
5.2.2.1 Perceptions of State Institutional Failures 
 
Many informants say the response of the central government was part of state 
institutional failures that have long plagued the country. The first EVD case was confirmed a 
few days after detection in the Kailahun District; however, no safeguards or provisions were 
made after this announcement. In other words, the resources, equipment, and training 
were not scaled up to address a growing crisis in the nation’s far eastern province. 
The government failed in its moral duty to health workers and volunteers during and 
after the crisis. Many health workers had sacrificed so much and some, their lives, to 
continue serving during the emergency period. The example of Dr. Khan was a pivotal 
moment.116 Many health workers did not receive any recognition for their service, let alone 
a regular paycheck. This failure by the state has been linked to corruption. Ross, Welch, and 
                                                          
116 The country’s most famous health worker and virologist, Dr. Sheik Umar Khan, was well known for treating Lassa fever 
patients (another VHF) and died from EVD. Maxmen (2015a) and BBC News (2014) report that his death triggered fear and 
realization of how serious the epidemic had become. 
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Angelides (2017) report that the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MOHS) had a list of fake 
health workers to distribute hazard pay. This resulted in many health workers not getting 
paid and subsequently striking. Many informants described the discrimination, abuse, and 
harassment for wearing their uniforms, this was a disintegration of social norms. Along with 
the failure to provide clinical and infrastructural resources for the health system, state 
institutional failures were also the inability to protect health workers and lead in a crisis. 
5.2.2.2 The Role of Local Leaders 
 
Traditional leaders were beneficial in restoring trust, particularly by leading 
engagement efforts. These leaders were key to the social re-integration of EVD survivors 
within their communities. Information failures emphasized that EVD was incurable rather 
than early treatment (Richards, 2016); hence, since people believed that EVD was incurable 
then anyone claiming to be cured was not trusted. Many EVD survivors were not accepted 
back into their homes or communities for fear that the person was still infectious (World 
Health Organization, 2014d; World Health Organization, 2015d). Many traditional leaders 
publicly embraced and welcomed survivors back into their neighborhoods, thereby helping 
to reduce stigma and maintain social cohesion and peace in local communities. In addition, 
by enacting a bylaw to report sick persons to the health centers, helped to restore some 
legitimacy to the health workers. Some health workers reported an increase in services after 
the bylaws. This aspect of trust and legitimacy is a surprising finding that was not discussed 
in prior studies on the bylaws or the involvement of chiefs (Parker and Allen, 2018; Parker et 
al., 2019; Richards, 2016). 
 
5.2.3 Perceptions of Locally-Derived Responses 
 
Media sources gave much attention to ‘bad behaviors’ of local people continuing to 
bury loved ones, avoid health centers, or escaping from them (Bullard, 2018). Building from 
the discussion in chapter one,117 the discourse of ‘bad behaviors’ is not unusual in health 
interventions as it was used during the height of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, to explain how 
‘highly sexualized Africans’ were spreading the disease (Caldwell, Caldwell, and Quiggin, 
1989; Johnston, 2015). There were warnings to cease certain activities that may spread EVD, 
such as home care for the sick or conducting funerals. However, these activities continued in 
                                                          
117 See in contextual chapter on pages 11 and 43. 
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some areas, and thus, local communities were not seen as rational or their behaviors were 
regarded as rigidly religious or superstitious (Gerlach, 2016; Grundy, 2014). 
 
The media focus relentlessly on the heroism of European and American responders and fell back on the stock images of 
Africans as helpless, hapless, victims who were nonetheless stubbornly resistant to Western medicine, irrationally carrying 
on with “secret burials,” and then getting on planes and spreading the disease to unsuspecting places like Dallas (Moran, 
2015, p. 177) 
 
The literature argues that the focus on Western heroism framed the outbreak as a 
narrative where Ebola started as an ‘African problem’ with racialized subtext and became a 
global threat (Moran, 2015; Nunes, 2016; Roemer-Mahler and Rushton, 2016). In this light, 
Western medicine, Western equipment, and Westernized behaviors are the solutions. Not 
only did it delegitimize local efforts to stop the disease spread, but it also largely ignored 
non-Western aid resources, such as those offered by China, Cuba, and Uganda. The aid from 
these nations was also vital and, in some cases, had responded sooner to West Africa than 
Western donors and humanitarians. This finding from the literature builds on Leach and 
Hewlett (2010)’s research on outbreak narratives. 
5.2.3.1 ‘Cultural-related Problems’ 
 
According to Leach and Hewlett (2010), another narrative that developed to discuss 
prior Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF) outbreaks, is one of “cultural knowledge”. This had 
been used by anthropologists, such as Hewlett and Amola (2003), Hewlett and Hewlett 
(2008), Parker et al. (2019), and Richards (2016) who have decoded and understood local 
beliefs and perceptions about illness broadly, and EVD specifically. These had the intention 
of explaining local behaviors and cultural rituals that were seen as ‘bizarre’ to Western 
responders and help adapt interventions into the cultural framework. 
However, some literature use ‘culture’ in an oversimplified manner for a variety of 
factors in the demand-side challenges in a disease outbreak. For example, in Msyamboza et 
al. (2014, p. 723)’s research into repeated Cholera outbreaks in Malawi, the authors list 
several challenges as “sociocultural risk factors” like infrastructural barriers regarding clean 
water, such as not enough pipes, lack of a chlorinated system, or distance to a source of 
clean water. The cultural-related problems, which are learned behaviors or perceptions,118 
were issues such as believing chlorinated water “tasted funny”, normalizing Cholera 
                                                          
118 There is not a singular definition of ‘culture,’ although this one is the most basic definition. See Baldwin et al. (2006), 
Birukou et al. (2013), Blumenthal (1940), and Harris (2001) for historical and multidisciplinary concepts of culture. 
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outbreaks, or believing in spiritual causes for the illness. The thesis holds that the first set of 
problems has to do with infrastructure, in other words, these problems have political and 
economic causes. 
Another example is from Bulte, Richards, and Voors (2018)’s discussion of cultural 
and moral obligations. Families are obliged to bring food to sick relatives in the Ebola 
Treatment Centers (ETUs), but they were prohibited from entering the hospital grounds. 
There is also a structural reason why families do this: many health facilities in West Africa do 
not serve food. Hospital food is a Western luxury and patients must either purchase food 
from vendors outside the hospital or rely on relatives to visit and bring food. Or sometimes 
relatives need to purchase drugs or other equipment for the patient if the health facility 
does not have them. 
Many ETUs were initially in urban areas, which made it difficult for people from rural 
hinterlands to access them. Some people had to travel hours (and sometimes days during 
the rainy season when dirt roads turn to mud) via motorbike, taxi, or private vehicle to 
reach one of these overcrowded centers. By then, not only could it have been too late for 
the patient, but his or her extensive travels may have exposed others to EVD. The logistical 
problem of aid not penetrating local communities could have been a factor in the choices of 
some affected people. For instance, burial teams were sometimes slow to respond, leaving 
some families with no choice but to conduct a funeral. A corpse sitting in the home or on 
the street for days could bring other health and sanitation problems. 
Media and academic sources discussed the local population’s widespread disbelief 
and denials about EVD being real, however, these sources attributed this to religion or lack 
of biomedical knowledge (Davies, Bowley, and Roper, 2015; Samb and Toweh, 2014). 
However, state institutions often broadcasted confusing and conflicting information or were 
slow to give information. Informants from both countries knew there was EVD in Guinea; 
and in Sierra Leone, many knew it was in Liberia at the time too. These issues carried over 
after the outbreak too; during fieldwork in Liberia, there were suspicious cases from the 
southeast region from funeral attendants. The ministry did not confirm any details reported 
in the newspapers and samples were sent abroad for testing (Front Page Africa, 2017). 
Information was vague, and newspapers only announced deaths and new cases. Several 
weeks later, the Ministry of Health confirmed that these patients had Meningitis. However, 
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many people were skeptical of the veracity of this information. This did not have to do with 
a lack of biomedical knowledge or religious belief but the skepticism of state institutions. 
The literature sometimes discusses these ‘local problems’ and ‘bad behaviors’ 
without consideration of social, political, and legal structures and how this compares to 
other societies in a similar context. Sometimes doing this may help to avoid stereotyping or 
otherizing human subjects. These examples above show that there are factors beyond 
culture that should also be explored. There can be culturally-derived responses for 
structural problems, but sources do not always fully distinguish and analyze which problems 
are structural or cultural and how they impact each other. 
By otherizing human subjects, the meaning and intent of people’s behaviors are not 
fully understood. For example, the literature focused on the community member’s fears of 
nefarious activities taking place in the health centers or sponsored by the government 
(Hogan, 2014; Mark, 2014; Schwerdtle, De Clerck, and Plummer, 2017; Wilkinson and 
Fairhead, 2017), without considering that the phrase, ‘injecting you with Ebola’ may also 
refer to nosocomial transmission, depending on one’s language skills. Otherizing not only 
make subjects appear ‘strange or odd’ but it also helps to discredit local responses to 
address a public health emergency. According to Jones (2011) ‘culture’ has been 
reconstituted as a risk factor in Ebola outbreak narratives, which hides political, economic, 
and/or structural challenges, such as why people avoid health centers. Past research 
showed that this may have saved lives if a clinic was the source of an outbreak due to poor 
sanitation practices. This is what happened in the 1976 EVD outbreak at the Yambuku 
Mission Hospital (Breman, 1978). 
5.2.3.2 The Pattern of Discrediting Local Solutions 
 
There is also a history of ignoring or discrediting local interventions in health for 
Western-derived solutions instead. Continuing with the example of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
funding to target this disease jumped to the billions in the 1990s after it was framed as a 
security issue (Benes, 2017). As discussed before, health security has been used as a 
justification for cooperation and sometimes, militarized interventions.119 However, local and 
inexpensive approaches, such as in Uganda, were largely ignored by international AIDS 
                                                          
119 In chapter one, page 43, it was briefly discussed that HIV/AIDS and EVD responses were securitized. This was part of an 
ongoing trend in global health that uses security to justify intervention, and sometimes, with military resources. 
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advocates, especially since it bypassed many Western-derived services (Benes, 2017; 
Mustapha, 2006). In effect, this is a hidden transcript (Scott, 1992) in the HIV/AIDS debate. 
Another example to build on, are the industry solutions that seek to medicalize and 
standardize treatments in low-income countries, using oral rehydration therapy as an 
example (Werner and Sanders, 1997). The main treatment for diarrhea is consistent 
rehydration, as no drug can cure it. Development agencies such as the United Nations (UN) 
and the WHO commercialized and marketed expensive rehydration solutions created by 
pharmaceutical companies. They encouraged local communities to abandon traditional 
practices of food-based rehydration, such as blended cereals or porridges, and instead 
encouraged dependence on commercial oral rehydration packets promoting them as 
medicine. These commercialized packets were limited in rural areas or people had to buy 
them (Werner and Sanders, 1997). Standardizing and medicalizing solutions may 
inadvertently create dependency on Western-derived resources, which can be problematic 
in isolated communities. Therefore, during the Ebola outbreak, local institutional changes in 
rural communities were solutions to eradicate EVD. 
Behavioral changes such as handwashing and enforcement strategies such as 
checkpoints, demonstrate internal institutional changes. This builds on previous studies’ 
notion of institutional change and institutional quality as the result of a significant event 
(Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015; Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Voors and Bulte, 2014). Local 
institutions amended religious rituals and cultural norms to fit the emergency context, 
largely in communities without much aid resources (Hagan et al., 2015; Parker and Allen, 
2018; Parker et al., 2019). However, local solutions were fetishized in the public transcripts 
as ‘secret burials,’ ‘bad behaviors,’ or ‘resistance’ against government and aid workers 
(Boland and McKay, 2018; Cenciarelli et al., 2015; Fairhead, 2016; Fallah et al., 2016; 
Laverack and Manoncourt, 2016; Wilkinson et al., 2017; Wilkinson and Fairhead, 2017). For 
example, caregiving was made safer through improvising with the “garbage bag Personal 
Protective Equipment” (PPE) (Perry and Sayndee, 2017). Or a bamboo reed was used as a 
pipe to irrigate clean water for handwashing as mentioned in the member checking, in 
Appendix C. In these cases, the information needed was not biomedical content, but on how 
to protect oneself from EVD using the available resources (Abramowitz et al., 2015). 
Moreover, although this section discussed specific examples in health interventions, we can 
also see how this broadly builds on Hanlon (2012)’s critique of the good governance 
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framework in development policy. Demand-led interventions have always been viewed by 
Western development practitioners and donors as ‘poor governance.’ The next section 
explains how locally-derived solutions reduced the demand-side barriers in the market. 
 
5.3 Market Approach of Locally-Derived Solutions 
 
This section addresses the research objective: to identify challenges that hampered 
the management of Ebola identification and prevention at the local level. Some information 
failures in the market hindered the proper identification of Ebola patients. In addition, some 
behaviors such as avoiding health centers, movement between areas, and unsafe 
undertaking of corpses hampered prevention and containment efforts. This section provides 
an interpretation of the market failures during the outbreak. It first introduces the 
theoretical framework to explain how community and traditional leaders helped to correct 
some of these market failures. It then supports this framework by examining the market 
failures in the next two subsections: 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. 
 
5.3.1 Theoretical Contribution to Knowledge 
 
TLIs are the laws, norms, and behaviors that its members follow, and these 
institutions operate at the community level. The organizations of paramount chiefs, chiefs, 
clan leaders, councils, monarchs, youth leaders, and secret societies regulate these 
traditional norms and laws. Low transaction costs have defined institutional quality or good 
governance for economic growth (North, 1990; North, 1991; Pande and Udry, 2005; World 
Bank, 2002). Thus, this framework is narrowly applied to institutions that regulate the 
economy for economic change. This would exclude most rural-based institutions and 
instead focus on urbanized state institutions in a market-led growth model (Gray, 2016). 
The reduction of social costs and the correction of information failures in the market 
can also be factors of high institutional quality. Thus, the theoretical contribution is that TLIs 
engaged during rulemaking, monitoring, and engagement strategies during the outbreak to 
reduce social costs and correct information failures, which demonstrates high institutional 
quality. Furthermore, the eradication of EVD and improved social outcomes have an impact 
on the economy too. At the end of the Ebola epidemic, measures restricting movement 
were lifted and production and trade recommenced. 
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However, this does not mean that local leaders were able to resolve all costs, as 
some challenges are not governed by them. For example, infrastructure is governed by state 
institutions or aid resources are governed by donors and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs). 
5.3.2 Information Failures during the Epidemic 
 
There were skepticism and disbelief when EVD was detected in a distant county or 
district in 2014. This was across all socioeconomic backgrounds and levels of education. 
Warnings and public health campaigns from MHSW in Liberia and MOHS in Sierra Leone, 
lost credibility when vague and sometimes conflicting advice was issued such as ‘stay away 
from bushmeat.’ Scientists believe that some species of fruit bats and primates may 
transmit EVD to humans (Marí Saéz et al., 2015; Pourrut et al., 2005; Pourrut et al., 2007; 
Preston, 2012; Taylor, Leach, and Bruenn, 2010); however, common wild game observed in 
both countries were snails, slugs, deer, and fowl (often called ‘country chicken’). None of 
these kinds of bushmeat have been thought to carry EVD. Therefore, many people were 
skeptical as the information did not match what was happening on the ground. After the 
index case in Guinea in December 2013, all transmissions since then were human-to-human 
(Richards, 2016). Consequently, EVD cases (patients) were coming into the health centers 
without a history of encountering or eating the believed dangerous bushmeat. This led 
health workers to set aside concerns that these were potential EVD cases and not wear PPE 
when caring for these patients. It is common practice to choose when to wear PPE, as these 
supplies were highly limited and had to be used judiciously. 
Information on EVD also centered on hemorrhaging from bodily orifices 
(Dallatomasina et al., 2015; Richards, 2016). Thus, many health workers misdiagnosed EVD 
patients and consequently, this led to many deaths. Community members became fearful 
and mistrustful. Loved ones who were sick but did not show signs of unusual bleeding were 
misdiagnosed with Malaria or another common endemic disease. However, when these 
patients did not return from the health centers, it raised suspicions of nefarious activities or 
the perception of the low quality of care. Some people feared nosocomial infection of EVD 
since Infection Prevention Control (IPC) standards were not uniform across all centers. So, 
this information failure of EVD symptoms led to a social cost of misdiagnoses and 
community members avoiding the health centers. 
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Information on EVD focused on its deadliness, with informants saying they received 
information that is was lethal and incurable. Some also discussed witnessing health workers 
on their deathbeds. Therefore, journeying for many hours or days to reach an ETU or a large 
hospital was seen as a fruitless and costly endeavor by some. Many thought it was better to 
face what they thought was inevitable at home. These main information failures affected 
individual health seeking behaviors (consumers) and clinical management (health workers). 
TLIs in Sierra Leone helped correct these information failures through engagement 
strategies, such as holding town halls with health workers and organizing health 
sensitization in the communities. The mandatory reporting and isolation bylaws made it 
necessary for all sick persons and visitors to go to the health centers, not just those who 
may think they have EVD. However, if a health worker is misinformed on how to properly 
diagnose the disease, it may still lead to a social cost. In Liberia, community leaders and 
volunteers conducted health sensitization, referral, and escorting of sick persons to the 
health centers too. 
 
5.3.3 Social Costs and Negative Externalities 
 
As explained in Reubi (2016), there is often an assumption that in a free and 
competitive market, consumers bear all the costs for their decisions. However, sometimes a 
choice creates costs that are absorbed by other individuals: a social cost. Early treatment of 
a VHF can increase chances of survival. If a person is admitted to a health center and 
receives care from clinical professionals in isolation, it also reduces the risk of spreading the 
disease to relatives or community members (Lokuge et al., 2016; Okware et al, 2002; Roddy 
et al., 2007). 
However, those that did not seek treatment in this manner likely received care at 
home by family members, culminating grave risks of spreading EVD. The person is more 
likely to die incurring a private cost, but then family members are exposed to the virus too. 
In turn, family members also become ill, either one at a time or at the same time. At a 
macro level, this is a negative externality. This means that the social costs are greater than 
the private cost. Deciding to receive care at home, where family members may not wear 
PPE or are unskilled at wearing PPE may prolong the disease spread. Regulations and 
enforcement mechanisms, such as a community engagement strategy on contact tracing, 
are supposed to reduce social costs from a VHF outbreak, by monitoring and referring 
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affected individuals.120 As stated above, traditional and community leaders organized and 
participated in contact tracing to refer all sick persons and visitors to a health center. 
There were other social costs during the epidemic too. For example, some 
informants mentioned that health centers closed because health practitioners stopped 
working. Building from chapter one, health human resources (HRHs) have been very low 
since the end of the civil conflict (World Health Organization, 2012b). This is because the 
wars resulted in large displacement and expatriation of citizens, especially skilled 
professionals such as health workers. Nurses and doctors were the main victims of EVD, 
depleting an already scarce resource. In this case, the decision to stop working when HRHs 
were depleting is another social cost; some health centers closed down and the ones that 
remained open were overwhelmed. Bullard (2018) reports that a major NGO refused a 
financial donation and instead pleaded for more HRH volunteers to aid in the response, as 
capacity was needed and not money. Thus, this social cost had been difficult for traditional 
and community leaders to resolve as it is a supply-side barrier. 
Another social cost was undertaking and funerals (Davies, Bowley, and Roper, 2015; 
Enria, 2017; Parker and Allen, 2018; Parker et al., 2019; Richards et al., 2015; Richards, 
2016). Funerals were identified as high-risk events for transmitting the virus, as EVD is highly 
infectious on a corpse (Dallatomasina et al., 2015; Perry and Sayndee, 2017; Preston, 2012; 
Richards and Mokuwa, 2014). However, funeral rites in West Africa have a cultural and 
religious significance. Perry and Sayndee (2017) say these are communal gatherings as it is 
not an individual who arranges the ceremony but an entire family. Many families continued 
to bury their dead, whether in ‘secret’ to resist the ban or by violently keeping away burial 
teams and contact tracers (Wilkinson and Fairhead, 2017). Therefore, it seems that this 
social cost was largely due to cultural and religious factors, by people refusing to abandon 
their traditions. Bylaws banning funerals in Sierra Leone should have reduced this cost. 
However, there were other factors related to the environment and infrastructure that 
hampered efforts to reduce unsafe undertakings and burials, as explained below. 
5.3.3.1 Infrastructure and Policies leading to Social Costs 
 
                                                          
120 See section 2.6.2 on the dominant narrative of public health emergencies and how contact tracing efforts help 
eradicate a VHF outbreak. 
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The social costs of unsafe undertakings and burials are also linked to infrastructural 
and logistical problems during the Ebola epidemic. The literature explained some of the 
cultural and religious aspects (Richards, 2016; Wilkinson and Fairhead, 2017), but 
informants discussed that there were also state institutional failures that exacerbated this. 
Burial teams created to collect corpses and sometimes draw blood for testing were in low 
capacity. Corpses would sit in a home for days, despite calling the central hotline for a burial 
team. Thus, in the hot and humid rainy season during the height of the epidemic (April to 
August 2014)121 many families and community members felt that they had no choice but to 
give the deceased a proper burial. This state institutional failure would have undermined 
the ban on funerals passed by TLIs. 
As mentioned above, it is a social cost if a suspected EVD patient did not go to the 
hospital as soon as possible; misinformation is partly to blame for these decisions, but so is 
the infrastructure of the healthcare system and protocols of some external partners. Perry 
and Sayndee (2017) say that some relatives were unwilling to bring their loved ones to the 
health centers in Liberia because these facilities were known to have poor infrastructures 
such as lack of running water and no food. It was a concern that a sick person would 
deteriorate under these conditions. Therefore, the thesis holds that avoiding the health 
centers was partly linked to the structural problems of an under-resourced healthcare 
system, which undermined the mandatory reporting bylaw or referrals and escorting done 
by community leaders. In addition, during the outbreak many hospitals prohibited family 
members from entering the grounds to bring food or check on their relatives’ wellbeing. 
This also deterred referrals. However, in phase two, some donors and agencies changed this 
protocol to allow families to visit (Sharma et al., 2014). 
Another example to build on is from Abramowitz (2014)’s discussion of structural 
problems in Liberia; relatives of the sick called the state-run Ebola hotline for an ambulance, 
but help only arrived to retrieve and bury the corpses.122 Resources may have been 
prioritized for safe burial management, rather than making ambulances available to 
transport sick persons and to staff local health centers. This is probably because funerals 
were classified as high-risk for EVD, and ETUs in urban areas were prioritized rather than 
                                                          
121 The rainy seasons are from the end of April to July and again from September to October. Most road networks are dirt 
roads and it is extremely difficult to travel as these roads become muddy. There is also a rise in Malaria infections as 
stagnant pools of water become breeding grounds for mosquitos and attract other vermin. 
122 See this narrative discussed in chapter two, under section 2.7.1. 
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local centers. Thus, some aid interventions and policies may have hindered behavior 
changes, such as health seeking and resulted in undesired effects, such as at-home 
caregiving. 
PPE and drugs were consistently in short supply, so health workers had to judiciously 
use them, even during the outbreak. Some health workers modified their methods to not 
touch patients but admitted in some circumstances it had to be done such as a weak or 
falling patient. Informants were knowledgeable on biomedicine and understood that PPE 
prevents infections. However, the lack of these supplies often means using resources very 
judiciously (such as making one box of gloves last three months) or taking a chance to treat 
patients without them. If a health worker did not feel there was a risk, she or he may decide 
not to use PPE, hence why understanding EVD is important. This finding contradicts the 
perception that healthcare workers in developing countries lack knowledge of IPC or 
biomedical science (Abdullah and Kamara, 2017; Dixon, 2014; Keneally, 2014). Access to PPE 
needs to be considered, when examining decision making and poor IPC standards. Poor IPC 
standard was a social cost that could not be addressed by community-level leaders. 
The findings build on other research that shows community members did not comply 
with some control measures because of lack of trust of state institutions and not solely due 
to lack of biomedical knowledge (Blair, Morse, and Tsai, 2017; Boland and McKay, 2018; 
Morse et al., 2016; Vinck et al., 2019).123 The challenges mentioned in this subsection are 
governed by state or aid institutions and demonstrate that these barriers had hindered 
some behavior changes needed to reduce EVD spread and deaths. Thus, even though 
traditional and community leaders organized and passed regulations and participated in 
community-led engagement strategies; barriers governed by state or aid institutions could 
have undermined their efforts. Hence why it is crucial to consider other bylaws (banning 
handshakes or secret society rituals) or other locally-derived solutions (safer burials and 
garbage bag PPE) that do not affect the demand for aid resources, but rather are 
institutional changes to prevent or stop EVD. 
5.3.3.2 A Private Benefit leads to a Social Cost 
 
                                                          
123 See Parker and Allen’s response to the Boland and McKay (2018) post on the LSE blog, in the same url in Boland and 
McKay (2018). 
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Not all decisions or behaviors incurred a private cost to the individual. In fact, some 
behaviors incurred a benefit to the individual but still borne a negative externality to the 
wider community. 
Many health workers discussed leaving the health centers and refusing to work, 
which left many facilities closed and unable to provide services. As explained above, this 
incurred a negative externality as patients had to travel farther to ETUs for care, or 
nonEbola patients did not receive care for their conditions (e.g. pregnant women about to 
deliver). However, considering the framework by Becker and Becker (1997) and Reubi 
(2016) on social costs, a surprising finding is that the health workers who decided to stop 
working did not incur a private cost. 
An initial argument is that they lost a paycheck and therefore, were financially 
constrained, incurring a private cost. However, in this context, it is common for health 
workers to go months without a paycheck, and when one received remuneration, it 
sometimes did not come with back pay. Thus, it is difficult to argue that the health workers 
that stopped working were more financially affected than the ones that continued working. 
Rather, since health centers were also a source of EVD transmission (likely due to poor IPC), 
the thesis holds that those who stopped working and stopped risking their lives incurred a 
private benefit that came at a cost to the community. 
Some institutional failures such as not paying employees may translate into higher 
incentives for individuals to inflict social costs, given that there are no private costs 
associated with them. 
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 address the first research aim of the thesis. The first aim is to 
investigate the role of TLIs and community-level leaders during the epidemic in both 
countries. We identified the challenges that were not being addressed by state institutions 
and how traditional and community leaders supported efforts. This fulfilled both objectives 
under the first aim in these sections. 
5.4 Governance of the Outbreak 
 
This section addresses the first research objective under the second research aim: an 
examination of the narratives from health workers and community stakeholders regarding 
how the overall response governed the EVD outbreak. The first section presents the 
evidence-based contribution to knowledge, from the findings on how the EVD outbreak was 
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governed via a polycentric institutional response. Section 5.4.2 briefly recaps what 
polycentric governance is from chapter two. The remaining sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 present 
the evidence from each country on how multiple institutions governed and how this helped 
or hindered efforts to resolve the market failures. 
 
5.4.1. Evidence-Based Contribution to Knowledge 
 
The 2014 EVD outbreak was governed by multitier institutions that have their 
structures and regulations to address social problems. Using a market approach as discussed 
above, TLIs and community leaders can help overcome the challenges of trust, reputation, 
and legitimacy, which are demand-side barriers. These institutions are specifically tasked to 
address these issues and hence, were more effective at resolving information failures and 
social costs. Humanitarian and donor organizations were effective in governing the supply-
side of the market, by bringing these tangible resources such as PPE, ambulances, fuel, 
drugs, funding, and HRHs. 
This evidence is derived from the data, but a market approach makes some 
assumptions around the decision making of consumers (citizens) and producers (donors and 
NGOs). Interpretation of this evidence may oversimplify the governance challenges. For 
example, demand-side barriers can be due to environmental and infrastructural problems 
that hinder the efficient delivery of goods and services. Lack of strong road networks has 
been mentioned in the literature and interviews as challenges for external partners to reach 
remote areas and for community members to reach ETUs. Therefore, neither TLIs nor 
external partners are equipped to address this challenge, as it relies on state institutions, 
and it could still result in a market failure. 
This analysis provides a relatively simple explanation for how rulemaking and 
monitoring changed behaviors in the community and the international response governed 
the supply of aid resources. However, the reality is more complex; rulemaking, monitoring, 
and enforcement were not effective everywhere, especially as communities organized 
differently in Liberia and there were some areas in Sierra Leone where some bylaws were 
not as effective. 
 
5.4.2 Recap of Polycentric Governance 
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Building on chapter two,124 polycentric governance is where institutions are 
designed at each level to meet specific governance challenges (Oström, 1990; Oström, 
2010). This literature discusses polycentric governance for the communal management of 
resources as opposed to a market approach to manage them. Common goods are defined as 
goods that are rivalrous but nonexcludable (Brousseau, Dedeurwaerdere, and Siebenhüner, 
2012). 
This arrangement is different from the decentralization of command or resources. 
Each institution is responsible for commanding and securing resources to address challenges 
in its jurisdiction. These institutions are locally managed, have higher social capital, trusted 
leaders make the rules, and they live inside the affected communities and thus, will be 
affected too (Acheson, 2000; Oström, 1990; Oström, 2010). 
Sawyer (2004; 2005b) argue that the Mano River region would benefit from 
peacekeeping and delivery of public goods with taskforces designed locally and across 
provincial lines. Moreover, these could add resiliency to national governing agreements and 
strategies. He says that social capital can mobilize people to self-govern. However, 
Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014) argue that social capital can have negative 
consequences for development such as patrimonialism. 
The thesis holds that polycentric governance was observed during the 2014 EVD 
outbreak. The challenges of trust and legitimacy of state institutions were demonstrated in 
chapter one and the thesis builds on it by explaining how these led to demand-side barriers. 
In other words, state institutions were not able to affect behavior changes via decentralizing 
resources alone. For example, the Afrobarometer data show that local elected officials do 
not enjoy the same levels of trust and influence as traditional leaders (Afrobarometer, 
2019).125 However, while they prefer TLIs, this does not mean community members do not 
want reform of these institutions either (Sesay, 2019; Van den Boogaard, Prichard, and 
Jibao, 2019). Community members tend to identify their communities as part of a clan or 
chiefdom, and not always by the geographical demarcations where the state and external 
partners usually channel resources (Baldwin, 2015; Mulbah, 2018; Wilkinson et al., 2017). 
This may explain why sometimes aid and government resources do not penetrate the 
community. However, this does not mean that support for TLIs is a substitution for state 
                                                          
124 See section 2.2.1 on polycentric governance. 
125 See Afrobarometer data listed in Tables 1.6 to 1.17 starting on page 33. 
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institutions, as prior research shows, both authorities must collaborate to bring stronger 
development outcomes (Baldwin, 2015; Van der Windt et al., 2018). 
 
5.4.3 Organizing in Liberia 
 
The types of organizing and engagement varied from community to community. 
Therefore, there were no consistent emergency management regulations from local 
institutions implemented throughout the country, except for the government’s policies. If 
one neighborhood implements isolation, but someone becomes sick or dies and safe 
transport does not occur, then people are essentially quarantined with an active case. 
Likewise, door-to-door health sensitization may improve knowledge, but if an undetected 
case can enter or leave a neighborhood, then it is unclear how this alone affects EVD 
incidences on a broader scale. 
Arguably, trusted and well-known leaders can implement systems that fit the local 
context, so having exact emergency procedures from community to community may not be 
necessary. For example, if a health center was closed in a remote village, then it may not 
make sense to have a mandatory reporting law. Rather, local leaders may prefer health 
sensitization and distribution of PPE to lower the risks of infection during at-home 
caregiving. Whereas another neighborhood that I visited in the field, was a mere walking 
distance from the county hospital. Therefore, local organizing efforts in that neighborhood 
focused on escorting sick persons to the hospital. 
5.4.3.1 Challenges of Coordinating with External Partners 
 
Community stakeholders described the partnership between local, national, and 
international actors as less cooperative than the health workers did. Informants started 
organizing before phase two and report not receiving assistance or supplies from donors or 
NGOs. Likewise, Kirsch et al. (2017) and Nyenswah, Engineer, and Peters (2016)126 say that 
while supplies from donors were an important contribution, much of it was brought too 
little too late. The priorities of international donors127 did not always match those of the 
government or local communities (Nyenswah, Engineer, and Peters, 2016). The findings 
support Kirsch et al. (2017)’s and Nyenswah, Engineer, and Peters (2016)’s research on 
                                                          
126 Tolbert Nyenswah was appointed by President Johnson-Sirleaf to lead the central taskforce during the EVD outbreak. 
127 This article refers to all humanitarian, funder, and donor agencies as ‘donors.’ 
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leadership problems during the outbreak; and builds on chapter one’s discussion of aid 
during the outbreak (Benton and Dionne, 2015; Kickbusch and Reddy, 2015; Moon et al., 
2015).128 Thus, the coordination of multitier institutions had some challenges that were 
political in nature. For example, Nyenswah, Engineer, and Peters (2016) discuss taskforce 
meetings in Monrovia where government officials had identified local community groups, 
such as a church conducting community engagement, but the donors declined to assist 
because these leaders were “unknown” to them. 
The supply of aid resources and how these were channeled were impacted by 
political considerations and not necessarily finding the best mechanism to resolve demand-
side barriers. Kirsch et al. (2017) and Nyenswah, Engineer, and Peters (2016) describe 
donors and NGOs as unwilling to relinquish control of supplies and sometimes not work 
alongside the centrally created taskforce (state institution). In a public health emergency, 
donors and humanitarians are sensitive to media coverage and want to be presented as one 
of the main responders. This can undermine strategies created by state institutions or 
community and traditional leaders to address the demand-side barriers. 
5.4.3.2 Health workers’ narratives: aid resources did help 
 
This analysis of Liberia presents an interesting enigma. The health workers that were 
interviewed felt the supply of aid resources greatly benefited them; many returned to the 
health facilities once equipment, medicine, IPC training, and regular salaries were available. 
By the end of September 2014, Liberia had the highest HRH casualties, out of the three 
West African countries at the epicenter of the epidemic, with nearly 200 deaths of workers 
(World Health Organization, 2015c). So, some did not return to work and the ones that 
continued limited contact with patients and visitors. As explained above, this was a social 
cost that hindered EVD containment and aid helped to resolve these particular costs. 
Since donors and NGOs were bringing clinical resources that are key to a biomedical 
strategy, it makes sense that health workers felt more positive of international aid than 
community stakeholders who are not clinical practitioners. However, informants did not 
discuss donors or NGOs as having strengths to address the demand-side barriers. Local 
leaders and volunteers were identified for doing so. Therefore, there was a polycentric 
                                                          
128 See section 1.6.1 on supply-side challenges to the Ebola outbreak. 
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arrangement where aid was supplied by international actors and community leaders acted 
to address some of the demand-side barriers. 
5.4.4 Rulemaking in Sierra Leone 
 
Traditional and community leaders organized through legal authority and social 
capital. TLIs and leaders could not overcome some barriers, such as the slow response from 
the burial teams or poor IPC standards at health centers, which were partly responsible for 
the social costs. The common thread among all community stakeholders interviewed was 
that they felt the government’s response was not effective and after witnessing the 
tragedies of the disease, they needed to act. 
5.4.4.1 Deliberative Process and Social Capital 
 
Enria (2017), Wilkinson and Fairhead (2017), and Wilkinson et al. (2017) say that 
local engagement strategies were not democratic and that the bylaws were passed in an 
authoritarian manner. It is interpreted that the authors believe the chiefs are undemocratic 
because they do not come into power through a liberal democratic election. However, they 
did not explore the deliberative democratic processes that are common in indigenous 
societies in West Africa or how chiefs remain accountable (Baldwin, 2015; Bulte, Richards, 
and Voors, 2018; Mulbah, 2018). 
A limitation of the good governance framework is that it relies on short-term interest 
as a rationale for cooperation. An analysis is needed to understand why there is long-term 
cooperation in societies. Baldwin (2015) says that short-term election cycles can sometimes 
incentivize officials to create policies to promote him or her for the next campaign and not 
long-term policies to benefit the community. Thus, coming into power by an electorate does 
not guarantee accountability or good governance, but trust and delivery of public goods can 
be an indicator. However, patrimonialism as discussed by Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 
(2014) can create inequalities as those who are connected would benefit more from the 
unequal redistribution of goods or services. Building on this, we would expect that the chief 
(the one who initiated the bylaws) would have campaigned for more aid or public goods for 
his chiefdom so that he could redistribute these resources via patron-client networks. 
Indeed, this would also fulfill short-term interests for cooperation. Instead, he gambled on 
his reputation to pass restrictive laws on people’s intimate lives such as banning 
handshakes. 
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So how come this paramount chief had not decided to use his connections to bring 
an ETU to his town, as this may have also shown good will or score political points? Van der 
Windt and Voors (2020) say it is because TLIs live in the community and would be affected 
too, so they established bylaws. However, building on chapter one’s discussion regarding 
the infrastructure of the health system and condition of aid resources (Herricks and Brooks, 
2018), the findings show that the limitations of the health systems were well-known; people 
knew that NGOs were largely propping up the system and their aid was not sustainable. 
There was a mistrust of state institutions and the health system. In terms of 
institutional response, his (the chief) experiences may have led him to decide to create 
emergency management rules as a more effective means to address the demand-side 
barriers instead of advocating for supplies alone. Therefore, only advocating for more aid 
would not have been good governance in terms of dismantling stigma or ‘risky’ behaviors. 
5.4.4.2 Challenges in Polycentric Governance 
 
Polycentric governance arrangements assume each institution can resolve a specific 
challenge. Thus, when delivering public goods and services, institutions at each level must 
interact and coexist effectively to address all aspects of a social problem. 
However, political and logistical problems may have undermined cooperation 
between and even within institutions (McNeil Jr., 2014). For example, there were allegations 
of incompetence and corruption in state institutions, due to the failure to expedite donated 
supplies through entry ports. This was because of a disputed shipping fee of $6,500 dollars 
(DePinto, 2016). This delayed some vital supplies from entering the country. Therefore, aid 
organizations are limited in addressing this barrier as the state is better positioned to 
resolve this. Additionally, some informants believed they would be paid during the 
outbreak, but some were not paid, and it was an external partner who advised against a 
salary for the health workers. TLIs have no control over this, and thus this policy may have 
created incentives for health workers to inflict social costs, by leaving the health centers and 
making the mandatory reporting bylaw less effective. 
Although DePinto (2016) argues that corruption from domestic authorities hindered 
the distribution of aid resources, building from chapter two, we see that party politics and 
poor coordination between the government and international responders were also factors 
(Ross, Welch, and Angelides, 2017). Political in-fighting meant that some actors dragged 
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their feet to sabotage President Koroma’s efforts, which also impacted the state and 
traditional institutions’ effectiveness. 
Likewise, not all traditional leaders felt that external actors had worked with them 
after phase two. Some NGOs entered and set up operations without alerting local 
authorities in Sierra Leone (Pedi et al., 2017). This not only undermined their authority but 
possibly hindered local coordination and engagement efforts too. Furthermore, not every 
area experienced a scaled-up response as aid resources were concentrated in the western 
and northern provinces and not where the epidemic began in the east (Boland and McKay, 
2018; World Health Organization, 2014a). 
When the bylaws were scaled up to a national strategy, state resources such as 
military and police personnel became available for monitoring and enforcement. Some 
informants say coordination with state institutions was effective, such as assistance with 
checkpoints and contact tracing. However, some also say that sending the military to enact 
isolation led to negative consequences in some communities as this did not consult with 
local stakeholders first. This builds on Enria (2017)’s findings on the use of state resources to 
enforce the bylaws. This could have been an ineffective arrangement between institutions 
in some areas if local stakeholders were not engaged first. However, it does not support 
that the use of the military was authoritarian as it will be discussed further below. 
The evidence provides valuable lessons learned from this outbreak, specifically if 
community-level leaders are engaged in dialogue in order to coordinate with other actors. 
The final section examines these lessons for policy implications on future disease outbreaks. 
 
5.5 Policy Implications 
 
This section addresses the final objective under the second research aim: an 
examination of the literature regarding the community’s impact on aid resources. Sections 
5.4 and 5.5 address the second research aim: the links between community engagement 
and aid resources in a public health emergency. Informants from Sierra Leone and Liberia 
felt that local engagement efforts made a significant difference in stopping EVD 
transmission and deaths. Communities in both countries began acting independently before 
PHEIC in August 2014, and this diminishes the current narrative of the impact from donors 
and humanitarians. This raises questions regarding future outbreaks, such as how to create 
more integrative responses between international and local actors or whether aid was 
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helpful. However, no one that I spoke with thought that this should replace aid resources, 
even informants who were critical of the initial response. In fact, it was mentioned that the 
bylaws in Sierra Leone allowed workers and volunteers to do their jobs more effectively in 
terms of being able to enter communities safely. 
 
5.5.1 Policy Contribution to Knowledge 
 
There is a narrative that strengthening the health systems in West Africa and other 
low-income countries will help in emergency preparedness (Kentikelenis et al., 2014; 
Kickbusch and Reddy, 2015; O’Hare, 2015; Rabkin and El-Sadr, 2015; Vandi et al., 2017). The 
thesis does not argue against this lesson, but it also offers another lesson learned. Evidence-
based findings of a polycentric response indicate that for future emergencies, domestic 
governments and local communities should aim to develop a multi-level institutional 
infrastructure to respond. This would not be done through vertical training. Each country, 
and communities within those countries, may already have something in place. Rather it 
should be a bilateral knowledge exchange to see what infrastructure exists and how 
domestic and international resources can support an active community-led response; 
instead of communities being expected to support a vertical response as discussed in 
chapter two (Lamunu et al., 2004; Okware et al., 2002; Roddy et al., 2007; U.K. Department 
for International Development, 2011).129 
The rationale behind this policy recommendation is to have local communities 
prepared to quickly mobilize resources to contain a suspicious disease outbreak at the 
epicenter. However, the unintended consequences may be in identifying those in the 
communities to lead the response. Ideally, community leaders should be identified in the 
field and internally within communities, rather than vertically by domestic governments or 
external partners. This would avoid having resented actors in charge as discussed by 
Wilkinson et al. (2017). If those who are in charge do not have the trust and legitimacy from 
the community, then they would be much less effective at bringing down the demand-side 
barriers in the next disease outbreak. 
                                                          
129 Although the thesis observed supply and demand factors through community and international actors, the state is a 
central actor in all emergencies, especially as aid resources are channeled through this network. So, state institutions 
should engage in a bilateral knowledge exchange with local leaders to determine how aid resources should complement 
efforts. 
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5.5.2 Did the Bylaws Work? 
 
As mentioned in chapter two, there is a debate on whether the bylaws in Sierra 
Leone were an effective response during the EVD outbreak.130 Local community 
engagement efforts were discussed using Scott (1992)’s concept of hidden transcripts 
because the dominant narrative in the academic and gray literature depicts a donor or 
humanitarian agency as the central actor channeling clinical resources through government 
ministries to resolve supply and demand-side barriers. If community stakeholders are 
mentioned, they are seen being trained for engagement efforts (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2007; Fallah et al., 2016; Georges et al., 1999; Lokuge et al., 2016; Muñoz, 
2017; Okware et al., 2002; Onyango et al., 2007; Roddy et al., 2007; U.K. Department for 
International Development, 2011; World Health Organization, 2007; World Health 
Organization, 2009; World Health Organization, 2014a). This hidden transcript on the bylaws 
challenges the conventional knowledge that Western-derived aid resources are effective on 
their own in such public health emergencies. 
The hidden transcript emerging from the findings reveal that a paramount chief from 
the Kailahun district initiated a collective action with other chiefs, traditional authorities, 
and health workers to mobilize an emergency management response (Richards, 2016). To 
the contrary, a WHO report (a public transcript) says that it was an NGO and WHO-led 
district taskforce that recruited community stakeholders and the paramount chiefs to “kick 
EVD out of the district” (World Health Organization, 2014a). It also claims to have mounted 
a response when it was first notified of EVD in West Africa, before declaring a PHEIC 
(Ippolito, Di Caro, and Capobianchi, 2015). However, the agency was heavily criticized for a 
slow response (Moon et al., 2015). The WHO Director-General maintained that the WHO 
was not an emergency response agency when defending the agency’s intervention timelines 
(Fink, 2014). It appears that this narrative is an attempt to both deflect responsibility and 
take credit for declining EVD cases at the same time. It is a fact, however, that those EVD 
cases were already declining before the WHO officially intervened (Kouadio et al., 2015; 
World Health Organization, 2014a). The thesis holds that this is thanks to the bylaws 
implemented by traditional authorities in Sierra Leone and community leaders organizing in 
Liberia. 
                                                          
130 See chapter two, sections 2.7.3 and 2.7.4. 
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5.5.2.1 The Governance of Chiefs 
 
The thesis builds on the literature of how chiefs are governing for social or economic 
outcomes (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson, 2014; Baker, 2007; Baldwin, 2015; Beekman, 
Bulte, and Nillesen, 2013; Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen, 2014; Casey, Glennerster, and 
Miguel, 2012; Dia, 1996; Pande and Udry, 2005; Sesay, 2019; Tokpa and Yengbeh Jr., 2012; 
UNDEF, 2014; Unsworth, 2010). It further develops the arguments that support for 
traditional leaders rely on cultural and religious legitimacy (Adjei, Busia, and Bob-Milliar, 
2017; Fanthorpe, 1998; Fanthorpe, 2001; Fanthorpe, 2006; Logan, 2013; Sesay, 2019; Ubink, 
2008). The thesis does not disagree with the premise of this argument, although cultural 
and religious authority varies from state to state and within states. The literature has largely 
confined traditional leaders as having authority over customary law (Adjei, Busia, and Bob-
Milliar, 2017; Bulte et al., 2013; Castillejo, 2009; Fanthorpe, 2001; Fanthorpe, 2006; Khan 
and Mehmood, 2016; Mamdani, 2001; Richards, 2005; Sawyer, 2008; Seidler, 2014; 
Sevareid, 1993; Ubink, 2008). However, their powers and jurisdiction are more broadly 
defined and they do act on behalf of state institutions, for example, to collect taxes 
(Chieftaincy Act, 2009; Local Government Act, 2015; Local Government Act of 2018, 2018; 
The Local Government Act, 2004). Thus, the demonstration of emergency management 
regulations builds on this argument too. 
The findings show that cultural and religious foundations are only the beginning of 
understanding the authority of traditional leaders in this case study and across the region. 
As explained in section 5.2.3, ‘culture’ is used in some public transcripts as vague 
explanations for locally-derived solutions without always considering overall political, 
economic, and structural factors. And in some public transcripts on public health 
emergencies, these leaders are broadly lumped into a stakeholder category with few details 
on how they were engaged in emergency management (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2007; Enserink, 2005; Lamunu et al., 2004; Roddy et al., 2007). In this case, they 
are seen as cultural interpreters or cultural mediators, placing the onus on select persons to 
‘demystify’ local customs that seem ‘odd’ to responders or to change cultural practices to 
create a demand for aid resources. While the findings showed that local institutions did 
change behaviors to increase demand (such as mandatory reporting) other bylaws or 
solutions that were not directly connected to the demand for aid, helped to prevent EVD 
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too. These were institutional changes (e.g. banning secret society rituals, freedom of 
movement, and funerals, limiting okada drivers, garbage bag PPE, mandatory handwashing). 
5.5.2.2 Authoritarian or State-Captured Response 
 
Enria (2017) argues that the bylaws were not effective everywhere and often 
contributed to mobilizing authoritarian structures, such as the military. It is not clear from 
the findings how often police or military resources were used, except for some informants 
who mentioned violations or seeing military presence at checkpoints. State resources, such 
as the military and police were made available after the President’s emergency declaration. 
This is a common protocol when a national emergency is declared in Western countries too 
(Reich, 2002; Relyea, 1976). For example, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina was declared an 
emergency and the National Guard (a military branch) was mobilized (Davis et al., 2007) and 
such resources were also available for public health emergencies in the United States too 
(Executive Office of the President, 2009; National Vaccine Information Center, 2009; Starr, 
2009). In addition, emergencies were declared for desegregation efforts to keep order.131 
So, it is unclear why these enforcement mechanisms are authoritarian in West Africa’s 
context if they are consistently used in Western societies too. Or if this means that 
generally, military interventions in an emergency are authoritarian. 
The thesis’ message is not a call for more military intervention, as securitizing health 
can be problematic too (McInnes, 2016). The reliance on security to justify cooperation 
reduces humanitarianism to a lesser priority. Additionally, military personnel may not have 
experience conducting health interventions, and may sometimes provide poor quality of 
care (Davies and Rushton, 2016). But what transpires in public health emergencies is that 
the public transcript is predominantly used to feature Western heroism, and it also ignores 
or marginalizes efforts by local volunteers. For example, McMahon et al. (2017)’s study in 
multiple districts where community members took turns to man checkpoints or other 
activities to enforce the bylaws. 
                                                          
131 The United States has a long history of legal segregation, and in the 1950s when school districts began to integrate 
(bussing Black children to all-White schools), these schools, and often the Black children were targets of angry mobs, 
violence, and harassment. So, emergency declarations were made so that the National Guard would come and keep order. 
Often, the local police force would not have the resources to do so or perhaps the officers were compromised (meaning 
they were White supremacists too). See Drone (2005), Edelman (1973), Gordon (1994), and McMillen (1971) for further 
reading. Today, some school districts are still integrating, but this level of violence to declare it an emergency does not 
often occur. 
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Another argument against the bylaws is that the chieftaincy can be subject to state 
capture, meaning the bylaws may be an extension of the state’s will (Wilkinson et al., 2017). 
At the time, the ruling party was the All People’s Congress (APC), which had historically been 
less supportive of TLIs as a political institution (Harris, 2013; Tangri, 1980). Considerable 
violence had been used in the past to convert or oust chiefs who would not switch their 
allegiance to the ruling political party. This strategy went as far as banning local 
governments (Harris, 2013). While this does not refute the argument of state capture 
generally, a closer examination of the political and social relations between TLIs and the 
state is needed to explore if this phenomenon of rulemaking had been captured by state 
institutions. It is not clear what the incentive would be for chiefs, especially those favoring 
the opposition party during an election cycle, to implement the incumbent’s mandate. 
Thus, as mentioned in chapters one and two, identity politics is a staple in Liberian 
and Sierra Leonean politics. There were also some missteps mentioned by informants such 
as the (APC) minister sending troops to the Eastern region without consulting local 
stakeholders. However, while much had been speculated in the past regarding ethno-
regional tensions in Sierra Leone and how this would affect collaboration of community-
level and state institutions (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Hanlon, 2005; Harris, 2013; Richards, 
2005). The bylaws that started in the Mende chiefdoms transcended identity politics. 
5.5.2.3 Two Bylaws 
 
The public and hidden transcripts narrowly examine two controversial bylaws: the 
ban on funerals and that on at-home caregiving. The dominant narrative is that these 
activities are risky behaviors that spread EVD, or in other words, ‘bad behaviors’ (Boland and 
McKay, 2018; Carter et al., 2017; Dietz et al., 2015; Enserink, 2005; Lokuge et al., 2016; 
Maxmen, 2015a; Richards, and Mokuwa, 2014; Roddy et al., 2007). However, the findings 
show that several behaviors were adapted under the bylaws to prevent EVD such as 
handwashing, curfews, limited movement, no touching (including handshakes), and the ban 
on some secret society rituals such as genital circumcision. Most of the bylaws were still in 
place during fieldwork in 2017 and health workers noted that these continued practices 
were also decreasing other health problems, like diarrhea and Cholera. The narrow focus on 
these two bylaws painted broad narratives across the transcripts. For example, religion and 
superstition trumping over Western scientific knowledge (Gerlach, 2016); community 
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resistance to structural violence and international responders (Wilkinson and Fairhead, 
2017); or that the entire strategy was ineffective and demonstrated poor governance 
(Boland and McKay, 2018; Enria, 2017; Wilkinson et al., 2017). 
Abramowitz et al. (2015), Parker and Allen (2018), Parker et al. (2019), Perry and 
Sayndee (2017), Richards (2016), and Van der Windt and Voors (2020) broadly argue that 
local communities used local knowledge in the hidden transcript, but like the authors of the 
public transcript they focus on the concepts of funerals and caregiving and how they were 
made safer to reduce EVD. Handshaking and greeting in West Africa has a cultural 
significance and transmits the virus just as easily too, but this example was not used to 
discuss the effectiveness of the bylaws or people’s science (Connolly, 2015; Doyle, 2014). 
Other behavior changes like movement, rituals, or handwashing that the findings show 
helped to reduce EVD cases, were also not fully explored in the literature. The hidden 
transcripts could have expanded their argument on a people’s science if these had discussed 
the bylaws more holistically and comprehensively at impacting all behaviors, and not just 
two. 
5.5.2.4 More Aid Can Help 
 
The public transcript not only claimed that local response efforts were ineffective or 
poorly governed, but also that aid resources substituted these governance institutions 
(Boland and McKay, 2018). The public transcript calls for more aid resources in public health 
emergencies without considering that this contradicts the long-term goals of development 
aid initiatives to build self-sustainable systems. Thus, the public transcript is unclear on how 
aid can substitute poor governance while arguing that aid resources resolved the outbreak. 
As discussed in chapter two, there have been several case studies that created 
community development committees to improve community participation and local 
governance. These have had mixed results, but the goal was to improve governance, which 
was defined differently in each study (Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012; Chhibber, 
Laajaj, and Bain, 2006; Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein, 2009; McMahon et al., 2017; 
Voors and Bulte, 2014). In some cases, we did see TLIs involved to expedite development 
projects (Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012) or pass bylaws for health governance 
(McMahon et al., 2017). The thesis holds that the paramount chiefs in the eastern provinces 
of Sierra Leone, who enacted emergency management regulations soon after the first case 
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was identified in the country, or community organizers in Monrovia conducting door to door 
distribution of buckets, are indicators of governance, response, and accountability. 
However, some of these efforts were hampered by external actors not contributing their 
resources towards it. This may be because donors were unwilling to relinquish control of 
their resources (Kirsch et al., 2017; Nyenswah, Engineer, and Peters, 2016). Furthermore, 
findings show that governance failures cannot always be assumed to be institutional failures 
of TLIs, rather there were logistical and infrastructural barriers that may have reduced the 
impact of the bylaws (for example closed health centers or slow burial teams). Therefore, 
this underlines the need for bilateral knowledge exchange in future outbreaks. 
While any country would have struggled to contain EVD in an outbreak of this size 
and would also need external assistance; the public transcript on this outbreak marginalized 
the efforts of local actors and elevated the impact of external actors (Cenciarelli et al., 2015; 
Dhillon and Kelly, 2015; Elemuwa et al., 2015; Fallah et al., 2016; Fu, Roberton, and 
Burnham, 2015; Hagan et al., 2015; Laverack and Manoncourt, 2016; Lokuge et al., 2016; 
Olu et al., 2016; World Health Organization, 2014a). 
Although this section focuses on Sierra Leone, as discussed in chapter two, this is a 
trend in the literature on public health emergencies (Allaranga et al., 2010; Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2007; Cohen, 2018; Enserink, 2005; Georges et al., 1999; 
Ilunga Kalenga et al., 2019; Lamunu et al., 2004; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2018a; Médecins 
Sans Frontières, 2018b; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2019; Moran, 2018; Msyamboza et al., 
2014; Muñoz, 2017; Nkengasong and Onyebujoh, 2018; Okware et al., 2002; Onyango et al., 
2007; Roddy et al., 2007; U.K. Department for International Development, 2011; World 
Health Organization, 2007; World Health Organization, 2009). 
This trend continues, as this statement from the WHO summarizes who the key 
actors were at resolving one of the EVD outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 
July 2018. 
The outbreak was contained due to the tireless efforts of local teams, the support of partners, the generosity of donors, and 
the effective leadership of the Ministry of Health. That kind of leadership, allied with strong collaboration between partners, 
saves lives,” said Dr. Tedros132 (World Health Organization, 2018e, p. 2). 
 
Thus, a public transcript on the 2014 EVD outbreak would not examine local self-
organizing as a central effort to eradicate a disease, as the thesis does below. 
                                                          
132 Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus is the current Director-General and the first African person to lead the WHO. 
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5.5.2.5 Outcomes: The Secondary Data 
 
In past interventions, contact tracing was crucial to finding hidden cases in the 
communities and monitoring them for symptoms, early treatment can improve chances of 
survival from EVD (Okware et al., 2002; Pourrut et al., 2005). Therefore, a review of the new 
cases and death figures provided by the WHO may shed light on how effectively each 
country was able to mobilize and find hidden cases. 
According to the WHO’s Ebola situation report, West Africa was declared Ebola-free 
by June 2016, with a minimum of 42 days of no newly reported cases (World Health 
Organization, 2016d). Sierra Leone reported 14,124 total cases and 3,956 deaths and Liberia 
reported 10,675 cases and 4,809 deaths due to EVD during the entire outbreak period 
(World Health Organization, 2016a). The death ratio in Sierra Leone was 28%, while in 
Liberia it was 45% of EVD cases, according to these figures provided. Sierra Leone identified 
more EVD cases than Liberia, at almost 4,000 more new cases, but it recorded nearly a 
thousand fewer deaths than Liberia (World Health Organization, 2016a). Additionally, Sierra 
Leone was the first in the Mano River region to be declared and remain free of EVD through 
the end of the outbreak, whereas Liberia had to be re-declared four times, because of 
discoveries of hidden EVD cases (Bullard, 2018; World Health Organization, 2016d). I 
interpret that these results are due to Sierra Leone’s nationalized organizing strategy to go 
door-to-door to find hidden cases. However, this strategy was built on the bylaws that 
mandated referrals and isolation and were enforced at the community level by TLIs and 
community stakeholders. Additionally, a legal strategy was not the sole manner behind the 
paramount chiefs’ response, such as local institutional changes. Traditional leaders 
participated in other efforts too, such as reintegrating EVD survivors in the communities and 
social capital was used to legitimize the response efforts and engage the community. 
 
5.5.3 Implications for Aid 
 
The public transcript is dominated by narratives from Western volunteers and aid 
resources, who worked during the EVD outbreak (Bullard, 2018; Walsh and Johnson, 2018). 
However, non-Western aid resources or actors have not gotten this same level of attention, 
including those who died in this humanitarian effort (Agaba, 2014; BBC News, 2014; Daily 
Observer, 2014; Green, 2014; Schubert, 2014). Donors and NGOs are sensitive to how they 
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are perceived in a high-profile case, as Boland and McKay (2018) indicated regarding the 
lack of the responders’ perspective in Parker and Allen (2018)’s fieldwork on community 
engagement. On the one hand, a narrative that does not feature the external actor as 
central to these engagements may lead funders and donors to ask why they are supporting 
these NGOs. However, by marginalizing the responses of local communities, we risk ignoring 
the challenges of integrating a multilevel response. Take for example, the recent EVD 
epidemic in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the failure to contain and eradicate the 
disease, despite the fact that this country has had repeated outbreaks of EVD (Beaumont, 
2019; Ebola Gbalo Research Group, 2019; Vinck et al., 2019; World Health Organization, 
2019b).133 These are not solely the obstacles of biomedical knowledge or cultural practices. 
Indeed, in Parker’s and Allen’s response, they say that there have always been challenges in 
integrating international, national, and local efforts (Boland and McKay, 2018). 
Thus, the implications from this research are that aid resources are ineffective on 
their own at resolving public health emergencies such as the 2014 Ebola outbreak, and that 
future responses need to penetrate and engage communities if the demand-side barriers 
are to be brought down. The thesis demonstrated that failing to follow such guidelines may 
mean international responses are not only less effective but also potentially damaging to 
local efforts, something which would lead to the imposition of high social costs. 
5.6 Summary 
 
This chapter brought together the findings and literature to have a comprehensive 
discussion of the theoretical and empirical knowledge of the case study. It began by 
understanding the informants’ perceptions of state institutional failures and the 
international community’s response. We learned that perceptions of institutional failure 
were not just about the delivery of resources, but also accountability, leadership, and trust, 
hence the lack of social capital and breakdown of social cohesion. Locally-derived solutions 
addressed some of these issues via interventions from traditional and community leaders. 
This finding builds on Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014), Baldwin (2015), and Bulte, 
Richards, and Voors (2018) on the role of social capital to legitimize response efforts. Hence, 
a surprising finding was that health workers were legitimized via local efforts to report and 
                                                          
133 The EVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo was announced in August 2018 and was declared a PHEIC in July 
2019. 
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escort people to the health centers for screening. This was not examined before (Parker and 
Allen, 2018; Parker et al., 2019; Richards, 2016). Furthermore, it builds on Hewlett and 
Hewlett (2008)’s research on communities self-organizing during EVD outbreaks and the 
research from Abramowitz et al. (2015), Pailey (2017), and Parker et al. (2019) on 
communities’ responses due to aid and state institutional failures. This section also 
discussed how locally-derived solutions are portrayed in mainstream academic and gray 
sources, depicting these as cultural oddities or discrediting them; this builds on Leach and 
Hewlett (2010)’s research on outbreak narratives. 
The next section 5.3 was the market approach of what prevented the identification 
and containment of EVD and how community-level institutions addressed these market 
failures. However, some market failures were created by the weak infrastructure. For 
example, in areas where burial teams could not respond in a timely fashion, this left no 
choice for community members except to bury the decease, despite knowing the risks of 
EVD. Thus, local institutional interventions were limited in addressing some of the demand-
side barriers. However, high institutional quality was demonstrated through the reduction 
of information failures and social costs, where changes in health seeking behavior led to a 
higher demand for aid resources, or in some places, institutional changes led to safer 
behaviors such as banning secret society rituals. 
A surprising finding was that some policies or failures by state and aid institutions 
imposed high social costs by eliminating private costs. For example, not paying health 
workers led some to leave their centers, especially since the risk of getting EVD was high. 
This would have undermined efforts by traditional and community leaders to refer sick 
people. Funerals were prioritized as ‘high-risk’, which eventually led to more resources into 
creating burial teams, but not safe transport of the sick or to staff rural health centers; since 
the ETUs were in urban areas and therefore attracted local human resources. 
Section 5.4 discussed governance of the epidemic with multiple institutions. It 
presented polycentric governance (Oström, 2010; Sawyer, 2004), as an evidence-based 
finding of how the epidemic was governed with a market approach of supply and demand 
factors. It concluded that external partners had strengths in governing the supply-side of the 
market and community-level leaders had strengths in governing the demand-side barriers. 
However, there were instances of tension that prevented both sides from fully integrating, 
such as donors’ control on resources and sensitivity to how they are perceived in the media 
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(Nyenswah, Engineer, and Peters, 2016). Additionally, there was political infighting and 
corruption within state institutions (Ross, Welch, and Angelides, 2017). And as mentioned 
above, some policies undermined community-led strategies and inflicted social costs. 
In the case of traditional leaders, this finding of emergency management regulations 
and bottom-up rulemaking builds on the literature regarding the role and powers of chiefs, 
which has mainly been confined to customary law and courts (Adjei, Busia, and Bob-Milliar, 
2017; Bulte et al., 2013; Castillejo, 2009; Fanthorpe, 2001; Fanthorpe, 2006; Khan and 
Mehmood, 2016; Mamdani, 2001; Richards, 2005; Sawyer, 2008; Seidler, 2014; Sevareid, 
1993; Ubink, 2008). Hence, demonstrating the broad powers of TLIs and how they are 
governing in a progressive context. 
This chapter finished its discussion with two policy implications that this research 
and others have speculated. The first was, whether aid was effective at all and should it be 
used in future outbreaks? The findings do not show that aid resources were negative; 
however, the conclusions were that the international response did not fully integrate with 
domestic strategies, which builds on Parker and Allen (2018) and Parker et al. (2019) 
arguments on aid. Health workers had a positive perception of donors and NGOs as 
suppliers, rather than with community engagement. The second implication was on how 
traditional and community leaders can be engaged in the future or even in other countries 
where their governance and influence may vary. The research found that legal management 
was not the sole manner of how paramount chiefs responded. Many participated in 
community engagement and education efforts too, using social capital to legitimize 
response efforts and the reintegration of EVD survivors. Thus, a bilateral knowledge 
exchange is needed between community and national leaders to develop an infrastructure 
that will address the demand-side barriers and can be complemented with supply-side 
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In 2015, I first developed this project in New York City with several questions on the 
world’s largest Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak and on the broader health status in West 
Africa. I started investigating what led to an epidemic of this size despite the countries being 
recipients of aid and health interventions for decades. In those days, I was a “consumer of 
knowledge” listening to “an existing conversation” (Single, 2009), by reviewing the extant 
literature and observing the exchanges between scholars, advocates, and other writers in 
the field. However, through the process of research and carrying out fieldwork for this 
Ph.D., I contributed to the conversation by answering the following question: what were the 
parallels and differences in how Liberia and Sierra Leone managed this outbreak? As 
described in the introduction, the two aims and four objectives answer this overall research 
question. 
This conclusion chapter reviews the research findings and briefly revisits the key 
debates on traditional local institutions (TLIs), which are the norms and customs that are 
governed by traditional leaders termed paramount chiefs, chiefs, clan leaders, councils, 
monarchs, youth leaders, and secret society leaders; and good governance to highlight the 
significance of these findings and their implications for future outbreaks and interventions. 
 
I. Summary of the Research Findings 
 
The findings show that community-level leaders addressed governance challenges 
before the international community intervened in the 2014 Ebola epidemic in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. 
This was done to prevent EVD in communities that did not have it yet (such as a 
community in Bo District, Sierra Leone), or to stop the disease outbreak in affected areas 
(e.g. Montserrado County, Liberia). This was done because the perception was that the state 
and humanitarian responses were slow or ineffective. In Sierra Leone, the bylaws and door-
to-door contact tracing were scaled up to a national strategy, where traditional leaders 
monitored and enforced the same rules and state resources were provided to help with this. 
In the end, Sierra Leone found 25% more EVD cases but had 18% fewer EVD deaths than 
Liberia (World Health Organization, 2016a). Additionally, Sierra Leone stopped the outbreak 
earlier in March 2016, whereas Liberia went into June 2016 due to repeated hidden EVD 
cases (World Health Organization, 2016d). 
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These findings challenge the mainstream literature on the 2014 Ebola outbreak, 
where aid organizations are featured as the lead actor in resolving supply and demand-side 
barriers (Cenciarelli et al., 2015; Dhillon and Kelly, 2015; Fallah et al., 2016; Fu, Roberton, 
and Burnham, 2015; Hagan et al., 2015; Laverack and Manoncourt, 2016; Lokuge et al., 
2016; Sharma et al., 2014); often, ‘recruiting’ key stakeholders to help implement their 
intervention strategies. The supply-side of the aid market is tangible resources that is 
needed during an outbreak, in this case medical equipment, drugs, building mobile 
treatment centers (called ETUs), or shoring up health human resources (HRHs) through 
volunteers or capacity building. The demand-side of the market are local cultural or 
environmental factors. Sometimes these factors (called barriers) can affect the supply of aid 
resources. 
It was community and traditional leaders that helped to correct the demand-side 
barriers of the market, demonstrating high institutional quality or good governance. The 
evidence suggests the outbreak was governed via multitier institutions addressing specific 
challenges such as supply-side barriers, logistics, or demand-side barriers. Thus, since local 
institutions can improve social outcomes by correcting the demand-side barriers, it makes 
sense to engage them in future disease outbreaks. 
 
A. Originality of the Research 
 
This thesis created a new evaluation metric for the known concept of institutional 
quality. As discussed in chapter two, this was conceived by North (1981; 1989; 1990; 1991; 
2003) as a determining criterion of why economies grow, stagnate, or decline. It framed the 
World Bank’s development policies on good governance and economic growth for nearly 
two decades (World Bank, 2002). However, it has been argued that the indicators used for 
measuring institutional quality are narrow (Gray, 2016; Rodrik, 2004). Rodrik (2004) says 
that these indicators tend to favor the perceptions of investors, who generally feel positive 
when the economy is doing well. This often leads to the conclusion that high institutional 
quality is when investors feel private property rights are protected or the rule of law is 
upheld. However, we do not know which rule of law specifically or what the intended 
outcome of said law is. Additionally, Gray (2016) argues that the indicators, the protection 
of property rights and low transaction costs, specifically follow a capitalist growth pattern. 
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This would leave out economies that are not market-based and other institutions within 
capitalist economies that are not designed for capitalist economic growth, such as TLIs. 
Therefore, the thesis redefines institutional quality in order to examine how 
community-level institutions govern and their outcomes. Two proposed indicators 
introduced into the framework were discussed in chapter two, section 2.5: social cost and 
information failure (Becker and Becker, 1997; Jha and Chaloupka, 2000; Reubi, 2016). Still 
using a market approach of supply and demand factors, when these market inefficiencies 
are high, then regulatory intervention can help to lower them and improve social outcomes. 
Additionally, some of these outcomes can also affect the economy. Thus, we applied these 
theoretical concepts to the empirical debate of local governance during the Ebola outbreak 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone in chapter two, section 2.7 and were further elaborated in the 
findings chapter. 
During the Ebola outbreak, the literature discussed a host of information failures 
that affected consumer behavior (Perry and Sayndee, 2017; Richards, 2016). For example, 
state authorities initially banned the consumption of bushmeat, because international 
guidelines stated it could be a source of infection (World Health Organization, 2019a). While 
this information is theoretically correct, it did not fit the local epidemiology, hence an 
information failure. EVD was spreading human-to-human (Richards, 2016), and the type of 
bushmeat consumed in West Africa is not known to transmit this virus. 
As discussed by key informants, confusing or vague information that did not match 
what community members saw, led to high social costs. In this case, a social cost is a death. 
Essentially, many people who did not consume or encounter bushmeat became very ill and 
died; while others who did eat bushmeat were fine. This made some people believe that the 
EVD outbreak was a hoax or that the healthcare system was unable to address the causes 
for the mysterious illnesses. Consequently, many people avoided the health centers, 
choosing to be cared for at home. However, home care is very risky if the caregiver does not 
have proper training and equipment. Many people died at home and consequently, other 
family members became infected and died too. 
In Sierra Leone, systematic regulatory intervention came from traditional leaders 
who govern institutions such as customary law. A set of bylaws were passed as emergency 
management to help reduce social costs during the disease outbreak. These included but 
are not limited to: mandatory reporting of sick persons, quarantine measures, banning of 
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funerals and at-home caregiving, curfews, suspending blood rituals of secret societies, 
mandatory handwashing, and no contact with others. Additionally, traditional leaders 
organized townhalls and health sensitization campaigns to discuss the outbreak and give 
updates as needed, hence addressing information failures too. In Liberia, traditional and 
nontraditional leaders also intervened to help reduce these market inefficiencies. However, 
this was not systematically implemented nationwide like Sierra Leone. 
This research contributes to two major debates regarding traditional leaders and 
institutions. A long-standing theoretical debate on the governance implications of 
traditional leaders and their role vis-à-vis the state; this is briefly revisited in section II. And 
an empirical debate of their role and impact during the 2014 Ebola outbreak; this is revisited 
in subsections B and C below on how the research aims were achieved for this study. 
This theoretical contribution to knowledge achieves the first aim of the research 
question also discussed below in subsection B. This is the building block to our second and 
third contributions of this thesis. Considering that we developed this new concept of 
institutional quality, we observed in the data (i.e. key informants’ interviews in chapter four) 
how TLIs governed during the outbreak and their relationship with state and aid institutions 
(the evidence-based contribution of polycentric governance). Next, we learned from these 
observations on how future disease outbreaks can be governed, especially in a low-resource 
context (policy contribution to knowledge). 
In sum, the thesis holds that TLIs do exhibit good governance when addressing 
specific challenges that they are originally designed for: maintaining the social welfare of the 
community. 
 
B. The First Aim: TLIs Governed the Local Community Response 
 
The first aim was to understand the role of TLIs and community leaders during the 
2014 EVD epidemic. This aim was achieved through a theoretical contribution to knowledge 
on extending the framework to add social cost and information failure as demand-side 
barriers. 
The literature from chapter two discussed the demand-side barriers in identifying 
and containing the disease (Abramowitz et al., 2015; Cenciarelli et al., 2015; Davies and 
Rushton, 2016; DePinto, 2016; Enria, 2017; Kamradt-Scott, 2016; Parker et al., 2019; 
Richards, 2016; Van der Windt and Voors, 2020; Wilkinson et al., 2017). The informants’ 
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interviews built upon what was discussed in the literature (for example, misinformation 
about EVD, losing trust in government agencies, and self-organizing to stop EVD), and 
adding what was not previously mentioned in the literature of locally-derived solutions. 
When I conducted fieldwork in 2017, many of the bylaws in Sierra Leone such as 
handwashing at public facilities, a 10 p.m. curfew, cessation of market/commerce on 
Sundays, and prohibition of some secret society rituals were still in effect. The literature had 
not previously investigated whether all these behavior changes helped to reduce social 
costs, because the focus was on two specific bylaws: banning funerals and at-home 
caregiving. These two bylaws directly affected the demand for aid resources. Therefore, the 
literature on the outbreak did not fully consider how locally-derived solutions were 
effective. Other bylaws that do not impact aid resources, such as handwashing or the secret 
society rituals, are institutional changes. 
Traditional and community leaders helped to correct the market failures. However, 
these leaders were not able to address all aspects of the outbreak, because their strengths 
in governing were in the demand-side challenges. This leads us to the second aim of 
understanding how community, state, and aid institutions interact with each other. 
C. The Second Aim: Multitier Institutions Governed Specific Challenges 
 
The second aim was to understand the links between community engagement and 
aid performance during a public health emergency. This aim was achieved through an 
evidence-based contribution to knowledge. Thus, building on our theory of how TLIs 
governed the demand-side barriers; we observed how multiple institutions governed supply 
and demand-side challenges together. 
The literature from chapter two, section 2.6, shows international responders and 
government agencies as lead actors in resolving these crises (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2007; Georges et al., 1999; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2018a; Médecins 
Sans Frontières, 2018b; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2019; Muñoz, 2017; Okware et al., 2002; 
Roddy et al., 2007; U.K. Department for International Development, 2011; World Health 
Organization, 2007; World Health Organization, 2009; World Health Organization, 2012a; 
World Health Organization, 2015c). In some cases, it is acknowledged that community 
support and ownership of the response is needed, as clinical resources alone would not stop 
a disease outbreak (World Health Organization, 2015c). However, community-level leaders 
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are not featured as owning or leading response efforts. Instead, the literature depicts 
international responders and state institutions executing vertical community engagement 
strategies to identify and resolve supply and demand-side barriers. A vertical response is a 
top-down intervention that does not incorporate knowledge from local stakeholders in the 
decision making process. These are referred to as the ‘public transcripts’, using Scott 
(1992)’s concept of how knowledge communicated to the public is framed in a power-laden 
context, often ignoring voices from marginalized communities. 
However, informants say that the governance of the EVD epidemic was managed 
with community-led engagement (self-organizing), and aid sometimes supported this, which 
challenges the public transcripts in the literature reviewed (Cenciarelli et al.; 2015; Dhillon 
and Kelly, 2015; Fallah et al., 2016; Fu, Roberton, and Burnham, 2015; Hagan et al., 2015; 
Laverack and Manoncourt, 2016; Lokuge et al., 2016; Sharma et al., 2014). Hence, these are 
‘hidden transcripts’ as these are voices that have been marginalized in the debate (Scott, 
1992). In Sierra Leone, in the areas that initially adopted the bylaws, EVD cases had already 
begun to resolve before the phase two scale up of aid resources (World Health 
Organization, 2014a).134 In Liberia, traditional and community leaders conducted various 
engagement efforts in their communities. Therefore, aid resources were able to penetrate 
the community because of these leaders. They largely resolved the demand-side barriers, 
making aid more effective in some places (e.g. by increasing demand for health facilities). In 
some places with little or no aid support, institutional changes also helped prevented EVD 
(e.g. ban on secret society rituals and handshakes). 
Donors and humanitarian agencies tend to govern the supply-side of the market. 
They can bring medical equipment, drugs, HRHs, or training. This is not to say that there 
were not challenges in the supply-side that slowed the response as discussed in chapter 
one, section 1.6 (Boseley, 2014; Gostin and Friedman, 2014; Kamradt-Scott, 2016). Other 
than demand-side barriers, there were also logistical problems that prevented these 
resources from penetrating the community such as government corruption, poor road 
networks, or travel bans preventing some resources from entering the countries (Bullard, 
2018; DePinto, 2016). A brief discussion on the gains and drawbacks of this multi-
institutional response is recapped in section II, part b below. 
                                                          
134 This is using the timeline of that the thesis proposes, where phase two begins October 2014. See Introduction on page 
xxii. 
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II. Traditional Local Institutions Have Good Governance 
 
As discussed in chapter two, Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014), Beekman, Bulte, 
and Nillesen (2013; 2014), Hanlon (2005), Jackson (2005; 2006; 2011), Mamdani (1996), 
Peters and Richards (1998), and Richards (2005) say that traditional leaders tend to be 
corrupt, and this corruption leads to underdevelopement in local communities. Additionally, 
there is the question of whether TLIs are still relevant to the modern state. Hanlon (2005), 
Jackson (2005; 2006), Peters and Richards (1998), and Richards (2005) argue that in West 
Africa, TLIs were the cause of the war, where young rebels held grievances against 
traditional leaders. These writers say if the chieftaincy is reinstated, it could hinder post-
conflict recovery in the Mano River region. 
On the other hand, arguments that support keeping the chieftaincy have relied on 
cultural and religious reasons to explain why TLIs will always be needed despite how the 
state develops (Adjei, Busia, and Bob-Milliar, 2017; Fanthorpe, 1998; Fanthorpe, 2001; 
Fanthorpe, 2006; Logan, 2013; Ubink, 2008). The thesis does not disagree with the premise 
of this argument; however, cultural and religious authority varies from state to state and 
within the state. For example, Nigeria did not always have traditional leaders come from the 
same ethnic background as the constituents (Iyanya, 2018). In addition, not all traditional 
leaders have religious authority (Richard, 2016). Nonetheless, rooting the legitimacy and 
authority of the chiefs in cultural and religious foundations is simply the beginning of 
understanding their authority and role in the community and not the entire picture. 
The thesis holds that this binary debate is not helpful in today’s circumstance, 
because the chieftaincy has withstood the test of time and external interference 
(colonialism, state institutions, and good governance reforms). This does not help us to 
understand how TLIs govern and their outcomes. Additionally, some key critics such as 
Richards, have evolved their research on TLIs where more recent work feature them as key 
institutions in local governance (Richards, 2016; Bulte, Richards, and Voors, 2018). Also, 
Mamdani (1996) has been referenced in much of this literature for referring to chiefs as 
despotic. However, this was regarding the manipulation of chieftaincies during the colonial 
era and how they were made more authoritarian. His broader thesis is that ‘customary law’ 
and ‘ethnic identity’ is rooted in nativism that did not exist before (Mamdani, 2001). 
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Therefore, a third perspective is introduced and this is the debate that the thesis 
contributes; this discusses evidence-based research on the outcomes of leadership and 
governance by traditional leaders (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson, 2014; Baker, 2007; 
Baldwin, 2015; Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen, 2013; Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen, 2014; 
Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012; Dia, 1996; Pande and Udry, 2005; Sesay, 2019; Tokpa 
and Yengbeh Jr., 2012; UNDEF, 2014; Unsworth, 2010). 
Broadly speaking, this debate acknowledges the challenges of traditional leadership 
such as corruption and patrimonialism; however, when development projects or 
governance reforms engage with TLIs, researchers say that barriers to implementation 
decrease (Baldwin, 2015; Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012; UNDEF, 2014; Unsworth, 
2010). Nonetheless, these leaders are also self-interested actors and this research is not to 
romanticize them (Baldwin, 2015). Traditional leaders have deep social and economic 
interests in development projects since they live in these communities too and are known 
by name by their constituents; thus, they will be held accountable by them. This notion 
contradicts a principle of good governance (World Bank, 2002), as there are ways to have 
accountability in a nondemocratic government. 
 
A. Bylaws as a Choice of Governing 
 
This leads us to another point to be made regarding the governance of traditional 
leaders during the 2014 Ebola epidemic, which points to a weakness in the good governance 
concept. 
As proposed by the World Bank (2002), good governance relies on short-term 
interest as a rationale for cooperation. However, an analysis is needed to understand why 
there is long-term cooperation. Short-term election cycles can sometimes incentivize 
officials to create policies to promote oneself for the next campaign and not long-term 
policies to benefit the community (Baldwin, 2015). Therefore, coming into power by an 
electorate does not guarantee accountability or good governance. 
However, social capital in the form of patrimonialism can create inequalities, as 
those who are connected would benefit more from the unequal redistribution of goods or 
services (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson, 2014). Building on this, we would expect that the 
chief, who started the bylaws in Kailahun, would have campaigned for more aid so that he 
could redistribute these resources via patron-client networks, which would have been a 
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popular choice and fulfill short-term interests for cooperation (Van der Windt and Voors, 
2020). Instead, he gambled on his reputation to pass restrictive bylaws on people’s intimate 
lives, such as banning handshakes. Thus, for those authors who believe that TLIs exhibited 
poor governance during the outbreak due to state capture or corruption, lack an 
explanation on how this happened and why passing the bylaws benefitted the chiefs in this 
way (Boland and McKay, 2018; Enria, 2017; Wilkinson et al., 2017). 
This research shows that chiefs and secret society leaders across Kailahun, Kenema, 
and Bo districts agreed to pass the bylaws because of the fear and helplessness experienced 
in the midst of the crisis. Moreover, after witnessing health workers who once saved lives, 
now die in grotesque fashion from EVD; it may not have been considered rational to 
advocate for more clinical resources. Nonetheless, in the eastern and southern provinces of 
Sierra Leone, bylaws were passed before the state and international responders scaled-up 
aid, which did not give them the same opportunity to extract resources for personal gain. 
The theoretical debate asks if traditional leaders can govern for the “good of the 
community” like elected leaders. However, there are two things wrong with this. First, it is 
naïve to assume that state leaders are not self-interested actors, they are and so are 
traditional leaders as explained in Baldwin (2015). However, as self-interested actors who 
live in the community, they too will benefit from social and development policies. Second, 
all evidence and research on corruption and political infight during the Ebola outbreak, has 
so far been on state institutions (DePinto, 2016; Ross, Welch, and Angelides, 2017; Sheplar, 
2017). Although there is a dissenting opinion on the efficacy of bylaws and traditional 
authority (Boland and McKay, 2018; Enria, 2017; Wilkinson et al. 2017), these had not 
produced evidence of poor governance from the chiefs. 
However, the criticisms that sometimes the chiefs were ineffective at enforcing the 
bylaws is merited, as we see that sometimes chiefs had to succumb to political pressure by 
constituents (Richards et al., 2015) or preferred a more democratic way of governing, but 
which led to higher EVD deaths (social costs) (Goguen and Bolton, 2017). The latter would 
be antithetical to our concept of high institutional quality. 
Additionally, Enria (2017) mentions that the bylaws reopened a debate between the 
rights of the individual versus the rights of the group. In other words, in emergency 
management, how do we maintain the collective well-being of the group without infringing 
on the individual’s rights for the sake of security? The thesis holds that this case study does 
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not fit into this debate, because the norms and laws of TLIs had always reflected 
communitarian values and not just during an emergency period as a short-term response. In 
chapter two, section 2.4.3, a brief discussion of customary laws and its socio-legal 
philosophies demonstrate that human rights are advocated through a collective voice and 
paternal responsibility (Frémont, 2009; Maimela, 2019; Mqeke, 1996). 
 
B. TLIs and the State 
 
There is a long and conflicting history between state and traditional institutions in 
West Africa (Harris, 2013; Mulbah, 2018; Sawyer, 2004; Tokpa and Yengbeh Jr., 2012). As 
mentioned in the introduction, during the colonial period, they were either ignored or their 
powers were consolidated to reflect European-style monarchies (Iyanya, 2018). Post-
independence, state institutions created strong central executive offices, which impacted 
their relationship with TLIs. In Liberia, chiefs and clan leaders were merged into the state 
and became agents of the centralized government, enforcing the laws created in Monrovia 
(Nyei, 2014). Whereas in Sierra Leone, all forms of local government were abolished under 
the Stevens’ regime (Jackson, 2006). Now in the post-conflict period, states are re-
integrating TLIs into overall public administration (Chieftaincy Act, 2009; Local Government 
Act, 2015; Local Government Act of 2018, 2018; The Local Government Act, 2004). However, 
this is not without political implications as demonstrated by this case study. 
As discussed in chapter five, a multitier institutional response governed this disease 
outbreak; and the relationship between state, traditional, and aid institutions helped or 
hindered each other’s actions. In Sierra Leone, some of the bylaws helped aid institutions, as 
it created a demand for their resources and it gave health and humanitarian workers 
protection to enter and work safely in communities. Later, police and military resources, 
provided by the state, helped staff local checkpoints and enforce quarantine measures; 
therefore, improving the efficacy of traditional governance. However, a slow response of 
burial teams coordinated by state and aid institutions meant that the bylaw banning 
funerals was less effective. If a burial team did not arrive soon after a death, sometimes a 
funeral had to be conducted. Or as Ross, Welch, and Angelides (2017) found, corrupt 
practices by local politicians allowed some people to perform ‘secret burials’ instead of 
reporting the deaths to the local authorities. In Liberia, state and aid institutions were 
actively engaged, however, TLIs acted in silo (Hagan et al., 2015) and were later ‘integrated,’ 
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into the national response but superficially (Nyenswah et al., 2016). According to Nyenswah 
et al. (2016), they were only given cell phones to report new EVD cases or deaths in 
November 2014. Some key informants expressed that state and aid resources were not 
made available to assist them in self-organizing. However, Liberian health workers felt that 
aid interventions were positive. This would make sense as HRHs are part of the supply-side 
of the market and these were scaled-up by donors and humanitarians in phase two. 
These drawbacks demonstrate that if social outcomes are affected by other 
institutions, then perhaps not all the market failures are resolved; hence, there could still be 
high costs. For instance, could identity politics, which was discussed in chapters one and 
two, hinder cooperation between traditional and state institutions? 
This was answered in the findings chapter in the Sierra Leonean interviews. The 
party in power was the All Peoples’ Congress (APC), which is historically dominated by the 
Temne and Limba ethnic groups from the northern province, and the southern and eastern 
provinces are predominantly Mende. There may have been some identity politics in the 
response. However, while much had been speculated in the past about ethno-regional 
tensions; the bylaws started in the Mende chiefdoms and the collaboration of both 
institutions transcended this. 
 
C. Social Outcomes Are Important Too 
 
The thesis holds that there should be a stronger reflection of social outcomes in the 
indicators of governance. These outcomes are best represented in qualitative research, 
which may make it challenging for policy makers because quantitative data is preferred so 
the results can be generalized. However, there is more research advocating for qualitative 
approaches in institutional analyses (Skarbek, 2020). 
Social issues such as health have been made quantifiable, as discussed in chapter 
one on performance-based targets.135 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were 
global targets for each country and they received funding via the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(PRS) to address social and economic barriers (Vandemoortele, 2008). However, aligning aid 
to three narrowly defined health issues in the MDGs created distortions in health planning 
in many low-income countries. Mostly Western-derived nongovernmental organizations 
                                                          
135 See pages 7 through 11 on health interventions and HIV/AIDS as an example. 
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(NGOs) delivered these services to improve specific governance indicators as shown in the 
health statistics in chapter one, section 1.5.1 (World Health Organization, 2012b; World 
Health Organization, 2016b; World Health Organization, 2016c). However, broader health 
issues were not addressed in same way (Harman, 2015; Mustapha, 2006). This means that 
having good performance on an MDG target, such as maternal infant mortality (MMI), does 
not mean there is good performance on a nonMDG health problem, such as alcohol 
consumption or Diabetes. The current Sustainable Development Goals, which replaced the 
MDGs after it expired in 2015, are broader and include 47 health-related goals (Lim et al., 
2016). However, time will tell how this initiative closes the gap where the MDGs have not. 
Some donors and humanitarians used a community-level approach such as the 
formation of health committees, which was also mentioned in chapter one’s discussion of 
Liberia and Sierra Leone’s health systems (Bedford and Miller, 2017; McMahon et al., 2017). 
In some areas, a stakeholder group of community leaders, volunteers, and health workers 
governed specific health MDG challenges (such as MMI) and improved the indicators. In 
Sierra Leone, the traditional leaders passed bylaws to encourage health-seeking behaviors 
and increase demand of prenatal and antenatal services (McMahon et al., 2017). So, there is 
prior evidence of rulemaking to increase demand in health services, especially when aid 
institutions support local governance institutions. 
Other development initiatives also leveraged traditional and community leaders to 
execute projects, such as the village development committees’ projects discussed in chapter 
two, section 2.4.2 (Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012; Fearon, Humphreys, and 
Weinstein, 2009). From Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel (2012)’s experiences in Sierra Leone, 
committees that did not include a traditional leader often saw projects stall. This 
contradicted an initial objective to change decision making at the local level and avoid 
perceived authoritarian figures. However, Baldwin (2015), Bulte, Richards, and Voors (2018), 
and Pande and Udry (2005) say that these leaders have social capital to mobilize efforts 
where needed; and while social capital is sometimes used in the literature to describe 
influence and power (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson, 2014; Sawyer, 2005b), we sometimes 
do not explicitly say that this is a leadership trait. And simply put, that community-level 
authorities need to be engaged for these types of projects because of their leadership skills, 
in addition to the legitimacy and authority they hold. 
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Therefore, redefining institutional quality for social outcomes helps us think more 
deeply as to why we evaluate institutions for weak or strong governance. The traits needed 
to mobilize cooperation on a social challenge, where they may not be any immediate or 
short-term incentives are different. This is especially true in a public health emergency, 
where local challenges such as stigma, are different from other disasters (Arola, 2008). 
Consequently, communication, local knowledge, strategic planning, and liaison abilities are 
needed to tackle these challenges to contain a disease outbreak. Thus, this extends our 
vision of TLIs beyond the ‘cultural brokers or cultural mediators’ label to effective leadership 
for social outcomes. 
Given the context of public health emergencies and development initiatives such as 
the health committees, it is not surprising to see traditional and community leaders 
governing on these taskforces. Future research in Institutional Economics should include 
qualitative data and methods when examining nonstate and nonurban-based institutions on 
social policy. TLIs in West Africa did more than end EVD, other health services were 
compromised, and many people died to due preventable nonEVD related conditions. The 
economy also stopped during this period. Resolving the social welfare crisis of the outbreak 
led to a return of economic activities in the short-term and reduced negative long-term 
impacts. This affects economic growth too. Thus, this brings us to our final contribution on 
policy and where these institutions fit in the future. 
 
III. Looking Ahead 
 
In public health, the question to ask is ‘when’ and not ‘if,’ because variations of acute 
and chronic health crises will always exist. So, policymakers and public administrators 
continuously seek to improve infrastructure and response mechanisms to contain a disease 
at the epicenter. This section focuses on the thesis’ policy contribution on how to take 
forward the lessons learned from studying the 2014 Ebola epidemic. 
Advocates and scholars have argued that current development initiatives have not 
strengthened the health systems, but instead have funded Western-derived agencies to 
provide limited services to improve specific performance-based indicators as discussed in 
chapter one (Chorev, 2013; Harman, 2015; Johnston, Deane, and Rizzo, 2015; Kickbusch, 
2005; Mathews, 2007; Mustapha, 2006; Parks, 2014; Petit et al., 2013; Sharples, 2015). 
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Therefore, global health policies have left Liberia and Sierra Leone in a vulnerable position 
to a disease outbreak (Kickbusch and Reddy, 2015; Rabkin and El-Sadr, 2015). In West Africa 
and other low-income countries, strengthening the health systems (e.g. universal health 
coverage and HRHs) may help to ensure preparedness for emergencies (Kickbusch and 
Reddy, 2015; O’Hare, 2015; Rabkin and El-Sadr, 2015; Vandi et al., 2017). Although it was 
not within the scope of the thesis to analyze these global health governance policies, the 
thesis does not disagree with those lessons. However, based on evidence from the field, the 
thesis holds a policy recommendation too. 
As mentioned in chapter one, after the outbreak in Sierra Leone, President Koroma 
increased the number of paramount chiefs to deepen decentralization efforts (Concord 
Times, 2017). This was with the support of the World Bank, which proposes that the way 
forward is to align the work of TLIs with that of local councils. Specifically, it recommends 
more revenue-sharing and well-defined responsibilities to create collaboration instead of 
competition. These recommendations were based on the governance exhibited by TLIs 
during the outbreak (All Africa, 2017; AYV Media Empire, 2017; Cocorioko, 2017; Concord 
Times, 2017). Thus, state governments are engaging more with local governing institutions, 
and not banning or limiting them. This is the path forward. Specifically, the thesis 
recommends a bilateral knowledge exchange to create an infrastructure to respond in 
future outbreaks. 
• A bilateral knowledge exchange is not training. It is engaging with key 
national and local stakeholders to create a response mechanism. Or in some 
cases, find out what infrastructure already exists. For example, Ross, Welch, 
and Angelides (2017) found that a disaster response unit already existed in 
Sierra Leone’s government with a protocol that included TLIs and the 
Ministry of Health and Sanitation. However, they were not engaged in the 
beginning, despite being well-resourced at the district levels. This could have 
changed the pace of the outbreak, if community and national leaders knew 
what infrastructure already existed and enacted on it. 
 
• This should be a community-led engagement, with domestic and aid 
resources assisting, rather than expecting communities to support a vertical 
intervention. For example, Hewlett and Amola (2003)’s work of the Ebola 
outbreak in Uganda show that survivors of gemo, would be responsible for 
preparing corpses for funerals and caring for the sick. This ensured that EVD 
corpses were buried quickly and in respect to local customs, as opposed to 
relying on overstretch resources (i.e. ambulances and burial teams). In 
Liberia, aid organizations did not penetrate most rural areas. So, one village 
devised an irrigation system to promote handwashing in public spaces. 
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Hence, local communities can devise a strategy on safer burial methods as 
well as caring methods; and have resources to support their strategies. 
 
• Community leaders and peers, who are leading emergency response efforts, 
should be identified internally and not by national governments or 
international responders. Ideally, this would prevent having resented actors 
in charge during an emergency, as we witnessed in some areas of Guinea 
during the outbreak (Wilkinson et al., 2017). Thus, traditional leaders passing 
bylaws universally may not be helpful, but findings from Liberia show that 
nontraditional leaders (i.e. community leaders) did change local norms to 
encourage healthier behaviors, even without formal rulemaking powers. 
 
• International humanitarian responders should avoid over-standardizing and 
medicalizing response efforts. As discussed in chapter five section 5.2.3, 
there is a pattern in the Western discourse of discrediting locally-derived 
solutions or ignoring them if they do not use a biomedical approach. Relying 
on pharma-medical solutions (as in the example with oral rehydration 
therapy) can harm local communities rather than help. This is especially true 
in a low-resource context where medical equipment may not be in 
abundance or exist at all. Therefore, interventions should focus on how to 
assist community-led strategies with behavior changes or what supplies can 
assist them to execute their strategies. This will involve working with 
community-level leaders (identified internally), rather than those ‘known’ to 
NGOs and donors as critiqued by Nyenswah, Engineer, and Peters (2016). 
They demonstrate that part of the challenges in Liberia was aid institutions 
not relinquishing control of resources to local stakeholders, which support 
the informants’ interviews. 
 
Ignoring TLIs and community institutions can lead to poor outcomes in development 
projects (Adjei, Busia, and Bob-Milliar, 2017; Baldwin, 2015; Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 
2012) or without trusted leaders in an emergency as demonstrated again by the recent 2018 
EVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Beaumont, 2019; Ebola Gbalo Research 
Group, 2019; Vinck et al., 2019; World Health Organization, 2019b). The public transcripts 
depict aid organizations as resolving supply and demand-side barriers, and not community-
led strategies or how local leaders are incorporated. For instance, it still argues the 
stereotype that providing biomedical knowledge will increase the demand for aid resources 
(Cohen, 2018; Ilunga Kalenga et al., 2019; Médecins Sans Frontières 2018a; Médecins Sans 
Frontières, 2018b; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2019; Moran, 2018; Nkengasong and 
Onyebujoh, 2018; World Health Organization, 2018e). However, we see the same market 
inefficiencies of information failures such as mistrust and stigma. This is because the 
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problem is not lack of biomedical knowledge, but rather lack of trusted local leaders to 
disseminate information and engage with the community (Vinck et al., 2019). 
 
IV. Limitations to Build On 
 
There were some limitations to the research project discussed in chapter three, 
section 3.9. However, this section highlights the limitations that have brought up new 
questions worthy of future research. 
This thesis did not explore the full impact of civil conflict on TLIs in the case study 
countries. However, it referred to studies on subsequent institutional changes in how 
communities perceive the state and participate in local political processes in the post-
conflict era (Baker, 2007; Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015; Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Sawyer, 
2008; Voors and Bulte, 2014). The fieldwork for this thesis did not obtain primary data on 
this. Further research is needed, particularly on how these institutions evolved during the 
post-conflict period. Additionally, more research is needed on how the 2014 Ebola epidemic 
led to institutional changes of traditional authorities and organizations (secret societies), as 
this thesis indicated that an external shock may have created some permanent changes (e.g. 
the blood rituals and local governance on health). 
The member checker from Sierra Leone discussed the 2014 census that was 
supposed to take place (Appendix C). However, it was canceled due to EVD cases in the 
eastern region of the country. It was suggested that this was a political controversy that 
contributed to why some people denied the existence of the disease in the country. Sierra 
Leone has a history of census manipulation for political purposes (Bockarie, 2015). Research 
may also add critical analyses of how denials and stigma have been interpreted in the 
literature of the outbreak on top of what was discussed in the thesis. Currently, media 
sources attribute local fears and perceptions to a lack of biomedical knowledge on illness or 
an attempt at genocide (Dixon, 2014; Mark, 2014). 
The phenomenon of bottom-up rulemaking was only observed in Sierra Leone in this 
case study, and it was not within the scope of this Ph.D. project to demonstrate if the 
findings apply to other contexts (Noble and Smith, 2015; Thomas and Magilvy, 2011). There 
is an indication that bylaws and rulemaking occurred in other countries affected by the 
outbreak (Elemuwa et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2018). Moreover, research on the involvement 
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of community-level leaders in the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Guinea and Nigeria or the recent 
2018 Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo would be worthy of future 
exploration. This latter outbreak is of particular interest, because so far, the public transcript 
mimics the same themes from the 2014 EVD outbreak, regarding international responders’ 
role. The challenges of trust and legitimacy in the communities are apparent even though 
this country has had many Ebola outbreaks in the past, and the world had witnessed the 
West African outbreak, which provided valuable lessons about the demand-side barriers 
(Chandler et al., 2015; Parker et al., 2019; Wilkinson et al., 2017). It is important now, more 
than ever, to apply these lessons in future emergency management. 
  






Pre-pilot questionnaire for health workers. 
 
1. Tell me what it is like to work as a (doctor/nurse/midwife) at your clinic/hospital. 
Probing: 
How many patients line up for service? 
How many patients would you see on average (per day or per week)? 
What services are provided here? 
Do patients pay a fee for service? 
 
2. Since the civil war ended, how have health services changed until 2013? 
Probing: 
Have more or less services came to this area? 
What kind of services were introduced or reduced? 
How has the volume of patients changed? 
 
3a. What changes have there been in patients coming in? 
Probing: 
Have you had to turn away more or less patients? 
A change in demographics of people coming in for care? 
What are the trending risk factors (e.g. a rise in non-communicable diseases, a decline in services for 
a specific issue)? 
 
3b. How have health human resources (HRHs) changed since the end of the civil war? 
Probing: 
How have universities or training centers functioned to train new health workers? 
How has the level of staff changed in this area? 
How has the level of HHR changed the health services delivered in this area? 
How are staff integrated from school into the local setting? 
 
4. How have resources to your clinic/hospital changed? 
Probing: 
Does the clinic get reimbursed for prescriptions? Has the reimbursement scheme changed? 
Are medical supplies arriving to the clinic/hospital on a consistent basis? 
Are supplies enough to cope with the flow of patients? 
Do funds come consistently to pay for other expenses like utilities or maintenance? 
Does funding include money for support staff? 
 
5. How were your clinic and area affected by the Ebola epidemic? 
Probing: 
How did the volume of patients change? 
How were health workers affected? 
Were resources to keep the clinic functioning still consistent or had changed? 
Did any external assistance arrive to the area (NGOs)? 
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6. What do you think happened during the Ebola outbreak that helped or hurt your ability to provide 
care? 
Probing: 
Extra or inconsistent resources? 
Stigma? 
Management practices? (e.g. training on personal protection equipment or infection control). 
 
7. What policies were enacted during the Ebola outbreak that affected health workers or the health 
industry during the epidemic? Did they help or hurt, why or why not? 
Probing: 
New isolation or containment measures? 
Health screenings at borders? 
 
8. How were voices/perspectives of healthcare workers integrated when these decisions were made 
during the outbreak? 
Probing: 
Any meetings between health workers and local officials or stakeholders? 
Any community-based meetings arranged, like town halls? 
 
9. How do health workers currently advocate or have a voice in the governance of healthcare? 
Probing: 
At any time not just during an outbreak. 
Are there organized unions? 
Do workers have discretion in implementing services and programs? 
Are there demonstrations? 
 
10. How did health workers organize during the outbreak? 
 
11. What changes in the law will affect how you or your colleagues provide care and services? 
Probing: 
What upcoming or pending changes may affect your services? 
Changes in user fees? 
Will the law affect volume of staff? 
12. Thinking about the patients that come here, what group of people are not being reached for 
healthcare? 
Probing: 
Why do you think they are not coming in for services? 
 
13. What can be changed to provide more efficient services and care to patients? 
 
14. How can health workers have more of a voice in the processes that affect health governance? 
 
15a. How do you see healthcare in this community evolving in the medium-term (5-7 years)? 
Probing: 
Population changes? 
Increase or decrease in services? 
Change in external providers of care? 
 
15b. How about in the country, generally? 
Probing: 
Population changes in those who can access health services 
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Resilience to manage infectious disease outbreak 
Managing noninfectious diseases (e.g. heart disease, cancer, diabetes etc...) 
 
Post-pilot questionnaire for health workers 
 
1. What are the main challenges at your clinic/hospital? 
Probing: 
How many patients line up for service? 
How many patients would you see on average? 
What services are provided here? 
Do patients pay a fee for service? 
 
2. During what period have health services been better or worse? 
Probing: 
Have more or less services came to this area? 
What kind of services were introduced or reduced? 
How has the volume of patients changed? 
 
3a. What changes have there been in patients coming in? 
Probing: 
Have you had to turn away more or less patients? 
A change in demographics of people coming in for care? 
What are the trending risk factors (e.g. a rise in noncommunicable diseases, decline in services for a 
specific issue)? 
 
3b. How have health human resources (HRHs) changed since the end of the civil war? 
Probing: 
How have universities or training centers functioned to train new health workers? 
How has the level of staff changed in this area? 
How has the level of HHR changed the health services delivered in this area? 
How are staff integrated from school into the local setting? 
 
4. How do you use the resources, despite the constraints? 
Probing: 
Does the clinic get reimbursed for prescriptions? Has the reimbursement scheme changed? 
Are medical supplies arriving to the clinic/hospital on a consistent basis? 
Are supplies enough to cope with the flow of patients? 
Do funds come consistently to pay for other expenses like utilities or maintenance? 
Does funding include money for support staff? 
 
5. How did you see the effects of the Ebola outbreak? 
Probing: 
How did volume of patients change? 
How were survivors treated in the community? 
How were health workers affected? 
Were resources to keep the clinic functioning still consistent or had changed? 
Did any external assistance arrive to the area (NGOs)? 
 
6. What do you think happened during the Ebola outbreak that affected (help or hurt) your ability to 
provide care? 
Probing: 
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Extra or inconsistent resources? 
Stigma? 
Management practices? (e.g. training on PPE or infection control. Getting people educated about 
the disease and behavioral changes)* 
 
7. What are the strength and weaknesses of policies/procedures enacted during the Ebola outbreak? 
What worked and what didn’t? 
Probing: 
New isolation or containment measures? 
Health screenings at borders? 
Involvement of local chiefs or councils? 
 
8. How were voices/perspectives of healthcare workers integrated when these decisions were made 
during the outbreak? 
Probing: 
Any meetings between health workers and local officials or stakeholders? 
Any community-based meetings arranged, like town halls? 
 
9. What role do health workers have in the governance of healthcare? 
Probing: 
At any time not just during an outbreak. 
Are there organized unions? 
Do workers have discretion in implementing services and programs? 
Are there demonstrations? 
 
10. What are the incentives to keep health providers working? 
 
11. What changes in the law will affect how you or your colleagues provide care and services? 
Probing: 
What upcoming or pending changes may affect your services? 
Changes in user fees? 
Will the law affect volume of staff? 
 
12. What kind of patients are not coming in for healthcare services? 
Probing: 
Why do you think they are not coming in for services? 
 
13. What can be changed to provide more efficient services and care to patients? 
 
14. How can health workers have more influence in the processes that affect health governance? 
 
15a. How do you see healthcare in this community evolving in the medium-term (5-7 years)? 
Probing: 
Population changes? 
Increase or decrease in services? 
Change in external providers of care? 
 
15b. How about in the country, generally? 
Probing: 
Population changes in those who can access health services 
Resilience to manage infectious disease outbreak 
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Managing noninfectious diseases (e.g. heart disease, cancer, diabetes etc...) 
 
Questionnaire for community stakeholders 
 
1. Since the end of the civil war, how did the health sector function? 
Before transition before new government? 
Before Ebola? 
During Ebola? 
And after the Ebola outbreak? 
 
2. The response to Ebola in the beginning took longer than expected, why do you think that 
happened? 
Probing: 




3. What are the strength and weaknesses of the response during the outbreak? What worked and 
what didn’t? 
Probing: 





4. What are the main challenges in the healthcare system? 
Before the Ebola epidemic 
During the Ebola epidemic 
And going forward after Ebola 
 
5. What are the incentives that keep health providers working? 
 
6. What was the relationship between the central government and local authorities in fighting 
Ebola? (e.g. local councils and chiefs) 
A. How does that compare to prior health emergencies or campaigns? 
 
7. How do you see the role of stakeholders going forward? (chiefs, councils, elders…) 
 
8. How does the community view the government/private health services? 
A. Does this change with external/NGO services? 
 
9. How do survivors or family members integrate back into society? 
A. How does this compare with survivors of other diseases? (e.g. HIV)  




This section contains blank copies of the participants’ information sheet and the consent 
form used in West Africa. The information sheet gives an overview of the research project and 
contact details for the researcher and supervisor at the University of Westminster. There were two 
mobile numbers given, a permanent British mobile number, which is redacted for the purposes of 
this thesis and a temporary local one was written in the line provided. The consent forms were 
signed by the informants and returned to the researcher. 
 
Participants’ Information Sheet 
 
The Healthcare of West Africa and The Role of 21st Century Global Governance 
Information Sheet 
 
Principal Investigator: Sabine Franklin    Phone number(s): XXXXX-XXXX31 
Email: w1577261@my.westminster.ac.uk   ___________________________ 
 
Who is doing the research? 
My name is Sabine Franklin and I am a post-graduate student at the University of Westminster in 
London, United Kingdom. I am conducting this research for my Ph.D. project, and I have an interest in 
studying health policies, economic development, and health disparities. I am not affiliated with any 
other organization or collaborators on this project. This project is not funded by any other corporation 
or external organization. 
 
Purpose 
You are being asked to participate in a research study on governance and access of healthcare systems 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The purpose of this study is to understand the level of services of the 
healthcare system, accessibility, and response and effectiveness during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. You 
were selected as a possible participant because you are a worker or volunteer in the formal healthcare 
system. 
 
What you should know about this research study: 
• I am providing you with this participant information and consent form so that you may read 
about the purpose, risks, and benefits of the research study in which you are about to 
participate. 
• Routine care refers to the best-known treatment, which is provided with the aim of helping 
the individual patient. The main aim of research studies is to gain knowledge that may help 
you and/or future patients. 
• I cannot promise that you will gain benefit from this research. 
• It is your right to agree or to refuse to take part in the research, and you may change your 
mind later. 
• Your decision will not affect your routine health care or social services. 
• Please review this consent form carefully and ask any questions or raise your concerns 
regarding the research before you take a final decision to participate or not in the study. 
• Your participation in the research is totally voluntary. 
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Procedures and Duration 
If you decide to participate in the study, you will undergo a one-on-one interview with the principal 
investigator. It is expected that you will only be interviewed once. 
 
Risks and Discomfort 
The nature of the project is to talk about health care services and the system of healthcare. It is 
possible that you may bring up memories or experiences around death, stigma, and /or trauma which 
may cause distress. The research will be conducted through one-on-one interviews, and there will no 
physical or biological tests conducted. 
 
THIS INFORMATION SHEET IS YOURS TO KEEP. 
If you have any questions concerning this study or consent form beyond those that have been 
answered by the investigator, including questions about the research, your rights as a research 
participant, or the implications of research-related injuries, or if you feel that you have been treated 
unfairly and would like to talk to someone other than a member of the research team, please feel free 
to contact:  Dr. Hannah Cross, University of Westminster, London UK. +44 020 7911 5000 ext. 68909 
or H.Cross@westminster.ac.uk 
 
Informed Consent Form 
 






Any information that is obtained in connection with this study that can identify you will remain 
confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. 
 
Voluntary participation 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you decide not to participate in this study, your decision will 
not affect your future relations with the University of Westminster, its personnel, and associated 
hospitals and organizations. If you decide to participate in the study, you are free to withdraw your 
consent from participating in the study, and to discontinue participation at any time without penalty 
to yourself. 
 
Benefits and/or Compensation 
I cannot promise or guarantee that you will receive any benefits from this study. The risk of physical 
harm is very low compared to the advantageous benefits of gaining knowledge of the country's 
individual healthcare system and how health workers negotiate power at a street-level bureaucracy. 
Understanding power relations and health services delivery at the micro level contributes to the field's 
scope of knowledge on policy and the impact of external influences. The risk of psychological harm is 
also low, as the questions and topic do not focus on personal loss. 
 
Offer to Answer Questions 
Before you sign this form, please ask any questions regarding any aspect of this study that is unclear 
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You are making a decision as to whether or not you are willing to participate in this study. Your written 
consent indicates that you have read and understood the information provided above, have had all 




Your informed consent and interview will be audio recorded on an encrypted digital recording device. 
This device is password protected so only the principal investigator can access the files. Files will be 
uploaded and stored on an encrypted operating cloud system. The data (interviews) will be used for 
this research and subsequent research articles on health and development by the principal 












This section contains evaluative feedback from gatekeepers in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. Each person was sent a copy of the findings, of their respective countries, from 
chapter four and was asked to give feedback on how the narratives and experiences were 
interpreted and portrayed. This transcript represents their verbatim responses, with very 
minimal editing for punctuation; thus, the transcript was left in its original dialect to 
minimize bias from the researcher. 
 
Member Checking from Liberia 
 
Wednesday November 14, 2018 
Yes, I agree with what you say. These were the realities, the message, first of all, the 
manner and form the message came from the minister of health and social welfare 
[MHSW]; his first message was intimidating. If you were to access the minister’s message in 
the first outbreak, the headline was, “No sex”. That was his first message. That was the first 
message without doing any investigation or finding out, what, any issues were; his first 
message was, “No sex”. So, it led people to panic and people were wondering, ‘Who is this 
minister of health?’ When there is an epidemic and his first message to the people is, “No 
sex?” They did not do any research and meanwhile the situation had already occurred in 
Guinea. So, there was no research on how the people in those countries helped in that 
situation. It created a panic. It was later, when WHO came in and tried to pass some 
guidance. And, as the health workers said, many facilities did not have the PPE and that was 
what led to the death of many workers. Those gloves and different stuff like that, were 
never, ever available. Also, there were no ambulances from the rural health facilities to the 
ETUs. The few that were available, when you call them, they were overwhelmed [with] 
taking all the patients. There were 2 or 3 ambulances in Montserrado County and taking 
calls from all other the country. 
As a person [my experience], in terms of talking about local community engagement, 
the WHO brought a lady from Uganda, and fortunately she was a Catholic and she started 
attending mass at the same church as me. She died later, but 2 or 3 times I drove her to 
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service, but I found out she brought PPE for the community dwellers, but the people were 
not trained in using them. They did not know how to wear the gloves or if someone is sick, 
how to administer first aid. So, I contacted her through my pastor and we got involved. After 
every service at the church, we were allowed 30 minutes at the altar to demonstrate how to 
use the PPE and we recruited some young people from the parish and they were also taught 
how and distributed the PPE. So, people started using PPE effectively. 
Also, I was living behind one of the ETUs; what I also saw, was so traumatic. The 
community engagement of local leaders, like the community chairperson and leader in each 
zones; so, I put myself in a zone. So, every morning in 2014, I had to drive through that zone, 
I had to encounter Ebola patients. Really, one success story going forward for any future 
outbreak was that the community engagement was very good. They did not wait for donor 
support and they took the issue into their own hands. We have the Muslims and Christians, 
and Muslims have a belief [ritual] that they undertook [prepare] the dead bodies, but 
because of the Ebola situation, the Muslims abandoned their traditional practices. But they 
were aware and brought on board the Imams and [Muslim] leaders to sensitize and educate 
their community. The fact that their own Imams and own people were used to carry out the 
message of sensitization played a major role. These messages of Ebola were translated into 
their own vernacular, so forget English and leaflets and billboards and those kinds of things. 
The Imams used their own mosques to do health education and pastors used their own 
churches to pass on the message. 
Yes, we have health workers, and they were dying, and people lost confidence in the 
health workers. It is like, “This person was supposed to treat me, if they are dying then what 
more should I listen to them?” So, they turned to the community leaders, and even the 
issue of visitation was curtailed, as every person kept to their own household. 
A typical example was like my own experience, where I knew this Ugandan lady at 
my church who is a health worker, so I engaged her. We did messaging after church services 
and then I started entering the ETUs. The recruitment of community health workers, 
normally, they go through the health systems (before Ebola, there were GCHVs), but they 
went through the community chairperson instead, during the Ebola. The quarantine was a 
natural behavior change, and every household now had a bucket. Before the Ebola crisis, 
people were not doing hygiene [handwashing], so with the outbreak of Ebola, every 
household had chlorine water placed in front of the house. So, every homeowner would 
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wash their hands before entering and after leaving the house. The government closed 
schools for a time (quarantine) and people had to stay at home too. 
The MHSW first message of ‘no sex’ or public action came after 3 or 4 months, 
maybe August. When the disease entered Monrovia is when they got serious and that’s one 
of the reasons that it spread. I saw the community people taking things into their own hands 
in August 2014. 
All the donor support, like ambulances, the government today, cannot account for 
them; where those supplies are. So, if there is an outbreak today, there wouldn’t be any 
ambulances. 
One of things in the rural areas, we saw that NGOs couldn’t reach them to distribute 
buckets; so they were creative to carve a “pipe” out of the bamboo reed, fill it with water, 
and pierce it with a nail and they can remove it and water spills out, so you can wash your 
hands. Things like that people had to do. 
 
Member Checking from Sierra Leone 
 
Sunday, December 9, 2018 
In general, the health conditions in this country that you described before, during, 
and after the war, as well as during and after the Ebola, is correct. And during Ebola there 
was a stigmatization on health workers. You were right about the misinformation of the 
symptoms. Initially, it was said there was supposed to be hemorrhaging from everywhere, 
so health workers were looking for those signs, but if they don’t see it, then they don’t think 
you have Ebola. The government said that EVD started in southeast in Kailahun District 
which is an SLPP stronghold and it was near the census organizing. So, people thought that 
because we are about to start counting and they [government] say we have Ebola; they 
want to stop the census and reduce the numbers. You did not mention that in the analysis. 
In 2014, the Sierra Leone government was about to conduct census and during the 
pre-sessions we heard about Ebola and the census leads up to 2017, which was meant for 
the national elections. So, people thought that since we are to organize the census and start 
voting soon, this was to stop us from voting. “This is lie, so they don’t have to count us and 
come to Kailahun [and] deny us our vote.” These were community people, and the SLPP said 
the government should explain why there is Ebola in Kailahun. They started politicizing it. In 
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terms of stigmatizing, you are right that people started sending health workers out of their 
homes. So, because there is no difference in signs between Typhoid and Malaria, people 
who were sick with that [nonEbola cases] went to the hospital and never came home. They 
were all treated like Ebola patients. 
There were a lot of misconceptions of Ebola and there were no clear definitions of 
symptoms. You were right about when they said there was no medicine for Ebola; so, 
people thought what was the point? So, let our loved ones die in dignity as opposed to 
taking them to the hospital and letting them die there and we never see the corpse. A 
responsible government should have embarked on research. The government heard about 
Ebola in Guinea and they should have taken precautions to go into the field and do research 
and sensitization, but they never did that. Just like they knew there was war in Liberia but 
didn’t take precautions to prevent that before it came to Sierra Leone. So, Ebola came here 
without any prior knowledge and caught us with our pants down. The minister of health was 
not a medical practitioner. What brought nationwide consciousness was when Dr. Khan died 
of the disease; the entire country panicked. Everybody knew it was not politics, it was 
reality. So, everyone became very conscious and afraid of Ebola. No one took Ebola 
seriously, even educated people did not believe the government, not until Dr. Khan’s death. 
You are right about the bylaws, also it is not okada drivers it is okada riders, and they 
were also fined if they carried people. In my case, when I went to the Kenema District in the 
Tongo chiefdom, they took me to the police station to give a statement, then to the chief to 
make a statement, and the guy that lodged me, also had to give a statement. Then, even 
when I went to my mom, my place of birth, my home, (Kenema town) she took me to the 
area chief. She didn’t want to be fined, so we had to go. So, they asked me where in 
Freetown I came from, and I was in Kissi, so there were no cases of Ebola in that part of 
Freetown. The bylaws were very successful to a large extent, in fact we expect the bylaws 
more. Because we are in the city here [Freetown], we do not take the laws very seriously, 
we don’t pay attention to local authorities, but because the towns are very small, so they 
took it seriously. 
In Freetown, when U.K. DFID came and sent personnel to help, China and Cuba also 
sent people and started curing people; that worked in Freetown. They brought powerful 
test machines that could do all these tests, instead of everyone going to Kenema for testing 
and having to wait for their results. So, people realize that the message that, “Ebola is 
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incurable” was not true; we started hearing about survivors. As well as the handwashing 
and limiting contact with other people worked in Freetown. But the testing machines were 
another part. 
I did not see anything that was not accurate, most of the things you wrote are what 
people said. You analyzed their accounts. The most important thing to mention about Ebola, 
is when government wanted to stop census and a lot of people denied existence of the 
disease and politicized it that way. The government was negligent to act: research, 
information, and messaging. It was more of a guess work. 
There is no structured information system. The minister will say what she wants to 
say, the health workers will say what they want to say, and the spokesperson for the 
government will say what they want to say. So, sometimes there was no coherence in the 
information. 
So, I read all the things you said about health workers and volunteers, there were 
complaints of health workers extorting money from patients before and during the Ebola. 
The volunteers were not paid, so they had to look for other means to get money. So, there 
were complaints from patients that government says, “There is free health care, but the 
health workers ask us for money.” So, people thought it was being done by volunteers, so 
that is one reason why volunteers were let go. The government also knew that they could 
not keep them on for long without paying them. That it wouldn’t be fair. So, they decided 
not to recruit the volunteers and let them go and may recruit them later. They knew the 
volunteers needed an incentive, but there was no provision for that. 
Before the formation of the burial teams, people were burying their loved ones. So, 
when they said to report the burials, the teams were not responsive as they should be. One 
chiefdom or district could have one ambulance and maybe there is no gas for that 
ambulance. 
The central government relied heavily on paramount chiefdoms, [as] there is no way 
Freetown authorities will go to Kailahun. The paramount chiefs relied on the section chiefs, 
then the section chief relied on town chiefs. 
Up until now, we respect the military. So, when there were these laws, especially in 
big towns like Makeni, Pujehun, or Kailahun, they bring the military for enforcement. To 
enforce quarantine, you could not even go to your neighbor’s house; both the military and 
police patrolled to ensure people were in their homes. The government also distributed 
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soaps and other things and hired people to do this. They would come to your house and 
show you how to wash your hands and keep thing sanitized. 
In the chiefdoms, there are no local police, so they must call the state police if 
someone is breaking the law. They would bring two officers (military or police) and bring 
rations and supplies while a house was quarantined for 21 days. They had a program that 
was responsible for feeding quarantined houses, since they were not expected to go to the 
market or leave their homes for any reason.  
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